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Robert Mapplethorpe, Self-Portrait (1988), Tate Modern

INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the dramatic changes that have occurred over
the last thirty years in the First Amendment doctrines governing sexual
speech. As a prism through which to evaluate these changes, I consider
the thirtieth anniversary of the landmark Robert Mapplethorpe trial,
the first censorship prosecution against an art museum in the history
of this country and the defining battle in the culture wars that roiled
post-Reagan America. The target was the exhibition of formally beautiful, sexually hard-core photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe on view at
a museum in Cincinnati. The controversy that erupted over those images—fueled by anxieties about AIDS, homosexuality, sadomasochism,
race, government funding for the arts, and the vanishing boundary
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between art and pornography—spilled out of the courtroom into popular culture and into the halls of the United States Congress.
This Article looks back at this landmark art trial and establishes
its continuing relevance for free speech law. What emerges is a surprising story about dramatic changes in the major First Amendment rules
governing sexual speech. In particular, I look at the shifting trajectories
over the years of the two legal doctrines that were at the center of the
Mapplethorpe case—obscenity law and child pornography law—and I
show the radically divergent paths these two areas of law have taken.
While obscenity law has receded in importance, and while the allegedly
obscene photos from the trial have become widely accepted in museums
and in the art market, child pornography law has followed the opposite
course. In contrast to the allegedly obscene pictures, which pose almost
no legal risk today, the two photographs of children that were on trial
have become more, not less, controversial over the past thirty years, to
the point where curators are quietly reluctant to show these images at
all. In my view, these photos now occupy a space of legal and moral
uncertainty.
In recent years there has been a growing art world “obsession” with
Robert Mapplethorpe.1 Three major museums have staged retrospectives of Mapplethorpe’s work in the past few years.2 Once denounced on
the floor of the U.S. Senate, his work viewed as menacing and contagious, Mapplethorpe has now emerged as a market and museum darling, to the point where a critic recently declared that the art world had
been gripped with a case of “Mapplethorpe fever.”3 The once-taboo photos that were on trial for obscenity have now become prized in museums
and in the art market. Yet in spite of this fever, and the easy acceptance
of the pictures that were once charged with violating obscenity law, the
two images of children from the trial have quietly receded from view,
and their legal status has become more fragile than it once was.
What happened to change the dynamics of showing these works,
legally and culturally? And what explains the differing trajectories of
the two major doctrines governing sexual speech? The trial marked the
last gasp of obscenity law, which has since become legally inert. Yet
child pornography law has expanded dramatically over the same period.

1

See Rain Embuscado, Forthcoming Book of His Archive Adds to Recent Robert Mapplethorpe
Fever, ARTNET NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/robert-mapplethorpe-ar
chive-published-422789 [https://perma.cc/C2VF-LUP3].
2
See Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Medium, J. PAUL GETTY MUSEUM, http://www.getty.
edu/art/exhibitions/mapplethorpe/ [https://perma.cc/N3P2-2546] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (website for Getty show); Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Medium, LOS ANGELES CTY. MUSEUM OF
ART, https://www.lacma.org/art/exhibition/robert-mapplethorpe-perfect-medium [https://perma.cc
/X5JK-D457] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (website for LACMA show).
3
Embuscado, supra note 1.
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In tracing the divergent paths taken by these two doctrinal areas, three
themes emerge: First, I show the direct relationship between obscenity
law’s decline and child pornography law’s ascent. Second, I explore the
shift within free speech law about what kinds of harms should be legally
cognizable. Both obscenity law and child pornography law are premised
on notions of harm that are anomalous within First Amendment doctrine. Yet over the last thirty years, the diffuse notion of harm that animated obscenity law has been eclipsed by the concrete vision of harm
that undergirds child pornography law: harm baked into the production
of the material itself. Finally, I argue that shifting cultural norms in
the wake of the Mapplethorpe trial have had a profound impact on First
Amendment law, even as the law has affected those norms. Free speech
law governed this chapter in the culture wars, yet in surprising ways,
the changing social norms unleashed by the culture wars have also governed free speech law.
Part I explores Mapplethorpe’s artistic process and legacy and tells
the story of the nation-wide scandal that erupted around his work, culminating in the landmark 1990 trial. In Part II, I argue that a combination of AIDs panic, racism, and homophobia, as well as backlash
against the changing role of art in society, made Mapplethorpe a perfect
target for prosecution during the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s.
I then analyze why, in spite of all these factors that made Mapplethorpe
the perfect target, the prosecution nonetheless led to an acquittal. Here
I argue that certain artistic aspects of the work made Mapplethorpe
surprisingly easy to defend under obscenity doctrine. Part III analyzes
the prosecution of two photographs of nude children included in the exhibition; I argue that these photographs now occupy a space of greater
legal and cultural uncertainty than they did thirty years ago. Part IV
argues that a fundamental mistake about artistic meaning underlay
the Mapplethorpe’s court’s pronouncements on the photographs as well
as common legal assumptions about the stability of artistic meaning. I
conclude that the dramatic changes in free speech law discussed in this
Article have been inextricably intertwined with and influenced by the
battles over social norms that the Mapplethorpe controversy unleashed.
I.

SCANDAL AND THE LANDMARK ART TRIAL

A. The Story of Mapplethorpe
Intertwined with Mapplethorpe’s legal legacy is a rich artistic and
cultural narrative. Mapplethorpe provoked political controversy, polarized critics, broke boundaries in the history of art and photography, and
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paved the way for a new generation of artists working today.4 Formally
perfect, sometimes radical in content, the work continues to capture the
attention of curators and collectors long after Mapplethorpe’s death
from AIDS in 1989 at age 42.
1.

The artist’s work

Mapplethorpe’s mature photographic work fell into three main categories: nudes, still lifes (particularly of flowers), and portraits. The
work that provoked Congress and prosecutors was a subset of nudes
that Mapplethorpe called the “sex pictures”;5 he also called them “smut
art.”6
The initial sex pictures were taken in a period from 1977–1980 and
depicted the gay male S&M community Mapplethorpe was actively participating in at the time, when he frequented New York clubs like the
Mineshaft.7 Mapplethorpe initially collected these images into a portfolio of thirteen photos called the X Portfolio. These photographs, some of
them showing hard-core, radical sex acts (as I will describe below), were
rarely exhibited in the U.S. during Mapplethorpe’s life, even as his fame
grew. The photos were often segregated from his main body of work despite Mapplethorpe’s attempt to integrate them into the corpus of his
art.8 For example, in one of their few showings during the artist’s life,
the sex pictures were displayed at the downtown avant-garde art space,
the Kitchen, while the same month in 1977, the more polished Holly
Solomon Gallery held an exhibit of Mapplethorpe’s regal and uncontroversial portraits.9

4

See PAUL MARTINEAU & BRITT SALVESEN, ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PHOTOGRAPHS
(Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds., 2016). For an important analysis of the artistic significance
of Mapplethorpe’s work, see ARTHUR C. DANTO, PLAYING WITH THE EDGE: THE PHOTOGRAPHIC
ACHIEVEMENT OF ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE (1996).
5
Richard Meyer, Mapplethorped: Art, Photography, and the Pornographic Imagination, in
ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PHOTOGRAPHS 231, 237 (Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds.,
2016).
6
Kevin Moore, Whipping Up a Storm: How Mapplethorpe Shocked America, GUARDIAN (Nov.
17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/nov/17/robert-mapplethorpe-the-perfect-moment-25-years-later [https://perma.cc/389U-ESNK].
7
See Ryan Linkof, On the Edge, in ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PHOTOGRAPHS 55 (Paul
Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds., 2016). The X Portfolio contained the earliest of the sex pictures,
but Mapplethorpe continued to produce more.
8
Meyer, supra note 5; see also Moore, supra note 6.
9
Id.
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Robert Mapplethorpe, Jim, Sausalito (X Portfolio) (1977), the J. Paul
Getty Museum

Robert Mapplethorpe, X Portfolio (1978), the J. Paul Getty Museum
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The companion to the X Portfolio, produced at the same time, was
another collection of thirteen photos called the Y Portfolio. (Portfolio
collections in photography are a traditional method of assembling a
compendium of an artist’s work.) The Y Portfolio contained Mapplethorpe’s elegant, stylized pictures of flowers. Accompanying these two
was a third collection of thirteen photographs called the Z Portfolio,
which Mapplethorpe put together in 1981. It was comprised of images
of nude Black men, some of whom Mapplethorpe was artistically and
sexually involved with.10

Mapplethorpe, Carnation, N.Y.C. (Y Portfolio) (1978)

10

These images were ultimately published in a book called the Black Book. ROBERT
MAPPLETHORPE, BLACK BOOK (1988). For my discussion of the controversial racial politics of this
work, see infra Part IV.
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Mapplethorpe, Leigh Lee, N.Y.C. (Z Portfolio) (1980)

Mapplethorpe wanted the three portfolios ideally exhibited “all in
one mass”;11 in this way he highlighted the formal similarities between
the jarringly distinct subjects.12 In Cincinnati, where five of the X Portfolio pictures led to obscenity charges, the X, Y, and Z Portfolios were
displayed together in a grid like format.13
Mapplethorpe’s career soared in the late 1980s at roughly the same
time he grew ill from AIDS. A one-man show of his work opened in July
1988 at the Whitney Museum of American Art, marking a new level of
status and visibility in his career. That same year, a retrospective of his
work called The Perfect Moment was organized by the Institute of Contemporary Art (“ICA”) at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. Opening in December 1988, it was set to travel to six more venues,
including Cincinnati, from 1989 to 1990.14 On March 9, 1989, Mapplethorpe died of AIDS at age 42.

11

Janet Kardon, Mapplethorpe Interview, in ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PERFECT MOMENT
28 (2d ed. 1989).
12
See Linkof, supra note 7, at 56. As Mapplethorpe commented, “I don’t think there’s that
much difference between a photograph of a fist up someone’s ass and a photograph of carnations
in a bowl.” Parker Hodges, ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: PHOTOGRAPHER, Manhattan Gaze, Dec. 10.
1979–Jan. 6, 1980, at 5.
13
Richard Meyer, The Jesse Helms Theory of Art, 104 OCTOBER 131, 136 (2003). They were
installed on a tilted table too high for small children to see on their own. Id.
14
MARTINEAU & SALVESEN, supra note 4, at 7.
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The funding debates

Two months after Mapplethorpe’s death, politicians in the U.S.
Senate began an attack on the National Endowment for the Arts
(“NEA”) for its funding of controversial art. The initial focus was on another scandalous artist, Andres Serrano. Serrano’s work Piss Christ
was a picture of a crucifix submerged in the artists’ urine. Serrano had
been awarded a $15,000 prize by the Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art in North Carolina, which had received funding in part from
the NEA.15 Conservative members of Congress and an activist evangelical group, the American Family Association (headed by the Reverend
Don Wildmon), led the charge against the NEA for its funding choices.
In June 1989, shortly after Congress began its attack on the NEA,
and only a few months after Mapplethorpe’s death, The Perfect Moment
(the traveling Mapplethorpe retrospective that had originated at the
University of Pennsylvania’s ICA) was scheduled to open in Washington, D.C. at the Corcoran Gallery of Art. But in a startling act of selfcensorship, the director of the Corcoran cancelled the show—after all
the invitations had gone out—citing the escalating political debates
about art in Congress. Presumably the Corcoran curator was worried
about congressional attention because the ICA had received $30,000
from the NEA to support the exhibition and its catalogue.16 As is frequently the case with acts of self-censorship, the Corcoran’s decision to
cancel the show only served to draw further attention to Mapplethorpe’s
work.
Brandishing Mapplethorpe’s virtuosic and frankly sexual pictures
before Congress, conservative Senator Jesse Helms seized the moment.17 Helms pointed repeatedly to Mapplethorpe’s supposed “promotion of a homosexual lifestyle” and his death from AIDS. Although they
defeated Helms’s more radical proposal, an outraged Congress nonetheless amended the statutory rules governing NEA grants to deny funding
to “obscene” art; the law was later struck down as unconstitutionally
vague.18 After this legal defeat, Congress tried again, this time

15

See Cynthia Carr, Going to Extremes, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 20, 1990, at 67; Gregory B.
Lewis & Arthur C. Brooks, A Question of Morality: Artists’ Values and Public Funding for the Arts,
65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 8 (2005).
16
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS: A HISTORY, 1965–2008 93 (Mark Bauerlein & Ellen
Grantham eds., 2009).
17
Senator Helms denounced Mapplethorpe’s work as “filth” and “trash.” 135 CONG. REC.
S8807–08 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms). See generally Owen M. Fiss, State
Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087, 2092 (1991).
18
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101–121,
304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989), invalidated by Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754
F. Supp. 774, 781–82 (C.D. Cal. 1991). The NEA chose not to appeal the decision. Nat’l Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 575 (1998).
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amending the statute governing NEA grants to add a so-called “decency
rule.”19 The new language, upheld by the Supreme Court in NEA v. Finley,20 was passed in direct response to the Mapplethorpe and Serrano
controversies. It provided that in its grant-making decisions, the NEA
should take “into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”21 Mapplethorpe had become the poster child for what conservatives claimed
was a culturally elite art world that mocked American values.22
3.

The trial

It was in this hostile political climate that The Perfect Moment was
set to open in Cincinnati at the Contemporary Arts Center (“CAC”).
Amidst political pressure, the museum sought to steel itself against attack; it segregated any general federal funds it received from the Mapplethorpe show, placed warning signs for visitors, and did not admit
anyone under 18 to the exhibition.23 Approximately 80,000 people saw
the show.24 On March 22, 1990, the CAC sought a declaratory judgment
that the work was not obscene. The show opened on April 7, 1990 and
was met on its first day with a grand jury indictment. Mapplethorpe
was dead, but the museum and its director, Dennis Barrie, were
charged with violating obscenity law as well as an Ohio law prohibiting
nude depictions of children. Seven of the show’s 175 pictures were on
trial.25 Barrie faced up to one year in jail.26
The prosecution’s main case was to present the photos and the testimony of three police offers who established that the photos were displayed at CAC. The defense presented four days of expert testimony,
19

20 U.S.C. 954(d) (1994).
524 U.S. 569 (1998) (rejecting a claim that the law was impermissible viewpoint discrimination and unconstitutionally vague). For discussion of Finley, see Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., NEA
v. Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1999); Kristine M. Cunnane,
Maintaining Viewpoint Neutrality for the NEA: National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 31
CONN. L. REV. 1445 (1999); Cara Putman, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The Supreme Court Missed an Opportunity to Clarify the Role of the NEA in Funding the Arts: Are the
Grants A Property Right or an Award, 9 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 237, 242 (1999).
21
20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990).
22
Robert Reid-Pharr, Putting Mapplethorpe in His Place, ART IN AM. (Mar. 2016), https://ww
w.gladstonegallery.com/sites/default/files/MAP-2016_03%20Art%20in%20America.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LT66-HAK].
23
STEVEN C. DUBIN, ARRESTING IMAGES: IMPOLITIC ART AND UNCIVIL ACTIONS 184–85 (1992).
24
Id.
25
The five pictures that were alleged to be obscene were as follows: One shows a man urinating into another man’s mouth; another called Lou, N.Y.C. shows a finger inserted into a penis.
Three more each depict a man with an object inserted in the rectum: a cylinder, a bull whip (this
is a self-portrait), and a man’s fist and forearm. Fiss, supra note 17 at 2089 n.4.
26
The CAC faced a $10,000 fine. DUSTIN KIDD, LEGISLATING CREATIVITY: THE INTERSECTIONS
OF ART & POLITICS 71 (2016).
20
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largely from art critics and curators.27 After a jury trial, the defendants
were acquitted.28 The trial gripped the art world, turning Mapplethorpe
into a cause célèbre and a symbol of the threat posed by the culture wars
to artistic and sexual freedom.29
B. “Mapplethorpe Fever”:30 The Resurgent Interest in the Work
There has been a resurgence of interest in Mapplethorpe in recent
years. A younger generation of curators has engaged with his legacy,
and his status as an art market star has risen. Over the last few years
critics have chronicled the art world’s “growing obsession” with the artist.31 One critic declared that the art world has been gripped with a case
of “Mapplethorpe fever.”32 Vogue Magazine termed it “Mapplethorpe
mania.”33 Certainly museums have been lavishing attention on his
work. Two major museums recently collaborated on a joint retrospective
of Mapplethorpe’s oeuvre; Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Medium
spanned both the J. Paul Getty Museum and LACMA (the Los Angeles
County Museum of Art).34 A documentary about his work and the scandal surrounding it debuted to critical acclaim in 2016.35 The Guggenheim staged a major one-year, two-part Mapplethorpe retrospective in
2019.
Mapplethorpe’s star is also rising in the art market. An image from
the X Portfolio broke a new auction record for that series in 2015.36 The
auction was for one of his most controversial—and highly regarded—
explicit images, Man in a Polyester Suit, depicting the artist’s lover,
27

DUBIN, supra note 24, at 188–89.
Mary T. Schmich, Art Gallery, Director Not Guilty: Cincinnati Jurors Clear Both of Obscenity Charges, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1990, at 1; see also Sonya G. Bonneau, Ex Post Modernism: How
the First Amendment Framed Nonrepresentational Art, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 195, 219 (2015).
29
Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen, Introduction, in ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE
PHOTOGRAPHS 1,7 (Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds., 2016).
30
Embuscado, supra note 1.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Julia Felsenthal, Mapplethorpe Mania Hits Los Angeles, VOGUE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://w
ww.vogue.com/article/robert-mapplethorpe-the-perfect-medium-interview [https://perma.cc/8L9VCWLT].
34
See J. PAUL GETTY MUSEUM, supra note 2; LOS ANGELES CTY. MUSEUM OF ART, supra note
2.
35
James Poniewozik, Review: ‘Mapplethorpe: Look at the Pictures’ on HBO Gives Context to
Controversy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/arts/television/review
-mapplethorpe-look-at-the-pictures-on-hbo-gives-context-to-controversy.html [https://perma.cc/5B
VE-YUT6].
36
The Sotheby’s sale marked “the first time in 23 years that one of the 15 images from the
original edition of X Portfolio” came up at auction. Sarah Cascone, Robert Mapplethorpe’s Controversial ‘Man in Polyester Suit’ Photo Sells for $478,000, ARTNET NEWS (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://news.artnet.com/market/robert-mapplethorpe-polyester-suit-sells-338631
[https://perma.cc/7JKN-N3KG].
28
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Milton Moore, wearing a three-piece suit with his penis exposed and his
head unseen. This image, once denounced in Congress, sold for
$478,000.37 (The photograph was one of an edition of fifteen.) The last
time the work sold publicly was in 1992, when it brought $9,000.38
II. DOES OBSCENITY LAW STILL MATTER?
Until Mapplethorpe, there had never been an obscenity prosecution
against an art museum in the history of this country. Obscenity law was
haunted by the specter of having banned great works of literature, but
never significant works of art. In its first obscenity decision in 1957,
Roth v. United States,39 the Supreme Court entered with some trepidation a doctrinal arena marked by a history of literary philistinism. Prior
to the Court’s intervention, lower courts had overseen the suppression
(and, later, the eventual freeing) of acclaimed books such as James
Joyce’s Ulysses and D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover.40 Writing
his concurrence in Roth, the Court’s first foray into the field, Chief Justice Warren evoked obscenity law’s historic suppression of “great” cultural works,41 referring to the “[m]istakes of the past.”42
And indeed, those mistakes had become a thing of the past by the
time the Mapplethorpe case came to trial in 1990. Although the
37

Daniel McDermon, Mapplethorpe Photograph Brings $478,000 at Auction, N.Y. TIMES:
ARTSBEAT BLOG (Oct. 7, 2015, 3:26 PM), https://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/mappleth
orpe-photograph-brings-478000-at-auction/ [https://perma.cc/E9DD-PUM3]. While this was the
record for a work from Mapplethorpe’s X Portfolio, an earlier record for all of Mapplethorpe’s images was set at Christie’s in 2006, when his 1987 portrait of Andy Warhol sold for $643,200. See
Stephen Milioti, Despite Record Prices for Photographs at This Year’s Auctions, it is Still Cheaper
to Corner the Market in Leibovitz than Lichtenstein. Here’s How to Get Started, FORTUNE (Nov. 17,
2006), https://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/13/8393128/index.
htm [https://perma.cc/9RJJ-K267]. In 2017, a Mapplethorpe self-portrait sold for £450,000
(£548,750 with fees). Anna Brady, Auction Record for Mapplethorpe as Christie’s Introduces Two
New Sales, ART NEWSPAPER (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/christies [htt
ps://perma.cc/DRJ3-8WB7].
38
Id.
39
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Prior to Roth, the Court had heard an obscenity
case but split four-to-four and thus did not issue an opinion. The result was to affirm a state court
obscenity judgment against noted critic Edmund Wilson’s novel, Memoirs of Hecate County. Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948). Thus, the Court was itself implicated in this history
of failure. It had failed to protect a novel by one of the most prominent cultural critics of the day.
40
See United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (allowing
the entry of Ulysses into the United States after previous censorship); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (overturning, under the Roth standard, the Postmaster
of New York’s suppression of Grove Press’s unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley’s Lover).
41
The Chief Justice wrote: “The history of the application of laws designed to suppress the
obscene demonstrates convincingly that the power of government can be invoked under them
against great art or literature, scientific treatises, or works exciting social controversy.” Roth, 354
U.S. at 495 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 178–79 (1982) (noting obscenity regulation’s history of plain errors in
banning what we now consider great cultural works).
42
Roth, 354 U.S. at 495 (Warren, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court had struggled mightily during the years between its
first major obscenity decision and its last in 1973,43 its goal had been to
ban “‘hard-core’ pornography”44 while at the same time protecting
works of cultural import.45 By 1973, when the Court finally agreed on
the modern definition of obscenity, it looked as if it had settled on a
formula that achieved both goals and that would ward off another cultural embarrassment. Then came Mapplethorpe.
The current definition of obscenity, crafted by the Court in 1973 in
Miller v. California, allows the government to ban material only if the
work, taken as a whole and according to contemporary community
standards:46
(a) “appeals to the prurient interest;”
(b) “depicts [sexual conduct] in a patently offensive way . . . ;
and”
(c) “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”47
All three prongs must be met before a work can be held obscene and
thus banished from First Amendment protection. This means that no
matter how sexually explicit—even disgusting—it may be, if a work
possesses “serious . . . artistic . . . value,” it is protected.48 Although one
might presume this standard would protect automatically any work

43

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Although it was a significant case in terms of its
clarification of Miller’s third prong, the Court’s decision in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), did
not change the basic definition or the rationale of obscenity law, both of which have remained in
place since Miller and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) were decided in 1973.
44
The Court specified in 1973 that only “‘hard core’ pornography” should be banned under the
obscenity test, Miller, 413 U.S. at 28, but failed to give a definition for the term. The phrase had
appeared before in obscenity jurisprudence, including in Justice Stewart’s famous opinion stating
that he understood obscenity law to encompass only “hard-core pornography.” Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Yet as for the definition of
that phrase, he wrote, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .” Id.
45
This angst of the Court’s struggle over the years is palpable in the cases: Chief Justice
Burger referred the somewhat “tortured history” of the Court’s obscenity cases. Miller, 413 U.S. at
19. Justice Harlan, terming the obscenity problem “intractable,” observed that it had “produced a
variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional
adjudication.” Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46
In Pope, 481 U.S. at 500–01, the Court explained that the community standards analysis
did not apply to the third prong of the test for value.
47
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). Note that the third prong is judged from the
perspective of the reasonable person rather than an “average person” in a community. Pope, 481
U.S. at 500–01.
48
Id. at 34.
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displayed in a major U.S. museum, that presumption turned out to be
wrong.
The Mapplethorpe case marked the return of obscenity law’s repressed history of banning works of cultural value, the very problem
that modern obscenity jurisprudence was designed to combat.49 What
was it about Mapplethorpe’s work that destabilized the Court’s project?
And what was it about Mapplethorpe that led to a new chapter in this
history of cultural attacks, provoking the first obscenity trial against an
art museum in the history of the U.S.?
The answer has to do with the nature of Mapplethorpe’s work and
the dramatic changes in the meaning of “art” that it signaled. But it
also has to do with a problem that had been brewing undetected in obscenity law for some time: its fundamental clash with a sweeping shift
that was taking place in art.
A. Mapplethorpe’s Scandalous Subject Matter
First consider the obvious reason why Mapplethorpe’s work provoked this unprecedented trial: some of his images were so controversial and provocative, particularly for their time, that the prosecution
seemed preordained. Mapplethorpe depicted sadomasochistic, sometimes violent, hard-core sex acts between gay men. For example, one of
the prosecuted pictures showed a man fisting another man, his hand
and wrist inserted into the other’s anus. Another picture depicted a
leather-clad man urinating into the mouth of another man, who kneels
to accept it. Even by today’s standards, thirty years later, in which pornography,50 not to mention homosexuality,51 have become
49

This had been in some ways Chief Justice Brennan’s core project in Roth, when he wrote
that all works of value were to be protected. But the Court’s project was not fully successful in
guiding lower courts. For example, it took an appeal all the way to the Supreme Court to save the
well-reviewed, popular film Carnal Knowledge, which had been held obscene by the Georgia Supreme Court. See Jenkins v. Georgia 418 U.S. 153 (1974). The Supreme Court, while noting the
film’s positive reviews, relied not on its value but on its lack of extreme sexual content to invalidate
the conviction under the First Amendment. The Court did not apply Miller’s serious value prong
to the film; rather, it based its holding on the first two prongs of Miller. Nonetheless, the Court did
describe the film’s favorable reviews and critical acclaim. Id. at 158, 158 n.5.
50
See Amy Adler, All Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 695 (2007) (writing
about the mainstreaming of porn); see also, Amy Adler, What Happened to the Feminist Critique
of Pornography? 19 – 25 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). A curator for
one of the recent retrospectives commented on the changing cultural values that allowed her to
hang the X Portfolio pictures with less controversy. She spoke of the “greater acceptance of explicitly sexual work” in the U.S. Helen Stoilas, Who’s Afraid of Mapplethorpe, ART NEWSPAPER (Mar.
15, 2016), http://theartnewspaper.com/news/museums/mapplethorpe-in-la/ [https://perma.cc/WR8
Z-TKBF].
51
On changing views about homosexuality: If Supreme Court law is any guide to cultural
values, one only need look at the trajectory from Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (decided
four years before the Mapplethorpe case and approving the criminalization of homosexual sodomy),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), to Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)
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comparatively mainstream, some of the S&M pictures are hard to look
at.52 One Mapplethorpe picture, for example, not included in the Cincinnati exhibit, depicts a bleeding penis (after having been grazed by a
knife), clamped in a bondage device.53
But in contrast to how we see them today, these images carried a
radically different meaning thirty years ago. They were shown at the
height of the AIDS crisis and the “culture wars”54 that were raging in
post-Reagan America. Homophobia and AIDS panic were rampant. Homosexual sodomy was criminal, with the Supreme Court’s approval.55
Gay men were politically reviled as they were being ravaged by an epidemic. Panic over the possibility that one could be contaminated just by
touching gay men was so great that police sometimes wore rubber
gloves during AIDS activist protests.56 Conservative writer William F.
Buckley had argued that people with AIDS should be mandatorily tattooed.57 Mapplethorpe had died from AIDS a year before the exhibition
opened in Cincinnati; he documented his illness in his art.58 And his
work was received as if the pictures themselves were polluted with the
contaminating threat of the disease. As critics have noted, “the spectre
of death” hung over the photos; “the information that Mapplethorpe
died of AIDS [was] always available.”59 Members of Congress continually spoke of Mapplethorpe’s disease as they denounced funding for his
(finding a constitutional right to gay marriage), to observe the growing mainstream and judicial
acceptance of homosexuality.
52
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6 (“If today the X Portfolio pictures are hard to look at (and they
still are), it has more to do with the violence than the sexuality.”).
53
Linkof, supra note 7, at 56 (describing Mapplethorpe’s Dick, N.Y.C. (1978)); cf. MIRA SCHOR,
WET: ON PAINTING, FEMINISM, AND ART CULTURE 28 (1997) (describing the photograph Richard
(1978), a diptych of a penis strapped into a wooden contraption, splattered with blood in the second
frame).
54
For a discussion of the culture wars and other artists who were targeted during the period,
see CULTURE WARS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE RECENT CONTROVERSIES IN THE ARTS (Richard Bolton
ed., 1992); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991);
MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S CENSORSHIP WARS (1993) (describing numerous cases of attacks on art); Amy Adler, The Thirty-Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures: The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 206–07 (2000). For an historical account of controversial art, see MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, VISUAL SHOCK: A HISTORY OF ART
CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN CULTURE (2006).
55
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–191. Although the Court upheld criminalization of all sodomy
(heterosexual and homosexual), the opinion focused on gay sex. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers).
56
Joe B. Warrick, Researcher: Police Should Use Gloves, Masks in Handling AIDS Victims,
UPI, Oct. 12, 1987 (describing police as “panic-stricken”).
57
William F. Buckley, Opinion, Crucial Steps in Combating the AIDS Epidemic; Identify All
the Carriers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 1986), http://movies2.nytimes.com/books/00/07/16/specials/buck
ley-aids.html [https://perma.cc/HT7P-LM6H].
58
One of the most shocking photographs in the exhibition was Mapplethorpe’s frank self-portrait of his AIDS-ravaged, skeletal face, his hand gripping a cane with a skull, reproduced on
page 2.
59
Ingrid Sischy, Photography: White and Black, NEW YORKER, Nov. 13, 1989, at 124, 138–39.
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work. Senator Helms, for example, calling Mapplethorpe’s work “homosexual pornography,” said Mapplethorpe “died of AIDS while spending
the last years of his life promoting homosexuality.”60
Further adding fuel to the fire, the works were tinged with the frisson of interracial sex. Many of Mapplethorpe’s most famous portraits
were of eroticized, nude Black men; some photos depicted interracial
couples. Senator Helms highlighted the interracial theme in his attack
on Mapplethorpe. Helms denounced a picture (that did not exist, oddly,
other than in his imagination) of “two males of different races” in an
erotic pose “on a marble-top table” as evidence of the artist’s depravity.61
(In Part IV, infra, I turn directly to the complex issue of race in Mapplethorpe’s work.)
Though the heady combination of race, homosexuality, pornography, AIDS-panic, and violent sadomasochistic practices was already
enough to provoke controversy, an additional factor upped the ante: the
fact that the photos were presented in highly classicized style and displayed with the imprimatur of “art” in a museum made them even more
galling to conservative critics. Indeed, as explained above, the photos
helped launch a national debate about government funding for the arts.
Congress found in Mapplethorpe a perfect symbol of what it viewed as
the perverse, menacing art world, thumbing its nose at mainstream values.
Thus it’s hard to imagine a more perfect target for prosecutors
wishing to win an obscenity prosecution in 1990: an unpopular speaker,
targeted by Congress as a contagious pervert, whose work depicted unpopular practices that tapped into national dread, hatred, and paranoia. As explained above, under the Miller standard for obscenity, a
conviction under obscenity law requires a prosecutor to prove three
prongs.62 The first two prongs seem like no-brainers for a win against
these images in 1990 America (in a conservative Midwestern city no
less). Under the first prong, the government must prove that a work
appeals to the “prurient”—meaning “shameful or morbid”—interest.63
Under the second prong of Miller, the government must show that the
work is “patently offensive” according to “contemporary community

60

135 CONG. REC. S12111 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms); see also id. at
H3640–41 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) (noting Mapplethorpe’s death
from AIDS, and calling him a “homosexual activist[ ]”).
61
Helms quoted in Maureen Dowd, Unruffled Helms Basks in Eye of Arts Storm, N.Y. TIMES
(July 28, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/28/arts/unruffled-helms-basks-in-eye-of-arts-st
orm.html [https://perma.cc/R65J-BPUX].
62
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
63
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U. S. 491, 497 (1985).
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standards.”64 Both inquiries seem designed to suppress representations
of sexual practices that deviate from the mainstream—and perfectly
tailored for Mapplethorpe. For example, in discussing the meaning of
prurience, the Supreme Court had previously let stand a lower court
interpretation that defined prurience as the opposite of “a good, oldfashioned, healthy” interest in sex.65 Prurience thus depends on a dichotomy between “shameful or morbid” desire on the one hand, and
“good old-fashioned, healthy” sexuality on the other. In 1990 America,
it seems clear that Mapplethorpe’s sex pictures would have fallen on
the wrong side of that line.
Indeed, the defense all but conceded that it would lose on the first
two prongs of the Miller test.66 The case seemed like an easy win for the
prosecution. Mapplethorpe’s work was a perfect lightning rod for the
sexual and cultural tumult that was sweeping America. But there was
a third prong of the test that would prove pivotal to the case: was Mapplethorpe’s work “serious art”?
B. The Clash between Obscenity Law and Postmodern Art
Beyond the almost ludicrously controversial subject matter of the
work for its time, I believe there was another reason the prosecution of
Mapplethorpe’s work was preordained. In my view, the crisis of Mapplethorpe was built into the structure of obscenity law itself and its
clash with a dramatic change in artistic practice that had been brewing,
unnoticed, as the Court crafted its modern definition of obscenity in
1973. Obscenity law was built on the very assumption that contemporary artists like Mapplethorpe had begun to question as a central tenet
of their work: that there was a distinction between pornography and
art. The fusion of pornography and art that Mapplethorpe championed
was not a peripheral practice but instead central to a deeper transition
in art that was underway just as Miller was decided.
The Miller standard for obscenity law, discussed above, had diminished the constitutional protection the Court had afforded art in its previous obscenity cases. The Court’s prior obscenity test (upheld by only
a plurality) had protected any work, no matter how filthy, prurient, or
offensive, unless it was “utterly without redeeming social value.”67 This
was the famous language that had protected the novel Fanny Hill in

64
65
66

Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
Brockett, 472 U.S. at 499 (citations omitted).
See Marc Mezibov, The Mapplethorpe Obscenity Trial, LITIGATION, Summer 1992, at 12–

20, 71.
67

nal).

Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in origi-
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1966.68 Miller rejected this expansive test in favor of a standard that
protected less art and was easier for the prosecution to meet.69 A work
of art now needed to possess “serious artistic value” to gain protection.
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent to Miller’s companion case,
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton:
The Court’s approach necessarily assumes that some works will
be deemed obscene—even though they clearly have some social
value—because the State was able to prove that the value, measured by some unspecified standard, was not sufficiently “serious” to warrant constitutional protection. That result is . . . an
invitation to widespread suppression of sexually oriented
speech.70
The problem is that this legal retrenchment occurred at a radical turning point in the history of art: the rise of “postmodernism.” The changes
in art that were brewing at the time of Miller would ultimately render
the new standard even less protective of art than Justice Brennan had
feared.71 This is because the “serious artistic value” test etched in stone
the precise standard against which art was beginning to rebel in 1973.
As I have argued elsewhere and as I explain below, Miller was premised
on the reigning, but soon to crumble, vision of art in mid-century America, the period called “Modernism.”72
Miller’s protection only for art that demonstrated “serious value”
would have made perfect sense in mid-century America. As I have argued, a particular form of modernism, “late modernism,” which had triumphed in the 1950s and 1960s, was foundational to Miller. 73 It may be
hard for us in our era of critical and artistic pluralism to imagine the
cultural penetration once attained by one artistic school of thought.74
68

Id.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 (interpreting prior obscenity cases as creating “a burden virtually
impossible to discharge” for prosecution).
70
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71
Amy Adler, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990).
This Part draws significantly from that piece, which argues that the Miller standard enshrined in
obscenity law the precise vision of art that so many artists rebelled against in the 1970s and 1980s
as postmodernism took hold and that Miller thus introduced into obscenity law a standard that
was deeply incompatible with the new art that was emerging when it was drafted. Id.
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., PETER HALLEY, Against Post-Modernism: Reconsidering Ortega, in COLLECTED
ESSAYS 1981–1987, at 27 (1988). Note that critic Michael Fried also held enormous sway over art
in this period.
74
Perhaps the closest contemporary analogue to Greenberg might be one of the powerful art
dealers, such as Gagosian or Zwirner. But in spite of their power in the market (and the market’s
power over museums), there is still no modern figure who exerts the kind of critical power Greenberg did. The rebellion against his vision was a success but is still a testament to his pervasive
reach.
69
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But in mid-century America, late modernism, particularly as articulated by its leading critic, Clement Greenberg, was so dominant that a
recent scholar described Greenberg as having ruled the mid-century art
world with a “papal authority.”75
The period of late modernism as articulated by Greenberg (and his
peers) was a purist movement.76 Greenberg believed that art could
“maintain its past standards of excellence”77 by using the “characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself—not in order
to subvert it, but to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.”78
Late modernism distinguished between good art and bad art by demanding that good art be pure, self-critical, original, sincere, and serious.79
The standard of “serious artistic value” seems perfectly designed to
protect the art we most valued in the late modernist era. As an art critic
wrote of modernism, “the highest accolade that could be paid to any
artist was this: ‘serious.’”80 It is as if the word “serious” were a code word
for modernist values: critics consistently equate it with the modernist
stance.81 In fact, the very foundation of Miller, the belief that some art
is just not good enough or serious enough to be worthy of protection,
mirrors the modernist notion that distinctions could be drawn between
good art and bad, and that the value of art was objectively verifiable.82
Yet the Court devised the Miller test for “serious artistic value” in
1973, precisely the time that modernism in art was entering its death
throes. Miller represented one of the last gasps of this crumbling but
still powerful modernist zeitgeist. One year earlier, the art critic Leo
Steinberg had been perhaps the first to apply the name “post-modernism” to the revolutionary shift in art that was emerging just as Miller
was decided.83 The emerging postmodern ethos took aim at each of the
75

Barry Gewen, State of the Art, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, § 7, at 28 (quoting art historian
Robert Rosenblum).
76
See, e.g., Clement Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in MODERN ART AND MODERNISM: A
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 6 (Francis Frascina & Charles Harrison eds., 1982) (“[A]rt . . . in its ‘purity’
[would] find the guarantee of its standards of quality.”).
77
Id. at 10.
78
Id. at 5.
79
Clement Greenberg wrote in 1955, “There is good and bad in [contemporary painting],
and . . . the difference . . . owes its realization to a severer discipline . . . .” Clement Greenberg,
“American-Type” Painting, in MODERN ART AND MODERNISM 94 (Francis Frascina & Charles Harrison eds., 1982); see also CLEMENT GREENBERG, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in ART AND CULTURE:
CRITICAL ESSAYS 3 (1961) (finding value in high art but not in kitsch).
80
Douglas Davis, Post-Performancism, ARTFORUM, Oct. 1981, at 31, 39.
81
See, e.g., Thomas Crow, These Collectors, They Talk about Baudrillard Now, in Discussions,
in CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 1 (Hal Foster ed., 1987).
82
See, e.g., BRIAN WALLIS, What’s Wrong with This Picture?, in ART AFTER MODERNISM:
RETHINKING REPRESENTATION xii (Brian Wallis ed., 1984).
83
LEO STEINBERG, Other Criteria, in OTHER CRITERIA: CONFRONTATIONS WITH TWENTIETH-
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Greenbergian precepts I catalogued above. Artists attacked basic modernist distinctions: between good art and bad, between high art and
popular culture, between the sanctity of the art context and real life.
Artists not only questioned the modernist demand that art be “serious,”
many made work that also questioned the idea that art must have any
traditional “value” at all.
One of many ways that artists attacked these assumptions was to
incorporate pornography into their art. The introduction of this debased
vernacular into the realm of high art disrupted the modernist norms
that undergirded the serious artistic value standard. In some ways, this
disruption was the essence of Mapplethorpe’s practice. He insisted “I
can make pornography art.”84 Mashing up “fine art photography and
the commercial sex industry,” Mapplethorpe was “scrambling aesthetic
categories and genres” that had previously been understood to be “mutually exclusive.”85 According to one critic, this was the major contribution of Mapplethorpe’s work: his incorporation of the pornographic led
to a “redrawing of the boundary line of the aesthetic to include that
which had previously been excluded from it.”86 By making what he
called “smut art,” his work undermined the foundation on which the
Miller test and obscenity law were founded: that we can separate the
pornographic from the artistic and valuable.
C. Why Art Won: An Assessment
How on earth did the Mapplethorpe defense win given all this?
Mapplethorpe’s shocking subject matter rendered prongs one and two
of the Miller test forgone losers. Prong three, protecting works of “serious artistic value,” depended on the precise late modernist view of art
that Mapplethorpe’s work challenged.
Yet, surprisingly, while certain characteristics of his photography
made Mapplethorpe an inevitable obscenity law target thirty years ago,
other qualities of his work help explain why the prosecution resulted in
an acquittal. Indeed, I want to assert that in some ways, the Mapplethorpe case was easy to defend. In spite of his shocking subject matter,
on a formal level, Mapplethorpe’s work looked thoroughly and undeniably like art. In fact, it was conventional, even old-fashioned. He was
an accomplished and elegant photographer. Formally beautiful, rich
with art historical allusions to the classical tradition (from Greek
CENTURY ART 91 (1972).
84
See Kardon, supra note 11.
85
See Meyer, supra note 5.
86
Jonathan D. Katz, Robert Mapplethorpe’s Queer Classicism: The Substance of Style, in
ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PHOTOGRAPHS 257, 258 (Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds.,
2016).
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sculpture to Caravaggio to nineteenth century portraiture), his meticulously printed work highlighted his classicized use of light and composition.87 (The images below give a glimpse of these qualities.) Calling
attention to their formal artistry, the photographs are tasteful, even
traditional; his use of black and white (rather than the popular color
photography at the time) signaled restrained classicism and old-fashioned assumptions about what art was meant to look like. At the time,
street photography like Gary Winogrand’s had captured the attention
of critics, in contrast to Mapplethorpe’s more traditional staged studio
photographs.88 It was easy to describe Mapplethorpe’s photos as “art”—
if you stopped looking at the subject matter and looked only at their
formal qualities.89

Hippolyte Flandrin, Study (1835-6)

87

Mapplethorpe, Ajitto (1981)90

Nonetheless, one should remember that Mapplethorpe’s use of photography as his medium,
rather than painting or sculpture, was in tension with this classicizing effect. He was creating the
work at a time when photography was still not fully accepted as a high art form. In some ways,
Mapplethorpe work thus explored the marginalization of photography from high art, just as it
explored the more extreme marginalization of smut. For a discussion of photography’s contested
status as art, see SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 115 (1977).
88
See DANTO, supra note 4, at 24–29 (contrasting Mapplethorpe with Winogrand).
89
It is important to note that many people within the art world did not take his work seriously
and still don’t. In contrast to Danto’s assessment, others dismiss Mapplethorpe as commercial and
slick, a mere “fashion photographer.” See, e.g., Arthur Lubow, Has Robert Mapplethorpe’s Moment
Passed?, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/arts/design/robert-mapplethorpe-guggenheim.html [https://perma.cc/8HQ7-WRNP]; DANTO, supra note 4, at 104 (describing the work and particularly its beauty as making it “somewhat suspect in the eyes of the art
world”).
90
The photographer Wilhelm von Gloeden liberally quoted from Flandrin’s painting in his
1902 photograph Caino that was likely a source for Mapplethorpe.
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Mapplethorpe, Jim (1980)

Contrast his work with other artists from the same era who were
also disrupting the boundaries between obscenity and art. For example,
consider Karen Finley, a later target of the culture wars, who brought
the Supreme Court challenge to the very NEA amendments that Congress had passed in response to the Mapplethorpe scandal.91 In contrast
to Mapplethorpe, Finley produced performance art that may have been
hard to categorize as “art” at all, particularly for a generation accustomed to paintings and sculpture as the paradigmatic art forms. Famously smearing her nude body with yams, screaming about sex acts,
performing in art venues but also bars, Finley dispensed with traditional markers of “art.” A signature Finley piece was called Yams Up
My Granny’s Ass.92 Compared to Finley’s art, Mapplethorpe’s work was
formally traditional and even conservative; its shock derived from the
tension between its high art presentation and its untraditional content.
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Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
For discussion of this piece, its gender politics, and the conservative reaction to Finley’s art,
see DAVIDA BLOOM, RAPE, RAGE AND FEMINISM IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN DRAMA 108–09
(2015).
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Karen Finley Performance

Or consider Jeff Koons’s merger of art and porn, his Made in
Heaven series from 1989 that was exhibited in New York shortly after
the Mapplethorpe trial. In some ways, Mapplethorpe’s work strikes me
as easier to defend on an obscenity charge than Koons’s would have
been if challenged at the time. In contrast to Mapplethorpe’s work,
Made in Heaven used the vernacular of porn without any trappings of
art. Koons produced the series by posing with his then-wife, the porn
star Cicciolina. The images of the couple were shot not by the “artist”
but by Cicciolina’s usual porn photographer, using the sets and the accoutrements of porn, complete with lurid, tacky backdrops. Like much
of Koons’s art, the work looked garish, kitschy, and lowly; it reveled in
its lack of conventional markers of high art.93 And, like Mapplethorpe’s,
the work included hard-core images, such as a close up of anal sex. Of
course, though some of the work was hard-core, Koons was still more
insulated from prosecution or conviction than Mapplethorpe in the
sense that he was engaging in heterosexual sex acts—with his wife no
less. Even so, the work still has the capacity to shock; in the 2014
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For a discussion of this series, see SCOTT ROTHKOPF, No Limits, in JEFF KOONS: A
RETROSPECTIVE 15, 24–25 (2014); see also, Michael Kimmelman, Art in Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 1991, at C28 (reviewing the Made in Heaven show); Calvin Tomkins, Koons at Fifty, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 7, 2005, at 33 (discussing the Made in Heaven show in the context of Koons’s other
work).
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retrospective of Koons’s work, the Whitney displayed this series (other
than the billboard, pictured below) in a separate room from the rest of
the exhibition, complete with warning signs about its content.

Jeff Koons, Made in Heaven (1989)

Thus, compared to other artists who were incorporating sex into
their work at the time, I think Mapplethorpe’s work was relatively easy
to defend under Miller’s third prong. The old-fashioned formalism of
Mapplethorpe’s work, coupled with obscenity law’s requirement of “serious . . . artistic . . . value” explains the sometimes laughable testimony that emerged at the trial. In my experience, contemporary art
world professionals sometimes seem perplexed by the tenor taken by
some experts for the defense in 1990.94 For example, consider the almost
ludicrously formalist testimony of Janet Kardon, the curator who had
organized the Mapplethorpe show for the ICA. Describing Mapplethorpe’s self-portrait with a bullwhip inserted into his anus, Kardon ignored the sexual content, testifying about its “classical” composition by
focusing on the placement of the horizon line.95 When asked to comment
on another photographs from the X Portfolio, depicting a finger shoved
into a man’s penis, Kardon said, “It’s a central image, very symmetrical,
a very ordered, classical composition.”96 Symmetry and composition are
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Moore, supra note 6.
HOLLIDAY T. DAY, POWER: ITS MYTHS AND MORES IN AMERICAN ART 1961–1991 113 (1991).
96
Andy Grundberg, Critic’s Notebook; Cincinnati Trial’s Unanswered Question, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/18/arts/critic-s-notebook-cincinnati-trial-s-unans
wered-question.html [https://perma.cc/RZS5-ZB3V]; see also Isabel Wilkerson, Clashes at Obscenity Trial on What an Eye Really Sees, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10
/03/us/clashes-at-obscenity-trial-on-what-an-eye-really-sees.html [https://perma.cc/7AZU-6G7K].
At another point, discussing the photograph Jim and Tom, Sausalito, in which one leather-clad
man urinates into another’s mouth, Kardon emphasized the “opposing diagonals” of the lines
95
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not exactly the first things one thinks about when viewing this image.
A critic at the time called such testimony “disingenuous.”97 A more recent critic labelled Kardon’s emphasis on formal qualities of the work
“bizarre.”98 But Kardon’s peculiar testimony was rooted directly in the
requirements of the Miller test, and in the truth of Mapplethorpe’s classicized work. That classicism, plus Mapplethorpe’s rising fame and
emerging blue-chip museum status, made his case relatively easy to defend under Miller, at least compared to many of his peers, who were
defying the standard of serious artistic value in a way that made their
work seem almost unrecognizable as “art.”
D. The Decline of Obscenity Law
How significant a threat is obscenity law to art in a post-Mapplethorpe world? Not very—for two reasons. First, as I will explain, obscenity law has all but died as a prosecutorial tool.99 Second, and relatedly, the merger between art and pornography that Mapplethorpe and
his compatriots championed has receded as a theme in contemporary
art.
In the 1990s, for a number of reasons I have explored elsewhere,
obscenity law began to fall into relative disuse.100 One main reason obscenity was all but abandoned was that child pornography was viewed
as the far more pressing problem. Under the Clinton administration, as
public concern about child sexual abuse escalated, the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Unit of the Department of Justice chose to focus its
limited resources on child pornography rather than obscenity.101
created by the men’s bodies. KIDD, supra note 26, at 72.
97
Grundberg, supra note 96.
98
Moore, supra note 6.
99
Josh Gerstein, Holder Accused of Neglecting Porn, POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2011), http://www.p
olitico.com/story/2011/04/holder-accused-of-neglecting-porn-053314#ixzz4GrYnOHA1
[https://perma.cc/YG7T-6K6R] (describing how Holder shut down the Justice department’s Obscenity Prosecution Task Force that had been set up during the Bush administration).
100
As I document in All Porn All the Time, the abandonment of obscenity law was a result of
multiple factors, including the rise of the sexual revolution and the mix of vexing and awkward
institutional and doctrinal problems the doctrine presented in First Amendment theory and practice. Obscenity was always a First Amendment anomaly. See Adler, All Porn All the Time, supra
note 50.
101
The Clinton administration’s policy was not explicitly announced but was clear in the pattern of prosecutions. In the period from 1992 to 2000, federal prosecutions of child pornography
increased more than fivefold, from 104 to 563 per year. In contrast, federal prosecutions of obscenity fell by more than half in the same period, from 44 cases in 1992 to 20 in 2000. See OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, No. I–2001–07, REVIEW OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND
OBSCENITY CRIMES REPORT (2001) available at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/plus/e0107/results.h
tm [https://perma.cc/698G-PG82]. The position to cut back on obscenity prosecutions was widely
maligned by conservative anti-pornography groups and legislators. See House Subcommittee Criticizes DOJ for Not Prosecuting Internet Obscenity, TECH L. J. (May 24, 2000), http://www.techlawjournal.com/crime/20000524.htm [https://perma.cc/GY5L-WBAN].
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Since that shift, the decline in obscenity prosecutions—and the explosion of adult pornography it both responded to and facilitated—have
made it hard to reverse course and to put the pornography genie back
in the bottle. In our porn-soaked contemporary culture, a pornographer’s defense is built into obscenity law’s reliance on community
standards: the government in an obscenity case must prove that the
material exceeds contemporary community standards.102 Yet given the
sea of pornography in which we live (a condition created in part by the
decline of obscenity law), it is now much harder for a prosecutor to prove
that material on trial deviates in its prurience and patent offensiveness
from the kind of stuff everyone else in the community has been watching. Perhaps this is why when the Bush administration’s Department
of Justice revived obscenity law in the early 2000s,103 it tended to target
extremely hard-core pornography on the fringes of the industry, material that might seem to a jury to be unlike the usual pornographic fare
they or their neighbors had grown accustomed to.104 In any event, the
Bush revival of obscenity law was quietly put to bed by the Obama administration, which (like Clinton’s) devoted its resources to child pornography rather than adult obscenity cases.105 Nonetheless, as I have
documented, obscenity law is still invoked sometimes to fills the gaps
for other doctrinal areas.106 And although there has been a resurgence
of conservative political rhetoric against pornography, there have been
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Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
See Barton Gellman, Recruits Sought for Porn Squad, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2005),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/09/20/recruits-sought-for-pornsquad/4efa6c1b-7be2-4a3a-a003-c1a3a2f5579a/ [https://perma.cc/Q9BE-SCUU]; see also Alberto
R. Gonzales, U.S Attorney General, Prepared Remarks at the U.S. Attorney’s Conference (Apr. 21,
2005) transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2005/042105usattorneys
conference.htm [https://perma.cc/GR6W-FAVR] (“I’ve made it clear that I intend to aggressively
combat the purveyors of obscene materials.”).
104
See Adler, All Porn All the Time, supra note 50, at 705–06.
105
See Gerstein, supra note 99; see also Jamshid Ghazi Askar, Prosecute Pornography? Why
Mitt Romney and President Obama Can’t Agree, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.de
seretnews.com/article/865562332/Prosecute-pornography-Why-Mitt-Romney-and-PresidentObama-cant-agree.html?pg=all [https://perma.cc/HDH8-DQKE].
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See, e.g., Adler, All Porn All the Time, supra note 50. For example, Congress has resorted
to obscenity law to achieve legislative agendas that have met with initial Supreme Court defeat.
For instance, Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 (“Protect Act”), Pub. L. No. 108–21, § 504, 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003), explicitly invoked
the rubric of obscenity law in response to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Congress’s attempt
to ban virtual child pornography. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104–
208, § 121, 110 Stat 3009 (1996), invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002). Similarly, after the Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s attempt to criminalize depictions of animal cruelty in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), Congress used obscenity
law to rewrite the legislation in a way that would pass constitutional muster. See Animal Crush
Video Prohibition Act of 2010, 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2010); United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269 (5th
Cir. 2014) (upholding the revised law which uses obscenity law to ban “crush” videos).
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few prosecutions.107 Most would be unwinnable in my estimation because the pornographic culture in which we now live will present a significant hurdle for prosecutors pursuing obscenity convictions.
The second reason that obscenity law is less of a threat to art than
it once was has to do with related developments in art. The merger of
porn and art that Mapplethorpe pioneered, once a scandalous assault
on the modernist demarcation between art and non-art, high and low,
has become so commonplace as to be dull, even old-fashioned. Artist
John Currin, in an interview about a recent exhibition with its de
rigueur blend of art, appropriated images and hard-core pornography,
explained his use of porn by saying: “It’s not a shock tactic. In every art
school in the world there’s a guy doing porn. As a failed shock tactic,
that’s kind of interesting to me.”108
Of course, there’s still a lot of sex in museums and galleries; at
times it has seemed almost normative. And I still get an occasional call,
perhaps once every few years, from a museum that is worried about
sexual content that might cross the line, at least enough to invite controversy if not prosecution. (By contrast, the calls I get from institutions
or artists with concerns about other kinds of offensive art, or about the
possible reach of child pornography law, are more frequent.) And some
of the sexually infused art on view these days is so graphic that I assume any law review would be uncomfortable reproducing it, even in a
scholarly article, just as mainstream newspapers like the New York
Times still do not reproduce some of Mapplethorpe’s renowned works.109
But even so, it’s hard to think of any sexually explicit art work in our
porn-saturated world that has the power to shock us as Mapplethorpe
once did.
I do not want to discount entirely the possibility that the next sexual outlaw/artist could fall prey. The Mapplethorpe case shows us that
we should worry about the risk of selective prosecution of an underenforced law against an unpopular speaker.110 It is commonplace to say
that in our current era, the chances of being prosecuted for obscenity
are like the chances of being struck by lightning.111 But as
107

See Adler, What Happened to the Feminist Critique Of Pornography?, supra note 50, at 33–
34 (describing new conservative rhetoric around pornography and explaining that it has been
largely ineffective).
108
Karen Rosenberg, Influences: John Currin, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 19, 2006), http://nymag.com/ar
ts/art/features/24355/ [https://perma.cc/M8RE-QW56].
109
The Times recently commented on its omission of an image of Mapplethorpe’s acclaimed
Man in a Polyester Suit which recently broke an auction record as described in McDermon supra
note 37.
110
See Elizabeth Glazer, When Obscenity Law Discriminates, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 1379 (2008)
(evaluating the discriminatory use of obscenity law against gays and lesbians).
111
Neil A. Lewis, A Prosecution Tests the Definition of Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/us/28obscene.html [https://perma.cc/JJS3-2FAF].
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Mapplethorpe shows, the chances of being struck are not random; politically and sexually unpopular speakers seem particularly attractive.
Nonetheless, to the extent art thrives on transgression, in a postpostmodern, post-Mapplethorpe world, when it comes to porn, there is
not much left to transgress. While Mapplethorpe and other artists once
pioneered the dissolution of the art/porn boundary, many artists take
this dissolution for granted and have simply moved on. Because of
changes in art and culture, and related changes in legal enforcement,
obscenity law poses a far less significant threat to art institutions today
than it did thirty years ago.
III. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW AND ART: A GROWING ISSUE FOR
MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES
In contrast to the allegedly obscene pictures, which seem far less
scandalous by today’s standards than they were in 1990, Mapplethorpe’s A Perfect Moment included two photographs that have become
much more, not less, controversial over the past thirty years, to the
point where curators are quietly reluctant to show these images at all.
Both pictures are child nudes and raise the specter of child pornography. In one, called Jesse McBride, a young boy poses naked, perched on
a chair next to a refrigerator. In the other, called Rosie, a four-year-old
girl sits on a stone bench. She wears a dress, but her legs are bent in a
way that reveals she is wearing no underpants. She gazes unsmilingly,
at the camera, her face conveying perhaps curiosity, perhaps wariness.
To the extent it’s relevant, the mothers of both children were friends
with Mapplethorpe and arranged the photo shoots.112 As adults, both
children looked back with pride on the photos.113 McBride called the
picture of himself “angelic.”114
These pictures occupy a space of legal and cultural uncertainty.
They have become harder to show over the years, both in terms of the
cultural controversy they might provoke, but also because their legal
status has become more fragile over time. Indeed, I believe a museum
that displays these pictures today is taking on a risk (very small but not
impossible) of prosecution. As I will explain below, as a matter of First
Amendment law, I think these pictures ought to be protected, but the
law governing this area is so subjective and unpredictable that I cannot
say with certainty that they would be protected if prosecuted. That
112

Kim Masters, Jurors View Photos of Children; Mothers Approved of Mapplethorpe Works,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1990, at C1.
113
For an article about the trial, Jesse McBride who was then 18, posed nude in the same
position he had taken as a child, next to the portrait of his younger self, to demonstrate his approval of the original image. The image is reproduced in Meyer, supra note 13.
114
Patti Hartigan, The Picture of Innocence, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 8. 1990, at A40.
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these images have not been targeted owes more to prosecutorial discretion—the reluctance to pursue an art museum115—than to legal clarity.
The legal status of these two images stands in stark contrast to
that of the five pictures of adult S&M gay sex that were prosecuted in
Cincinnati, which have become far less legally and culturally risky over
the elapsed thirty years; they are all but certain to be protected given
the current state of obscenity law that I described above. Indeed, the
adult sex pictures prosecuted in Cincinnati were featured prominently
in the recent major museum retrospectives of Mapplethorpe’s work at
the Getty, LACMA, and the Guggenheim.116 But the curators for these
shows conspicuously omitted the two child images.117 Curators have
grown increasingly uncomfortable with these photographs. And, as with
other photographic child nudes by other artists, the pictures have quietly disappeared from some museum websites as well. In recent years,
at least two arts institutions have taken down two other photographer’s
pictures of children based on threats of prosecution.118 In my view, given
the evolution of child pornography law in the lower courts, the doctrine’s vast uncertainty, and the severe penalties that accompany a mistaken interpretation of it, this growing reluctance to show these kinds
of art images may be a defensible, if extremely risk-averse, legal position.
What explains this trajectory? What happened to change the dynamics of showing these works, legally and culturally? Once again, the
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Another significant factor is that as the crisis of child pornography has exploded, aided and
abetted by the digital revolution, prosecutors have far more pressing material to pursue than art—
enormous caches of images of hard-core sexual abuse committed against children.
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See supra note 2. The Guggenheim completed a yearlong two-part show in 2019. Implicit
Tensions: Mapplethorpe Now, GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM, https://www.guggenheim.org/exhibition/ma
pplethorpe [https://perma.cc/VJ3R-YCXM] (last visited Sep. 1, 2020).
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See Stoilas, supra note 50 (describing remarks of curator who chose not to include the two
pictures of children in an exhibition).
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In 2013, the Kohler Arts Center removed artist Betsy Schneider’s series of photographs of
her daughter including ones that showed her as a naked baby on her changing table. Debra Lau
Whelan, Photographer Betsy Schneider on the Kohler Arts Center Banning Her Work, NAT’L COAL.
AGAINST CENSORSHIP (Aug. 12, 2013), http://ncac.org/blog/photographer-betsy-schneider-on-thekohler-arts-center-banning-her-work [https://perma.cc/RU4R-NDU7]. In Britain, the Tate Modern
removed Richard Prince’s well-known work called “Spiritual America” after police warning. Charlotte Higgins & Vikram Dodd, Tate Modern Removes Naked Brooke Shields Picture After Police
Visit, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2009/sep/30/
brooke-shields-naked-tate-modern [https://perma.cc/33MT-S7QK]. The museum also shredded its
existing catalogue copies for fear of prosecution. Dave Itzkoff, Tate Modern Closes Richard Prince
Exhibition, Citing Concern Over Brooke Shields Photo, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT BLOG (Oct. 1, 2009:
11:53 AM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/tate-modern-closes-richard-prince-exhibition-citing-concern-over-brooke-shields-photo/ [https://perma.cc/QCJ9-7BVC]. The photo is significant enough in Prince’s oeuvre that when the Guggenheim did a one-man show of Prince’s
work, they titled the exhibition “Spiritual America” after the photograph. See Richard Prince:
Spiritual America, GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/exhibition/richard-prince-spiritual-america [https://perma.cc/K5DG-4S2U].
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answer points to a story about the mutually productive relationship between censorship law and culture.
A. Thirty Years Later: The Dramatic Expansion of Child Pornography Law
In 1990, when Mapplethorpe’s child pictures were shown in Cincinnati, child pornography law was in its infancy. Born in 1982, child pornography law developed at a time when child sexual abuse had only
recently come to light in the late 1970s as a widespread cultural crisis.119 Child pornography law grew up in a pre-digital era that barely
resembled our present one, in which digital and technological advances
have allowed the production and distribution of horrific child abuse images to skyrocket.120 As the crisis of child pornography has grown, child
pornography law has emerged as a complex, rapidly growing, and
deeply anomalous area of First Amendment jurisprudence.121 Just as
obscenity law began its decline, child pornography law grew to fill the
gap. The body of law that has developed since New York v. Ferber,122 the
Court’s first child pornography case, has made the Mapplethorpe child
images shown in Cincinnati more vulnerable to prosecution now than
they were thirty years ago.
Child pornography law began in 1982 with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ferber, in which it encountered a novel First Amendment
problem: whether non-obscene123 sexual depictions of children—speech
not falling into any previously defined First Amendment exception—
could be constitutionally restricted.124 The Court’s answer was “yes.”
Although the Ferber Court announced five reasons that supported the
exclusion of child pornography from First Amendment protection,125 the
119

See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2001).
See, e.g., Michael H. Keller and Gabriel J.X. Dance, The Internet Is Overrun with Images of
Child Sexual Abuse: What Went Wrong? N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/in
teractive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/G2XP-UZA7].
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Amy Adler, The ‘Dost Test’ in Child Pornography Law: ‘Trial by Rorschach Test’, in
REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 81 (Carissa
Byrne Hessick, ed., U. Mich. Press, 2016).
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458 U.S. 747 (1982).
123
The materials at issue in Ferber had been found not obscene by the jury, which was instructed to consider obscenity as well as child pornography charges against the defendant. See
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751. Thus, the issue for the Court was sharply defined. Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) sets forth the Court’s obscenity standard. The “Miller test” asks: (1) whether
the “average person” would find that the speech, “taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) whether it is “patently offensive”; and (3) “whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. (citations omitted).
124
Note this section draws in part on Adler, supra note 121.
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Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. The five rationales set out in Ferber were as follows:
1. The State has a “compelling” interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor.” Id. at 756–57 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
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fundamental focus of these rationales was this: child pornography must
be prohibited because of the grievous harm done to children in the production of the material.126 The creation of child pornography requires
an act of child sexual abuse. The opinion repeatedly emphasizes this
concern for the abuse “of children engaged in [the] production” of child
pornography. 127 Indeed, the Court framed the issue as whether “a child
has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the
work.” 128
When it comes to artistic expression, this urgent rationale animating child pornography law—to protect real children from abuse entailed
in creating the materials—leads to a pivotal distinction between this
area and obscenity law: unlike obscenity law, child pornography law
makes no explicit exception for works of “serious . . . artistic . . . value.”129 Whereas obscenity law was initially premised on the
U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
2. Child pornography is “intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at least
two ways. First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the child’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second, the distribution network for child pornography must be closed” in order to control the production of
child pornography. Id. at 759 (citations omitted). The Court went on to explain that the
production of child pornography is a “low-profile clandestine industry” and that the “most
expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the
market for this material” by punishing its use. Id. at 760.
3. The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and
are thus an integral part of the production of child pornography. Id. at 761 (citations
omitted).
4. The possibility that there would be any material of value that would be prohibited
under the category of child pornography is “exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.” Id.
at 762.
5. Banning full categories of speech is an accepted approach in First Amendment law
and was therefore appropriate in this instance. Id. at 763–64.
126
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
127
This conception of child pornography—that it is sexual abuse, that it is the core of sexual
abuse—was the foundation of the approach taken by courts, legislators, politicians, and the media.
See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 406 (1986) (“Child
pornography is child abuse.”) (emphasis in original); 142 CONG. REC. S-11886-01, S-11900 (Sept.
30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“At the heart of the analysis . . . is a very straightforward
idea: Children who are used in the production of child pornography are victims of abuse, plain and
simple. And the pornographers, also plainly and simply, are child abusers.”); see also 132 CONG.
REC. S-14225-01 (Sept. 29, 1986) (statement of Sen. Roth) (“[T]hose who advertise in order to receive or deal in child pornography and child prostitution are as guilty of child abuse as the actual
child molester . . . .”). The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography stated that “[c]hild
pornography must be considered as substantially inseparable from the problem of sexual abuse of
children . . . There can be no understanding of the special problem of child pornography until there
is understanding of the special way in which child pornography is child abuse.” ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 127, at 406 (emphasis in original). The abuse of an actual child is
“[t]he distinguishing characteristic of child pornography.” Id. at 405.
128
Id. at 765. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002) further underscored that production harm is the key to understanding child pornography
law.
129
Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (establishing an exception in obscenity law for works that lack such
value). Although the Court has never entertained a child pornography case in which serious value
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worthlessness of certain expression,130 child pornography law excludes
speech from First Amendment protection because of the horrible abuse
from which it stems. This explains why the Court’s jurisprudence in this
area departs so dramatically from obscenity law: the merit of an artwork is irrelevant to the child who has been abused. As the Court explained, even if a work possesses serious value, that “bears no connection
to whether or not a child has been harmed in the production of the
work.”131 Thus, the only argument that led to the acquittal of the adult
sex pictures at the Mapplethorpe trial—the serious artistic value defense—is irrelevant under child pornography law.132 Furthermore, unlike
obscenity law, child pornography law does not require us to evaluate
works as a whole, a standard which is more speech protective, as described above.133
Meanwhile, the legal definition of child pornography has grown increasingly capacious over the last thirty years in the lower courts.134
was raised as a defense, the Court in Ferber considered the issue in the context of an overbreadth
claim, holding that the lack of an exception for serious value did not render the law “substantially”
overbroad. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766–74. The concurring opinions in Ferber show some discord on
the question of serious value among the members of the court at the time of the 9-0 decision. Justice O’Connor wrote to emphasize that artistic value was irrelevant to the harm of child abuse that
child pornography law sought to eradicate. “[A] 12-year-old child photographed while masturbating surely suffers the same psychological harm whether the community labels the photograph ‘edifying’ or ‘tasteless.’ The audience’s appreciation of the depiction is simply irrelevant to New York’s
asserted interest in protecting children from psychological, emotional, and mental harm.” Id. at
774–75 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Brennan assumed that serious artistic
value would be a valid defense in a case if it were raised. He wrote that harm to a child and value
of a depiction bear an inverse relationship to one another: “[T]he Court’s assumption of harm to
the child resulting from the permanent record and circulation of the child’s participation lacks
much of its force where the depiction is a serious contribution to art or science.” Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
130
This is the fundamental principle of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court’s
first obscenity decision, in which it held that “obscenity” was a category of expression that lacked
First Amendment protection. In 1973 the Court introduced new rationales for banning obscenity.
131
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
132
As we will see, due to an unusual feature of Ohio state law, the value of the work was
relevant in the Mapplethorpe trial, but such an exception is not required by the First Amendment.
See infra Part III.C.
133
A further distinction is that unlike obscenity law, child pornography law allows for the prosecution of mere possession, as opposed to distribution or production, of a suspect picture. In Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), a case decided shortly before the Mapplethorpe trial, the Court
relied on the unique rationale underlying child pornography law to justify the decision and its
rejection of a basic tenet of obscenity law: that privacy rights protect the individual possessor of
obscenity in his own home even though the material he possesses is illegal to make or sell. See
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the government cannot prohibit mere possession of obscene material); cf. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (“The State does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne’s mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted [its law prohibiting possession of child pornography] in order to protect the victims of child pornography . . . .”). As the Court
explained, the underlying crime of child sexual abuse entitles the States to “greater leeway in the
regulation” of child pornography than of obscenity. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. This compelling rationale justifies the departure from traditional First Amendment strictures that child pornography
law permits.
134
See Adler, supra note 121.
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“Child pornography” is defined as “visual depictions” of “sexual conduct
involving a minor.”135 Federal law defines “sexually explicit conduct” as
“(A) sexual intercourse . . . ; (B) bestiality; (C) masturbation; (D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of any person” under 18.136 The inclusion of this latter category—“lascivious exhibition of the genitals”—as part of the class of prohibited depictions of “sexually explicit conduct” introduces the most
problematic aspect of defining child pornography. How should courts
discern the difference between a criminally “lascivious” image and an
acceptable image of a child, such as an innocent family photo? The
Court has made clear that nudity is not the dividing line between protected speech and lascivious child pornography. Indeed, the Ferber
Court stated that “nudity, without more is protected expression.”137
Conversely, and surprisingly, a picture can be criminalized as “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” even if it contains no nudity, even if the
child’s genitals are not discernible,138 and even if it contains no sexual
conduct.139
The Supreme Court has so far offered no guidance on the question
of what constitutes a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” or what differentiates such an image from constitutionally protected images of
135

18 U.S.C. § 2252. In response to Ferber, Congress quickly passed legislation modeled on the
New York statute upheld in that case. The result was the Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98–292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2253 (2008)). That and
subsequent Acts have closely followed the Ferber definition.
136
18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)–(E). Congress adopted this definition from Ferber but changed the
word “lewd” to “lascivious” to clarify the distinction between child pornography law and obscenity
law, in which the word “lewd” is a term of art. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–292,
98 Stat. 204 (1984); see also United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 830–32 (S.D. Cal. 1986)
(discussing the Act).
137
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n.18 (citations omitted).
138
Although the Supreme Court has never directly approved this interpretation, several influential Circuit Court opinions have held that a picture can be a lascivious exhibition of a child’s
genitals—and thus child pornography—even if the child’s genitals are not discernible and even if
the child is wearing clothes. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994); accord United
States v. Helton, 302 F. App’x. 842, 847 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding videotape defendant recorded of
an eleven-year-old girl wearing opaque underpants qualified as child pornography because of the
way it was framed); United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding nude images of minors with pixel boxes covering their genitals are still lascivious within the meaning of
the federal child pornography statute, noting it is an easier determination than Knox); United
States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a “reasonable jury could conclude
that the exhibition of pubic area was lascivious” in “beach scenes [of] girls wearing swimsuit bottoms”); People v. Spurlock, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 1127 (2003) (holding child pornography and
child exploitations statutes could apply to an image depicting topless fifteen-year old girl in her
underwear with her legs spread); People v. Kongs, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1741, 1755–56 (1994) (following
Knox, finding photographs that zoomed in on girls’ pubic area were lascivious even though the
girls were wearing underwear); cf. U.S. v. McGlothlin, 391 Fed. App’x 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2010)
(finding probable cause existed regarding photographs of clothed boy in innocent activity but photographs focused on pubic area).
139
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 440 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Thus, even images
of children acting innocently can be considered lascivious if they are intended to be sexual.”).
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children, nude or otherwise. In the absence of any guidance, and as the
onslaught of horrific child sexual abuse images has grown exponentially
over the years, lower courts have been busily filling the gap left open by
the Supreme Court. As I have documented in recent work, the result is
a growing body of law that has rendered the category of child pornography increasingly subjective at its edges.140
Indeed, many lower courts now evaluate whether a picture is lascivious based not on what happened to the child at issue but on whether
a pedophilic viewer might find the picture arousing.141 This allows for
the possible prosecution of pictures that were not the product of abuse
but still appeal to a deviant audience. In this way, the definition of child
pornography has come unmoored from its constitutional rationale—
that the pictures lack First Amendment protection because their production requires abuse.142
The leading case on the meaning of “lascivious exhibition” is United
States v. Dost,143 a 1986 California federal district court case that announced a six-part test for analyzing images. The Dost test, followed by
virtually all state and lower federal courts,144 identifies six factors that
are relevant to the determination of whether a picture constitutes a
“lascivious exhibition”:
(1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s
genitalia or pubic area;

140

Adler, supra note 121.
Id. (describing the debate in the lower courts between the objective and subjective interpretation of the Dost test and the subjective way in which some courts apply the Dost factors).
142
It is important to emphasize that to the extent pedophiles regard these photographs of children in a sexual way, the children are grievously harmed. But this harm seems to reside more in
the realm of a privacy violation (akin to revenge porn) and less in the kind of harm on which Ferber
was premised. The abuse now lies in how the pictures are used, not how they were produced. I
leave for another day the question of how to frame and prosecute this kind of harm as a privacy
violation.
143
636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239
(9th Cir. 1987).
144
Dost has been relied on by virtually all Circuits that have considered it. See, e.g., United
States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2008); Knox, 32 F.3d at 747 (3d Cir. 1994); United
States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 244–46 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 448
(5th Cir. 1987) (affirming use factors without specifically citing Dost); United States v. Amirault,
173 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that factors are “neither comprehensive nor necessarily applicable in every situation”); United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 789 (8th Cir. 1999) (“We
find helpful the six criteria” in Dost); U.S. v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2009) (“This Court,
in line with other Circuit courts, has applied a six-factor test for ‘lasciviousness,’ as set forth in
[Dost].”) Numerous district courts have followed Dost, as have state courts. See, e.g., Nebraska v.
Saulsbury, 498 N.W.2d 338 (Neb. 1993).
141
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(2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e. in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity;
(3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child;
(4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;
(5) whether the visual depiction suggests coyness or willingness
to engage in sexual activity;
(6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit
a sexual response in the viewer.145
The test does not require that all factors be met to find that a depiction
is a lascivious exhibition.146 Indeed, one circuit court suggested that satisfying merely one of the six factors would suffice to criminalize a photograph as child pornography.147
B. Are the Mapplethorpe Pictures Protected Speech?
What would the result be today for the Mapplethorpe pictures described above, Jesse McBride and Rosie? Would a federal prosecution
succeed? In my view, the answer is unclear. (Given this uncertain status, I have not included the pictures here for the reader to assess.) On
my analysis of the images, in light of the way courts have interpreted
the Dost factors, I offer a few impressions. First, if merely one Dost factor is required, then certainly factor four, which asks if the child is nude,
is met. Furthermore, both pictures might be seen as having a focal point
on the child’s pubic area as well, thereby meeting both factors four and
one of the test. Justice Brennan argued that this focal point inquiry can
be easily manipulated. In elaborating on what he found to be the constitutional vagueness of a similar provision of a state law, Justice Brennan wrote in dissent, “the test appears to involve nothing more than a
subjective estimation of the centrality or prominence of the genitals in
a picture or other representation. Not only is this factor dependent on
the perspective and idiosyncrasies of the observer, it also is unconnected to whether the material at issue merits constitutional
145

Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 831.
Nor are the factors meant to be exhaustive. See, e.g., Horn, 187 F.3d at 789.
147
Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245 n.6; cf. United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989)
(“Although more than one factor must be present in order to establish ‘lasciviousness,’ all six factors need not be present.”). The Second Circuit imposes no minimum number of Dost factors that
must be present for an image to constitute child pornography. United States v. Goodale, 831 F.
Supp. 2d 804, 810 (D. Vt. 2011) (citations omitted).
146
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protection.”148 The subjective nature of this inquiry was on full display
during the Mapplethorpe trial, when the prosecutor had the following
exchange on the subject with a defense witness, discussing the picture
of Jesse McBride:
“Isn’t the focus primarily between the legs of the child, the penis
area?” [the prosecutor] Prouty pursued.
“Mr. Prouty, I don’t have that reading of the direction of the
lines” Stein responded.
“Could anyone?” Prouty said.
Defense attorney Marc Mezibov objected. “The only person that
seems to have that reading is Mr. Prouty,” he said.149
Although I doubt that either Mapplethorpe image is in a “sexually
suggestive” setting under factor three, I note that this factor can be subject to surprising interpretations; for example, courts have divided on
whether a bathroom is a sexually suggestive setting.150 In a First Circuit case, the government argued, unsuccessfully (and in my view quite
startlingly) that a beach was a sexually suggestive setting because
“many honeymoons are planned around beach locations.”151 This kind
of subjective analysis can affect the interpretation of all the factors, not
just the third. And the subjectivity is significantly heightened in those
jurisdictions where courts require the material be viewed through the
imagined subjective vision of the pedophile voyeur when applying the
factors.152
There are significant arguments to be made for the defense of these
pictures. First is the most obvious: these pictures, taken with their parents’ approval, depict children being children, playing and cavorting in
an utterly non-sexual way that is more akin to a photo in a family album. To read them as sexual seems perverse. The picture of Rosie, for
example, was taken (with her mother’s consent) at a weekend wedding

148

Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 138 (1990) (Brennan J., dissenting).
Masters, supra note 112.
150
The Tenth Circuit has held that a bathroom is a sexually suggestive setting under the second factor because “showers and bathtubs are frequent hosts to sexual encounters as portrayed on
television and film. It is potentially as much of a setting for sexual activity as an adult’s playroom.”
United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Goodale, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 810.
In contrast, an Oklahoma district court found that a bathroom is “not necessarily a sexually suggestive location.” United States v. Helton, CR–07–70–T, 2007 WL 1674196 (W.D. Okla. June 7,
2007), aff’d, 302 Fed. App’x 842 (10th Cir. 2008).
151
United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1999).
152
Adler, supra note 121.
149
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celebration at her house in northern England.153 Jesse’s mother explained that the picture of her son was taken at her apartment while
she was there and that her son was naked because he had just taken a
shower.154 The circumstances under which these photos were taken
seem worlds away from the horrors of sexual abuse that child pornography law is designed to prohibit (and that, unfortunately, the vast
amount of child pornography images portray). At trial, a local art critic
had testified that the pictures were “most innocent and nonsexual,”
comparing them to Renaissance cherubs or “modern-day angels.”155
Both children pictured looked back on these images with pride when
they were adults.156 Specifically, I would point to the sixth Dost factor,
as weighing heavily in favor that they were not designed to arouse an
erotic reaction by the viewer.157
Nonetheless, this argument does not guarantee the photographs’
protection. First, remember that a Dost conviction does not require that
all factors or even the majority of them be met, and in my view at least
two could arguably be met here. Second, there are counterarguments to
be made under the sixth factor. In particular, to counter the claim that
the work was not designed to arouse an erotic reaction in the viewer,
one could point to the very merger between art and pornography that
Mapplethorpe championed in his adult sex pictures. It’s also possible to
argue that the camera angle in the Rosie photograph, positioned as if to
see up the child’s dress, could be seen as sexual, particularly to a pedophile viewer.158 Furthermore, I might worry about a recurrence of the
kind of sinister prejudice that entered the debates about Mapplethorpe
in Congress during the time of the exhibition, when members of Congress suggested a link between Mapplethorpe’s homosexuality and a
pedophilic intent. For instance, a congressman from California said
that Mapplethorpe “was a child pornographer. He lived his homosexual,
erotic lifestyle and died horribly of AIDS.”159
153

Masters, supra note 112.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Meyer, supra note 13; KIDD supra note 26. But note that this may not be a sufficient test
for whether an image was a product of abuse, since so much child sexual abuse entails psychological grooming in which part of the abuse entails grooming the victim to believe he can trust his
abuser.
157
In this sense the case may be comparable to United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.
1999). There the court said, “While it is conceivable that others may differ about some of the judgment calls we have made in our analysis of the photograph, we hesitate to dub this photograph
sexually explicit where many would find the depiction innocuous . . . we believe the only truly
striking aspects of the photograph to be the girl’s nakedness and her youth.” Id. at 25.
158
KIDD, supra note 26, at 61. Kidd goes on to argue that the picture is open to sexual and nonsexual interpretations.
159
See RICHARD MEYER, OUTLAW REPRESENTATION: CENSORSHIP AND HOMOSEXUALITY IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY ART 207 (2004) (quoting Representative Dornan); id. at 211 (describing the
154
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I do not interpret these pictures as sexual, nor do I interpret them
as the product of child sexual abuse. Yet given the current state of child
pornography law, I am not certain that the pictures would be protected
by a court applying the Dost test. Ultimately, my analysis points to a
conflict between the expansive reach of the Dost test and the underlying
rationale of child pornography law itself, to protect children from the
abuse that the production of child pornography necessarily entails.160
C. Why the Pictures Won
What saved the pictures in 1990? The answer stems from two features of the Ohio law at issue in the Mapplethorpe trial. Although that
law had potentially sweeping aspects,161 it was far more generous to
defendants than federal child pornography law in two important respects.162
First, the Ohio law made an exception for parental consent, an exception that federal law does not provide (and indeed, one that may be
ill-advised given the unfortunate reality that many children are abused
by their own family members).163 The mothers of both children, Jesse
and Rosie, signed affidavits and testified expressing their approval of
the images; these affidavits figured as an affirmative defense to the
charges.164

longstanding stereotype of the “homosexual as child molester” that was deployed against Mapplethorpe).
160
But see supra note 142 where I suggest that some images that do not entail production harm
in the traditional sense still impose a kind of privacy harm to the child pictured that ought to be
legally cognizable albeit under a different First Amendment rubric.
161
In a separate case, the Supreme Court had evaluated the constitutionality of the Ohio law
only shortly before the Mapplethorpe case was decided. The dissenting justices in that case argued
that the law swept more broadly than Ferber and was overbroad. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 126 (1990) (Brennan J., dissenting).
162
The charges were brought under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), which prohibited, inter alia, the possession or viewing of “any material . . . that shows a minor who is not
the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity . . . . ” This very Ohio statute had withstood an
overbreadth challenge in Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, decided just shortly before the Mapplethorpe trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute as it had been construed and limited by the Ohio
Supreme Court to prohibit “the possession or viewing of material or performance of a minor who
is in a state of nudity, where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus
on the genitals, and where the person depicted is neither the child nor the ward of the person
charged.” Id. at 114 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As so construed, a majority of the Court
found that the statute was in line with Ferber.
163
The relevant provision of Ohio law provided protection for a defendant who “knows that the
parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing to the photographing or use of the minor
in a state of nudity and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or transferred.”
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3)(b) (Supp. 1989),
164
See City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d 207 (Hamilton Cty. Mun. Ct
1990) (describing affirmative defense based on “affidavits filed from the parents of the minor children consenting to possession and displaying of the photographs”); see also KIDD, supra note 26,
at 72 (describing the mothers’ testimony).
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The second feature of the Ohio law that was more generous to defendants than the First Amendment requires was a provision to allow
exceptions for work “presented for a bona fide artistic . . . purpose.”165
As I indicated previously, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
defense of artistic value is not a mandatory feature of child pornography
law. Of course, states are free to make laws that are more speech-protective than the Constitution requires, and Ohio’s law, by carving out a
sphere for artistic works, did so in this respect.
Thus, the fact that these images were exonerated in 1990 does not
settle their legal status today if they were prosecuted. The Mapplethorpe defense was able to invoke two idiosyncratic speech-protective
features of Ohio law that depart from what the Supreme Court has indicated is required by the First Amendment. Neither issue would be
relevant in a federal prosecution.
IV. HOW MEANING SHIFTS: THE RELEVANCE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
LAW
One of the most revealing aspects of the Mapplethorpe case was a
ruling issued by the Court that addressed the nature of artistic meaning.166 The Court’s analysis exposed a clash that reverberates to this
day between legal and artistic views on how to assess the “meaning” of
art.
The issue arose in the context of a ruling on a pretrial motion in
limine filed by the state of Ohio on a key aspect of obscenity law. Since
1957, in Roth v. United States,167 the U.S. Supreme Court made it a
requirement of obscenity law that a work be evaluated “as a whole.” The
previous approach that Roth replaced had been far less protective of
artistic expression; it allowed prosecutors to focus on isolated passages
of a work,168 plucking out of a novel only the naughty bits. Yet while
Roth’s new “work as a whole” standard was relatively easy to apply to
works of literature—the unit of measurement is the whole book—the
Mapplethorpe trial raised a question of first impression for a court:
what constitutes the “work as a whole” for an art exhibit? Is it the entire
exhibit? Or is each individual picture a “work as a whole” in its own
right? The question ultimately implicates the relationship between
meaning and context.
In the Mapplethorpe case, this question was potentially pivotal:
The five S&M sex pictures on trial, extremely graphic, appeared in a

165
166
167
168

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989).
City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d 207 (Hamilton Cty. Mun. Ct 1990).
354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
R. v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868) (Eng.).
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larger exhibition of 175 works dominated by G-rated, tasteful portraits
and still lifes. Indeed, the curatorial installation of the X Portfolio was
calculated to challenge the assumption that the sexual works could be
viewed apart from their context. As explained above, the sex pictures
were displayed in a grid, mixed with the Y Portfolio’s elegant flowers.
The arrangement invited the viewer to consider the sex pictures’ unity
with the other works. In this way, the exhibition was curated to illustrate a central tenet of Mapplethorpe’s photographic project. As the artist explained in his own words: “When I’ve exhibited pictures, I’ve tried
to juxtapose a flower, then a picture of a cock, then a portrait, so that
you could see they were the same.”169
Yet the Court rejected the contention that a work’s meaning could
depend on its context. It ruled instead that each picture was a work as
a whole in its own right. In elaborating on this ruling, the judge offered
a stark vision of how images produce meaning. The judge wrote, “the
pictures speak for themselves . . . . The click of the shutter has frozen
the dots, colors, shapes, and whatever finishing chemicals necessary,
into a manmade instant of time. Never can that ‘moment’ be legitimately changed.”170
Note two assumptions undergirding this statement. First, the court
assumes that the image is a self-contained universe that requires no
interpretation—it “speaks for itself.”171 This is a longstanding—and
problematic—theme in the history of the legal treatment of images in
both First Amendment law and also other legal realms.172 As I have
argued in previous work, this assumed ability of images to “speak for
themselves” helps explain the systematic suspicion that images are not
fully “speech” for purposes of the First Amendment, and the greater free
speech protection afforded verbal as opposed to visual forms of representation.173 Rebecca Tushnet has documented a similar problem in
copyright law, where courts frequently view images as so transparent
that they need no interpretation.174
Second, the court’s analysis is built on the assumption that a work’s
meaning cannot vary: it is “frozen” in the “instant of time” it was
169

Kardon, supra note 11 (quoting Mapplethorpe).
Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d at 217 – 218.
171
Id. at 217.
172
See generally Amy Adler, The First Amendment and the Second Commandment, 57 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 41 (2012–2013) (arguing that the First Amendment systematically offers greater protection for verbal as opposed to visual forms of representation in part because images are viewed
as so transparent as not to be speech).
173
Id.; see also Adler, supra note 54.
174
See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 683, 687 (2012) (noting that courts have taken “two positions on nontextual creative works
such as images: they are either transparent, or they are opaque” and “[w]hen courts treat images
as transparent, they deny that interpretation is necessary.”).
170
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created.175 The analysis pictures the meaning of a photograph as eternally bound to its moment of creation, so that it can’t fluctuate over time
or across different contexts. As the court wrote, “never can that moment
be legitimately changed.”176 This view—that visual images have a “frozen,” static and unchanging meaning—has had a stranglehold on legal
analyses of art, not only in First Amendment law177 but also in other
doctrinal areas, as I have previously explored.178
The fallacy of this legal assumption is particularly evident in the
changing racial meanings that have been ascribed over the years to
Mapplethorpe’s works. Earlier I discussed Mapplethorpe’s photographs
of Black men. I argued that anxieties about race and interracial desire
had fueled the conservative outrage over Mapplethorpe in 1990 America. Of course, there is no First Amendment doctrine under which these
photographs of Black men could be prosecuted for their racial content
alone. Obscenity law filled the gap.
At the same time that conservatives feared these pictures, some
Black critics, artists, and curators of the 1980s and 1990s explored the
disturbing racial politics of Mapplethorpe’s images of Black males, criticizing Mapplethorpe’s fetishization and objectification of the Black
male body. At the same time, however, there were champions of the
work, who saw it as having an activist potential to subvert rather than
reinforce racial stereotypes.179
175

Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d at 217–18.
Id. at 218.
177
See Adler, supra note 172, at 45–58. There I explore the assumption that images have a
single static meaning. I note that the Supreme Court in the Summum case took a position closer
to my own, offering a view of visual images as given to fluctuating meaning overtime, across contexts, and based on who views them. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. 460, 477 (2009)
(explaining that the meaning of a monument could be “altered by the subsequent addition of other
monuments in the same vicinity” or over time).
178
See generally Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559 (2016)
(analyzing how copyright law’s fair use test, which asks courts to assign “meaning” to works of
visual art, has come to threaten artistic creativity). For an articulation of how the precise opposite
view of meaning has purchase in the art world, see DAVID JOSELIT, AFTER ART 45–48 (2013) (arguing against attempts to tether artworks to meanings and envisioning art as “a commons, which
resists the enclosure of meaning”).
179
There have been a range of political readings of Mapplethorpe’s Black Book. Glen Ligon’s
extraordinary artwork, Notes on the Margin of the Black Book (1991–93), explores the artist’s reaction to the troubling racial themes of the Mapplethorpe work. In an important series of essays,
the critic Kobena Mercer had initially decried the racial fetishism of the work, but subsequently
revised his reading to see the work as containing the activist possibility of undermining the “white
supremacist imaginary.” Compare Kobena Mercer, Imagining the Black Man’s Sex, in
PHOTOGRAPHY/POLITICS: TWO 61–9 (Pat Holland et al. eds., 1987) with Kobena Mercer, Skin Head
Sex Thing: Racial Difference and the Homoerotic Imaginary, in HOW DO I LOOK?: QUEER FILM AND
VIDEO 169, 192 (Bad Object Choices ed., 1991); see also Wesley Morris, Last Taboo: Why Pop Culture Just Can’t Deal with Black Male Sexuality, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/30/magazine/black-male-sexuality-last-taboo.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/FB4E-2Z5X] (noting that at
the time of the works creation one could see the “radical, defiant feat of inscribing black men —
176
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I believe that in the thirty years since the Mapplethorpe trial, the
racial component of Mapplethorpe’s work has grown more inescapable
to us as viewers, even eclipsing the sexual content of the work, which
has become comparatively more mundane. As our society has increasingly grown aware of the troubling implications of mainstream depictions of race and Blackness, I believe that Mapplethorpe’s Black males
may make us even more uncomfortable than they once did, in contrast
to Mapplethorpe’s S&M images, which time has to some extent
tamed.180 In this way, we see that even though the pictures have stayed
the same, the lens through which we view the pictures has shifted,
bringing new meanings to the fore.
Ironically, the story of Mapplethorpe’s work, from the time of its
creation to present, demonstrates the folly of the court’s approach to
meaning. Instead of showing us that the meaning of his images were
“frozen” in the “instant of time” they were created and that meaning
can “never” change, we see instead a proliferation of fluctuating meanings that the works have evoked. The X Portfolio photographs were
taken in the late 1970s when AIDS was unknown; Mapplethorpe was
documenting his world of sexual experimentation in a time without fear
of the still-undiscovered virus that was brewing as the photographs
were taken. But after Mapplethorpe’s death, and in the hands of conservative critics, the work came to stand for the threat posed by AIDS
and by homosexuality to American culture. Conversely, to the political
left, Mapplethorpe’s work came to stand for artistic freedom.181
None of these interpretations had any basis in the moment of the
works’ creation. They all arose in the history of its use and reception.
And over the ensuing years since the trial, Mapplethorpe’s meanings
have continued to change. We see the work differently now, as attitudes
about homosexuality, pornography, sexuality, child sexual abuse, race,
and art have all changed.
The story I have told about the works’ shifting legal status bears
testament to its evolving meaning. Our changing cultural perspective
not only reflects but also informs the legal shifts I have described, as
the works have become more vulnerable to one legal doctrine and less
black gay men — into portraiture”); Evan Moffitt, Picture Imperfect, 179 FRIEZE 184 (2016) available at https://www.frieze.com/article/picture-imperfect-0 [https://perma.cc/3PGH-HKBT] (exploring racial critiques of Mapplethorpe’s work). For my discussion of the racial politics of these images
as well as my reading of Kobena Mercer’s evolving view of Mapplethorpe, see Amy Adler, What’s
Left: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 CAL L. REV. 1499
(1996).
180
See Arthur Lubow, supra note 89 (observing that “the images that continue to make viewers
uncomfortable, and rightly so, are the ones of nude black models” ).
181
See Meyer, supra note 5, at 242 (describing how the work came to symbolize freedom in the
face of “intolerance and homophobia”). As Meyer wrote, our interpretation of the work “cannot be
dissociated from the political panic and public controversy it provoked in 1989–90.” Id.
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vulnerable to another. Therefore, to understand how misguided the
court was in its assessment of how art produces “meaning,” we can look
at the changing legal status of Mapplethorpe’s art over the last thirty
years. The history of Mapplethorpe’s work, from its moment of creation
to its present reception, bears witness to the way in which art’s “meaning,” rather than “frozen,” evolves over time and across contexts. Ultimately these evolving meanings informed the shifting legal status of
Mapplethorpe’s art.
CONCLUSION
The Mapplethorpe trial, fueled by anxieties about AIDS, homosexuality, sadomasochism, pornography, race, government funding for
the arts, and the vanishing boundary between art and smut, was the
defining battle in the culture wars of post-Reagan American. As I have
argued, it also marked a turning point in the First Amendment doctrines governing sexual speech. The trial marked the first obscenity
prosecution against an art museum in the history of this country. But
since that time, obscenity law has receded in importance and the oncescandalous, allegedly obscene photos from the trial have become widely
accepted in museums and in the art market. Child pornography law has
followed the opposite course. In contrast to the allegedly obscene pictures, which pose almost no legal risk today, the two photographs of
children that were on trial have become more, not less, controversial
over the past thirty years, to the point where curators are quietly reluctant to show these images at all. In my view, these photos now occupy
a space of legal and cultural uncertainty. Ultimately my account shows
how these dramatic changes in free speech law have been inextricably
intertwined with and influenced by the battles over social norms that
the Mapplethorpe trial unleashed.

The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other
Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform
Danielle Keats Citron† and Mary Anne Franks††

I.

INTRODUCTION

A robust public debate is currently underway about the responsibility of online platforms for harmful content. We have long called for
this discussion,1 but only recently has it been seriously taken up by legislators and the public. The debate begins with a basic question: should
platforms be responsible for user-generated content?2 If so, under what
circumstances? What exactly would such responsibility look like?
At the heart of this debate is Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 19963—a provision originally designed to encourage tech
companies to clean up “offensive” online content. Section 230 was
adopted at the dawn of the commercial internet. According to the standard narrative of its passage, federal lawmakers wanted the internet to
be open and free, but they also realized that such openness risked
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See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89
B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012).
2
That is, beyond the select avenues that currently are not shielded from liability, such as
intellectual property, federal criminal law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the
knowing facilitation of sex trafficking.
3
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encouraging noxious activity.4 In their estimation, tech companies were
essential partners in any effort to “clean up the Internet.”5
A troubling 1995 judicial decision, however, imperiled the promise
of self-regulation. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy, a New York
state court ruled that any attempt to moderate content turned platforms into publishers and thus increased their risk of liability.6 Lawmakers devised Section 230 as a direct repudiation of that ruling. The
idea was to incentivize, rather than penalize, private efforts to filter,
block, or otherwise address noxious activity.7 Section 230 provided that
incentive, securing a shield from liability for “Good Samaritans” that
under- or over-filtered “offensive” content.8
Over the past two (plus) decades, Section 230 has helped secure a
variety of opportunities for online engagement, but individuals and society have not been the clear winners. Regrettably, state and lower federal courts have extended Section 230’s legal shield far beyond what the
law’s words, context, and purpose support. 9 Platforms have been
shielded from liability even when they encourage illegal action, deliberately keep up manifestly harmful content, or take a cut of users’ illegal
activities.10
To many of its supporters, however, Section 230 is an article of
faith. Section 230 has been hailed as “the most important law protecting
internet speech” and characterized as the essential building block of
online innovation.11 For years, to question Section 230’s value proposition was viewed as sheer folly and, for many, heretical.
No longer. Today, politicians across the ideological spectrum are
raising concerns about the leeway provided to content platforms under
Section 230. 12 Conservatives claim that Section 230 gives tech

4

See generally Hearing on Fostering a Healthier Internet to Protect Consumers Before the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Danielle Keats Citron, Professor, B.U. Law Sch.) (available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20191016/110075/
HHRG-116-IF16-Wstate-CitronD-20191016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F2V-BHKL]).
5
Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google is About to Change,
NPR (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/sectio
n-230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change [https://perma.cc/FG5N-MJ5T].
6
See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995); see also JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019)
(offering an excellent history of Section 230 and the cases leading to its passage).
7
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 170–73.
8
Citron & Wittes, supra note 1, at 404–06.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/W75F-6MRN].
12
See Danielle Keats Citron & Quinta Jurecic, Platform Justice: Content Moderation at an
Inflection Point at 1, 4 (Hoover Inst., Aeigis Series Paper No. 1811, 2018), https://www.hoo
ver.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/citron-jurecic_webreadypdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XZY-9H
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companies a license to silence speech based on viewpoint. 13 Liberals
criticize Section 230 for giving platforms the freedom to profit from
harmful speech and conduct.14
Although their assessments of the problem differ, lawmakers agree
that Section 230 needs fixing. As a testament to the shift in attitudes,
the House Energy and Commerce Committee held a hearing on October
16, 2019 on how to make the internet “healthier” for consumers, bringing together academics (including one of us, Citron), advocates, and social media companies to discuss whether and how to amend Section
230.15 The Department of Justice held an event devoted to Section 230
reform (at which one of us, Franks, participated) on February 19,
2020.16
In a few short years, Section 230 reform efforts have evolved from
academic fantasy to legislative reality.17 One might think that we, as
critics of the Section 230 status quo, would cheer this moment. But we
approach this opportunity with caution. Congress cannot fix what it
does not understand. Sensible policymaking depends on a clear-eyed
view of the interests at stake. As advisers to federal lawmakers on both
sides of the aisle, we can attest to the need to dispel misunderstandings
in order to clear the ground for meaningful policy discussions.
The public discourse around Section 230 is riddled with misconceptions.18 As an initial matter, many people who opine about the law are
BF].
13

See Sen. Cruz: Latest Twitter Bias Underscores Need for Big Tech Transparency, U.S.
SENATOR FOR TEX. TED CRUZ (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=
4630 [https://perma.cc/23UU-SWF7].
14
Marguerite Reardon, Democrats and Republicans Agree that Section 230 is Flawed, CNET
(June 21, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/news/democrats-and-republicans-agree-that-section-230-isflawed/ [https://perma.cc/6VJG-DW5W].
15
See Hearing on “Fostering a Healthier Internet to Protect Consumers,” HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY & COM., https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/hearing-on-fo
stering-a-healthier-internet-to-protect-consumers [https://perma.cc/4YK2-595J]. Witnesses also
included computer scientist Hany Farid of the University of California at Berkeley, Gretchen Petersen of the Alliance to Counter Crime Online, Corynne McSherry of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Steve Huffman of Reddit, and Katie Oyama of Google. Id. At that hearing, one of us (Citron)
took the opportunity to combat myths around Section 230 and offer sensible reform possibilities,
which we explore in Part III.
16
See Section 230 Workshop—Nurturing Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability?, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/video/section-230-workshop-nurturing
-innovation-or-fostering-unaccountability [https://perma.cc/PQV2-MZGZ]. The roundtable raised
issues explored here as well as questions about encryption, which we do not address here.
17
There are several House and Senate proposals to amend or remove Section 230’s legal
shield.
18
See Adi Robertson, Why The Internet’s Most Important Law Exists and How People are Still
Getting it Wrong, VERGE (June 21, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/21/18700605/section230-internet-law-twenty-six-words-that-created-the-internet-jeff-kosseff-interview
[https://perma.cc/6ALQ-XN43]; see also Matt Laslo, The Fight Over Section 230—and the Internet
as We Know It, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/fight-over-section-230-internet-as-we-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/D9XG-BYB5].
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unfamiliar with its history, text, and application. This lack of
knowledge impairs thoughtful evaluation of the law’s goals and how
well they have been achieved. Accordingly, Part I of this Article sets the
stage with a description of Section 230—its legislative history and purpose, its interpretation in the courts, and the problems that current judicial interpretation raises. A second, and related, major source of misunderstanding is the conflation of Section 230 and the First
Amendment. Part II of this Article details how this conflation distorts
discussion in three ways: it assumes all internet activity is protected
speech, it treats private actors as though they were government actors,
and it presumes that regulation will inevitably result in less speech.
These distortions must be addressed to pave the way for effective policy
reform. This is the subject of Part III, which offers potential solutions
to help Section 230 achieve its legitimate goals.
II.

SECTION 230: A COMPLEX HISTORY

Tech policy reform is often a difficult endeavor. Sound tech policy
reform depends upon a clear understanding of the technologies and the
varied interests at stake. As recent hearings on Capitol Hill have
shown, lawmakers often struggle to effectively address fast-moving
technological developments.19 The slowness of the lawmaking process
further complicates matters.20 Lawmakers may be tempted to throw up
their hands in the face of technological change that is likely to outpace
their efforts.
19

See Dylan Byers, Senate Fails its Zuckerberg Test, CNN BUS. (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/10/technology/senate-mark-zuckerberg-testimony/index.html
[https://perma.cc/Y2M6-3RMG]. The 2018 congressional hearings on the Cambridge Analytica
data leak poignantly illustrate the point. In questioning Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg for several days during his testimony before the House and the Senate, some lawmakers made clear that
they had never used the social network and had little understanding of online advertising, which
is the dominant tech companies’ business model. To take one example of many, Senator Orrin
Hatch asked Zuckerberg how his company made money since it does not charge users for its services. See Hearing on Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data Before the
S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018); see also SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER
479–88 (2019). As is clear from committee hearings and our work, however, there are lawmakers
and staff devoted to tackling tech policy, including Senator (now Vice President–Elect) Kamala
Harris, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Senator Mark Warner, Congresswoman Jackie Speier, and
Congresswoman Kathleen Clark, who exhibit more familiarity and knowledge with tech companies
and their practices.
20
According to conventional wisdom, it can take years for bills to become law. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the process is speedier when lawmakers’ self-interests hang in the balance. The Video
Privacy Protection Act’s rapid-fire passage is an obvious case in point. That law passed in less than
a year’s time after the failed nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court revealed that
journalists could easily obtain people’s video rental records. Video Privacy Protection Act,
WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 2, 2020), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_Privacy_Protection_Act [https://pe
rma.cc/8WJD-JB2P]. Lawmakers fearing that their video rental records would be released to the
public passed VPPA in short order. Id.
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This Part highlights the developments that bring us to this moment
of reform. Section 230 was devised to incentivize responsible content
moderation practices.21 And yet its drafting fell short of that goal by
failing to explicitly condition the legal shield on responsible practices.
This has led to an overbroad reading of Section 230, with significant
costs to individuals and society.
A. Reviewing the History Behind Section 230
In 1996, Congress faced a challenge. Lawmakers wanted the internet to be open and free, but they also knew that openness risked the
posting of illegal and “offensive” material. 22 They knew that federal
agencies could not deal with all “noxious material” on their own and
that they needed tech companies to help moderate content. Congress
devised an incentive: a shield from liability for “Good Samaritans” that
blocked or filtered too much or too little speech as part of their efforts
to “clean up the Internet.”23
The Communications Decency Act (CDA), part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, was introduced to make the internet safer for
children and to address concerns about pornography.24 Besides proposing criminal penalties for the distribution of sexually explicit material
online, members of Congress underscored the need for private sector
help in reducing the volume of “offensive” material online.25 Then-Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden offered an amendment to
the CDA entitled “Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material.” 26 The Cox-Wyden Amendment, codified as Section
230, provided immunity from liability for “Good Samaritan” online service providers that over- or under-filtered objectionable content.27
Section 230(c), entitled “Good Samaritan blocking and filtering of
offensive content,” has two key provisions. Section 230(c)(1) specifies
that providers or users of interactive computer services will not be
treated as publishers or speakers of user-generated content.28 Section
230(c)(2) says that online service providers will not be held liable for

21

Or at least this is the most generous reading of its history. See MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE
CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION (2019) (showing that one of us (Franks) is somewhat more skeptical
about the narrative that Section 230’s flaws were not evident at its inception).
22
Selyukh, supra note 5.
23
See Citron & Wittes, supra note 1, at 406.
24
See id. at 418.
25
KOSSEFF, supra note 6, at 71–74; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 1.
26
Id. at 403.
27
Id. at 408.
28
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
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good-faith filtering or blocking of user-generated content.29 Section 230
also carves out limitations for its immunity provisions: its protections
do not apply to violations of federal criminal law, intellectual property
law, the Electronic Privacy Communications Act, and, as of 2018, the
knowing facilitation of sex trafficking.30
In 1996, lawmakers could hardly have imagined the role that the
internet would play in modern life. Yet Section 230’s authors were prescient in many ways. In their view, “if this amazing new thing—the Internet—[was] going to blossom,” companies should not be “punished for
trying to keep things clean.”31 Cox recently explained that, “the original
purpose of [Section 230] was to help clean up the Internet, not to facilitate people doing bad things on the Internet.”32 The key to Section 230,
Wyden agreed, was “making sure that companies in return for that protection—that they wouldn’t be sued indiscriminately—were being responsible in terms of policing their platforms.”33
B. Explaining the Judiciary’s Interpretation of Section 230
The judiciary’s interpretation of Section 230 has not squared with
this vision. Rather than treating Section 230 a legal shield for responsible moderation efforts, courts have stretched it far beyond what its
words, context, and purpose support.34 Section 230 has been read to immunize from liability platforms that:
knew about users’ illegal activity, deliberately refused to remove it, and ensured that those users could not be identified;35
solicited users to engage in tortious and illegal activity;36 and

29

Id. § 230(c)(2).
Id. § 230(e).
31
See Danielle Keats Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/section-230s-challe
nge-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties [https://perma.cc/ARY6-KTE8].
32
See id.
33
See id.
34
See Citron & Wittes, supra note 1, at 406–10; Mary Anne Franks, How the Internet Unmakes the Law, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L. J. 10 (2020); see also Olivier Sylvain, Recovering Tech’s Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. FORUM 252 (2020) (explaining that “common law has not had a meaningful hand in shaping intermediaries’ moderation of user-generated content because courts, citing
Section 230, have foresworn the law’s application).
35
Franks, How the Internet Unmakes the Law, supra note 34, at 17–22.
36
See id.
30
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designed their sites to enhance the visibility of illegal activity
while ensuring that the perpetrators could not be identified and
caught.37
Courts have attributed this broad-sweeping approach to the fact that
“First Amendment values [drove] the CDA.”38 For support, courts have
pointed to Section 230’s “Findings” and “Policy” sections, which highlight the importance of the “vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists” for the internet and the internet’s role in facilitating
“myriad avenues for intellectual activity” and the “diversity of political
discourse.” 39 But as one of us (Franks) has underscored, Congress’s
stated goals also included:
the development of technologies that “maximize user control
over what information is received” by Internet users, as well as
the “vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking and harassment by
means of the computer.” In other words, the law [was] intended
to promote the values of privacy, security and liberty alongside
the values of open discourse.40
Section 230’s liability shield has been extended to activity that has little
or nothing to do with free speech, such as the sale of dangerous products. 41 Consider Armslist.com, a self-described “firearms marketplace.”42 Armslist helps match unlicensed gun sellers with buyers who
cannot pass background checks, buyers like domestic abuser Radcliffe
Haughton.43 Haughton’s estranged wife, Zina, had obtained a restraining order against him that banned him from legally purchasing a firearm,44 but Haughton used Armslist.com to easily find a gun seller that
did not require a background check.45 On October 21, 2012, he used the
gun he purchased on the site to murder Zina and two of her co37

See Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, supra note 31. See
generally Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2017).
38
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 622 (2017).
39
See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009).
40
See Mary Anne Franks, The Lawless Internet? Myths and Misconceptions About CDA Section 230, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/section-230-the-lawl
ess-internet_b_4455090 [https://perma.cc/R6SF-X4WQ].
41
See, e.g., Hinton v. Amazon.com.DEDC, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 687–90 (S.D. Miss. 2014);
see also Franks, How the Internet Unmakes the Law, supra note 34, at 14.
42
See ARMSLIST FIREARM MARKETPLACE, https://www.armslist.com/ [https://perma.cc/VX34GVB4].
43
See id.
44
See id.
45
See id.
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workers.46 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found Armslist to be immune
from liability under Section 230(c)(1), despite profiting from the illegal
firearm sale that led to multiple murders.47
Extending Section 230’s immunity shield to platforms like Armslist.com, which deliberately facilitate and earn money from unlawful
activity, directly contradicts the stated goals of the CDA. Armslist.com
can hardly be said to “provide ‘educational and informational resources’
or contribute to ‘the diversity of political discourse.’”48 Invoking Section
230 to immunize from liability enterprises that have nothing to do with
moderating online speech, such as marketplaces that connect sellers of
deadly weapons with prohibited buyers for a cut of the profits, is unjustifiable.
C. Evaluating the Status Quo
The overbroad interpretation of Section 230 means that platforms
have scant legal incentive to combat online abuse. Rebecca Tushnet put
it well a decade ago: Section 230 ensures that platforms enjoy “power
without responsibility.”49
Market forces alone are unlikely to encourage responsible content
moderation. Platforms make their money through online advertising
generated by users liking, clicking, and sharing content.50 Allowing attention-grabbing abuse to remain online often accords with platforms’
rational self-interest.51 Platforms “produce nothing and sell nothing except advertisements and information about users, and conflict among
those users may be good for business.”52 On Twitter, for example, ads
can be directed at users interested in the words “white supremacist”
and “anti-gay.”53 If a company’s analytics suggest that people pay more
46

See id.
See Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 562 (2019). The nonprofit organization the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, of which one of us (Franks) is the President
and one of us (Citron) is the Vice President, filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioner’s
request for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. See Brief for the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative
and Legal Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 140
S. Ct. 562 (2019) (No. 19-153).
48
See Brief for the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and Legal Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 16, Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 562 (2019) (No. 19-153).
49
Rebecca Tushnet, Power without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1002 (2008).
50
See Mary Anne Franks, Justice Beyond Dispute, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1374, 1386 (2018) (reviewing ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
INTERNET OF DISPUTES (2017)).
51
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet As It Is
(and As It Should Be), 118 MICH. L. REV. 1073 (2020).
52
See id.
53
Kim Lyons, Twitter allowed ad targeting based on ‘neo-Nazi’ keyword, VERGE (Jan. 16,
2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/16/21069142/twitter-neo-nazi-keywords-ad-targeting-bbc
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attention to content that makes them sad or angry, then the company
will highlight such content.54 Research shows that people are more attracted to negative and novel information.55 Thus, keeping up destructive content may make the most sense for a company’s bottom line.
As Federal Trade Commissioner Rohit Chopra warned in his powerful dissent from the agency’s 2019 settlement with Facebook, the behavioral advertising business model is the “root cause of [social media
companies’] widespread and systemic problems.” 56 Online behavioral
advertising generates profits by “turning users into products, their activity into assets,” and their platforms into “weapons of mass manipulation.”57 Tech companies “have few incentives to stop [online abuse],
and in some cases are incentivized to ignore or aggravate [it].”58
To be sure, the dominant tech companies have moderated certain
content by filtering or blocking it.59 What often motivates these efforts
is pressure from the European Commission to remove hate speech and
terrorist activity.60 The same companies have banned certain forms of
online abuse, such as nonconsensual pornography61 and threats, in response to lobbying from users, advocacy groups, and advertisers.62 They
have expended resources to stem abuse when it has threatened their
bottom line.63
Yet the online advertising business model continues to incentivize
revenue-generating content that causes significant harm to the most
vulnerable among us. Online abuse generates traffic, clicks, and shares

-policy-violation [https://perma.cc/RQ9G-S5AT].
54
See Dissenting Statement of Federal Trade Commissioner Rohit Chopra, In re Facebook,
Inc., Commission File No. 1823109, at 2 (July 24, 2019).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See Franks, Justice Beyond Dispute, supra note 50, at 1386.
59
See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2018); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for the Information Age, 91 B.U. L REV.
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because it is salacious and negative.64 Deepfake pornography sites65 as
well as revenge porn and gossip sites66 thrive thanks to advertising revenue.
Without question, Section 230 has been valuable to innovation and
expression.67 It has enabled vast and sundry businesses. It has led to
the rise of social media companies that many people find valuable, such
as Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit.
At the same time, Section 230 has subsidized platforms whose business is online abuse and the platforms who benefit from ignoring abuse.
It is a classic “moral hazard,” ensuring that tech companies never have
to absorb the costs of their behavior.68 It takes away the leverage that
victims might have had to get harmful content taken down.
This laissez-faire approach has been costly to individuals, groups,
and society. As more than ten years of research have shown, cyber mobs
and individual harassers inflict serious and widespread injury. 69 According to a 2017 Pew Research Center study, one in five U.S. adults
have experienced online harassment that includes stalking, threats of
violence, or cyber sexual harassment.70 Women — particularly women of
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Online Harassment 2017 Study, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/inte
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color and bisexual women — and other sexual minorities are targeted
most frequently.71
Victims of online abuse do not feel safe on or offline.72 They experience anxiety and severe emotional distress. They suffer damage to their
reputations and intimate relationships as well as their employment and
educational opportunities.73 Some victims are forced to relocate, change
jobs, or even change their names.74 Because the abuse so often appears
in internet searches of their names, victims have difficulty finding employment or keeping their jobs.75
Failing to address online abuse does not just inflict economic, physical, and psychological harms on victims — it also jeopardizes their right
to free speech. Online abuse silences victims.76 Targeted individuals often shut down social media profiles and e-mail accounts and withdraw
from public discourse. 77 Those with political ambitions are deterred
from running for office.78 Journalists refrain from reporting on controversial topics.79 Sextortion victims are coerced into silence with threats
of violence, insulating perpetrators from accountability.80
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ds/2018/09/Attacks-and-Harassment.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B79-FJF80; see also Women Journalists and the Double Blind: Choosing silence over being silenced, ASS’N FOR PROGRESSIVE COMMC’N
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An overly capacious view of Section 230 has undermined equal opportunity in employment, politics, journalism, education, cultural influence, and free speech.81 The benefits of Section 230 immunity surely
could have been secured at a lesser price.82
III.

DEBUNKING THE MYTHS ABOUT SECTION 230

After writing about overbroad interpretations of Section 230 for
more than a decade, we have eagerly anticipated the moment when federal lawmakers would begin listening to concerns about Section 230.
Finally, lawmakers are questioning the received wisdom that any tinkering with Section 230 would lead to a profoundly worse society. Yet we
approach this moment with a healthy dose of skepticism. Nothing is
gained if Section 230 is changed to indulge bad faith claims, address
fictitious concerns, or disincentivize content moderation. We have been
down this road before, and it is not pretty.83 Yes, Section 230 is in need
of reform, but it must be the right kind of reform.
Our reservations stem from misconceptions riddling the debate.
Those now advocating for repealing or amending Section 230 often dramatically claim that broad platform immunity betrays free speech guarantees by sanctioning the censorship of political views. By contrast, Section 230 absolutists oppose any effort to amend Section 230 on the
grounds that broad platform immunity is indispensable to free speech
guarantees. Both sides tend to conflate the First Amendment and Section 230, though for very different ends. This conflation reflects and reinforces three major misconceptions. One is the presumption that all
internet activity is speech. The second is the treatment of private actors
as if they were government actors. The third is the assumption that any
regulation of online conduct will inevitably result in less speech. This
Part identifies and debunks these prevailing myths.
A. The Internet as a Speech Machine
Both detractors and supporters agree that Section 230 provides
online intermediaries broad immunity from liability for third-party content. The real point of contention between the two groups is whether
this broad immunity is a good or a bad thing. While critics of Section
230 point to the extensive range of harmful activity that the law’s deregulatory stance effectively allows to flourish, Section 230 defenders
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argue that the law’s laissez-faire nature is vital to ensuring a robust
online marketplace of ideas.
Section 230 enthusiast Elizabeth Nolan Brown argues that “Section 230 is the Internet’s First Amendment.”84 David Williams, president of the Taxpayers Protection Alliance, similarly contends that, “The
internet flourishes when social media platforms allow for discourse and
debate without fear of a tidal wave of liability. Ending Section 230
would shutter this marketplace of ideas at tremendous cost.”85 Professor Eric Goldman claims that Section 230 is “even better than the First
Amendment.”86
This view of Section 230 presumes that the internet is primarily, if
not exclusively, a medium of speech. The text of Section 230 reinforces
this characterization through the use of the terms “publish,” “publishers,” “speech,” and “speakers” in 230(c), as well as the finding that the
“Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”87
But the presumption that the internet is primarily a medium of
speech should be interrogated.88 When Section 230 was passed, it may
have made sense to think of the internet as a speech machine. In 1996,
the Internet was text-based and predominantly noncommercial.89 Only
20 million American adults had internet access, and these users spent
less than half an hour a month online.
But by 2019, 293 million Americans were using the internet,90 and
they were using it not only to communicate, but also to buy and sell
merchandise, find dates, make restaurant reservations, watch television, read books, stream music, and look for jobs.91 As Nolan Brown describes it:
84
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the entire suite of products we think of as the internet—search
engines, social media, online publications with comments sections, Wikis, private message boards, matchmaking apps, job
search sites, consumer review tools, digital marketplaces,
Airbnb, cloud storage companies, podcast distributors, app
stores, GIF clearinghouses, crowdsourced funding platforms,
chat tools, email newsletters, online classifieds, video sharing
venues, and the vast majority of what makes up our day-to-day
digital experience—have benefited from the protections offered
by Section 230.92
Many of these “products” have very little to do with speech and, indeed,
many of their offline cognates would not be considered speech for First
Amendment purposes.
This is not the same thing as saying that the First Amendment
does not protect all speech, although this is also true. The point here is
that much human activity does not implicate the First Amendment at
all. As Frederick Schauer observes, “Like any other rule, the First
Amendment does not regulate the full range of human behavior.”93
The acts, behaviors, and restrictions not encompassed by the
First Amendment at all — the events that remain wholly untouched by the First Amendment--are the ones that are simply
not covered by the First Amendment. It is not that the speech is
not protected. Rather, the entire event — an event that often involves “speech” in the ordinary language sense of the word —
does not present a First Amendment issue at all, and the government’s action is consequently measured against no First
Amendment standard whatsoever. The First Amendment just
does not show up.94
Section 230 absolutists are not wrong to emphasize the vast array of
activities now conducted online; they are wrong to presume that the
First Amendment shows up for all of them.
First Amendment doctrine draws a line, contested though it might
be, not only between protected and unprotected speech but between
speech and conduct. As one of us (Citron) has written, “[a]dvances in
law and technology . . . complicate this distinction as they make more
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/183910/internet-activities-of-us-users/ [https://
perma.cc/QA5D-6KBB].
92
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93
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& MARY L. REV. 1613, 1617–18 (2015).
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Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004).
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actions achievable through ‘mere’ words.”95 Because so much online activity involves elements that are not unambiguously speech-related,
whether such activities are in fact speech should be a subject of express
inquiry. The Court has made clear that conduct is not automatically
protected simply because it involves language in some way: “it has
never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed.”96
And even when dealing with actions sufficiently expressive to be
considered speech for First Amendment purposes,97 “[t]he government
generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has
in restricting the written or spoken word.” 98 When considering such
conduct as wearing of black armbands,99 setting fire to the American
flag, 100 making financial contributions to political campaigns, 101 or
burning draft cards,102 the Court asks whether such acts are speech at
all before turning to the question of how much, if at all, they are protected by the First Amendment.
But the conflation of Section 230 and the First Amendment shortcircuits this inquiry. Intermediaries invoking Section 230’s protections
implicitly characterize the acts or omissions at issue as speech, and
courts frequently allow them to do so without challenge. When “courts
routinely interpret Section 230 to immunize all claims based on thirdparty content”—including civil rights violations; “negligence; deceptive
trade practices, unfair competition, and false advertising; the common
law privacy torts; tortious interference with contract or business relations; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and dozens of other
legal doctrines”103—they go far beyond existing First Amendment doctrine, and grant online intermediaries an unearned advantage over offline intermediaries.104
95
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In addition to short-circuiting the analysis of whether particular
online activities qualify as speech at all, an overly indulgent view of
Section 230 short-circuits the analysis of whether and how much certain speech should be protected. The Court has repeatedly observed
that not all speech receives full protection under the First Amendment.105 Speech on “matters of public concern” is “‘at the heart of the
First Amendment’s protection,’” whereas “speech on matters of purely
private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”106 Some categories
of speech, including obscenity, fighting words, and incitement, are historical exceptions to the First Amendment’s protections.107
Treating all online speech as presumptively protected not only ignores the nuances of First Amendment jurisprudence, but also elides
the varying reasons why certain speech is viewed as distinctly important in our system of free expression.108 Some speech matters for
self-expression, but not all speech does.109 Some speech is important for
the search for truth or for self-governance, but not all speech serves
those values. Also, as Kenneth Abraham and Edward White argue, the
“all speech is free speech” view devalues the special cultural and social
salience of speech about matters of public concern.110 It disregards the
fact that speech about private individuals about purely private matters
may not remotely implicate free speech values at all.
The view that presumes all online activity is normatively significant free expression protected by the First Amendment reflects what
Leslie Kendrick describes as “First Amendment expansionism”—
“where the First Amendment’s territory pushes outward to encompass
ever more areas of law.”111 As Kendrick observes, the temptations of
First Amendment expansionism are heightened “in an information
economy where many activities and products involve communication.”112 The debate over Section 230 bears this out.
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(2015) (explaining that freedom of speech is a “term of art that does not refer to all speech activities, but rather designates some area of activity that society takes, for some reason, to have special
importance”).
112
Id.

45]

MYTHS CONFOUNDING SECTION 230 REFORM

61

The indulgent approach to Section 230 veers far away not only from
the public discourse values at the core of the First Amendment, but also
from the original intentions of Section 230’s sponsors. Christopher Cox,
a former Republican Congressman who co-sponsored Section 230, has
been openly critical of “how many Section 230 rulings have cited other
rulings instead of the actual statute, stretching the law,” asserting that
“websites that are ‘involved in soliciting’ unlawful materials or ‘connected to unlawful activity should not be immune under Section
230.’” 113 The Democratic co-sponsor of Section 230, now-Senator Ron
Wyden, has similarly emphasized that he “wanted to guarantee that
bad actors would still be subject to federal law. Whether the criminals
were operating on a street corner or online wasn’t going to make a difference.”114
There is no justification for treating the internet as a magical
speech conversion machine: if the conduct would not be speech protected by the First Amendment if it occurs offline, it should not be transformed into speech merely because it occurs online. Even content that
unquestionably qualifies as speech should not be presumed to be doctrinally or normatively protected. Intermediaries seeking to take advantage of Section 230’s protections — given that those protections were
intended to foster free speech values — should have to demonstrate, rather than merely tacitly assert, that the content at issue is in fact
speech, and further that it is speech protected by the First Amendment.
B. Neutrality and the State Action Doctrine
The conflation of the First Amendment and Section 230, and internet activity with speech, contributes to another common misconception
about the law, which is that it requires tech companies to act as “neutral
public forums” in order to receive the benefit of immunity. Stated
slightly differently, the claim here is that tech companies receive Section 230’s legal shield only if they refrain — as the First Amendment
generally requires the government to refrain — from viewpoint discrimination. On this view, a platform’s removal, blocking, or muting of usergenerated content based on viewpoint amounts to impermissible censorship under the First Amendment that should deprive the platform
of its statutory protection against liability.115
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This misconception is twofold. First, there is nothing in the legislative history or text of Section 230 that supports such an interpretation.116 Not only does Section 230 not require platforms to act neutrally
vis-à-vis political viewpoints as state actors should, it urges exactly the
opposite. Under Section 230(b)(4), one of the statute’s policy goals includes “remov[ing] disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies.”117
Second, the “neutral platform” myth completely ignores the state
action doctrine, which provides that obligations created by the First
Amendment fall only upon government actors, not private actors. Attempting to extend First Amendment obligations to private actors is not
only constitutionally incoherent but endangers the First Amendment
rights of private actors against compelled speech.118
High-profile examples of the “neutral platform” argument include
Senator Ted Cruz, who has argued that “big tech enjoys an immunity
from liability on the assumption they would be neutral and fair. If
they’re not going to be neutral and fair, if they’re going to be biased, we
should repeal the immunity from liability so they should be liable like
the rest of us.”119 Representative Greg Gianforte denounced Facebook’s
refusal to run a gun manufacturer’s ads as blatant “censorship of conservative views.”120 Along these lines, Representative Louie Gohmert
contended that, “Instead of acting like the neutral platforms they claim
to be in order obtain their immunity,” social media companies “act like
a biased medium and publish their own agendas to the detriment of
others.”121
116

See David Ingram & Jane C. Timm, Why Republicans (and Even a Couple of Democrats)
Want to Throw Out Tech’s Favorite Law, NBC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/po
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It is not just politicians who have fallen under the spell of the viewpoint neutrality myth. The Daily Wire’s former Editor-at-Large, Josh
Hammer, tweeted: “It is not government overreach to demand that Silicon Valley tech giants disclose their censorship algorithms in exchange
for continuing to receive CDA Sec. 230 immunity.”122
Several legislative and executive proposals endeavor to reset Section 230 to incentivize platforms to act as quasi-governmental actors
with a commitment to supposed viewpoint neutrality. One example is
Senator Josh Hawley’s bill, “Ending Support for Internet Censorship
Act.”123 Under the Hawley proposal, Section 230’s legal shield would be
conditioned on companies of a certain size obtaining FTC certification
of their “political neutrality.” Under Representative Gohmert’s proposal, Section 230 immunity would be conditioned on a platform’s posting of user-generated content in chronological order. Making judgments
about—in other words, moderating—content’s prominence and visibility would mean the loss of the legal shield.124 President Trump’s May
28, 2020 “Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship,” issued
after Twitter took the unprecedented step of fact-checking two Trump
tweets containing false information about mail-in ballots and marking
them as factually unsupported, sounded a similar theme, declaring that
Section 230 “immunity should not extend beyond its text and purpose
to provide protection for those who purport to provide users a forum for
free and open speech, but in reality use their power over a vital means
of communication to engage in deceptive or pretextual actions stifling
free and open debate by censoring certain viewpoints.”125
It is important to note, first, that there is no empirical basis for the
claim that conservative viewpoints are being suppressed on social media. In fact, there is weighty evidence indicating that rightwing content
dominates social media. Facebook, responding to concerns about anticonservative bias, hired former Senator John Kyl and lawyers at Covington & Burling to conduct an independent audit of potential anti-conservative bias.126 The Covington Interim Report did not conclude that
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Section 230’s legal shield was predicated on platforms serving as “for[a] for a true diversity of
political discourse”).
124
See Gohmert, supra note 121.
125
Exec. Order. No. 13925, 85 F.R. 34079 (2020).
126
See Senator Jon Kyl, Covington Interim Report, COVINGTON INTERIM REPORT (Accessed
Mar. 20, 2020), https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/08/covington-interim-report-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VWD-7YK5].
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Facebook had anti-conservative bias. 127 As Siva Vaidhyanathan observes, there is no evidence supporting accusations that social media
companies are disproportionately silencing conservative speech: the
complaints are “simply false.” 128 Many studies have found that conservative political campaigns have in fact leveraged social media to
much greater advantage than their adversaries.129
But even if the claims of anti-conservative bias on platforms did
have some basis in reality, the “neutral platform” interpretation of Section 230 takes two forms that actually serve to undermine, not promote,
First Amendment values. The first involves the conflation of private
companies with state actors, while the second characterizes social media platforms as public forums. Tech companies are not governmental
or quasi-governmental entities, and social media companies and most
online service providers are not publicly owned or operated.130 Both of
these forms of misidentification ignore private actors’ own First Amendment rights to decide what content they wish to endorse or promote.
Neither Section 230 nor any judicial doctrine equates “interactive
computer services” with state guarantors of First Amendment protections. As private actors, social media companies are no more required
to uphold the First Amendment rights of their users than would be
bookstores or restaurants to their patrons.131 As Eugene Kontorovich
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearing on “Stifling
Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse”:
If tech platforms “engage in politically biased content-sorting . . . it is not a First Amendment issue. The First Amendment
only applies to censorship by the government. . . . The conduct of
private actors is entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment. If anything, ideological content restrictions are editorial
decisions that would be protected by the First Amendment. Nor

127

See id. (noting that the audit found Facebook’s advertising policies prohibiting shocking and
sensational content resulted in the rejection of pro-life ads focused on survival stories of infants
born before full-term. Facebook adjusted its enforcement of this policy to focus on prohibiting ads
only when the ad shows someone in visible pain or distress or where blood and bruising is visible).
128
See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Why Conservatives Allege Big Tech is Muzzling Them, ATLANTIC
(July 28, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/conservatives-pretend-big-te
ch-biased-against-them/594916/ [https://perma.cc/4N5L-QNKE].
129
See, e.g., Mark Scott, Despite Cries of Censorship, Conservatives Dominate Social Media,
POLITICO (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/26/censorship-conservatives-social-media-432643 [https://perma.cc/US83-PEVB].
130
See Citron & Richards, infra note 133, at 1361 (exploring how entities comprising our digital
infrastructure, including search engines, browsers, hosts, transit providers, security providers, internet service providers, and content platforms, are privately-owned with certain exceptions like
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers).
131
See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 139 S. Ct. 1921 (finding privately-owned cable television
channel not a state actor).
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can one say that the alleged actions of large tech companies implicate ‘First Amendment values,’ or inhibits the marketplace of
ideas in ways analogous to those the First Amendment seeks to
protect against.”132
The alternative argument attempts to treat social media platforms as
traditional public forums like parks, streets, or sidewalks. The public
forum has a distinct purpose and significance in our constitutional order. The public forum is owned by the public and operated for the benefit of all.133 The public’s access to public parks, streets, and sidewalks
is a matter of constitutional right.134 The public forum doctrine is premised on the notion that parks, streets, and sidewalks have been open for
speech “immemorially . . . time out of mind.”135 For that reason, denying access to public parks, streets, and sidewalks on the basis of the
content or viewpoint of speech is presumptively unconstitutional.136 But
wholly privately-owned social media platforms have never been designated as “neutral public forums.”137
As one of us (Franks) has written, the attempt to turn social media
controversies into debates over the First Amendment is an yet another
example of what Frederick Schauer describes as “the First Amendment’s cultural magnetism.”138 It suggests that “because private companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google have become ‘state like’ in
many ways, even exerting more influence in some ways than the government, they should be understood as having First Amendment obligations, even if the First Amendment’s actual text or existing doctrine
would not support it.”139 Under this view, the First Amendment should
be expanded beyond its current borders.
But the erosion of the state action doctrine would actually undermine First Amendment rights, by depriving private actors of “a robust
sphere of individual liberty,” as Justice Kavanaugh recently expressed
132

See Hearing on Stifling Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse
Before S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 116th Congress (2019) (statement of Eugene Kontorovich, Prof.
Geo. Mason Law Sch.) (available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kontorovich
%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ8S-8SHV]).
133
See Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You
Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1360 (2018).
134
Id.
135
See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
136
Cf. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d, Davis v. Massachusetts,
167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897).
137
See Padhi, supra note 115.
138
See Mary Anne Franks, The Free Speech Black Hole: Can the Internet Escape the Gravitational Pull of the First Amendment?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://knight
columbia.org/content/the-free-speech-black-hole-can-the-internet-escape-the-gravitational-pullof-the-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/8MGE-M8G3].
139
See id.; Citron & Richards, supra note 133, at 1371.
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it in Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck.140 An essential part of
the right to free speech is the right to choose what to say, when to say
it, and to whom. Indeed, the right not to speak is a fundamental aspect
of the First Amendment’s protections. As the Court famously held in
West Virginia v. Barnette, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”141
If platforms are treated as governmental actors or their services
deemed public fora, then they could not act as “Good Samaritans” to
block online abuse. This result would directly contravene the will of Section 230’s drafters.142 For instance, social media companies could not
combat spam, doxing, nonconsensual pornography, or deepfakes. 143
They could not prohibit activity that chases people offline. In our view,
it is desirable for platforms to address online abuse that imperils people’s ability to enjoy life’s crucial opportunities, including the ability to
engage with others online.
At the same time, the power that social media companies and other
platforms have over digital expression should not proceed unchecked,
as it does now in some respects. Currently, Section 230(c)(1)—the provision related to under-filtering content—shields companies from liability without any limit or condition, unlike Section 230(c)(2) which conditions the immunity for under-filtering on a showing of “good faith.”144
In Part IV, we offer legislative reforms that would check that power
afforded platforms. The legal shield should be cabined to interactive
computer services that wield their content-moderation powers responsibly, as the drafters of Section 230 wanted.145
140

See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 1928.
See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
142
Citron & Richards, supra note 133, at 1371.
143
In connection with our work with CCRI, we have helped tech companies do precisely that.
See generally Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 80; Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from
the Front Lines, supra note 61.
144
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
145
See Citron & Richards, supra note 133, at 1374 (explaining that, of course, not all companies
involved in providing our online experiences are alike in their power and privilege. “As a company’s
power over digital expression grows closer to total (meaning there are few to no alternatives to
express oneself online), the greater the responsibilities (via regulation) attendant to that power.”
Companies running the physical infrastructure of the internet, such as internet service and broadband providers, have power over digital expression tantamount to governmental power. In locations where people only have one broadband provider in their area, being banned from that provider would mean no broadband internet access at all. The (now-abandoned) net neutrality rules
were animated by precisely those concerns); see also Genevieve Lakier, The Problem Isn’t Analogies but the Analogies that Courts Use, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/problem-isnt-use-analogies-analogies-courts-use
[https://perma.cc/6H7ZXPNN]; FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2014) (arguing that the power of search engines may warrant far more regulation than currently exists. Although social media companies
141
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We would lose much and gain little if Section 230 were replaced
with the Hawley or Gohmert proposals, or if Trump’s Executive Order
were given practical effect.146 Section 230 already has a mechanism to
address the unwarranted silencing of viewpoints. 147 Under Section
230(c)(2), users or providers of interactive computer services enjoy immunity from liability for over-filtering or over-blocking speech only if
they acted in “good faith.” Under current law, platforms could face liability for removing or blocking content without “good faith” justification,
if a theory of relief exists on which they can be sued.148
C.

The Myth that Any Change to Section 230 Would Destroy Free
Speech

Another myth is that any Section 230 reform would jeopardize free
speech in a larger sense, even if not strictly in the sense of violating the
First Amendment. Of course, free speech is a cultural as well as a constitutional matter. It is shaped by non-legal as well as legal norms, and
tech companies play an outsized role in establishing those norms. We
agree that there is good reason to be concerned about the influence of
tech companies and other powerful private actors over the ability of individuals to express themselves. This is an observation we have been
making for years—that some of the most serious threats to free speech
come not from the government, but from non-state actors.149 Marginalized groups in particular, including women and racial minorities, have
long battled with private censorial forces as well as governmental ones.
But the unregulated internet — or rather, the selectively regulated internet — is exacerbating, not ameliorating, this problem. The current
state of Section 230 may ensure free speech for the privileged few; protecting free speech for all requires reform.
The concept of “cyber civil rights”150 speaks precisely to the reality
that the internet has rolled back many gains made for racial and gender
are powerful, they do not have the kind of control over our online experiences as broadband providers or even search engines do. Users banned on Facebook could recreate a social network elsewhere, though it would be time consuming and likely incomplete); Citron & Richards, supra note
133, at 1374 (highlighting that dissatisfaction with Facebook has inspired people’s migration to
upstart social network services like MeWe by exploring different non-constitutional ways that law
can protect digital expression).
146
See Mary Anne Franks, The Utter Incoherence of Trump’s Battle with Twitter, THE
ATLANTIC (May 30, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/the-utter-incoheren
ce-of-trumps-battle-with-twitter/612367/ [https://perma.cc/5UNZ-4WPR].
147 One of us (Franks) is skeptical of the argument that there is any legal theory that entitles people,
especially government officials, to demand access or amplification to a private platform.
148

At the symposium, Brian Leiter provided helpful comments on this point.
See, e.g., MARY ANNE FRANKS, BEYOND ‘FREE SPEECH FOR THE WHITE MAN’: FEMINISM AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (2019); CITRON, HATE
CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 1.
150
See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 1, at 66; Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne
149
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equality. The anonymity, amplification, and aggregation possibilities
offered by the internet have allowed private actors to discriminate, harass, and threaten vulnerable groups on a massive scale.151 There is empirical evidence showing that the internet has been used to further chill
the intimate, artistic, and professional expression of individuals whose
rights were already under assault offline.152
Even as the internet has multiplied the possibilities of expression,
it has multiplied the possibilities of repression. 153 The new forms of
communication offered by the internet have been used to unleash a regressive and censorious backlash against women, racial minorities, and
sexual minorities. The internet lowers the costs of engaging in abuse by
providing abusers with anonymity and social validation, while providing new ways to increase the range and impact of that abuse. The online
abuse of women in particular amplifies sexist stereotyping and discrimination, compromising gender equality online and off.154
The reality of unequal free speech rights demonstrates how regulation can, when done carefully and well, enhance and diversify speech
rather than chill it. According to a 2017 study, regulating online abuse
“may actually facilitate and encourage more speech, expression, and
sharing by those who are most often the targets of online harassment:
women.” 155 The study’s author suggests that when women “feel less
likely to be attacked or harassed,” they become more “willing to share,
speak, and engage online.” Knowing that there are laws criminalizing
online harassment and stalking “may actually lead to more speech, expression, and sharing online among adult women online, not less.” As
expressed in the title of a recent article by one of us (Citron) and Jonathon Penney, sometimes “law frees us to speak.”156

Franks, Cyber Civil Rights in the Time of COVID-19, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 14, 2020), https://
blog.harvardlawreview.org/cyber-civil-rights-in-the-time-of-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/766J-JYB
R].
151
See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 57–72; Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 227
(2011); Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 1, at 66–67, 69–72.
152
See Penney, Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online: A Comparative
Case Study, supra note 76.
153
FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21.
154
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 17.
155
See Penney, Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online: A Comparative
Case Study, supra note 76.
156
See Jonathon W. Penney & Danielle Keats Citron, When Law Frees us to Speak,
87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2318, 2319 (2018).
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MOVING BEYOND THE MYTHS: A MENU OF POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS

Having addressed misconceptions about the relationship between
Section 230 and the First Amendment, state and private actors, and
regulation and free speech outcomes, we turn to reform proposals that
address the problems that actually exist and are legitimately concerning. This Part explores different possibilities for fixing the overbroad
interpretation of Section 230.
A. Against Carveouts
Some reformers urge Congress to maintain Section 230’s immunity
but to create an explicit exception from its legal shield for certain types
of behavior. A recent example of that approach is the Stop Enabling Sex
Traffickers Act (SESTA),157 which passed by an overwhelming vote in
2016. The bill amended Section 230 by rendering websites liable for
knowingly hosting sex trafficking content.158
That law, however, is flawed. By effectively pinning the legal shield
on a platform’s lack of knowledge of sex trafficking, the law arguably
reprises the dilemma that led Congress to pass Section 230 in the first
place. To avoid liability, some platforms have resorted to either filtering
everything related to sex or sitting on their hands so they cannot be said
to have knowingly facilitated sex trafficking.159 That is the opposite of
what the drafters of Section 230 claimed to want—responsible content
moderation practices.
While we sympathize with the impulse to address particularly
egregious harms, the best way to reform Section 230 is not through a
piecemeal approach. The carveout approach is inevitably underinclusive, establishing a normative hierarchy of harms that leaves other
harmful conduct to be addressed another day. Such an approach would
require Section 230’s exceptions to be regularly updated, an impractical
option given the slow pace of congressional efforts and partisan deadlock.160
B. A Modest Proposal—Speech, Not Content
In light of the observations made in Part II.A., one simple reform
of Section 230 would be to make explicitly clear that the statute’s protections only apply to speech. The statutory fix is simple: replace the
157
158
159
160

Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 1693, 115th Cong. (2017).
See id.
See Citron & Jurecic, supra note 12.
See Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, supra note 31.
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word “information” in (c)(1) with the word “speech.” Thus, that section
of the statute would read:
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker: No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any speech provided by another information content
provider.
This revision would put all parties in a Section 230 case on notice that
the classification of content as speech is not a given, but a fact to be
demonstrated. If a platform cannot make a showing that the content or
information at issue is speech, then it should not be able to take advantage of Section 230 immunity.
C. Excluding Bad Samaritans
Another effective and modest adjustment would involve amending
Section 230 to exclude bad actors from its legal shield. There are a few
ways to do this. One possibility would be to deny the immunity to online
service providers that “deliberately leave up unambiguously unlawful
content that clearly creates a serious harm to others.”161 Another would
be to exclude from the immunity “the very worst actors:” sites encouraging illegality or that principally host illegality. 162 Yet another approach would be to exclude intermediaries who exhibit deliberate indifference to unlawful content or conduct.
A variant on this theme would deny the legal shield to cases involving platforms that have solicited or induced unlawful content. This approach takes a page from intermediary liability rules in trademark and
copyright law. As Stacey Dogan observed in that context, inducement
doctrines allow courts to target bad actors whose business models center on infringement.163 Providers that solicit or induce unlawful content
should not enjoy immunity from liability. This approach targets the
harmful activity while providing breathing space for protected expression.164
A version of this approach is embraced in the SHIELD Act of
2019,165 which one of us (Franks) assisted in drafting and the other (Citron) supported in advising lawmakers on behalf of the Cyber Civil
161

E-mail from Geoffrey Stone, Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., to author (Apr. 8,
2018) (on file with author).
162
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 1, at 177–78 (showing that one of us (Citron) supported this approach as an important interim step to broader reform).
163
See Stacey Dogan, Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion: A Tale of Two Approaches
to Intermediary Trademark Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503, 507–08 (2014).
164
See id. at 508–09.
165
H.R. 2896, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
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Rights Initiative. Because SHIELD is a federal criminal bill, Section
230 could not be invoked to defend violations of it. However, the proposed bill creates a separate liability standard for providers of communications services that effectively grants them Section 230 immunity so
long as the provider does not intentionally solicit, or knowingly and predominantly distribute, content that the provider actually knows is in
violation of the statute.166
D. Conditioning the Legal Shield on Reasonable Content Moderation
There is a broader legislative fix that Benjamin Wittes and one of
us (Citron) have proposed. Under that proposal, platforms would enjoy
immunity from liability if they could show that their content-moderation practices writ large are reasonable. The revision to Section
230(c)(1) would read as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service that takes
reasonable steps to address unlawful uses of its service that
clearly create serious harm to others shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider in any action arising out of the publication of content provided by that information content provider.
If adopted, the question before the courts in a motion to dismiss on Section 230 grounds would be whether a defendant employed reasonable
content moderation practices in the face of unlawful activity that manifestly causes harm to individuals. The question would not be whether
a platform acted reasonably with regard to a specific use of the service.
Instead, the court would ask whether the provider or user of a service
engaged in reasonable content moderation practices writ large with regard to unlawful uses that create serious harm to others.167
Congressman Devin Nunes has argued that reasonableness is a
vague and unworkable policy, 168 while Eric Goldman considers the
166

See SHIELD Act of 2019, H.R. 2896, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019); see also Franks, Revenge
Porn Reform: A View from the Front Lines, supra note 61 (explaining the exception).
167
Tech companies have signaled their support as well. For instance, IBM issued a statement
saying that Congress should adopt the proposal and wrote a tweet to that effect as well. See Ryan
Hagemann, A Precision Approach to Stopping Illegal Online Activities, IBM THINKPOLICY LAB
(July 10, 2019), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/cda-230/ [https://perma.cc/YXN7-3B5V]; see also
@RyanLeeHagemann, TWITTER (July 10, 2019), https://twitter.com/RyanLeeHagemann/status/1149035886945939457?s=20 [https://perma.cc/QE2G-U4LY] (“A special shoutout to @daniellecitron and @benjaminwittes, who helped to clarify what a moderate, compromise-oriented approach to the #Section230 debate looks like.”).
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See User Clip: Danielle Citron Explains Content Moderation, C-SPAN (June 14, 2019),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4802966/user-clip-danielle-citron-explains-content-moderation
[https://perma.cc/B48G-4FYJ] (portraying Congressman Devin Nunes questioning Danielle Keats
Citron at a House Intelligence Committee hearing about deepfakes in June 2018); see also
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proposal a “radical change that would destroy Section 230.” In Goldman’s estimation, “such amorphous eligibility standards” makes “Section 230 litigation far less predictable, and it would require expensive
and lengthy factual inquiries into all evidence probative of the reasonableness of defendant’s behavior.”169
Yes, a reasonableness standard would require evidence of a site’s
content moderation practices. But impossibly vague or amorphous it is
not. Courts have assessed the reasonableness of practices in varied
fields, from tort law to the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures.170 In a wide variety of contexts, the judiciary has
invested the concept of reasonableness with meaning.171 As John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have argued, tort law sets norms of behavior in recognizing wrongful, injury-inflicting conduct, and it empowers
victims to seek redress.172
Courts are well suited to address the reasonableness of a platform’s
speech policies and practices vis-à-vis particular forms of illegality that
cause clear harm to others (at the heart of a litigant’s claims). The reasonableness inquiry would begin with the alleged wrongdoing and liability. To state the obvious, platforms are not strictly liable for all content posted on their sites. Plaintiffs need a cognizable theory of relief to
assert against content platforms. Section 230’s legal shield would turn
on whether the defendant employed reasonable content moderation
practices to deal with the specific kind of harmful illegality alleged in
the suit.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to reasonable content moderation. Reasonableness would be tailored to the harmful conduct alleged
in the case. A reasonable approach to sexual-privacy invasions would
be different from a reasonable approach to spam or fraud. The question
would then be whether the online platform—given its size, user base,
and volume—adopted reasonable content moderation practices vis-à-vis
the specific illegality in the case. Did the platform have clear rules and
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law, 163 PENN. L. REV. 2131,
2135 (2015) (“For a term or a phrase to fall short of clarity because of vagueness is quite different
from having no meaning at all, and both are different from having multiple meanings—being ambiguous.”).
169
See Goldman, supra note 86, at 45.
170
See Zipursky, supra note 168, at 2135 (noting that reasonableness is the hallmark of negligence claims by stating that “[t]he range of uses of ‘reasonableness’ in law is so great that a list is
not an efficient way to describe and demarcate it”).
171
This is not to suggest that all uses of the concept of reasonableness are sound or advisable.
There is a considerable literature criticizing various features of reasonableness inquiries. In this
piece, we endeavor to tackle the most salient critiques of reasonableness in the context of content
moderation practices.
172
JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 29 (2020). Goldberg
and Zipursky contend that tort law is not about setting prices for certain activity or allocating costs
to cheapest cost avoider. Id. at 46–47.
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a process to deal with complaints about illegal activity? What did that
process entail? The assessment of reasonable content-moderation practices would take into account differences among content platforms. A
blog with a few postings a day and a handful of commenters is in a different position than a social network with millions of postings a day.
The social network could not plausibly respond to complaints of abuse
immediately, let alone within a day or two, whereas the blog could. On
the other hand, the social network and the blog could deploy technologies to detect and filter content that they previously determined was
unlawful.173
Suppose a porn site is sued for public disclosure of private facts and
negligent enablement of a crime. The defendant’s site, which hosts hundreds of thousands of videos, encourages users to post porn videos. The
defendant’s terms of service (TOS) ban nonconsensual pornography and
doxing (the posting of someone’s contact information). In the complaint,
the plaintiff alleges that her nude photo and home address were posted
on the defendant’s site without her consent. Following this disclosure,
strangers came to the plaintiff’s house at night demanding sex. One of
those strangers broke into her house. Although the plaintiff immediately reported the post as a TOS violation, defendant did nothing for
three weeks.
Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on Section 230 grounds.
It submits evidence showing that it has a clear policy against nonconsensual pornography and a process to report abuse. Defendant acknowledges that its moderators did not act quickly enough in plaintiff’s case,
but maintains that generally speaking its practices satisfy the reasonableness inquiry. However, defendant offers no evidence showing its engagement in any content moderation at all.
Is there sufficient evidence that the defendant engaged in reasonable content moderation practices so that the court can dismiss the case
against it? Likely no. Yes, the defendant has clearly stated standards
notifying users that it bans nonconsensual pornography. And yet the
site has provided no proof that it has a systematic process to consider
complaints about such illegality. 174 In assessing reasonableness, it
would matter to the court that the site has thousands of videos to moderate. The volume of the content is relevant to the likelihood of potential
harm and the requirements to address such harm. The absence of a

173

See id. (discussing Facebook’s hashing initiative to address nonconsensual distribution of
intimate images).
174
Nonconsensual pornography here would likely amount to tortious activity—the public disclosure of private fact. Also, nonconsensual pornography is now a crime in 46 states, D.C., and
Guam. See 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIV. RTS.
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/KH69-YV7T].
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systematic process to respond to complaints of nonconsensual pornography shows the absence of reasonableness in the site’s practices writ
large.175
A reasonableness standard would not “effectively ‘lock in’ certain
approaches, even if they are not the best or don’t apply appropriately to
other forms of content,” as critics suggest.176 The promise of a reasonableness approach is its elasticity. As technology and content moderation
practices changes, so will the reasonableness of practices. As new kinds
of harmful online activity emerge so will the strategies for addressing
them. At the same time, a reasonableness approach would pave the way
for the development of norms around content moderation practices,
such as having clear policies in place, accessible reporting systems, and
content moderation practices tailored to particular forms of illegality.
A reasonable standard of care will reduce opportunities for abuse
without discouraging further development of a vibrant internet or turning innocent platforms into involuntary insurers for those injured
through their sites. Approaching the problem of addressing online
abuse by setting an appropriate standard of care readily allows differentiation among different kinds of online actors. Websites that solicit
illegality or that refuse to address unlawful activity that clearly creates
serious harm should not enjoy immunity from liability. On the other
hand, platforms that have safety and speech policies that are transparent and reasonably executed at scale should enjoy the immunity from
liability as the drafters of Section 230 intended.
V.

CONCLUSION

Reforming Section 230 is long overdue. With Section 230, Congress
sought to provide incentives for “Good Samaritans” to engage in efforts
to moderate content. That goal was laudable. But market pressures and
morals are not always enough, and they should not have to be.
A crucial component in any reform project is clear-eyed thinking.
And yet clear-eyed thinking about the internet is often difficult. The
Section 230 debate is, like many other tech policy reform projects, beset
by misconceptions. We have taken this opportunity to dispel myths
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We take this example from an interview that one of us (Citron) recently conducted in connection with a book project on sexual privacy. A woman’s nude photo was used in a deepfake sex
video, which was posted on a porn site. The porn site had a policy against nonconsensual pornography but did nothing when victims reported abuse. See Danielle Keats Citron, The End of Privacy:
How Intimacy Became Data and How to Stop It (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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See Masnick, supra note 119.
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around Section 230 so that this reform moment, a long time coming and
anticipated, is not wasted or exploited.

Is There an Anti-Democracy Principle in the
Post- Janus v. AFSCME First Amendment?
Charlotte Garden†

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, Council 31,1 the Supreme Court held that union-represented public sector workers could not be compelled to pay money to the
union that represents them. However, even as the Court affirmed that
public sector labor-relations systems could remain “exactly as they are”2
as long as they did not mandate union dues or fees, the Court also
hinted in dicta that it might not be finished announcing new First
Amendment principles regarding public sector union arrangements.
Specifically, the five-Justice majority also observed that the exclusive
representation system—in which an elected union represents every employee in a bargaining unit—“substantially restricts the rights of individual employees.”3
This observation was enough to prompt dozens of new lawsuits
challenging exclusive representation in the public sector. These cases,
which have uniformly and rightly failed, differ in their specific legal
theories. But they all target collective bargaining and not other public
sector workplace management systems under the First Amendment.
For example, those who argue that exclusive representation by a labor
union is unconstitutional do not—and presumably would not—argue
that it would be unconstitutional for a public employer to hire a management consulting firm to assist it in determining pay and other benefits for groups of workers. Likewise, if employers simply empowered
an internal human resources department to set wages and working conditions, that department would face few constitutional constraints

†

Co-Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Associate Professor of Law,
Seattle University School of Law. For feedback and suggestions on this article, I am grateful to
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jessica Rutter, and the participants in the University of Chicago Legal
Forum symposium, What’s the Harm?: The Future of the First Amendment. I am also grateful to
the Chicago Legal Forum editors for their careful work on this Article.
1 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). The respondent’s name is frequently shortened to “AFSCME.”
2
Id. at 2485 n.27.
3
Id. at 2460.
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regarding whether or to what extent it permitted employee input into
its decisions.
What is the constitutional objection to collective bargaining with
an exclusive representative? As I explain in Part III, the lawyers bringing these cases imply that the answer lies either in the fact that collective bargaining representatives are elected by employees themselves, or
that unions commit themselves to representing the interests of workers,
rather than management. If that is right, then there is a central irony
at the crux of these cases: plaintiffs often couch their arguments in
terms of rights to speech and association, but success could imply that
workers have a constitutional right not to more democratic participation in their workplaces, but instead to have their wages and working
conditions determined unilaterally by their employers.
This Article explores the current wave of First Amendment challenges to the exclusive representation system and other aspects of public sector labor relations, arguing that these systems are constitutional
as a matter of both law and of logic. Part II begins with an overview of
the relevant Supreme Court case law, which mainly dates to the 1970s
and 1980s. It then discusses the Court’s more recent cases holding that
public employees cannot be compelled to pay union fees as a condition
of keeping their jobs—these cases do not concern exclusive representation, but their existence helps to explain why some union opponents
have chosen now to attempt to unsettle the constitutionality of exclusive representation. Part III analyzes some of the arguments common
to the new round of challenges to exclusive representation. This section
focuses first on the arguments that collective bargaining displaces a
right to bargain individually with a public employer, or creates the appearance that represented workers support their union, arguing that
neither premise is accurate. It then turns to the argument that unions
are engaged in state action when they set membership requirements or
determine internal decision-making criteria. This argument—which
the Article argues is unfounded—is the predicate to a set of arguments
that unions cannot exclude nonmembers from their own internal deliberations, leadership, or benefits.
II. THE CHALLENGE TO EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
A. The First Challenges to Exclusive Representation
Public-sector collective bargaining became widespread in the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s.4 Both then and today, virtually

4

SETH D. HARRIS ET AL., MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 64–65
(2d ed. 2016).
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all jurisdictions that permit public sector collective bargaining use what
is known as the exclusive representation system, in which an elected
union is charged with representing every worker in the bargaining
unit.5 In turn, the union owes each represented worker what is known
as the duty of fair representation, which requires the union to treat
workers fairly and not to discriminate based on workers’ individual
characteristics such as race, gender, or union membership.6
The rapid growth of public sector unionization was followed by litigation, including several cases challenging aspects of public sector collective bargaining under the First Amendment. This section recounts
and analyzes those cases. The bottom line is that the Court mostly affirmed that governments were free to decide to handle labor relations
with their public sector workforces through collective bargaining with
an elected exclusive representative. The main exception, in which the
Court imposed limits on states’ choices, involves union dues and fees.
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,7 the Court limited how unions
could finance certain expenses, but it did not question the constitutionality of the underlying logic or structure of bargaining.
This subsection considers the relevant cases chronologically. Collectively, they establish that workers have a right to associate with a
labor union even in the absence of a collective bargaining statute,8 but
also a right to criticize publicly union proposals or the collective bargaining process.9 On the other hand, states also have considerable flexibility: they may adopt the exclusive representation system without
even implicating employees’ First Amendment rights,10 bar rival unions
from accessing channels of communication reserved for the exclusive
representative,11 or refuse to permit union participation in any or all
aspects of workplace governance.12 Finally, in the now-overruled Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education,13 the Court limited how unions could finance activities other than collective bargaining, though it agreed that
governments and unions could jointly require represented workers to
pay for their share of union representation.

5

See Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry Into a “Unique”
American Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 47 (1998).
6
For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the exclusive representation system and the duty of fair representation, see Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 206–07 (2015).
7
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
8
Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
9
City of Madison v. Wis. Emp’t. Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
10
Minnesota State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 274 (1984) (“Knight II ”).
11
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
12
Smith, 441 U.S. at 463–64.
13
431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
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The first of these cases, Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, arose after a union-represented teacher spoke at a
school board meeting in opposition to certain union bargaining proposals, including that represented teachers be required to pay agency
fees. In an administrative complaint, the union alleged that “the board
had engaged in negotiations with a member of the bargaining unit other
than the exclusive collective-bargaining representative,” thereby violating a provision of state law forbidding city employers from striking individual employment contracts with union-represented employees.14
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission agreed that the
school board had committed an unfair labor practice, and ordered that
it “immediately cease and desist from permitting employees, other than
representatives of Madison Teachers, Inc., to appear and speak at meetings of the Board of Education, on matters subject to collective bargaining between it and Madison Teachers Inc.”15 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the Commission’s decision, writing that “[t]he principle
of exclusivity, by definition, forbids certain individuals from speaking
certain things in certain contexts . . . . But the gravity of that evil was
considered outweighed by the necessity to avoid the dangers attendant
upon relative chaos in labor-management relations.”16
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, citing earlier cases holding that
public employees did not “relinquish the First Amendment rights they
would otherwise enjoy as citizens.”17 Then, the Court distinguished
speaking at a school board meeting—something that any citizen of Madison was free to do—with true union negotiations.18 “Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in public meetings to conduct
public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to
discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or the
content of their speech.”19 Likewise, the Court observed that teachers
who objected to union representation could express their views in other
available fora, such as the news media.20
The key here is the Court’s focus on where the relevant speech occurred—at a public-school board meeting—and whether union-represented teachers were disadvantaged as compared to other citizens. In a
14

City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 172, 173 n.4.
Id. at 172–73.
16
City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 231 N.W.2d 206,
212–13 (1975), rev’d and remanded sub nom. City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. Emp’t
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
17
City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 175 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968)).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 176.
20
Id. at 176 n.10.
15
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concurrence joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan emphasized
this point, writing that public employers could hold “closed bargaining
sessions” in which only union representatives could be heard.21
Next, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court held that
union-represented public employees could not be required to contribute
toward the cost of a union’s activities outside of its role as bargaining
representative.22 A large number of scholarly articles discuss Abood and
cases that rely on it, and I will not retread their discussions of Abood’s
holding or consequences. For purposes of this Article, I want to make
only two points about Abood and the exclusive representation system.
First, the decision treated the fact of exclusive representation as a reason that mandatory union agency fees were justifiable,23 as part of what
Cynthia Estlund has called labor law’s “quid-pro-quo.”24 But, as Estlund
also describes, under this view, it is the exclusive representation system
(coupled with the duty of fair representation, which prohibits unions
from discriminating against represented nonmembers) that offers one
basis for agency fees, not the other way around.25 In other words, even
though agency fees help the exclusive representation system function
well, Abood did not suggest that agency fees are a prerequisite to the
constitutionality of exclusive representation.
Second, the Abood Court addressed an argument that bears more
directly on one iteration of the current day challenges to exclusive representation. The Court noted that “[t]he appellants’ complaints also alleged that the Union carries on various ‘social activities’ which are not
open to nonmembers.”26 The Court made this observation in the course
of discussing an issue it ultimately left for another day—which union
activities fell into the category of expenses that were germane to its role
as representative, and were therefore chargeable. But with the allegation left undeveloped, the Court simply noted that “[i]t is unclear to
what extent such activities fall outside the Union’s duties as exclusive
representative or involve constitutionally protected rights of association.27 The Court did not say whose rights of association were at issue,
21

Id. at 178.
431 U.S. at 236 (discussing “drawing lines between collective-bargaining activities, for
which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining,
for which such compulsion is prohibited”).
23
Id. at 221–22 (“The designation of a union as exclusive representative carries with it great
responsibilities . . . . A union-shop arrangement has been though to distribute fairly the cost of
these activities among those who benefit . . . .”).
24
Estlund, supra note 6, at 206.
25
Id. at 217–218 (describing the “free rider” problem that would result from a system in which
unions are required to fairly represent each worker in a bargaining unit, but foreclosed from requiring them to pay their share).
26
Abood, 431 U.S. at 236 n.33.
27
Id. (emphasis added).
22
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but it would have been logical for the Court to think that a union, as a
private association, had a First Amendment right to refuse to associate
socially with represented nonmembers.28
Next, the Court addressed whether the First Amendment required
public employers to allow a role for public sector unions in workplace
governance. In Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local
1315,29 the Court rejected a union’s argument that it violated the First
Amendment for the State Highway Commission to refuse to “consider a
grievance unless the employee submits his written complaint directly
to the designated employer representative.”30 While observing that the
Commission’s rule would be inconsistent with labor statutes applicable
in other jurisdictions, the Court held that it did not violate—or even
implicate—the First Amendment. “[T]he First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond
to, or in this context, to recognize the [union] and bargain with it.”31
However, in the course of ruling against the union, the Court also
wrote that the Commission did not “prohibit[] its employees from joining together in a union, or from persuading others to do so, or from advocating any particular ideas.” If it had, the Court continued, it would
give rise to a “claim of retaliation or discrimination proscribed by the
First Amendment.”32 This language suggests that public sector employers may not refuse to hire or otherwise retaliate against public employees based on their union membership. Likewise, it suggests that, at a
minimum, unions and public employees have the right to advocate on
workplace issues in whatever fora are available to them, even though
public employers are not required to open channels that are otherwise
closed for communication.
The Court again dealt with the relationship between closed channels of communication and union representation in Perry Education
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.33 There, a rival union challenged
a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that required the district to allow its teachers’ elected exclusive representative access to the
in-school mail delivery system, while denying access to competing unions.34

28

Other cases confirm this right to exclude. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–
48 (2000) (discussing contours of this right).
29
441 U.S. 463 (1979).
30
Id. Arkansas demanded that employees themselves handle the potentially stressful process
of submitting a grievance, instead of allowing the union to take that step. Id.
31
Id. at 465.
32
Id.
33
460 U.S. 37 (1983).
34
Id. at 40–41.
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This time, the Court found that the rival union’s First Amendment
rights were implicated by the differential access policy,35 but then
turned to the characteristics of the mailboxes themselves. The Court
held that the mailboxes were a “nonpublic forum,” which meant that
the school could “reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker’s view.”36 Viewing the case through the lens of stateas-property-owner,37 the Court held that as long as the district did not
convert the mailboxes to a designated public forum by allowing indiscriminate access for the public, the school district was free to privilege
an exclusive representative’s access over a rival union’s. And while a
state’s discretion to exclude would-be speakers from a nonpublic forum
does not extend to viewpoint discrimination, the Court held that the
exclusion was viewpoint neutral; this conclusion was buttressed by the
fact that the employees, not the school, were charged with choosing the
exclusive representative that would in turn receive mailbox access. At
the same time, the Court observed that “exclusion of the rival union
may reasonably be considered a means of insuring labor peace within
the schools,” and deterring “inter-union squabbles.”38
Perry Education Association is different than some of the other
cases discussed in this section because it involved state control over one
channel of communication between a union and teachers, rather than
communication between the union and the state itself. In Smith and
Madison, the Court grappled with when the state, itself an unwilling
audience, was free to close its metaphorical ears to an unwanted message. Perry more directly involved listeners’ rights in addition to speakers’ rights—some teachers may have liked to hear from the Local Educators’ Association, while others would have tossed its missives in the
trash.
A closely related concern prompted a dissent by four justices who
would have held that the mailbox restriction was viewpoint discriminatory.39 But the dissenting justices focused on the Perry Education Association’s likely reason for wanting to exclude the Local Education Association,40 raising the question of whether or when it is appropriate to
35

Id. at 44 (“There is no question that constitutional interests are implicated by denying
PLEA use of the interschool mail system.”).
36
Id. at 46.
37
Id. (“[T]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
38
Id. at 52.
39
Id. at 65.
40
Id. (“On a practical level, the only reason for the petition to seek an exclusive access policy
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impute the reasoning of the union—a private organization that by definition cannot violate the First Amendment—to the school district.
The last case in the series discussed in this Section is also the one
that deals with exclusive representation most directly. Minnesota State
Board for Community Colleges v. Knight 41 involved a challenge by a
public employee to a “meet and confer” statute that required the state
to discuss topics that fell outside of the state’s collective bargaining process with its employees’ union or (if there was no union) other representative.42 Inversely, the statute prohibited state employers from either negotiating or conferring with employees individually or with other
representatives.43 The plaintiffs in Knight were state university employees who wanted their own seat at the bargaining table and in the
“meet and confer” process.44
Knight made two trips to the Supreme Court. In the first, the Court
summarily affirmed a decision of a three-judge district court that it was
lawful for the state to exclude parties other than elected union representatives from collective bargaining.45 In the second, the Court upheld
Minnesota’s meet-and-confer statute in an opinion that focused on public employers’ rights to control which parties may participate in nonpublic forums.46
The plaintiffs in Knight objected to the fact that the statute also
restricted public employers from either bargaining or conferring with
represented employees except through their elected representative—
that is, the suit challenged the state’s decision to create a channel of
communication to which only an elected representative would have access.47 On the other hand, the state did not limit what represented public employees could say in public settings or private settings to which
they could gain access; for example, they were free to criticize employer
or union positions on topics of collective bargaining or collective conferencing in any available forum.48

is to deny its rivals access to an effective channel of communication.”).
41
465 U.S. 271 (1984).
42
Id. at 274. Unlike the state’s separate collective bargaining law, the meet-and-confer statute
did not require the state to bargain in good faith over covered topics. Rather, the statute created a
channel for employees to provide input through their chosen representatives. Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 278.
45
Knight v. Minn. Cmty. Coll. Faculty Ass’n, 460 U.S. 1048 (1983) (“Knight I ”).
46
Knight II, 465 U.S. at 280.
47
Id. at 275.
48
Id. (noting that “nothing in PELRA restricts the right of any public employee to speak on
any ‘matter related to the conditions or compensation of public employment or their betterment’
as long as doing so ‘is not designed to and does not interfere” with the exclusive representative’s
rights or duties).

77]

IS THERE AN ANTI-DEMOCRACY PRINCIPLE POST- JANUS?

85

The Knight II Court upheld the collective conferencing statute, ultimately writing that the plaintiffs’ argument was less compelling than
the (also unsuccessful) challenge in Perry Education Association.49 The
difference was that, whereas Perry Education Association involved a
claim of access to a nonpublic forum, the Knight plaintiffs “claim[ed] an
entitlement to a government audience for their views.”50 The Court emphasized that government bodies are free to decide whom to consult,
and that the decision to solicit “outside” advice from one voice does not
create an obligation to listen to competing outside views.51 The alternative, the Court continued, could create an unworkable morass for both
policymaking parts of government and for the courts, because “[g]overnment makes so many policy decisions affecting so many people that it
would likely grind to a halt were policymaking constrained by constitutional requirements on whose voices must be heard.”52 Thus, the Court’s
conclusion rested on two premises. First, that as a doctrinal and theoretical matter, the First Amendment does not guarantee a government
audience—there is no such thing as a First Amendment right to participate in private deliberations of government. And second, that as a practical matter, “the government could not work” if the First Amendment
required it to listen to either nobody or everybody.53
Finally, the Court also rejected two arguments that—as Part III
discusses—also appear in the new set of challenges to exclusive representation. First, the fact that the Faculty Association did not choose the
plaintiffs—individuals who objected to the Association’s positions—to
represent it in its deliberations with the state “no more unconstitutionally inhibits [plaintiffs’] speech than voters’ power to reject a candidate
for office inhibits the candidate’s speech.”54 And second, the meet-andconfer statute did not violate the plaintiffs’ associational rights, even
though its functioning meant that they “may well feel some pressure to
join the exclusive representative” in order to participate in its advocacy.55
Knight II was not unanimous—Justices Brennan, Stevens, and
Powell dissented, with Justices Brennan and Stevens writing separate
opinions. Justice Brennan saw the case through the lens of academic
freedom, and he objected to the faculty’s choice either to join the Faculty
49

Id. at 281.
Id. at 282.
51
Id. at 284–85.
52
Id. at 285.
53
See generally Nikolas Bowie, The Government-Could-Not-Work Doctrine, 105 VA. L. REV. 1
(2019) (discussing cases in which the Court has reasoned that its outcome is necessary to the government’s ability to function).
54
Knight II, 465 U.S. at 289.
55
Id. at 289–90.
50
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Association, or be excluded from meet-and-confer sessions.56 It is unclear whether he would have dissented from a similar majority opinion
involving non-academic workers, or even public school teachers who
worked in a K-12 setting. Justice Brennan also emphasized that his objection did not extend to collective bargaining settings, because of “the
state’s compelling interest in reaching an enforceable agreement, an interest that is best served when the state is free to reserve closed bargaining sessions to the designated representative of a union selected by
public employees.”57
Justice Stevens’s dissent, which Justices Brennan and Powell each
joined in part, reasoned that “the First Amendment does not permit any
state legislature to grant a single favored speaker an effective monopoly
on the opportunity to petition the government.”58 Thus, Justice Stevens
would have required the state to satisfy strict scrutiny before excluding
the plaintiffs from the meet-and-confer process. However, he also noted
that collective bargaining was different, citing Abood.59
Knight II settled things for almost 30 years. As the next section
discusses, in 2012, the Supreme Court’s conservative-leaning justices
suggested they were open to new arguments regarding public sector labor relations. That suggestion arose in a case that, like Janus, was focused on union dues and fees. But union opponents soon began to push
against other aspects of public-sector labor relations, including the exclusive representation system. Outside of the agency fee context, these
arguments have gotten nearly no traction, although they have been percolating in dozens of cases.
B. New Challenges to Exclusive Representation
In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 100060 that union-represented public workers
who were not union members had to affirmatively consent before they
could be charged a mid-year fees increase.61 I have criticized Knox in
detail elsewhere,62 but its main significance for this Article was as a
triggering mechanism. By signaling that the Court was open to expanding the rights of union-represented nonmembers,63 Knox prompted a
new round of exclusive representation challenges.
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 295–96 (discussing “the free exchange of ideas at institutions of higher learning”).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 315–16.
567 U.S. 298 (2012).
Id. at 321.
See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, Meta Rights, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 855 (2014).
Knox, 567 U.S. at 311 (referring to Abood as an “anomaly”). But perhaps more importantly,
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One of those challenges became the Supreme Court’s next major
decision concerning public sector unions, Harris v. Quinn.64 The Harris
Court held that union-represented “partial-” or “quasi-” public employees could not be required to pay agency fees to their elected union representative.65 In the District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the case focused on this issue, in addition
to procedural and justiciability issues that are not relevant to this Article.66 However, the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in 2011, and the
Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in the case until 2013—shortly
after the Court’s decision in Knox.
In the Supreme Court, the Harris plaintiffs sought to raise the constitutionality of exclusive representation alongside their agency fee arguments. For example, they wrote in their opening brief that “requir[ing] providers to accept [an elected union] as their ‘exclusive
representative’ . . . infringes on their associational rights, as it inextricably affiliates them with the Union’s petitioning, speech, and policy
positions.”67 This argument proceeded in two steps. First, the plaintiffs
argued that their First Amendment rights were implicated because a
mandatory agency relationship links union-represented workers to the
union’s speech. Then—echoing both the Knight plaintiffs and Justice
Stevens’s dissent in that case—the Harris plaintiffs argued that the
State was required to satisfy strict scrutiny in order to justify infringing
associational rights, but that “[t]he State has no interest in suppressing
providers’ ability to petition it through diverse associations.”68 Here, the
Harris plaintiffs analogized collective bargaining to lobbying, arguing
that “the expressive activity is identical.”69
The argument seemed to get off to a rocky start for the Harris plaintiffs, with Justice Scalia asking a series of skeptical-sounding questions
about whether public sector employees really had a First Amendment
right to demand that their employers listen to them:
Knox gave the petitioners more relief than they requested, signaling that union objectors should
make more ambitious requests of the Court. For a more detailed accounting of the litigation in
Knox, see Garden, supra note 62 at 876–77.
64
573 U.S. 616 (2014).
65
Id. at 656. “Partial” or “quasi” public employees are those who are jointly employed by a
government and a private individual or organization; for example, the plaintiffs in Harris were
home healthcare providers who were paid by the state but directed in their day-to-day work by
individual customers.
66
See Harris v. Quinn, No. 10-cv-02477, 2010 WL 4736500, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2010),
aff’d in part, remanded in part, 656 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 573 U.S. 616 (2014), and rev’d in part sub nom, Harris v. Rauner, 601 F. App’x 452 (7th
Cir. 2015) (listing issues presented in the case); Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 693–94 (7th Cir.
2011) (same).
67
Brief for Petitioners at 37, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681).
68
Id. at 39.
69
Id. at 41 (emphasis in original).
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Suppose you have a policeman who . . . is dissatisfied with his
wages. So he makes an appointment with the . . . police commissioner, and he goes in and grouses about his wages. He does this
. . . 10 or 11 times. And the commissioner finally is fed up, and
he tells his secretary, I don’t . . . want to see this man again. Has
he violated the Constitution?70
Counsel for Harris replied, “No, because . . . with an individual speaking, it’s . . . a matter of private or internal proprietary matter that, under this Court’s precedents, [doesn’t] rise to a matter of public concern.”71 Later, Justice Sotomayor asked whether there was “anything
wrong with the State saying, ‘we’re not going to negotiate with any employee who’s not a member of the union?’”72 Harris’s counsel answered
“no,” and he later elaborated that “[u]nder Knight, the State can choose
who it bargains with.”73
Perhaps because of that exchange, the Harris Court did not ultimately discuss the briefed exclusive representation argument at all, instead stating that “Petitioners do not contend that they have a First
Amendment right to form a rival union. Nor do they challenge the authority of the [elected union] to serve as the exclusive representative of
all of the personal assistants.”74
The Court’s next (and most recent) case about public sector unions
is Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31.75 Janus overruled Abood, holding that public sector
employers and unions could not require represented workers to pay an
agency fee as a condition of employment. As in Knox and Harris, Justice
Alito wrote for the majority. Of significance for this Article, the majority
opinion assumed the existence of exclusive representation, asserting repeatedly that unions would continue to serve as exclusive representatives for groups of employees even without agency fees.76 Further, the
majority wrote that—aside from having to discontinue mandatory
agency fees—“[s]tates can keep their labor-relations systems exactly as
they are.”77 Given that the Janus opinion spent considerable time discussing exclusive representation, this statement suggests that the majority did not see that aspect of labor relations systems as legally problematic.
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681).
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Harris, 573 U.S. at 649.
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
See, e.g., id. at 2480, 2483.
Id. at 2486 n.27.
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On the other hand, the majority also sent two contradictory signals.
First, the opinion stated that exclusive representation “substantially
restricts the rights of individual employees,” because “this designation
means that individual employees may not be represented by any agent
other than the designated union; nor may individual employees negotiate directly with their employer.”78 Later, it characterized exclusive representation as “a significant impingement on associational freedoms
that would not be tolerated in other contexts”79—a statement that is
reminiscent of the Knox majority’s characterization of Abood as “something of an anomaly—one that we have found to be justified by the interest in furthering ‘labor peace.’ But . . . an anomaly nonetheless.”80
However, the Janus majority did not elaborate on either of these statements, and it did not cite Knight II or other cases on associational freedoms—in fact, Knight II is not cited a single time in Janus.
Knox, Harris, and Janus offer at least a tentative signal to union
objectors and opponents that the Court’s conservative majority is open
to arguments that various aspects of public sector labor relations violate
the First Amendment. Unsurprisingly, this has led to a large number
of new cases arguing that exclusive representation is unconstitutional.
The next subsection discusses the main arguments in those cases. To
be clear, these arguments have rightly received a chilly reception in the
federal courts so far—but the same was true of cases arguing that
Abood should not be applied to home healthcare workers, or should be
overturned, until conservative Supreme Court majorities in Harris and
Janus adopted those positions. Thus, the remainder of this Article offers an analysis of, and conceptual rejoinder to, those arguments.
III. ASSESSING THE NEW ARGUMENTS ABOUT EXCLUSIVE
REPRESENTATION
There are dozens of post-Knox cases that challenge aspects of exclusive representation in the public sector.81 Rather than attempting to
catalogue each of them, this section discusses a handful of representative cases, focusing on two lines of argument in particular.82 The first
78

Id. at 2460.
Id. at 2478.
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Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012).
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This Article focuses on First Amendment challenges, but some cases also raise other arguments, such as an argument that exclusive representation violates federal antitrust law. See, e.g.,
Crockett v. NEA-Alaska, 376 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1009–10 (D. Alaska 2019) (describing and rejecting
an antitrust argument).
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These cases also vary in terms of the workers involved. Some follow the Harris Court’s
distinction between regular public employees and “partial” or “quasi” public employees who are
paid by the state but directed in their day-to-day duties by private organizations or individual
clients. See, e.g., Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043
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line insists that the First Amendment is violated when a public employer designates a union as representative for an employee, because
doing so puts the union’s words in the employee’s mouth. These arguments focus mainly on the relationship between the union and the employer, but fail to make a legal and factual case that the link between a
union and a represented worker counts as compelled association, or its
appearance. Second, other cases argue that union membership incentives or other practical constraints on workers’ choices about union
membership violate the First Amendment. These cases argue that exclusive representation requires unions to grant represented nonmembers all the same rights and benefits that usually come with union
membership, including rights to participate in union governance. This
argument faces the opposite difficulty from the first set—it links the
union and its members, but excludes the government, meaning that the
state action necessary to trigger constitutional protection is not present.
A. Exclusive Representation as Compelled Speech or Association?
Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Organization83 is representative of the
first set of arguments. In a petition for a writ of certiorari that the Supreme Court denied in April 2019, the petitioner echoed the Harris
plaintiffs in arguing that the problem with exclusive representation is
that it requires “compelled representation” of public sector workers,84
and that it results in workers being “forced to accept [a union’s] speech,
made on their behalf by a state-appointed representative, as their
own.”85
The petitioner in Uradnik was a professor employed by a public
university in Minnesota. Uradnik challenged the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act86—the same statute that was at issue in
Knight87—although she focused on the collective bargaining provision
that had been summarily approved by the Supreme Court in Knight I
rather that the meet-and-confer provision that was discussed in greater
detail in Knight II.

(2019) (exclusive representation challenge involving home healthcare providers). In the next Section, I note a few instances in which plaintiffs develop arguments that the First Amendment analysis should turn on their partial public employee status.
83
No.18-1895, 2018 WL 4654751 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2018), summarily aff’d, No. 18-3086 (8th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1618 (2019).
84 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Org., 139 S. Ct. 1618 (2019)
(No. 18-719) https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-719/74002/20181204095722857_U
SSC%20Petition%20for%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GE5-8G8N].
85
Id. at 2–3.
86
MINN. STAT. § 179A.06–08 (2019).
87
Id. at 10.
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Uradnik’s petition began by attempting to distinguish Knight, arguing that although Knight upheld a state’s ability to exclude persons
from a meet-and-confer session, it had not approved “compelled representation,” because the plaintiffs had focused only on the former and
not the latter. The main problem with this system, according to
Uradnik, was that Minnesota law treated an elected union as the “representative” of all employees in a bargaining unit, whether or not each
employee actually agreed with the union’s positions.88 Or, as Uradnik
put it, “when the Union speaks, it is speaking for the Petitioner, putting
words in her mouth.”89 This representation, Uradnik reasoned, violated
the Court’s precedents about compelled speech and compelled association because exclusive representation could not be justified by any sufficiently compelling interest, nor was it narrowly tailored to any such
potential interest.90
Each iteration of this argument is premised on the idea that exclusive representation either actually compels or restricts public employees’ speech or association, or that it creates the false appearance of
speech or association by, for example, causing third parties to believe
the employee is a union supporter. But that premise is flawed as both a
matter of case law and of logic. A union’s relationship to represented
workers is more like a voter’s relationship to an elected government
than it is to a lawyer’s relationship to a client. No reasonable observer
would attribute a government’s views to each voter—of course, the voter
might have preferred different representatives. In the same way, no
reasonable observer would assume that every union-represented
worker supports the union’s positions.
Many courts have correctly relied on Knight II to conclude that exclusive representation does not involve actual compelled speech or association.91 The key is that unions may not require represented workers
to join them, nor may they bar represented workers from joining other
organizations. Likewise, unions cannot compel represented workers to
tow the metaphorical line during negotiations, or to walk the literal
picket line during a strike. As the Knight II Court put it, exclusive representation “in no way restrained appellees’ . . . freedom to associate or
not to associate with whom they please, including the exclusive
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Id. at 14 (citing MINN. STAT. § 179A).
Id.
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Id. at 16–17.
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See, e.g., Mentele v. Inslee, 916 F.3d 783, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2019); Bierman v. Dayton, 900
F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019); Hill v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 850
F.3d 861, 866 (7th Cir. 2017); Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 F. App’x 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2016); D’Agostino v.
Baker, 812 F.3d 240, 244 (1st Cir. 2016); Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass’n, 371 F. Supp. 3d 431
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representative.”92 That much is underscored by the Court’s holding in
Madison v. WERC that a union-represented employee had the same
freedom as any other citizen (or as any other public employee) to express her views in any available forum, including views that her employer should reject union bargaining proposals.93
Even beyond the fact that union representation does not limit represented workers’ rights to join other organizations or express themselves in opposition to the union, there are also multiple senses in which
union representation enhances—rather than detracts from—opportunities for workers to make themselves heard, even if they are union opponents. First, there is the fact that unions are elected (and can later be
rejected) through a democratic process, and if a union is elected then
collective bargaining replaces other methods by which employers impose wages and working conditions, which are often unilateral and autocratic.94 Second, as a practical matter, union representation tends to
lead to working conditions that are conducive to employee speech. For
example, union-represented workers tend to earn a wage premium, and
union contracts often contain provisions related to job security, seniority, scheduling, and other matters that make work more predictable and
less precarious.95 Perhaps most important, collective bargaining agreements usually limit the grounds on which an employee can be fired, and
include a disciplinary process. These conditions usually aren’t a formal
“right to speak out,” but they are speech-enhancing. For example, predictable schedules make it easier for workers to plan to attend government town-halls and other fora, campaign for a preferred candidate,
and otherwise participate in civic life.96 And protections against arbitrary termination can help workers feel confident that they won’t be
retaliated against at work if they take an unpopular position, either in
the public square, or in water-cooler conversation with co-workers.
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Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 288 (1984).
429 U.S. at 174–75.
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See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND
WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 57 (2017) (discussing scope of employer power over wages and
working conditions).
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See Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1067
(2018) (discussing the union wage premium in the context of represented workers’ First Amendment rights); see also Estlund, supra note 6, at 218 (observing that if a union represented employee
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Does collective bargaining displace a right to individual bargaining?

Opponents of exclusive representation sometimes frame their challenge in a way that suggests that union representation means objectors
are losing the right to negotiate on their own behalf. For example, the
employee plaintiffs in Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations
Board,97 discussed further in the next subsection, wrote that “the government . . . extinguishes the Educators’ right to represent themselves
with their employers.”98 Similarly, the challengers in another recent
case, Bierman v. Dayton, “allege[d] that [exclusive representation] violates their First Amendment right to choose who speaks for them in
their relations with the State.”99
If public employees truly had a legal right to negotiate with their
employer, then it would follow that electing an exclusive representative
extinguished an opportunity for speech that public employees would
otherwise have had. But recent Supreme Court cases have rejected that
premise.100 For example, in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,101 the
Court held that the First Amendment right to petition—like the First
Amendment right to free speech—does not protect a public employee’s
complaints and requests of their employer unless those complaints or
requests are about a matter of public concern.102 And in Connick v. Myers,103 the Court made clear that most workplace problems—including
those related to “confidence and trust . . . in various supervisors, the
level of office morale, and the need for a grievance committee”104—do
not rise to the level of matters of public concern.
Further, there are no signs that the Court is likely to shift on this
point. To the contrary, Justice Alito—the author of the majority opinions in Knox, Harris, and Janus—emphasized during oral argument
that public employees have no First Amendment right to seek better
treatment from their supervisors: “I suppose that [a public sector
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Branch v. Dep’t of Labor Relations, Commonwealth Emp’t Relations Bd., 120 N.E.3d 1163
(Mass. 2019), cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020).
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Branch v. Dep’t of Labor Relations, Commonwealth
Emp’t Relations Bd., 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020) (No. 19-51).
99
Appellants’ Brief at *I, Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-1244).
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To be clear, I am not suggesting that it would be constitutionally impermissible for a public
employer to negotiate with an individual employee, or that public employers never voluntarily
negotiate with individual employees or job applicants. My point is simply that the alternative to a
system of exclusive representation is not necessarily one in which individual employees negotiate
with their employers.
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564 U.S. 379 (2011).
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Id. at 382–83.
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461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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Id. at 148.

94

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

employer] has a perfect right to say: Enough is enough; I don’t want to
meet with you for the fifth time or for the first time.”105 Then, in Janus,
the Court majority took care to avoid calling into question Guarnieri,
Connick, and other cases concerning the limited First Amendment
rights of individual public employees. Instead, the Court wrote that
while it is a matter of only private concern when a single employee requests a raise, “a public-sector union’s demand for a 5% raise for many
thousands of employees it represents” would qualify as a public concern
because of the potential budgetary effects, were the employer to agree
to such a demand.106 As a result, public employers would not violate the
First Amendment if they decided to ignore or even punish employees
attempting to use workplace channels to negotiate on their own behalves.107
2.

Does exclusive representation create an appearance of union
support?

Even if exclusive representation does not restrict speech or association, it might still implicate the First Amendment if it creates the false
appearance that represented workers were union supporters.108 For example, the plaintiffs in Harris argued that the fact that an exclusive
representative union owed them the duty of fair representation was
enough to “affiliate[] them with the Union’s petitioning, speech, and policy positions.”109 In their reply brief, the plaintiffs similarly argued that
Illinois had “dictate[d] . . . who shall speak for every provider by designating an exclusive representative to petition for them . . . thrust[ing]
providers into a fiduciary relationship with” the union.110 The lynchpin
of that argument seems to be the “fiduciary relationship” between a
105

Supra note 70, at 10 (emphasis added).
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472–73. (2018). The correctness of the
Court’s approach is beyond the scope of this Article, but I have critiqued it elsewhere. See Charlotte
Garden, Speech Inequality after Janus v. AFSCME, 95 IND. L.J. 269, 288–89 (2020).
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Many states that allow public sector collective bargaining also protect by statute the ability
of union-represented workers to raise grievances directly with their employers. For example, Massachusetts law states that an “employee may present a grievance to his employer and have such
grievance heard without intervention by the exclusive representative,” though the public employer
cannot resolve the grievance in a way that is inconsistent with an applicable collective bargaining
agreement. MASS. G.L. c. 150E § 5.
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See Seana V. Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW U. L. REV.
839, 851–52 (discussing First Amendment “rulings [that] protect individuals from having to attest
to beliefs that they reject and thus from having others wrongly associate them with those beliefs”).
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Brief for Petitioners at 37, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681),
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Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681),
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union and represented workers, which the Harris plaintiffs argued was
enough to “inextricably affiliate[] them with the union’s petitioning and
policy positions.”111 The petitioner in Uradnik made a similar argument, focused on statutory language referring to an elected union as the
“representative” of employees in the bargaining unit, and reasoning
that a “representative” speaks for the person they represent.112
In other words, the argument is: if a union can truthfully say it is
a worker’s “representative,” then others would assume that the union’s
positions are also the positions of the represented worker. But that argument relies on a specific version of “representation,” similar to that
undertaken by lawyers or hired spokespeople. But elected representatives also “represent” their constituents—though they do not speak for
them. Only the first type of “representative” can reasonably be regarded
as speaking for those they represent—for example, judges and opposing
counsel will attribute an attorney’s statements to their client, and a client whose attorney makes an admission or concedes a point during oral
argument cannot usually take a different position later. Instead, their
remedy is usually to assert in a later court proceeding or a bar complaint that the attorney breached their duty as the client’s representative.
If union representation worked like attorney representation, then
it would make sense to argue that the union’s speech put words in the
mouths of represented workers. But union representation is crucially
different. First, recall that neither private- nor public-sector unions
may compel represented workers to join the union as a condition of
keeping their job, and in the public sector (as well as in states with
“right-to-work” laws), unions also cannot compel represented nonmembers to pay anything towards the costs of the costs of union representation. And, while unions have a duty of fair representation to all represented workers, their performance of their duty is evaluated according
to a flexible standard that recognizes that some represented workers
may flatly disagree with some or all union decisions.113 This disagreement can be both forceful and public—for example, the union’s brief opposing certiorari in Uradnik cited evidence reflecting Uradnik’s frequent and public opposition to the union’s positions.114
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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Org., 139 S. Ct. 1618 (2019)
(No. 18-719).
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Further, unions negotiate collective bargaining agreements in their
own names; workers are third-party beneficiaries rather than parties.115 This means that although workers benefit from union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements, they cannot be bound by the union to honor its provisions. For example, a union that calls a strike in
violation of a no-strike clause can be enjoined116—but an employer cannot successfully sue striking employees for breach of contract, even if
they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement that contains a
no-strike clause.117 In contrast, a lawyer who negotiates a contract is
typically doing so on behalf of a client, who will then become a party
with obligations that can be enforced by the other party.
These differences make attorney representation a poor analogy for
union representation. Instead, as the First Circuit observed in the
course of rejecting a challenge to exclusive representation, “once [a union] becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for a bargaining unit, [it]
must represent the unit as an entity . . . solely for the purposes of collective bargaining.”118 This makes representation by an elected official
a closer analogy. Voters are entitled to vote for or against a candidate,
but they will be stuck with the results of the election unless they move
out of the jurisdiction. The winning candidate will then have significant
(but not unlimited) latitude to implement their policy preferences; there
is no legally enforceable duty of fair representation, but elected officials
generally may not discriminate or retaliate against their opponents’
supporters.119
Given these rules, it would be irrational to think that everyone who
lives in a jurisdiction supports their elected officials—inevitably, some

139 S. Ct. 1618 (2019) (No. 18-719), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-719/93384/2
0190327130415676_18-719_bio_Inter_Faculty_Organization.3.27.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A9KACJ8] (“Petitioner’s disagreements with the IFO and its views are well known on campus.”).
115
See Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525,
538–39 (1969) (“Professor Corbin treats collective agreements as contracts made for the benefit of
third persons, and quite properly so. The union and the employer clearly intend to provide benefits
for the individual employees, and the individual employees acquire legally enforceable rights under the agreement.”).
116
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254–55 (1970).
117
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 408–09 (1981) (holding that the employer was not entitled to recover damages from employees who engaged in strike that was in
violation of a contractual no-strike clause); United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 951
v. Mulder, 31 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing ability of employees to sue—but not be
sued—as third party beneficiaries to a collective bargaining agreement).
118
Reisman v. Associated Faculties of the Univ. of Me., 939 F.3d 409 (1st Cir. 2019) (emphasis
in original).
119
See, e.g., O’Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 714–15 (1996) (“Although
the government has broad discretion in formulating its contracting policies, we hold that the protections of Elrod and Branti extend to an instance . . . where government retaliates against a contractor, or a regular provider of services, for the exercise of rights of political association or the
expression of political allegiance.”).
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voters would have preferred different candidates. In the same way, it
would be irrational to assume that an elected union that owes a duty of
fair representation to each worker in a bargaining unit is in fact taking
positions that each worker prefers. Rather, the union is each worker’s
representative in the political sense—it is the representative chosen in
a likely contested election, and it is bound to advocate for its view of
what workplace conditions will advance workers’ interests within the
confines of the duty of fair representation.
3.

Do union elections trigger First Amendment scrutiny where
autocratic alternatives do not?

Finally, there is also a more intuitive reason to reject the argument
that exclusive representation either restricts speech or association or
creates the appearance of such a restriction. Consider a non-union public employer facing new budget constraints that compel cuts. The employer might choose to hire a management consultant to give advice
about issues such as whether it would be better to make layoffs or cut
benefits. The consultant—either at the employer’s request or on its own
initiative—might then ask workers about their views and preferences,
and take those views into account when making its recommendations.
In turn, the employer could give negligible or decisive weight to the employees’ views as reported by the consultant.
In much the same way, another public employer that faces a significant amount of workplace turnover might ask a human-resources professional to conduct a series of focus-group-style interviews with current workers. Based on what the employees say in these meetings, the
human resources professional might make recommendations about
what to do, for example that the employer should improve pay, add a
tuition benefit, or change the promotion process.
Do these scenarios give rise to a First Amendment problem? If the
Uradnik and Harris plaintiffs are right about exclusive representation,
then the answer should be yes: both hypothetical employers have asked
others to aggregate and then make representations about employees’
preferences. These employers have also declined to allow employees either to opt out of this process, or to form their own competing advisory
groups. However, that argument seems obviously wrong under the case
law discussed in Part I, and as a matter of logic.
There are two differences on which objector employees would likely
rely to distinguish her arguments from the one in the previous paragraph. First, during collective bargaining, the employer is committed to
bargain over union proposals, rather than to take the consultant’s or
the employees’ recommendations into account to whatever degree it
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chooses.120 But that difference places us squarely back in Knight II territory, by focusing on the employer’s own choice about how to engage
with an employee representative. Second, there is the fact that a union
is elected by employees themselves, and then it owes those employees a
duty of fair representation. That is the difference on which the Harris
and Uradnik plaintiffs focused—implying that, from their perspective,
a First Amendment problem arises only when a public employer does
not behave autocratically enough, instead allowing workers to elect a
bargaining representative. We might then recharacterize the First
Amendment arguments in these cases as seeking a right for public employees to have their wages and working conditions set unilaterally by
their employers.
These arguments should fail, but if they were to succeed, some
plaintiffs might hope that public employers respond by allowing multiple bargaining representatives to sit at the table. First, this approach
would likely serve to empower employers rather than employees.121 And
employers could also respond in at least two other ways. First, they
could decide that bargaining with one or more unions on a membersonly basis is too complicated, and respond by eliminating collective bargaining altogether. Second, they could bargain with an elected union on
a members-only basis. But this scenario would not mean that public
employers would permit other employee representatives or individual
employees to bargain for different working conditions. Far more likely,
employers would find it expedient to unilaterally extend collectivelybargained-for working conditions to cover non-members.122 This
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See Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990 *10–11 (1992) (distinguishing “bilateral” negotiation from other ways that management might solicit input from employees in context of deciding
whether employer had created unlawful “dominated” union).
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outcome would leave objectors with less security in their working conditions by depriving them of a contractual guarantee, while also giving
them fewer opportunities to exercise voice at work. In other words, both
the formal structure of this argument against exclusive representation,
and its likely effect if it is accepted by courts, tends to undermine their
proponents’ abilities to have input over workplace conditions.
This section has argued that exclusive representation neither compels public employees’ speech or association, nor creates the appearance
of compulsion. The next section turns to an argument that does not argue directly that exclusive representation is unconstitutional, but instead challenges union membership incentives or restrictions, on the
theory that they influence public employees’ choices about whether or
not to become union members.
B. State Action in Worker-Union Relations?
This set of arguments focuses on the relationship between unions
and represented workers. It is exemplified by the petition for certiorari
filed in Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.123 The
Branch employees focused on the advantages of union membership over
represented nonmember status, arguing that unions used the services
and benefits offered as a condition of membership to coerce membership.124 The Branch plaintiffs focused on the fact that represented nonmembers could not participate in union democracy, such as voting for
union leadership, voting on certain decisions that the union put to its
membership, and participating in internal union deliberations over topics like negotiation strategies.125 Employees in another case, Bain v.
California Teachers Ass’n, made a similar argument, but focused in part
on union membership incentives such as insurance benefits for which
only union members were eligible.126
These arguments depend on the success of two linked claims: first,
that a public sector union’s relationship with represented workers involves state action, even when the union is not interacting with the government employer but instead setting the terms on which workers may
join; and second, that unions in this posture violate the First Amendment when they constrain represented workers’ choices by excluding
from a bargaining unit for other reasons, such as that they are designated “management and confidential” employees.
123
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Branch v. Dep’t of Labor Relations, Commonwealth
Emp’t Relations Bd., 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020) (No. 19-51), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF
/19/19-51/107367/20190708132424467_Branch%2019-__PetitionForAWritOfCertiorari.pdf [perm
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them from union participation rights or other benefits if they do not join
the union.
The Branch plaintiffs made two arguments on this point. First,
that “[i]f an organization can engage in a specific activity only by government empowerment, then that activity . . . must be one committed
by the government.”127 And second, that the state government “grants
monopoly representation power to the union,” while making “‘direct
dealing’ between government employers and individual employees unlawful.”128 The Branch plaintiffs also argued that Knight should control
the state action question. They reasoned that because Knight assumed
that there was state action when a public employer excluded organizations other than an elected union from its meet-and-confer process,
state action would also be present when “employees seek a voice and a
vote in the collective bargaining process,” including the pre- or postbargaining stage in which the union consults with its members about
bargaining positions. In addition, they argued that the union is “entwined” with the public employer because state law sets the parameters
of the state-union relationship, and that the union is a state actor because it performs functions that have traditionally been performed exclusively by government.
The Bain plaintiffs made a somewhat different argument about
why a union’s decision to offer a membership incentive involved state
action. They posited that “unions intentionally decline to bargain with
school districts for certain critical job benefits that are within their
state-conferred exclusive authority to bargain, and which (if bargained)
would apply to all teachers.”129 In other words, the argument is premised on the allegation that the Bain plaintiffs’ union conspired with the
state to leave “gettable” benefits on the bargaining table so that the union could instead offer those benefits as a membership incentive.
The state action inquiry is a famously flexible one, and it is beyond
the scope of this Article to analyze each line of doctrine that the plaintiffs invoke in various cases. Instead, this Article is limited to two more
conceptual points. First, the argument that public sector unions are
state actors is in tension with Harris and Janus. Second, unions’ adversarial role in public systems of collective bargaining makes them less
likely to qualify as state actors, not more; in this way, public sector unions are analogous to public defenders, who are treated as state actors
only when they directly cause courts to act.
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Supra note 123, at 6.
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Appellants’ Opening Brief at 3–4, Bain v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 891 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2018)
(No. 16-55768), 2016 WL 6649995 at *3–4.
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In Harris, the majority emphasized that the union was a private
organization, likening it to trade groups that “advocate on behalf of the
interests of persons falling within an occupational group,” and asking
why only unions were empowered to charge agency fees.130 And when
the Janus Court addressed the argument that unions should be permitted to charge agency fees because they (unlike other voluntary associations) owed a duty of fair representation to non-members, it wrote that
“it is questionable whether the Constitution would permit a public-sector employer to adopt a collective-bargaining agreement that discriminates against nonmembers.”131 By focusing on employers’—not unions’—potential
constitutional
violations,
this
formulation
differentiates and remains silent about a different question—whether
it would be a constitutional violation for a union to suggest that an employer discriminate against nonmembers.
There also is a deeper inconsistency between the decisions in Harris and Janus, and the argument that a public sector union is a state
actor. In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,132 the Court held that a
program requiring beef producers to pay a mandatory fee to finance generic beef advertising was constitutional because the advertisements
were attributable to the government.133 This was because, in the Court’s
words, citizens “have no First Amendment right not to fund government
speech.”134 The Johanns Court specifically distinguished Abood—the
then-controlling case on public sector agency fees—on the basis that
Abood concerned “exactions to subsidize speech . . . of an entity other
than the government itself.”135 In other words, Johanns stands for the
proposition that individuals can be charged an assessment that funds
government speech, but not private speech. Applying this rule, either
public sector unions are state actors, and there is no constitutional problem with agency fees—which would mean that Harris and Janus were
wrongly decided; or they are private actors, whose dealings with represented workers do not involve state action as a general rule, although
particular instances of union conduct could still qualify as state action.
Public defenders are a useful comparison. Public defender offices
can be government departments, or they can be private attorneys or
agencies that contract with the government to provide services. But in
either case, they are not generally considered to be state actors, even
though there are limited circumstances under which specific actions by
130
131
132
133
134
135

Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014).
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2468 (2018).
544 U.S. 550 (2005).
Id. at 561–62.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 559.
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public defenders might be treated as state action. That was the holding
in Polk County v. Dodson, in which the Court held that even public defenders who were employed directly by the county did not necessarily
act under color of state law just because they were funded by the
state.136 That is in part because they were “not amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as other employees of the State.”137 Instead, public defenders were bound by duties to their clients to exercise
“professional independence” not subject to state control, and typically
in an adversarial posture to other state interests.138
On the other hand, public defenders are treated as state actors
when they exercise government power. Thus, public defenders’ peremptory challenges are treated as state action because those challenges involve “wielding the power to choose a quintessential government
body.”139 Or, to put it another way, by exercising a peremptory challenge, a public defender triggers action by the government body—in
that case, by prompting a judge to excuse a prospective juror. But the
fact that public defenders’ peremptory challenges count as state action
does not convert the other things public defenders do into state action.
Public sector unions are similar: even though state law generally
empowers them to engage in collective bargaining if they are elected as
the exclusive representative of a group of workers, the government cannot direct the positions that unions take in bargaining or grievances, or
the tactics they use to try to convince government employers to agree to
those positions.140 As in the public defender example, this is one reason
that unions are not generally state actors—and in fact, the case for
treating public defenders as state actors is much stronger than the case
for treating public sector unions as state actors, because unions are
never organized as state agencies. In fact, states that allow public sector
collective bargaining often also bar government employers from exercising control over how the unions operate.141
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Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981). In a later case, the Court stated that the
constitutional state actor inquiry is the same as the question whether an entity acts under color
of state law. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 54 n.9 (1992); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830 (1982) (characterizing Dodson as having held that public defenders were not state
actors); Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 304–05 (2001)
(discussing Dodson and observing that “[t]he state-action doctrine does not convert opponents into
virtual agents”).
137
Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321.
138
Id.
139
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 54.
140
For a more extensive discussion of relevant differences and similarities between unions and
public defenders, see Aaron Tang, Life After Janus, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 677, 710–15 (2019).
141
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(A)(2) (West 2020); 115. ILL COMP. STAT. 5/14(a)(2)
(2019).
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In contrast, the state-action requirement is satisfied in public-sector agency-fee cases like Harris and Janus because either state law or
a collective bargaining agreement signed by a public employer requires
union-represented employees to pay the fees. The ability to require a
public-sector employer to take that step is equivalent to exercising a
peremptory challenge, compelling a government entity to dismiss a juror. Likewise, in Knight, state action was present when the Minnesota
government enforced its statute foreclosing anyone other than an
elected union from participating in its conferencing process. However,
a union’s decisions about its own membership requirements or internal
decision-making are more like the public defender’s decisions about how
to represent her clients. The public defender and the union may hope
these decisions will ultimately contribute to a favorable government decision on either a set of wages and working conditions or her clients’
lack of criminal culpability, but they do not have the power to compel a
favorable government decision.
Not only would it be inconsistent with unions’ purposes and structures to treat every union decision as occurring under color of state law,
but unions’ own associational rights militate in favor of allowing unions
to set requirements for membership and to exclude those who do not
qualify. As Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky have detailed, the
Supreme Court has protected a robust right of associations to exclude.142 And while the Court has permitted or required some incursions
on that right to protect dissenting members,143 those incursions have all
come in contexts discussed above—those in which the union is directly
engaged with determining the public employer’s treatment of individual workers. By contrast, unions’ internal deliberations and other internal functions both more squarely implicate the core of unions’ own
associational interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed the new generation of challenges related
to union exclusive representation. So far, these challenges have—appropriately—failed to gain a toehold, and therefore they have had few
real-world consequences. But if these challenges ultimately succeed,
they have the potential to significantly disrupt labor relations in the
public sector. Moreover, it is possible that a holding that exclusive representation is unconstitutional in the public sector would translate into
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Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerisky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox
v. SEIU Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1062–63 (2013).
143
See generally id. (discussing tensions between the Court’s agency fee case law and its cases
on associational freedoms).
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the private sector, where it could be used by anti-union employers to
undermine union contracts.
At the same time, these cases generally suffer from one or more
major conceptual flaws. Some attempt to limit Knight’s reach—but end
up arguing for a worker-disempowering right not to have a say in setting working conditions. Others recast unions as entities that always
act under color of state law—an argument that must seem incomprehensible to the public employers sitting across the bargaining table. For
these reasons, courts should continue to reject the new challenges to
exclusive representation.

Must Free Speech be Harmful?
Leslie Kendrick†

INTRODUCTION
Must free speech be harmful? That is, must the freedom of speech
protect harmful speech? Popular discourse in the United States often
assumes that it must.1 Discussions about hate speech or false speech
frame harm as the price we pay for freedom. Meanwhile, several distinguished scholars have also asserted that the right of freedom of speech
must include protection for harmful speech.2 They claim that, in order
to be either conceptually or normatively significant, any plausible
speech right must protect harmful speech.3 In other words, freedom of
speech must include harm. If it does not, it is not doing its job.
This assertion has the distinction of being at once an old saw, a
sophisticated philosophical argument, and a fairly stunning claim. A
right that must encompass harmful conduct? Why would people say
that harm protection is a necessary feature of a right? And are they
correct?
Protection of harmful conduct is not a necessary feature of any
right, including a free speech right. Considering the relationship between free speech rights and harm clarifies the structure of rights and
shows that, conceptually speaking, there is no reason to conclude that
free speech must protect harmful conduct in order to be meaningful.
That is our choice, and one that few other cultures make, at least in
such strong terms.4 This is not to say that protection for harmful
†

Vice Dean and David H. Ibbeken ‘71 Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia
School of Law. I would like to thank Amy Adler, Will Baude, Danielle Citron, Genevieve Lakier,
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See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Free Speech Isn’t Free, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.t
heatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/free-speech-isnt-free/283672/ [perma.cc/V7UL-73JJ].
2
See infra Part I.
3
Id.
4
Compare Féret v. Belgium, App. No. 15615/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 16, 2009), http://hudoc.e
chr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2800730-3069797 [https://perma.cc/FX88-EXTT] (holding that there
was no violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human

105

106

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

conduct is never justified. It is just not inevitable in the ways commonly
asserted by judges, scholars, and the citizenry. Here, I will identify the
arguments made in support of the view that free speech must include
harm, argue that protection for harmful conduct is not inherent in the
structure of rights generally, and argue finally that special rights such
as freedom of speech need not include protection for harmful conduct.
I.

PERSPECTIVES ON RIGHTS AND HARM

Various important thinkers have asserted that freedom of speech
must protect activity that risks causing harm to other people. In various
ways, they have asserted such protection as a necessary criterion for
any plausible free speech right. Some identify particular activities and
conclude that any plausible free speech principle must protect them,
whether because of their relationship to democratic self-governance, or
to autonomy, or to some other value. Some of the identified activities
involve risks of harm. For example, lawyers and scholars commonly
conclude that freedom of speech must protect dangerous or incendiary
political speech.5 Such speech carries obvious risks of physical and other
types of harm, risks of the kind that make other conduct regulable. Despite these risks, many stipulate that freedom of speech must protect
incendiary political speech—not necessarily to the level of immunity,
but to a higher degree than similarly risky non-speech activity. These
types of arguments have a long doctrinal pedigree, back to Justice
Holmes’s shift from treating subversive speech like any other subversive conduct to reformulating the “clear and present” danger test to protect speech to a higher degree.6 The result of such reasoning is that
Rights for convicting appellant based on distributed leaflets publicly inciting discrimination and
hatred) with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (prohibiting laws restricting incitement to
hatred or violence unless the words or expression at issue create a serious and imminent risk of
harmful conduct). See also Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
5
See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985) (“[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first
amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox
ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically.”); see also Mary Ellen Gale and Nadine Strossen, “The Real ACLU,” 1 YALE J. L. &
FEMINISM, 161, 173 (1989) (“If free speech is to have meaning, it must encompass ‘freedom for the
thought that we hate,’ freedom for the idea, opinion or expression that is unpopular, divergent,
degraded, derided, dangerous, or even pornographic or obscene.”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 348–56 (1993) (arguing that political speech merits protection unless it poses a clear
and present danger to the democratic order); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach
to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 285 (2011) (“[A] decent regime of freedom of
speech must provide a principled and strong form of protection for political speech and, in particular, for incendiary speech.”).
6
Compare Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), with Abrams v. United States, 250
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some speech that carries a risk of harm—a high enough risk to justify
regulation of non-speech conduct—will be protected. When that risk
manifests in harm, the speaker will be insulated from liability. This is
one way in which the freedom of speech can require protection of harmful conduct.
Others begin by developing conceptual criteria for a free speech
right and conclude that freedom of speech must include protection for
harmful conduct.7 One version of this argument contends that free
speech that does not protect harm is not very meaningful. For example,
Professor Thomas Scanlon, in discussing immunity for harm-causing
speech, says that it is “the existence of such cases which makes freedom
of expression a significant doctrine.”8 Similarly, in considering whether
to “accept the principle that speech may be restricted when it causes
harm to others,” Frederick Schauer concludes: “[y]et then what [would
be] the point of a principle of free speech?”9 On this view, if freedom of
speech did not protect harmful conduct, it would not be a significant
right.
Kent Greenawalt makes a similar argument and places it in the
context of a larger theory of rights. Greenawalt begins with a minimal
principle of liberty, which protects all harmless conduct. Within that
context, he develops criteria for a free speech right:
As far as speech is concerned, the minimal principle of liberty
establishes that the government should not interfere with communication that has no potential for harm. To be significant, a
principle of freedom of speech must go beyond this, positing constraints on the regulation of speech which are more robust.10
On this view, a free speech right that did not protect harmful conduct
would not just be insignificant; it would be superfluous.
Like Greenawalt, Ronald Dworkin reasons from a general theory
of rights to the conclusion that free speech must protect harmful

U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7
See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 208
(1972); RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 131 (2013).
8
Scanlon, supra note 7, at 204.
9
See Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1294 (1983); see
also Frederick Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays, 34 L. & PHIL. 119, 135 (2015) (stating that a
plausible free speech right must protect harmful conduct, while reserving judgment on whether
such a right can ultimately be successfully delineated); Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of
Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635, 652 (concluding that, if a free speech right principle exists, it
necessarily entails protection for activity that causes harm).
10
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 10 (1989).
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speech.11 Dworkin defines free speech as a “special right,” one that pertains to a limited set of activities, in contrast to a “general right” that
covers all activities.12 Mill’s liberty principle, which protects all activity
to the extent that it does not cause harm, is a prime example of a general liberty right.13 Dworkin explains:
Freedom of speech is a special right: government may not infringe that special freedom unless it has what American lawyers
have come to call a “compelling” justification. Speakers may not
be censored even when what they say may well have bad consequences for other people . . . The right to free speech can be
abridged only in emergencies: only to prevent, again in a phrase
beloved of American lawyers, a clear and present—and, we
might add, grave—danger.14
Dworkin’s framework thus contemplates that free speech will protect
harmful conduct, because only a compelling justification can support a
restriction of speech, and a compelling justification generally requires
something like a clear, present, and grave danger. Risks that do not
meet this bar go unregulated, and protected speech therefore may cause
harm to others.15
These scholars range in their approaches. Dworkin appears to
make protection of harmful conduct an inevitable feature of a special
right such as freedom of speech. The others do not suggest that a free
speech right covering only harmless conduct is conceptually impossible,
just that such a right would be essentially meaningless.16 What all these
claims have in common, however, is the idea that freedom of speech
should protect harmful conduct. If a free speech right does not, it is either a conceptual failure or insignificant.

11

See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 129–31.
Id. at 129–30.
13
JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM, AND OTHER ESSAYS 15
(Mark Philp & Frederick Rosen, ed. 2015) (“[T]he principle [of liberty] requires liberty of tastes
and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject
to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as
what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or
wrong.”).
14
DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 131–32.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Scanlon, supra note 7, at 204; Schauer, supra note 9, at 1294.
12
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II. ON RIGHTS AND HARM
Must rights protect harmful conduct? If so, then freedom of speech
must include protection of harmful speech. The short answer is, no,
rights need not protect harmful conduct. A right may exist for reasons
having nothing to do with protection for harmful conduct, and limits on
governmental action can constrain the government without affording
direct protection for harmful conduct. A Millian general liberty right to
engage in harmless conduct is an example: it expressly does not extend
to harmful conduct but is a right nonetheless.17
Yet perhaps it is not so simple. Much depends on what “harm”
means. Every right has a correlative of some kind that places limitations on other actors: a Hohfeldian claim-right correlates with a duty
toward the rightsholder; an immunity correlates with a disability.18
When the right in question is a right held against the government, the
existence of the right inevitably limits the government’s scope of action
in some way. Perhaps it prevents the government from regulating certain conduct at all; perhaps, more modestly, it requires the government
to give certain types of justifications or to withstand heightened scrutiny for its actions.19 One could argue that any limitation on governmental action involves harm because it reduces the government’s ability to achieve an interest. If this is the case, then not only do free speech
rights protect harmful conduct: all rights protect harmful conduct.
I raise this possibility to set it aside. Limitations on the government’s means of pursuing an interest may reduce its ability to achieve
that interest. Such limitations on government, however, do not inherently count as “harms” in the sense of setbacks to interests. Thus, for
example, a free speech right that protects people’s ability to post political signs on their property will frustrate the government’s pursuit of its
interest in reducing visual clutter.20 In this case, the freedom of speech
reduces the ability of government to pursue a legitimate objective, but
it does not involve harm in the sense of setbacks to interests. It seems
implausible, then, to say that all rights cause harm because they limit
the government’s ability to pursue its objectives.
But what if any limitation on the government’s ability to pursue its
interests necessarily posed harm to third parties, even if indirectly? If
this were so, then rights generally would cause harm, because rights
17

MILL, supra note 13, at 165.
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (describing different types of rights and their correlatives).
19
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980)
(requiring government regulations of commercial speech to pass intermediate scrutiny).
20
See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (invalidating residential signage ban).
18

110

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

would place limitations on the government, which would inevitably,
though indirectly, pose harm to others. For example, Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure and Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination both limit how the government
may pursue its interest in law enforcement. This could well mean that
some private individuals are harmed, for example by becoming victims
of someone who was not convicted. If every governmental interest ultimately worked to protect third parties from harm, then all rights would
indirectly risk harm to others.
The problem is that the premise is not true: not all government
interests ultimately protect third parties from harm. The government’s
asserted interest in reducing visual clutter is one example.21 So are
many other interests that the government has advanced in the First
Amendment context: administrative interest in accurate recordkeeping,22 interest in protecting the flag as a symbol of national unity,23 and
interest in “maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital in an attractive and intact condition.”24 Protecting such interests bears no necessary relation to preventing harm in the sense of setbacks to individual
interests, and constraining the government’s pursuit of these interests
bears no necessary relation to harm creation.
Thus, harmful conduct is not a necessary feature of all rights. Even
if one were to conclude, contrary to my argument above, that the limitation on pursuit of the government’s interests constitutes “harm,” or
that all rights do pose indirect risks of harm to third parties, commentators’ contentions about free speech are still different. Those who claim
free speech must protect harmful conduct have in mind conduct that
poses obvious, direct risks of harm, mostly physical harm, to individuals. The typical examples—incendiary speech,25 false speech,26 advocacy
of law violation,27 speech that poses risks short of a clear and present
danger28—all contemplate risk of physical harm to other people. As
Dworkin puts it, what speakers say “may well have bad consequences
for other people” and yet still is protected by freedom of speech.29 The
21

See id.; see also Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 795
(1984); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171–72 (2015).
22
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 379–80 (1968).
23
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
314 (1990).
24
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 288 (1984).
25
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 888–89 (1982).
26
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
27
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 477 (1969).
28
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
29
DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 131.
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basic claim is that the freedom of speech protects conduct that poses
direct harm to third parties and that this feature is crucial to the significance of the right.
III. ON FREE SPEECH AND HARM
When articulated in this way—that free speech must affirmatively
protect conduct that poses direct and obvious risks of harm to other people—the contention starts to sound unusual. Protection of harmful conduct is not a predicate for other rights, such as voting rights, rights of
sexual intimacy, or rights of religious exercise. Some of these rights, as
implemented, may lead to harm, and some conceptions of them may
have harm as an unavoidable incidental effect. No one, however, starts
from the premise that these rights must protect harmful conduct or else
they have no meaning. It is a curious feature of free speech rights that
people regularly describe them this way.30
Is there something special about a free speech right that requires
protection of harmful conduct in order for it to be significant? It seems
not. It is possible to conceive of something properly deemed a speech
right that does not protect harmful conduct and that would still be
meaningful. For example, one could frame speech as a positive right,
which would require the government to provide speech opportunities. A
government could be obligated to provide speech opportunities for citizens without protecting their speech when it causes harm. Or imagine
formulating a free speech right in a primary or secondary school setting.
One valuable part of an education is for students to learn how to formulate ideas and arguments and to learn how to listen to others. A classroom might be obligated to provide these opportunities to students. At
the same time, however, students might have no right to be disruptive
of the educational endeavor or derogatory or cruel toward each other.
Both the civic formulation and the classroom formulation involve rights
properly designated as free speech rights, and those rights seem significant enough to identify and discuss. Perhaps we might think that a
free speech right in civil society should go farther than this, and certainly American free speech jurisprudence does.31 But it need not in order to be worth talking about. Indeed, many nations around the world
subject free speech rights to proportionality and balancing tests that
come much closer to limiting free speech with some kind of Millian

30
31

See Scanlon, supra note 7, at 208; DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 131.
See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
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harm principle, and yet those nations still find free speech worth singling out.32
One argument for the harm-protecting view is that protecting
harmful conduct is necessary to differentiate free speech from a general
liberty right. Greenawalt, for example, contends that, in order to be significant, a free speech right must protect conduct that would otherwise
not be protected by a general liberty principle.33 For Greenawalt, this
translates into protection for harmful speech. Dworkin also seems to
take for granted that speech rights must afford more protection than
general rights, and for him, like Greenawalt, this seems to translate
into protection for harmful conduct.34 Note that, if this is true, it is true
of all special rights, not just speech rights: all of them would have to be
differentiated from general liberty through protection of harmful conduct.
This is not true, however, for two reasons. First, even if we accept
Dworkin and Greenawalt’s premise that special rights have to serve
some function above and beyond general liberty, that could take forms
other than protection for harmful conduct. Again, a positive right is an
example: an affirmative obligation to provide speech opportunities
would do something beyond what a general liberty right does, without
protecting harmful conduct. If it is important to Greenawalt and
Dworkin that a special right do something more than a general liberty
right, there are other things for it to do besides protect harmful conduct.
Second, and more importantly, special rights need not do more than
general rights. If a right has a special relationship to a particular value,
it may be important to single it out in order to identify that special relationship, regardless of whether the right ultimately affords additional
protection. For example, one might think that certain sexual activities
are not harmful—say, the decision to use contraception or to engage in
fully consensual sexual activity between adults. If such activity is not
harmful, then it will be protected by a general liberty right. But we
might still want to recognize a special right of sexual autonomy, rather
than lumping this conduct in with all the other harmless activity covered by general liberty. We might think a right of sexual autonomy
should be recognized for historical or pragmatic reasons—that is, because the state has a distinctive history of attempting to regulate this

32

See, e.g., Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere but
Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 295–96 (2012) (noting that the German constitutional
model, which protects fundamental freedoms but simultaneously empowers the legislature to limit
it, has been exported to most European countries, as well as Israel, Canada, and South Africa).
33
See GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 10.
34
See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 130–31.
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particular harmless conduct.35 Alternatively, we might think sexual autonomy bears a special relationship to a larger underlying value—personal autonomy, self-development, or the like. For either reason, we
could rightfully conclude that our taxonomy of rights should identify a
special right of sexual autonomy. Recognition of such a right is appropriate, regardless of whether it protects any more conduct than would
otherwise be protected. Recognition of the special right makes clear that
violating that right infringes freedom in more than one way: it implicates the values underlying the general right of liberty and those underlying a special right of, say, sexual autonomy. Thus, regulating consensual sexual activity is wrongful in a different way from regulating,
say, harmless activities such as hopscotch or handball.
We might also think about rights of religious free exercise. Imagine
a view that religious observance is distinctive from other forms of activity (a commonly held view that I am simply stipulating here). Imagine
a right of religious free exercise that protects religious observance, but
not when a particular practice poses harm to other people. Suppose further that the state will not make positive provisions for free exercise
opportunities because of establishment concerns. Incidentally, this is a
fairly accurate description of American jurisprudence. Regulation that
incidentally burdens religion is permitted when justified by legitimate
government interests; preventing harm to third parties is an obviously
legitimate governmental interest.36 In addition, the Establishment
Clause has placed limits on statutory religious accommodations that
would burden third parties.37
Against the backdrop of a right of general liberty, this free exercise
right accomplishes exactly nothing: it protects no more activity than
general liberty already protects, and it imposes no additional positive
obligations on the state. If, however, we think that free exercise of religion is importantly distinctive, then it deserves to be singled out for
special recognition, even if that recognition does not result in additional
protection. If we think that prohibiting harmless religious activity is
more wrongful than, or wrongful in a different way from, prohibiting
harmless activity generally—for example, that banning the wearing of
a yarmulke while playing handball is wrongful in a different way from
banning the playing of handball—then we have reason to recognize a

35

See Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays, supra note 9 (considering historical and pragmatic
reasons for singling out special rights).
36
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
37
See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985); see also Micah
Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe, and Richard Schragger, The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L. J. 781,
788 (2017).
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right of religious free exercise. Doing so articulates that targeting harmless religious free exercise implicates another value besides whatever
value supports the right of general liberty. Regulation that targets
harmless religious practice is impermissible not only because it fails the
general liberty principle but also because—given the distinctiveness of
religion—targeting harmless religious practice is a particularly wrongful thing for the government to do.
The fact that two rights protect the same activity to the same degree does not make one of the rights superfluous. The fact that harmless
speech—or harmless religious exercise or sexual activity—would be
protected by a general liberty right does not make the special right
meaningless and unnecessary. The question is whether we have a reason to identify the activity as distinctive—to distinguish it from the
other activities covered by the general right. Whether a special right is
appropriate will depend upon the distinctiveness of the activity, not
upon whether the special right would ultimately afford more robust protection. This approach makes clear that, even if there were no general
liberty right (or other broad principle encompassing the conduct), the
narrower right would still exist. This approach also pushes us to identify all the reasons we have for recognizing rights. This seems like a
salutary feature for a conception of rights.38
IV. CONCLUSION
Must free speech protect harmful conduct? No—not in order for the
right to qualify as a special right, and not for it to be significant enough
to discuss. Yes, the more robust a free speech right is, the more attention it is likely to demand, but that is not the same as being significant.
Free speech can be a sufficiently significant doctrine without requiring
protection for harmful conduct. Deductions to the contrary are not correct.
That leaves us with the inductive approach—the conclusion of some
jurists and scholars that certain forms of harmful conduct, such as

38

A further argument might be that a special right necessarily offers further protection because it requires a higher level of scrutiny than a general right. This is not necessarily true, for
the reasons I outline in Kendrick, supra note †, 108–09. It is possible for the requirements of both
a general and a special right to be satisfied by a single justification, and in a world of perfect
information, no additional scrutiny would be required to ensure that the justification was as sincere and satisfactory for the special right as for the general right. To the extent that courts impose
higher scrutiny on special rights (which they do not always do), this could be a matter of institutional design in response to imperfect information. Thus, in practice, special rights might receive
more scrutiny, but it is not at all clear that they conceptually must in the way that, say, Dworkin
seems to contemplate. See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 131.

105]

MUST FREE SPEECH BE HARMFUL?

115

incendiary speech, must be protected by any plausible speech right.39
This approach does not begin with the premise that free speech must
protect harmful conduct in order to be meaningful. It looks for speech
activities that require protection and finds that some include harmful
conduct. This is reasoning not from the structure of rights but from the
particular types of speech that seem normatively worthy of protection.
Some of these intuitions might bear out: the proposition that the government should not be able to deny people benefits based on their political affiliation—finally embraced by the Supreme Court after many
years of struggle—may seem an important commitment, even if it does
have the tendency to risk certain types of harm.40 Other harm-causing
propositions may be less defensible. The point is that these are discrete
normative judgments, which should be continually questioned and defended, and which should not find refuge in general statements that
free speech inevitably involves harm.
Our free speech tradition involves strong protections, including
protections for various forms of harmful conduct. My point here is not
to say that all of those protections are unjustified; it is simply to say
that they are not inevitable. Despite our societal insistence to the contrary, a right of free speech need not include protection for harmful conduct. Nothing about the structure of rights generally compels that, and
nothing about the structure of free speech rights does either. Our insistence that free speech must protect harmful conduct is a product of
our weighing of speech and harm, weighing that deserves the same level
of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” inquiry that the First Amendment prescribes for other subjects.41

39

Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 285.
Compare United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (rejecting the contention that defense
facility employment could be predicated on mere political affiliation) with, e.g., Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958) (upholding denial of state tax exemption for veterans to veteran who refused
to attest to political affiliation).
41
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
40

Uncommon Law: The Past, Present and Future of
Libel Law in a Time of “Fake News” and
“Enemies of the American People”
Jane E. Kirtley†

I.

INTRODUCTION

After many years of comparative quiet, the United States is experiencing a growth in libel suits brought by both public officials and private figures. President Donald Trump has claimed that our current libel
laws “are a sham and a disgrace and do not represent American values.”1 Is it time to “open up our libel laws,” as he has called for?2
Doing away with the New York Times v. Sullivan3 rule is a dictator’s dream. Because government can control and manipulate information, any determination of truth or falsity that fails to recognize the
fundamental right of the people to criticize government and to make
their own independent interpretations is fundamentally flawed. The
marketplace of ideas is imperfect, but essential to facilitate the search
for truth. In fact, it is the essence of American values.
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author’s lecture, “Uncommon Law: The Past, Present and Future of Libel in America,” delivered
at the 2019 Reynolds School of Journalism First Amendment Forum at the University of Nevada
in Reno, on April 23, 2019, and from her article Getting to the Truth: Fake News, Libel Laws, and
“Enemies of the American People” published in Vol. 43, No. 4 of Human Rights Magazine. The
author would like to thank Silha Center Research Assistants Scott Memmel, Sarah Wiley, and
Jonathan Anderson for their invaluable research assistance. Uncommon Law: The Past, Present
and Future of Libel in America, U. OF NEV., RENO, https://events.unr.edu/event/uncommon_law_the_past_present_and_future_of_libel_in_america#.XN8jrMhKiUk
[https://perma.cc/EQ6Z-SS6D].
1
See Brian Naylor, Trump Again Blasts Libel Laws, Calling Them ‘A Sham’, NPR (Jan. 10,
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/10/577100238/trump-again-blasts-libel-laws-calling-them-asa-sham [https://perma.cc/9ZLS-NVP7].
2
See Hadas Gold, Donald Trump: We’re Going to ‘Open Up’ Libel Laws, POLITICO (Feb. 26,
2016), https://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/donald-trump-libel-laws-219866 [https://p
erma.cc/3SSL-4F3B].
3
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Should the New York Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard4 be
overturned, as suggested by Justice Thomas in February 2019?5 Should
states curtail the fair and accurate reporting privilege protecting accurate accounts of government actions?6 Should the United States adopt
standards of other countries around the globe that are less protective of
free speech and more concerned with “truth”?7
Many would argue that governments have a duty to protect their
citizens from “fake news.”8 But can we trust the government to define
what is “true”? Recent initiatives abroad to enact laws to censor “fake
news” in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate how problematic this can be.9 We must be careful not to cede those determinations to a governmental entity, nor to assume that their findings on a
controversial issue are the truth.
II. BACKGROUND
Until 1964, libelous speech—that is, speech that is false and defamatory—enjoyed no legal protection under the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.10 Common law libel, derived from English common law,11 permitted each state to decide for itself what the burden of
proof would be. However, in 1931, the high court dipped its toe into the
murky waters of defamation law, striking down a state statute that
4

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
6
See, e.g., Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Minn. 2020), reh’g denied (Mar. 30,
2020) (concluding that “the fair and accurate reporting privilege protects news reports about statements on a matter of public concern made by law enforcement officers at an official press conference and in an official press release”).
7
See, e.g., 25 P.R. Laws Ann. 3654(a), (f) (2020); Katherine Jacobsen, Amid COVID-19, the
Prognosis For Press Freedom is Dim. Here Are 10 Symptoms to Track, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS, https://cpj.org/reports/2020/06/covid-19-here-are-10-press-freedom-symptoms-to-tr
ack/ [https://perma.cc/A2X8-3CMZ].
8
See infra Part III.
9
See Shibani Mahtani, Singapore Introduced Tough Laws Against Fake News. Coronavirus
Has Put Them to The Test., WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_pacific/exploiting-fake-news-laws-singapore-targets-tech-firms-over-coronavirus-falsehoods/2020/03/16/a49d6aa0-5f8f-11ea-ac50-18701e14e06d_story.html [https://perma.cc/YAV6-PW
9G] (including examples in Thailand, Nigeria, Indonesia, and other countries, as well as Singapore).
10
See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) (“But it is recognized that punishment
for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press is essential to the protection of the public, and
that the common-law rules that subject the libeler to responsibility for the public offense, as well
as for the private injury, are not abolished by the protection extended in our Constitutions.”).
11
This inheritance included the concept of seditious libel, which, during the colonial period,
criminalized criticism of the Crown or its officials. A notable example was the trial of New York
printer John Peter Zenger, which resulted in an early example of jury nullification, when the jurors
acquitted Zenger of charges of sedition for publishing statements that criticized the colonial governor. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, INDELIBLE INK: THE TRIALS OF JOHN PETER ZENGER AND
THE BIRTH OF AMERICA’S FREE PRESS (2016).
5
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permitted “a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical” to be enjoined from publication.12 The majority
found that allowing government to censor allegations of official misconduct in advance of publication would undermine the central purposes of
the First Amendment—specifically, public oversight and government
accountability.”13
And, indeed, it was a lawsuit predicated on accusations of official
misconduct that led to the watershed case of New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964, at the height of the Civil Rights movement. Following publication of a full-page fundraising advertorial in The New York Times,
headlined “Heed Their Rising Voices,” which decried what was characterized as a “wave of terror” against African Americans and others who
engaged in nonviolent protests in the American South, Montgomery,
Alabama Commissioner L.B. Sullivan sued the newspaper, as well as
several signatories to the advertorial, for libel.14 Although Sullivan was
not named in the publication, he claimed that a paragraph describing
actions of law enforcement at a historically black college campus, including that officers had surrounded the campus and padlocked the dining hall “in an attempt to starve [the students] into submission,” could
be imputed to him because his duties as commissioner included supervision of the police.15 Sullivan proved, inter alia, that the incident described in the advertorial had not occurred, and that there were other
factual errors in the narrative as well.16 The trial judge concluded that
the false statements constituted libel per se under state law, as
“tend[ing] to injure a person . . . in his reputation” or to “bring [him]
into public contempt” so as to “injure him in his public office, or impute
misconduct to him in his office, or want of official integrity, or want of
fidelity to a public trust . . . .”17 The jury returned a verdict of $500,000
and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.18
Before the Supreme Court of the United States, the Times’s counsel
argued that the Alabama libel law was equivalent to the Sedition Act of
1798—a statute championed by the Federalists that punished criticism
of government officials, and, according to First Amendment scholar
Geoffrey Stone, was “perhaps the most grievous assault on free speech
in the history of the United States.”19 Between 1798 and 1801,
12

Near, 283 U.S. at 701–702 (quoting Mason’s Minn. Stat., §§ 10123-1 to 10123-3 (1927)).
See id. at 721.
14
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–57 (1964).
15
Id. at 258.
16
See id. at 258–59.
17
Id. at 267.
18
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962), rev’d, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19
GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF
1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 19 (2004).
13

120

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

approximately 25 Republican editors and writers were arrested, and 10
were ultimately tried and convicted under the statute.20 Popular opinion was outraged, with John Quincy Adams observing that the Sedition
Act had “operated like oil upon the flames.”21 After the Republicans prevailed in the contentious election of 1800, the statute was allowed to
expire, and consequently was never tested in the Supreme Court.22
Herbert Wechsler, a Columbia law professor who represented the
Times, invoked the Sedition Act when he contended that misstatements
of fact about public officials could not be the basis for a libel judgment
because that would deter legitimate commentary by citizens and the
press.23 And in his opinion for the Court, Justice William Brennan
agreed:
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to
be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having
to do so. They tend to make only statements which “steer far
wider of the unlawful zone.” The rule thus dampens the vigor
and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with “actual malice” — that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.24
The ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan changed the shape of libel
law. It was “an occasion for dancing in the streets,” a sentiment attributed to First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn.25 No
longer could government officials successfully sue for defamatory statements made in the course of good faith criticism by simply claiming that
the statements were false. Although the Court declined, in the same

20

See id. at 63.
Id. at 71.
22
See id. (“The Sedition Act expired on March 3, 1801, the final day of Adams’s term of office.”); see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
23
See ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 52 (2007).
24
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (citation omitted).
25
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn).
21
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term, to declare unconstitutional all criminal libel laws,26 it nevertheless held that truth must always be a defense in complaints brought by
public officials.27
In succeeding years, the progeny of New York Times v. Sullivan
expanded the actual malice standard to include public figures,28 though
leaving to the states to establish whatever fault standard they chose in
cases brought by private figure plaintiffs, “so long as they do not impose
liability without fault.”29 And the Court declared that “[u]nder the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience
of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”30 As a consequence of these rulings, public officials faced an almost insurmountable
barrier to successful libel litigation.
But things changed in the late 1980s. Punitive damages awards
against the news media escalated, causing alarm among news organizations.31 Even if successful in gaining reversal on appeal, they were
likely to expend enormous sums in legal fees in the course of defending
themselves. This situation, coupled with the findings of a 1987 study
concluding that most libel plaintiffs sue to vindicate their reputations,
rather than for the money,32 prompted prominent scholars, judges, and
free press advocates to argue for new approaches to libel law that would
focus on truth or falsity, not fault.
In a 1988 Harvard Law Review article, Judge Pierre N. Leval, then
of the Southern District of New York, advocated for creation of what he
called the “no-money, no-fault” libel suit.33 Under Leval’s system, plaintiffs could sue to obtain a declaratory judgment of falsity.34 The fault
requirements of Sullivan and its progeny would not apply, because,
Leval claimed, “the sole purpose” of the Sullivan standard was to protect the press from crippling monetary awards.35 He also argued that
these “no-money, no-fault” trials would be simpler, more efficient, less
expensive, and would protect the media from inquiries into their news26

See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
See id. at 73.
28
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
29
Id. at 347.
30
Id. at 339–40.
31
See generally Charles Rothfeld, The Surprising Case Against Punitive Damages in Libel
Suits Against Public Figures, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165 (2000) (discussing the trend of substantial libel damages verdicts against media defendants).
32
Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 792 (1986)
33
See Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper
Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988).
34
See id. at 1288.
35
Id. at 1302.
27
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gathering practices.36 They would provide plaintiffs with a far greater
chance of vindicating their reputations, which is really what most of
them want, he wrote.37
Also in 1988, the Libel Reform Project at Northwestern University
issued the Annenberg Proposal.38 Under the Annenberg model, a libel
“victim” would have to request a retraction or opportunity to reply
within 30 days of publication.39 If the defendant complied, any further
legal action would be barred.40 If not, either the plaintiff or the defendant could compel any libel suit to be converted into a “no-fault, no-damages” declaratory judgment proceeding, where the only issue would be
truth or falsity.41 A traditional suit for actual damages would remain
an option, but only if the defendant agreed to it.42
Neither of these proposals was adopted at the state level. However,
in 1993, the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act (“UCCDA”), making a correction or clarification request a prerequisite to a libel suit.43 Under the
UCCDA, if, after a correction or clarification was published, the case
still went to trial, a prevailing plaintiff could recover only economic
losses, not punitive damages.44 As of 2018, only North Dakota, Texas,
and Washington had adopted the UCCDA.45
The common link between these initiatives was the goal of shifting
the focus of libel litigation from fault to “truth.” But one problem with
them is that they presume that truth is something that can be concretely determined through an adversarial proceeding. Of course, First
Amendment theory, notably the “marketplace of ideas,”46 presumes

36

Id. at 1287–1288, 1295.
Id. at 1293.
38
NW. UNIV., THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL
LAW (1988). For further discussion of the proposal, see Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J.
Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal: The Case for Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV.
25 (1989).
39
See Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 38, at 32–33.
40
Id. at 33.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 34.
43
See Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=6ba5d1ed-8924-48aa-81e91ed0f7a9f47d [https://perma.cc/234A-6RG3].
44
See id.
45
See id.
46
Generally attributed to John Stuart Mills’s 1859 essay, On Liberty, the “marketplace of
ideas” has been invoked by the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, Jr., J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out.”).
37
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“that the test of the truth or acceptance of ideas depends on their competition with one another and not on the opinion of a censor, whether
one provided by the government or by some other authority.”47 It is
therefore troublesome when a governmental or quasi-governmental entity is tasked with determining what is “the truth.”
III. TRUTH VERSUS “FAKE NEWS”
Which brings us, inevitably, to the question: if determining “truth”
is the goal, what is the value of so-called “fake news”? Politicians and
their supporters frequently accuse those in the mainstream media of
peddling “fake news,” a term President Donald Trump claimed he invented.48 In fact, he didn’t. Perhaps the most notorious use of the equivalent term, “Lüegenpresse” or “lying press,” was invoked by the Nazis
in the 1930s and revived by far-right anti-immigration activists in Germany in 2014 and by Trump supporters during the 2016 campaign to
undermine public confidence in the mainstream media.49 But other
groups across the political spectrum have used the term as well. As one
example, the left-leaning Center for Democracy & Technology’s PR
Watch has been “reporting on spin and disinformation since 1993”50
with its various campaigns to “stop fake news.”51
Although Trump did not invent the term, he has been one of the
most prolific users of it. During his candidacy and since his election, he
has applied the label of fake news to virtually any media—the “failing” New York Times, NBC, ABC, CBS, CNN, among others—he disagrees with.52 This view is shared by many of his supporters, and, in fact,
by others as well. A poll conducted by Monmouth University reported
that three out of four Americans believe that the media routinely

47

David Schulz, Marketplace of Ideas, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/f
irst-amendment/article/999/marketplace-of-ideas [https://perma.cc/J2WG-HR5X] (updated by David L. Hudson 2017).
48
Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump Just Claimed He Invented ‘Fake News’, CNN (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/08/politics/trump-huckabee-fake/index.html [https://perma.cc/3ZD
D-RBJQ].
49
Rick Noack, The Ugly History of ‘Lügenpresse,’ a Nazi Slur Shouted at a Trump Rally,
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/24/th
e-ugly-history-of-luegenpresse-a-nazi-slur-shouted-at-a-trump-rally/ [https://perma.cc/DHU6-7N
GY].
50
See Profile on PR Watch, INDEP. AUSTRALIA, https://independentaustralia.net/profile-on/pr
-watch,530 [https://perma.cc/5CJ4-FHJQ].
51
Diane Farsetta, Fake TV News: Widespread and Undisclosed, PR WATCH (Mar. 16, 2006),
https://www.prwatch.org/fakenews/execsummary [https://perma.cc/W8YZ-PPKP]; No Fake News!,
PR WATCH, https://www.prwatch.org/nofakenews [https://perma.cc/U49Y-TLZY].
52
See, e.g., Brett Samuels, Trump ramps up rhetoric on media, calls press ‘the enemy of the
people,’ HILL (Apr. 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/437610-trump-callspress-the-enemy-of-the-people [https://perma.cc/M57C-JA9U].
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reports fake news.53 The phrase has become so ubiquitous that Washington Post columnist Margaret Sullivan has argued that it should be
discarded because its original meaning—“fraudulent or misinformation
meant to deceive”—has been distorted beyond recognition.54
Yet, the fake news label persists. Trump’s inaugural “Fake News
Awards,” published on the Republican National Committee’s website in
January 2018, included several cases where news outlets had corrected
themselves and apologized—actions that would not fit the traditional
definition of fake news.55 In April 2018, more than 170 television stations owned by conservative-leaning Sinclair Broadcast Group were ordered to use local anchors to produce a scripted “must-run” commentary
decrying fake news.56 Responding to criticism from others in the industry that the segment itself was fake news intended to deceive viewers,
Trump tweeted that “The Fake News Networks, those that knowingly
have a sick and biased AGENDA, are worried about the competition
and quality of Sinclair Broadcast.”57
Yet despite Trump’s incendiary tweets calling “the FAKE NEWS
media . . . the enemy of the American People,”58 his actual power to take
action to curtail their activities has, to date, been limited to largely unsuccessful attempts to exclude credentialed reporters from press briefings and “gaggles.”59 But as Joel Simon of the Committee to Protect
53

MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY POLL, NATIONAL: ‘FAKE NEWS’ THREAT TO MEDIA; EDITORIAL
DECISIONS, OUTSIDE ACTORS AT FAULT (2018), https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/docu
ments/monmouthpoll_us_040218.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/4BQE-A95B].
54
Abby Adcock, “Fake News” Has Lost its Meaning and Punch, Post’s Margaret Sullivan Says,
NEWS LAB, https://newslab.org/fake-news-has-lost-its-meaning-and-punch-posts-margaret-sullivan-says/ [https://perma.cc/K8HX-ZV7E].
55
Team GOP, The Highly-Anticipated 2017 Fake News Awards, GOP (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://gop.com/the-highly-anticipated-2017-fake-news-awards/ [https://perma.cc/M8CC-KBXK].
56
See David Folkenflik, Sinclair Broadcast Group Forces Nearly 200 Station Anchors to Read
Same Script, NPR (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/02/598916366/sinclair-broadcast-g
roup-forces-nearly-200-station-anchors-to-read-same-script [https://perma.cc/6CHN-U264].
57
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 3, 2018, 5:34 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/981117684489379840 [https://perma.cc/A93X-89BM]; see also Chris
Morris, Trump Calls Out CNN, NBC, ABC, and CBS in Wake of Sinclair’s ‘Fake News’ Promos,
FORTUNE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/04/03/trump-tweets-sinclair-fake-news/ [https://
perma.cc/N7AC-Y662]; Paul Farhi, As Sinclair’s Sound-Alike Anchors Draw Criticism for ‘Fake
News’ Promos, Trump Praises Broadcaster, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/as-sinclairs-sound-al . . . adcaster/2018/04/02/a1be67e8-367a-11e89c0a-85d477d9a226_story.html?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/HR7H-NSSM].
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Journalists observed, Trump’s words provide authoritarian leaders in
countries with less robust protections than the First Amendment such
as Kenya, Venezuela, Somalia, Thailand, and the Philippines the ammunition to suppress opposition media, even as they spread fake video
clips and stories of their own through paid commentators and bots.60
This legislation to curtail fake news is proliferating, often citing
national security concerns or the need to stamp out misinformation
about COVID-19 as justification. The Poynter Institute documents the
adoption of these statutes around the world,61 including in Singapore62
and Albania.63 By contrast, although Malaysia enacted the Anti-Fake
News Act in April 2018, which provided that anyone convicted of creating or circulating fake news online or on social media could face imprisonment for up to six years or fines in excess of $120,000, the statute was
repealed in October 2019 on the grounds that it stifled dissent.64 The
Committee to Protect Journalists also reported that between 2012 and
2019, 65 journalists around the world have been imprisoned on falsenews charges; as of the end of 2019, 30 of them were still in jail.65
Even mature democracies struggle with the issue of fake news. On
January 1, 2018, Germany announced that it would begin to enforce a
law, known as NetzDG,66 requiring social media sites to remove hate
speech and fake news within 24 hours or face fines of up to €50 million.67
In March 2018, the European Commission’s High Level Group on fake
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news and online disinformation issued a report concluding that although disinformation may not necessarily be illegal, it nevertheless is
harmful to democratic values.68 Although ostensibly eschewing “any
form of censorship, either public or private,” it advocates greater selfregulation in the short term, with a long-range goal of developing a
Code of Practices to encourage transparency, media literacy, diversity,
the development of tools to “tackle” disinformation, and further research to monitor and assess the sources and impact of fake news.69 On
the other hand, also in March 2018, the Dutch Parliament voted to repudiate EUvsDisinfo.eu, a European Union website created by the East
StratCom Task Force70 in 2015 to report disinformation and fake news
allegedly spread by Russian actors.71 Its Dutch opponents characterize
it as a state publication that “passes judgments whether a publication
in the free media contains the correct views or not. If your publication
ends up in its database, you’re officially labeled by the EU as a publisher of disinformation and fake news.”72
Meanwhile in Puerto Rico, the ACLU filed suit to challenge a pair
of Puerto Rican laws, passed in 2017 and 2020, which make it a felony
to raise “a false alarm in relation to” a catastrophe, or to “[t]ransmit or
allow [another person] to transmit . . . through any social network or
mass media, false information with the intention of creating confusion,
panic, or collective public hysteria, regarding any proclamation or executive order decreeing a state of emergency or disaster or curfew.”73 Punishment could include imprisonment or a fine of up to $5,000, or both.74
The case arose after Governor Wanda Vázquez-Garced declared a
state of emergency and issued a series of executive orders aimed at controlling the spread of COVID-19 in March 2020.75 They included
68
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imposition of an island-wide curfew and a variety of business restrictions.76 According to the complaint, a minister, Pastor José Luis
Rivera Santiago, was charged with disseminating false information via
WhatsApp about an executive order that would close all businesses.77
The government claimed that his speech resulted in a rush on the island’s supermarkets.78 Eventually Governor Vázquez-Garced did order
the closure of businesses, which in turn resulted in another run on supermarkets.79 At that point, the Court of San Juan ruled that the government had failed to establish probable cause to prosecute Rivera Santiago.80
Nevertheless, the ACLU decided to challenge the statutes. The
named plaintiffs are two Puerto Rican journalists, Sandra Rodríguez
and Rafelli González. Both have a history of tangling with the government. Rodríguez, a syndicated radio host, and blogger, and a former
president of the Oversea Press Club, challenged Puerto Rico’s criminal
defamation law prior to its repeal,81 and her reporting and commentary
helped trigger protests that led to the resignation of the former Governor, Ricardo Rosselló.82 González, an independent journalist, has reported on undercounting of the island’s COVID-19 fatality rate.83 He
received thousands of threatening messages via social media and, according to the complaint, his house was broken into “under mysterious
circumstances.”84 Both plaintiffs claim the statutes are so vague that
their sources are discouraged from speaking to them, and that they
themselves fear prosecution, even if they have multiple sources, citing
the chilling effect of the prosecution of Pastor Rivera Santiago.85
Accordingly, the ACLU complaint alleges that the statutes violate
the First Amendment as overbroad, specifically by making it a crime to
share false information, but not requiring the government to demonstrate that the speaker acted with actual malice.86 Moreover, the language in the statutes does not clearly define what types of speech are
76
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criminalized. “Without a well-defined standard of criminal responsibility, law enforcement officers and factfinders are given nearly unfettered
discretion to apply their own standards,” the complaint alleges.87
These examples illustrate how problematic it can be when governmental entities become arbiters of what is true and what is fake. As the
Dutch critics of EUvsDisinfo.eu argued, governments should be loath to
interfere in freedom of the press because “it makes it impossible for the
truth to emerge in the public debate.”88
IV. THREATS TO THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE
It is indisputable that the public must have accurate data about
what its government is up to in order to engage in informed debate and
for democracy to function properly. Curiously, however, in recent years,
the long-standing common privilege—the “fair report” privilege,89
which protects news organizations from libel suits when they accurately
report pronouncements and actions of government—has been under
fire.
For example, in February 2020, the Minnesota Supreme Court
ruled in Larson v. Gannett Co.90 that the fair report privilege protects
fair and accurate reporting of information about matters of public concern derived from official law enforcement press conferences and press
releases, therefore holding that several statements published by television station KARE 11 and the St. Cloud Times were not actionable.91
However, the Court also ordered a new trial, finding that the jury
lacked sufficient information to adequately determine whether the privilege could be defeated in relation to five particular statements published about the incident.92
The case arose following a 2012 fatal shooting of police officer Tom
Decker behind a bar in Cold Spring, Minnesota.93 Decker was in the
process of performing a welfare check on the plaintiff, Ryan Larson, who
lived above the bar and was reportedly suicidal.94 Police arrested Larson soon after the shooting, and the following day, senior local and state
law enforcement officials held a press conference and issued a press
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release about the incident.95 The press release said that a SWAT team
had arrested Larson “[w]ithin an hour” of the shooting and that he “was
booked into the Stearns County Jail on murder charges.”96
Based on the law enforcement press conference and press release,
numerous news organizations, including KARE 11 and the St. Cloud
Times, reported on the fatal shooting, investigation, and arrest of Larson.97 However, days after his arrest, Larson was freed because authorities lacked sufficient evidence to prosecute him, and he was formally
eliminated as a suspect in August 2013.98 Investigators had identified
a different man, Eric Thomes, as a lead suspect in January 2013, but
Thomes committed suicide when agents sought to question him.99 Nonetheless, after the ordeal, Larson reportedly quit his job, dropped out of
school and moved away so he could avoid further “embarrassment and
humiliation,” according to the Minneapolis Star Tribune.100
On May 28, 2015, Larson sued KARE 11 and the St. Cloud Times,
alleging they published 11 defamatory statements about his arrest.101
Five of the statements were attributed to law enforcement, three statements referenced accusations against Larson, and three additional
statements discussed his criminal history or community members’ opinions about the case.102 In April 2014, Larson sued KSTP-TV and
WCCO’s TV and radio stations, each of which settled.103
The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
KARE 11 and the St. Cloud Times, ruling in May 2016 that “to the extent the news conference and news release only communicated the fact
of Mr. Larson’s arrest or of the charge of crime made by the officer in
making or returning his arrest, these sources are entitled to the [fair
report] privilege.”104
However, the court amended the ruling during trial in November
2016 to find that the fair report privilege did not cover the five
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statements attributed to law enforcement and that the three statements referencing accusations against Larson were not substantially
accurate.105 Only claims based on the last three statements at issue,
which discussed Larson’s criminal history and community members’
opinions about the case, were dismissed because the court found they
were incapable of a defamatory meaning.106
A jury then found that that the eight remaining statements were
defamatory, but that the news organizations were immunized from liability because the statements were not false.107 Larson moved for a new
trial following the jury verdict, asserting that the jury did not properly
apply the law. The district court granted Larson a new trial for all 11
statements, finding that the statements exceeded “the mere fact of arrest or charge” and were false and defamatory as a matter of law.108
On May 7, 2018, a three-judge panel of the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the fair report privilege
covers “fair and accurate reports of statements by law enforcement during an official press conference and in an official news release.”109 The
panel held that the district court erroneously concluded that the fair
report privilege did not apply, writing that Minnesota “has recognized
the fair-report privilege for over a century.”110 Most recently, in 2000,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co.111 that the privilege applies to an “accurate and complete report
or a fair abridgement of events that are part of the regular business of
a city council meeting.”112 The Court held that the privilege was premised on two principles: a fair and accurate report of a city council meeting would “simply relay information to the reader that she would have
seen or heard herself were she present at the meeting,”113 and second,
that there is an “obvious public interest in having public affairs made
known to all.”114 The Court therefore concluded that the news media
should be able to cover meetings when they are open to the public and
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are related to matters of public interest without fear that doing so might
subject them to litigation.115
In its February 2020 opinion in the Larson case, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part,
and remanded the case back to the district court for a new trial.116 Justice Margaret Chutich, writing for the majority, concluded that the privilege applied to seven statements the media published based on the
press conference and press release, that the jury instructions and a special verdict form failed to sufficiently inform the jury of the factors that
should be used to assess whether the privilege can be defeated, and that
although four of the statements were not covered by the privilege, they
were not actionable.117
Chutich began her analysis by explaining the majority’s reasoning
as to why the privilege should apply to the media statements based on
the press conference and press release. Larson had disputed that
Moreno supported extending the privilege to law enforcement press conferences and press releases.118 However, Chutich found that “principles
recognized in Moreno and the values underlying the First Amendment
warrant applying the fair and accurate reporting privilege” to the facts
of the case.119 Chutich wrote that the Court was taking an “incremental
approach” in expanding the privilege, holding only that it protects
“news reports that accurately and fairly summarize statements about a
matter of public concern made by law enforcement officers during an
official press conference and in an official news release.”120
First, Chutich found that the press conference and press releases
were public.121 Larson had argued that the press conference was not
public because only invited journalists were allowed to attend, and the
public was not provided with advance notice.122 However, the majority
rejected this argument, concluding that such a view is “far too narrow”
for when proceedings can be deemed public.123 “The clear purpose of the
press conference was to convey information to the community, and the
community was able to view the press conference live on television or
through the subsequent media coverage,” Chutich wrote.124 She further
held that the press must be provided with “some leeway in its depiction
115
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118
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and reporting of public events.”125 Chutich wrote, “[I]n a society in
which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to
observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring him in convenient form the facts of those
operations.”126
Second, Chutich concluded that the press conference and press release were a matter of public concern. “The citizens of Cold Spring and
surrounding communities had a great need to be informed about matters affecting their safety and their ability to go about their daily activities without fear,” she wrote.127 “And under some circumstances, such
as when a suspected criminal remains at large, it is important for the
public to be so informed and for the government to be able to caution
the public and solicit pertinent information.”128 Furthermore, Chutich
ruled that reporting such information advances the “key values of
transparency and accountability,” namely facilitating communication
between officials and the public, but also allowing the public to evaluate
the officials’ actions.129
Third, Chutich found that reporting about the press conference and
press release were covered by the privilege as an official action or proceeding because they were organized by senior officials of law enforcement agencies.130
The majority also rejected Larson’s argument that extending the
privilege to police press conferences and press releases would prejudice
juries. Although Chutich recognized that there can be a tension between press freedom and fair trials, she said that because of the strong
public interest in fair and accurate reporting about matters of public
interest derived from public proceedings, it would not be appropriate to
extend ethical rules prohibiting lawyers from making public statements
to non-lawyer public officials.131 The majority also said changes to voir
dire or moving the venue could also be used to find an unbiased jury.132
Finally, Chutich explained that a report is fair and accurate when
it “simply relay[s] information to the reader that she would have seen
or heard herself were she present” at the official proceeding.133 However, Chutich added that because the district court erroneously held
125
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that the privilege did not apply, the district court did not tell the jury
how to assess whether the privilege has been defeated.134 Therefore, the
district court’s jury instructions were not adequate because they focused only on whether the statements were substantially accurate and
did not assess fairness.135 A report may be unfair if it omits or misplaces
information or adds context that changes the meaning of the statements
in a material way, she wrote.136
Thus, the majority ordered a new trial to decide whether the privilege can apply to five statements at issue.137 KARE 11 published four
statements: “Police say that man—identified as 34-year-old Ryan Larson—ambushed officer Decker and shot him twice—killing him”; “Investigators say 34-year-old Ryan Larson ambushed the officer, shooting
him twice. Larson is in custody”; “He [Officer Decker] was the good guy
last night going to check on someone who needed help. That someone
was 34-year-old Ryan Larson who investigators say opened fire on Officer Tom Decker for no reason anyone can fathom”; and “Investigators
believe he fired two shots into Cold Spring Police Officer Tom Decker,
causing his death.”138 The St. Cloud Times published the fifth statement: “Police say Larson is responsible for the shooting death of Cold
Spring-Richmond Police Officer Tom Decker.”139
Regarding the remaining statements, Chutich concluded that
two—“Ryan Larson, the man accused of killing Officer Decker, could be
charged as early as Monday,” and “Man faces murder charge”—were
fair and accurate as a matter of law.140 Chutich held that four additional
statements were not actionable because they were not capable of a defamatory meaning, were opinion, or were true.141
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice G.
Barry Anderson, joined by Chief Justice Lorie S. Gildea, agreed with
the majority’s conclusion that four media statements were not actionable.142 However, he disagreed with the rest of the majority’s decision,
writing that the Court “tip[ped] [the] balance too far . . . in favor of the
press, effectively immunizing the press from liability for falsely accusing a private citizen of murder.”143
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Anderson first argued that the majority’s holding made the fair and
accurate report privilege “expansive and limitless,” and that the privilege should not apply to a law enforcement press conference and press
release.144 He observed that the Minnesota Constitution entitles residents to a specific remedy for reputational harm.145 Furthermore, Anderson concluded that expanding the privilege “is neither consistent
with the history of defamation law nor wise under our existing jurisprudence.”146 He questioned why the press conference and press release
would be considered “official” for purposes of the privilege.147
Anderson criticized the majority’s holding that reporting about the
press conference and press release were covered by the privilege as “an
official action or proceeding” because the conference and release were
organized by senior officials of law enforcement agencies.148 However,
he argued that “[u]nder that logic, the media has immunity to report on
any press conference held by any government employee and the scope
of the fair and accurate reporting privilege is effectively limitless,”149
adding that “[b]ecause of the court’s broad rule, any government official
or employee will be able to call a press conference or disseminate a press
release that defames private individuals and the press, with impunity,
will be able to widely circulate that defamation.”150 Such immunity, he
wrote, contradicts the Court’s own precedent and the Restatement (Second) of Torts.151
Moreover, Anderson questioned the majority’s invocation of the
First Amendment. Its “values and principles,” he wrote, “have little to
do with the facts here.”152 He found that the case was not about government misconduct or defamation of a government employee, but instead
concern[ed] “a private citizen who was falsely accused by certain media
representatives of shooting and killing a police officer.”153 Although acknowledging that the murder of a police officer and the expenditure of
public money to investigate such a crime are of public concern, he concluded that the identity of someone who is solely the target of a police
investigation “cannot be said to be of sufficient public concern to
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warrant the application of the immunity the media seeks here.”154 As
such, he would find that eight of the media statements were false and
would remand back to the district court to determine the negligence of
KARE 11 and the St. Cloud Times, as well as damages.155
This case is illustrative of another thorny aspect of the “truth” problem: is information “true,” simply because the government reports it? Is
it “reckless” for the press to report without independently verifying
what is said? The answer may be different, depending upon whether
the question is considered from a legal or ethical perspective. As reporter Bob Collins wrote in a 2014 post on his blog NewsCut, a Minnesota Public Radio (MPR) hosted opinion blog, “There was never any real
evidence against Larson, but that didn’t stop reporters from racing to
show his mug shot and name him as a suspect only on the strength of
what police said.”156 He added, “‘We just reported what the cops said’ is
a solid First Amendment defense in cases like this. But cases like this
should remind all of us that we should be better and more careful. Our
job isn’t to be stenographers. It’s to get the story right.”157
V.

ACTUAL MALICE REDUX

An explosion of public figure libel cases has roiled the press in recent months, providing an opportunity for courts to reexamine the actual malice standard. Litigants have included Sarah Palin,158 Joe Arpaio,159 Harvard law professor and former presidential candidate
Lawrence Lessig,160 and many others—all public figures who would be
required to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth
on the part of the publisher. Not least among these is President Donald
Trump, whose reelection campaign has sued, among others, The New
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York Times.161 As media attorney Theodore Boutrous observed, “The
lawsuit is a transparent misuse of the judicial branch as a political and
fundraising stunt. The lawsuit also plainly aims to chill freedom of
speech and freedom of the press when it comes to Trump.”162
But even before his election, Trump had complained that libel law
is stacked against the rich and powerful. As he told the Washington Post
editorial board in March 2016, “I want to make it more fair from the
side where I am, because things are said about me that are so egregious
and wrong, and right now according to the libel laws I can do almost
nothing about it.”163 And it appears he may have an ally in Associate
Justice Clarence Thomas. In a concurring opinion filed in McKee v.
Cosby164 in February 2019, Thomas called for the Court to revisit the
actual malice standard.165
In December 2014, petitioner Kathrine McKee accused actor and
comedian Bill Cosby of sexually assaulting her in the 1970s, one of
many #MeToo cases that surfaced during that time.166 She alleged that
Cosby’s attorney responded by writing and leaking a letter that deliberately distorted her personal background in order to “damage her reputation for truthfulness and honesty, and further to embarrass, harass,
humiliate, intimidate, and shame [her].”167
On October 18, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
upheld the district court’s decision to grant Cosby’s motion to dismiss,
finding that McKee was a public figure and could not prove actual malice.168 On February 19, 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
the case.169
In his concurring opinion, Thomas wrote that although he agreed
with the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in the case, he also called
for the high court, in an appropriate case, to reconsider the actual
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malice standard.170 He contended that Sullivan and subsequent decisions extending the standard were “policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law.”171
He continued, “[t]he states are perfectly capable of striking an acceptable balance between encouraging robust public discourse and
providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm,” adding that
“[t]here appears to be little historical evidence suggesting that the New
York Times actual-malice rule flows from the original understanding of
the First or Fourteenth Amendment.”172
Part of Thomas’s disquiet seems to be based on concerns about recourse for individuals who are not obviously classified as public figures
but are thrust into the public eye as a result of their involvement in
matters of public concern.173 The #MeToo complainants, like those in
McKee, are one such group. But perhaps the poster child for this dilemma is Nicholas Sandmann, a Covington Catholic High School student who became the subject of a viral video involving an alleged confrontation with a Native American activist Nathan Phillips.174
The litigation stemmed from reporting about an incident on January 18, 2019, when numerous news organizations and social media accounts circulated photos and videos of a confrontation between Sandmann and Phillips during two separate rallies taking place at the
National Mall in Washington, D.C.175 Sandmann had traveled to Washington, D.C. from a suburb of Cincinnati to participate in a march on
the National Mall opposing abortion.176 As the students were waiting
for a bus to pick them up at the Lincoln Memorial, they were approached by Phillips and other participants of the Indigenous Peoples
March.177 Many of the students, including Sandmann, were wearing
“Make America Great Again” hats.178 Early reporting about the incident
170
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alleged that Sandmann was blocking Phillips as Phillips chanted and
beat a drum.179 However, Sandmann later disputed that characterization and said he was not trying to interfere with Phillips’s movements.180
On February 19, 2019, Sandmann sued The Washington Post, alleging that video the news organization had posted of the incident was
“selectively edited” in order to show Sandmann as the aggressor and
that “the Post actively, negligently and recklessly participated in making the [video] go viral on social media,” without investigating the validity of the video or the Twitter account.181 The complaint further asserted that the Post ignored journalistic standards when interpreting
the incident.182 Media experts opined that Sandmann would face challenges in winning the case.183
On March 12, 2019, the Sandmann family filed a similar lawsuit
against CNN, making largely the same claims as the complaint against
the Post.184 The complaint asserted that CNN would have known its
reporting of the incident contained false accusations against Sandmann
if it had “undertaken any reasonable efforts to verify their accuracy before publication.”185 The complaint also claimed that CNN sought to advance an anti-Trump agenda.186 “Contrary to its ‘Facts First’ public relations ploy, CNN ignored the facts and put its anti-Trump agenda first
in waging a 7-day media campaign of false, vicious attacks against
Nicholas.”187
The complaint claimed that Sandmann was defamed in four CNN
television broadcasts and nine online articles published on the CNN
website, pointing particularly to claims that Sandmann and his classmates acted with a “mob mentality,” “looked like they were going to
lynch” other protestors, and were “racist.”188 The lawsuit sought $75
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million in compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive damages.189
On July 26, 2019, federal District Judge William O. Bertelsman
dismissed the complaint against the Post “in its entirety.”190 He held
that several of the alleged defamatory statements by the Post were “protected opinion” under the First Amendment.191 He also found that other
alleged defamatory statements were not “about” or “concerning” Sandmann, or did not constitute defamation per se, meaning statements that
accuse an individual of crimes or immoral acts and are presumed to be
harmful.192
However, on October 28, 2019, Bertelsman partially reinstated the
suit against the Post and wrote that he would allow the plaintiffs to
begin discovery based on three statements in the Post’s coverage.193 Although Bertelsman had previously found that it was Phillips’s opinion
that he was being blocked and not allowed to retreat, and that he had
conveyed those beliefs to the newspaper, he ruled that this
“should . . . be the subject of proof.”194 Bertelsman wrote, “Suffice to say
that the Court has given this matter careful review and concludes that
‘justice requires’ that discovery be had regarding these statements and
their context. The Court will then consider them anew on summary
judgment.”195
Meanwhile, on November 21, 2019, Bertelsman similarly ruled
that a separate, $275 million libel lawsuit the Sandmann family filed
against NBC Universal could move forward.196 Bertelsman wrote,
“[T]he court finds that the statements that plaintiff ‘blocked’ Phillips or
did not allow him to retreat, if false, meet the test of being libelous per
se . . .”197
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On January 7, 2020, CNN Business reported that the media outlet
had reached a settlement with Sandmann, though it did not provide the
details of the settlement.198 However, the outlet noted that the settlement would “allow CNN to avoid a lengthy and potentially unpredictable trial.”199 In July 2020, the Washington Post reported that the newspaper had also settled the Sandmanns’ lawsuit, quoting one of their
attorneys who stated that the plaintiffs had agreed to end the litigation
“because the Post was quick to publish the whole truth – through its
follow-up coverage and editor’s notes.”200
In early March 2020, Sandmann filed lawsuits against five additional defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, seeking $450 million in total, including $195 million from
Gannett, which publishes USA Today, the Cincinnati Enquirer, and numerous other local newspapers; $95 million from ABC News; $65 million from The New York Times; $60 million from CBS News; and $35
million from Rolling Stone magazine.201 The complaints identified multiple articles and social media posts by Gannett and ABC News as allegedly containing libelous material.
A critical question as the cases proceed will be determining
whether Sandmann is a public figure and therefore obliged to prove actual malice. Opinion on this is divided, with some arguing that he is, at
most, an involuntary public figure who found himself caught up in a
controversy unrelated to the rally he had traveled to attend.202 As the
Supreme Court observed: “Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own,
but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.”203
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But regardless of his status as a public figure, Sandmann’s claims
for punitive damages would need to be supported by proof of actual malice. In his case, much of the allegedly libelous material he complains of
may be otherwise protected, such as by the opinion or fair comment
privileges. But ultimately, they constitute reporting or commentary
that reflects badly on Sandmann, and that he does not like, and which
he and his supporters undoubtedly consider to be “fake news.”204
VI. WHO DECIDES: COVID-19 AND MISINFORMATION
Which brings us back to the core question of who will determine
what is true, and what is false? The answer to that question becomes
even more critical in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, where disinformation and fake news abounds. In a March 8, 2020 story, The New
York Times reported that misinformation and conspiracy theories about
the coronavirus “ha[d] spread across the world” prompting different efforts by social media and technology companies “to prevent its dissemination.”205
Public Knowledge, a nonprofit organization promoting freedom of
expression and access to information online, listed several efforts by Facebook to address false information on its platform related to the virus,
including partnering with the “International Fact-Checking Network
(IFCN) to support the fact-checking community by broadening the
#CoronaVirusFacts Alliance, the COVID-19 related misinformation effort, with a budget of $1 million in grants.”206
Facebook announced on April 7, 2020 that it was investing an additional $100 million into the “news industry,” including “$25 million in
emergency grant funding for local news through the Facebook Journalism Project, and $75 million in additional marketing spend to move
money over to news organizations around the world.”207 It also temporarily banned ads and listings for medical masks, hand sanitizer, surface disinfecting wipes, and COVID-19 testing kits.208
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For its part, Google also took several actions to address COVID-19
misinformation, including, like Facebook, blocking all ads “capitalizing
on the coronavirus,” according to Public Knowledge. Google also pledged
$6.5 million to fund fact-checkers, news organizations, and others to
improve research and reporting on the virus to help curtail the spread
of misinformation related to COVID-19.209
Twitter also announced that it would remove tweets about the coronavirus that could cause a “direct risk to people’s health or well-being.”210 The company claimed that it was broadening its guidance on
“unverified claims that have the potential to incite people to action,
could lead to the destruction or damage of critical infrastructure, or
cause widespread panic/social unrest,” which were “considered a violation of our policies,” and that it would begin placing labels and warning
messages on tweets containing disputed or misleading information related to COVID-19.211
However, the issue is complicated when government officials are
themselves spreading misinformation.212 For example, although Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has stated that promoting bleach as a cure
for COVID-19 constituted “misinformation that has imminent risk of
danger,” Facebook, as well as several other social media sites, including
Twitter, declined to remove comments by President Donald Trump on
April 24 suggesting that disinfectants and ultraviolet light were possible treatments for the virus.213
The New York Times reported that although Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube declined to remove the statements because President
Trump “did not specifically direct people to pursue the unproven treatments,” his comments nevertheless “led to a mushrooming of other
posts, videos and comments about false virus cures with UV lights and
disinfectants that the companies have largely left up.”214 The Times
209
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found “780 Facebook groups, 290 Facebook pages, nine Instagram accounts and thousands of tweets pushing UV light therapies that were
posted after Mr. Trump’s comments and that remained on the sites . . . .
Only a few of the posts have been taken down.”215 The Times also found
“more than 45,000 tweets discussing bleach and UV light cures for the
coronavirus that stemmed from the president’s comments. Many of the
posts said Mr. Trump was right about his suggested treatments.”216
Renee DiResta, a technical research manager at the Stanford Internet
Observatory, told the Times that most tech companies crafted policies
addressing misinformation “with the expectation that there would be a
competent government and reputable health authority to point to,” and
therefore were unprepared to handle false information coming from the
White House.217
VII. CONCLUSION
And indeed, what are the media—or for that matter, the public—
to do in the face of such false information? Ironically, the fair report
privilege, for the most part, will protect the press when it repeats even
patently untrue government pronouncements. Yet if they choose to critically but accurately report on controversial actions of public officials or
figures, they are vulnerable to lawsuits. That vulnerability will only increase if the actual malice standard is modified or eliminated.
Writing in The Federalist in March 2016, Political Editor John
Daniel Davidson wrote that then-candidate Trump’s musings about
“open[ing] up the libel laws” “should alarm all Americans who care
about freedom of speech and freedom of the press.” He continued:
Does [Trump] care about freedom of speech and freedom of the
press, or understand why those things are sacrosanct in American public life? Freedom of speech is a rare thing, after all. It’s
one of the big differences between the United States and a place
like Cuba . . . . Cuba has no freedom of the press—or rule of law.
Libel is whatever the regime says it is. Does Trump realize the
slippery slope in front of him?218
That is the slippery slope in front of all of us. Presuming that the government is operating in good faith is a prerequisite for civil society. But
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that trust must be earned and is always subject to independent verification. Allowing the government to arbitrate and determine what is
true and what is false undercuts the essential teaching of New York
Times v. Sullivan: that without the actual malice standard, “would-be
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism,
even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense
of having to do so.”219
There is no question that the defense of libel suits can be very
costly, and that news organizations, facing significant financial challenges of their own, may well be deterred from investigative reporting
if they fear that crippling legal expenses, or even bankruptcy, may follow.220 But the true cost of libel suits, and of fake news legislation, is
the loss of individual autonomy. It undermines the right of citizens to
seek and find truth for themselves, without fear of retaliation or censorship. The marketplace of ideas is imperfect, but essential to facilitate
that search. Eliminating it would imperil nothing less than democracy
itself.
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The First Amendment as a Procrustean Bed?: On
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Greek mythology, Procrustes was a notorious bandit who would
abduct travelers and then offer them a rather macabre form of hospitality.1 Procrustes would provide his “guests” with rich food and drink.
When it came time for sleep, he would require his victims to “sleep” in
a bed that he promised would provide a perfect fit. Procrustes achieved
this perfect fit by stretching those too short to fit the bed or by lopping
off the limbs of those who were too tall to fit it.2 From this myth comes
the concept of the “Procrustean Bed,” which involves either ignoring
relevant factors (lopping them off) or placing too much weight on considerations that do not adequately support an argument (stretching the
truth, if you will).3
If, as First Amendment theorists, such as Alexander Meiklejohn,
have argued with such persuasive force,4 the freedom of speech is
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4
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26
(1948) (“The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of selfgovernment.”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 119
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essential to the project of democratic self-government,5 the federal
courts should not value predictability and consistency of results over
the inclusiveness and vibrancy of the political marketplace of ideas.
First Amendment doctrine must not become a Procrustean bed. Instead, the constitutional tests used to frame and decide First Amendment cases must be sufficiently open-ended to permit judges to take all
relevant factors and considerations into account.
To be sure, consistency of outcomes across the run of cases presenting similar facts constitutes an important virtue—not a vice—in the adjudication of constitutional rights because it promotes the appearance
of fairness. In First Amendment cases, however, consistency and the
appearance of fairness cannot serve as the only relevant values that
judges take into consideration. Instead, First Amendment rules should
advance, rather than impede, the process of democratic deliberation.6
Unfortunately, a great deal of contemporary First Amendment law
arguably resembles a Procrustean bed. This is because in its search for
tests that will yield consistent outcomes on a predictable basis, the Supreme Court has adopted a great many doctrinal tests that either disregard relevant factors or place undue weight on factors that, although
relevant, should not be deemed controlling. Free speech cases will always fit the tests—even if the tests themselves fail reliably to advance
and secure core First Amendment values (such as facilitating, on a
wide-spread basis, the ability of ordinary citizens to participate actively
in the process of democratic deliberation).
Over time, the Roberts Court, and the Rehnquist Court before it,
has worked assiduously to make First Amendment jurisprudence more
predictable by rejecting doctrinal approaches that vest judges with
broad discretion to select free speech winners and free speech losers. As
explained below, salient examples include access to government property for speech activity, the speech rights of government employees,
transborder speech, and the speech rights of students and teachers in
the nation’s public schools, colleges, and universities.7 In these varied

(1993) (arguing that the “overriding goal” of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
should be “to reinvigorate processes of democratic deliberation, by ensuring greater attention to
public issues and greater diversity of view[s]” and positing that “[t]he First Amendment should
not stand as an obstacle to democratic efforts to accomplish these goals”).
5
SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 18 (arguing that “a well-functioning system of free expression”
is essential to attaining “the central constitutional goal of creating a deliberative democracy”).
According to Sunstein, maintaining the project of democratic self-government must include “an
important deliberative feature” that provides voters with “new information and perspectives” so
that “both collective and individual decisions can be shaped and improved.” Id. at 19.
6
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4, at 89–91. Professor Meiklejohn posits that “[t]he unabridged
freedom of public discussion is the rock on which our government stands.” Id. at 91.
7
See infra text and accompanying notes 9 to 14, 44 to 49, 64 to 104.
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and important contexts, the Supreme Court has, over time, reduced rather than expanded the scope of First Amendment rights.
In this Essay, I will argue that this approach is mistaken because
safeguarding the process of democratic deliberation requires that some
play in the joints exist. What is more, the use of bright line, categorical
rules, rather than the open-ended balancing tests that the Warren
Court, and to some extent the Burger Court, embraced, has a disparate
impact on the ability of ordinary citizens to participate in the process of
democratic deliberation. For ordinary citizens, possessed of average financial means, it has been getting harder over time, rather than easier,
for them to speak their versions of truth to power.8 Access to public
property for speech activity provides a particularly telling, and egregious, example of this trend.
First, the Supreme Court has narrowly defined the scope of government property that must be presumptively available for speech activity
(so-called “traditional public forums”).9 Second, even with respect to
government property that constitutes a traditional public forum, the
Supreme Court has deployed the time, place, and manner doctrine to
convey broad discretion on the government to limit access to public
property for speech activity.10 The combination of these doctrinal
threads leads to puzzling lower federal court decisions. For example,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (bizarrely) held
that the broad marble plaza in front of the Supreme Court, which is
otherwise open to the public 24 hours a day, seven days a week, is not
a public forum.11 So too, it turns out, the government may close all access to the Jefferson Memorial for First Amendment activity.12 Even in
a large park, in the central core of a major American city (St. Louis,
Missouri), extending for over a half-mile and comprising almost 100
acres, the government may severely restrict any and all speech activity—banishing it to a handful of small designated areas.13 If democratic
deliberation and engagement are essential to making elections meaningful, all of these decisions are deeply misguided.14

8

RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE DISAPPEARING FIRST AMENDMENT 9–21 (2019).
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) (holding that an
airport concourse does not constitute a “public forum” and, accordingly, that the government may
impose any “reasonable” speech regulations that restrict or prohibit speech activity within the
concourse area—even though the particular airport concourses at issue, in New York City, otherwise functioned in many respects as de facto government-owned and operated shopping malls).
10
See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–21, 725–30 (2000).
11
Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1150, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
12
Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 552–54 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
13
United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1995).
14
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 22–26, 35–46.
9
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Of course, the standard narrative holds that the First Amendment’s scope of application has never been broader.15 For example, Professor Kathleen Sullivan posits that the Roberts Court’s strongly libertarian vision for the First Amendment “emphasizes that freedom of
speech is a negative command that protects a system of speech, not individual speakers, and thus invalidates government interference with
the background system of expression no matter whether a speaker is
individual or collective, for-profit or nonprofit, powerful or marginal.”
From this vantage point, free speech has moved in a single direction—
toward ever broader, arguably “Lochnerian”16 protection of an ever-expanding array of human behaviors and activities.17
Professor Gregory Magarian expresses similar concerns.18 Although straightforwardly acknowledging growth in the scope of the
First Amendment’s application over time,19 Magarian argues that the
Roberts Court has adopted a “managed speech” approach to the First
Amendment, under which the Supreme Court routinely favors powerful
corporate speakers and the government itself over marginalized speakers who seek to advance the causes of political minorities. He warns
that “[m]anaged speech lets select government actors and powerful
speakers manage the content and scope of public debate.”20 He suggests
that, in an ideal world, the federal courts would “shift [their] center of
First Amendment gravity from powerful and well-financed speakers to
dissenters and outsider speakers.”21
15

Kathleen Sullivan, Comment, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143,
143–46, 155–63 (2010) (discussing the Roberts Court’s libertarian gloss on the Free Speech Clause
as a proscription against government efforts to control the marketplace of ideas by regulating either speakers or their messages).
16
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17
For relevant critiques of this trend of interpreting and applying the First Amendment to
protect and ever-broader spectrum of human activity, see Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199 (2015) and Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. MARY L. REV. 1613 (2015). However, not everyone
agrees with the ever-expanding First Amendment thesis. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free
Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 723–34 (2011). Dean Chemerinsky argues that if one considers
“the overall pattern of Roberts Courts rulings” on the First Amendment, it becomes crystal clear
that the Roberts Courts “is not a free speech court.” Id. at 734.
18
See GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST AMENDMENT
xiv–xxii, 235–53 (2017).
19
Id. at xiii–xiv, 157–91.
20
Id. at 242.
21
Id. at 243; see also STEVEN F. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF
AMERICA 128 (2000) (positing that “the First Amendment spotlights a different metaphor than the
marketplace of ideas or the richness of public debate; instead, it supports the American ideal of
protecting and supporting dissent by putting dissenters at the center of the First Amendment
tradition”). Professor Shiffrin argues that marginalized dissenters, like flag burners, should enjoy
the most robust First Amendment protection, whereas “business corporations and commercial
speakers have less of a claim to be at the heart of the First Amendment then they would if the
marketplace of ideas was our guiding metaphor.” Id.
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Concerns of this sort enjoy support with at least some current members of the Supreme Court. As decision after decision has expanded the
First Amendment’s scope of application to potentially invalidate laws
involving, for example, commercial advertising practices involving
credit card fees,22 sitting Justices have warned against the federal
courts Lochnerizing via the First Amendment—and more specifically by
continually expanding the amendment’s scope of application over time.
For example, Justice Stephen Breyer invoked the Lochner bugbear in
his dissenting opinion in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.23
In Sorrell, Justice Breyer vociferously objected to the invalidation
of a Vermont personal data protection law that prohibited the sale of
physicians’ prescription data for marketing purposes.24 He warned that
the majority’s application of strict scrutiny to the state law threatened
to open a jurisprudential “Pandora’s Box”25 by “reawaken[ing] Lochner’s
pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.”26
In Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, Breyer struck another cautionary note against the specter of using the First Amendment
as a generic constitutional tool for undoing various and sundry government social and economic regulations. In a concurring opinion, he observed—quite accurately—that “virtually all government regulation affects speech” and “[h]uman relations take place through speech.”27 If
this is so, then the First Amendment’s scope of application could encompass “virtually all government regulation.”28
The prospect of applying strict judicial scrutiny to virtually all government social and economic regulations does bear more than a passing
resemblance to Lochner. To the extent that government regulations affect communications related to the sale of goods or services, the potential risk of Lochnerizing is obvious.29
22

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 585–86, 591–92, 602–03 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24
See id. at 587–91, 602–03.
25
Id. at 602.
26
Id. at 603. For a thoughtful critique of the majority’s decision and First Amendment analysis in Sorrell, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of
Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 856, 870–80 (2012).
27
Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
28
Id.
29
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). Professor Schauer observes
that although “[t]here have been many important disagreements about what rules should apply
when a law or practice infringes upon the First Amendment,” that “far fewer disagreements [have
arisen] about whether, as a threshold matter, the First Amendment is even implicated at all.” Id.
at 1766. The problem is a serious one because despite occasional consideration of the First Amendment’s proper scope of application, more often than not, “the boundary disputes have been
23
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More than a little irony exists in this trend; conservative judges
who regularly warn about the dangers of judicial overreach in cases
raising substantive due process30 or equal protection31 claims have no
difficulty exercising judicial review in a maximalist way to enforce the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It is far from self-evident
why women, sexual minorities,32 and would-be school children33 should
have to rely on voluntary self-restraint by state legislatures or the Congress, whereas would-be corporate speakers enjoy the active and eager
protection of the federal courts. If judicial modesty is appropriate in
safeguarding minorities’ (however defined) fundamental rights,
shouldn’t the same deferential approach apply when Consolidated Edison34 or Hobby Lobby35 appear at bar to invoke the First Amendment?
At least arguably, the Supreme Court should be more deferential
to democratically-elected legislatures seeking to regulate subjects such
as corporate campaign expenditures36 or to provide public support to
seriously underfunded candidates for public office running against selfinvisible.” Id. at 1768.
30
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603–04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that “I
have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda through normal
democratic means,” arguing that LGBTQ persons should seek protection of their fundamental
rights from the state legislatures and not from the courts, and concluding that the courts should
“leav[e] regulation of this matter to the people”).
31
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 569–70 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting an
equal protection challenge to VMI’s official policy of categorically excluding women from matriculating based on their gender because states traditionally maintained all-male, single-sex institutions, observing that “[t]he all-male constitution of VMI comes squarely within such a governing
tradition,” and objecting that “change is forced upon Virginia, and reversion to single-sex education
is prohibited nationwide, not by democratic processes but by order of this Court”).
32
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 686–88 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
the federal courts should not extend marriage rights to sexual minorities because “this Court is
not a legislature,” positing that “[w]hether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us,” and concluding that “in our democratic republic, that decision should rest with the
people acting through their elected representatives”). But cf. United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (opining that if a state or federal law abridges or denies a fundamental right or reflects “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities,” the normal presumptions of constitutionality should not apply and instead the Constitution mandates a “more searching judicial inquiry”). How Chief Justice Roberts manages to reconcile his dissenting opinion in
Obergefell, which would commit sexual minorities to the tender mercies of the Mississippi or Alabama state legislatures, with the central meaning and import of footnote 4 of Carolene Products is
something of a mystery.
33
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (opining that “[w]ere it our
business to set the Nation’s social policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for
an enlightened society to deprive any children—including illegal aliens—of an elementary education,” positing that “it would be folly—and wrong—to tolerate creation of a segment of society made
up of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our language,” but nevertheless
concluding that “[w]e trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today”).
34
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
35
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
36
But cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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funding millionaires with virtually unlimited campaign war chests.37
Whatever the merits of these arguments, we tend to see aggressive use
of the power of judicial review in cases where a government seeks to
regulate private speech. The Supreme Court has shown little, if any,
reticence to “say what the law is” in this context.38
From this vantage point, free speech claims, of any and all stripes,
will receive a sympathetic hearing—and favorable treatment—at the
Supreme Court.39 In many important contexts, this predictive judgment
holds true. First Amendment doctrinal rules against content-, viewpoint-, and speaker-based discrimination have never been more robustly defined and applied.40 Speech designed to inflict serious emotional harm enjoys generous constitutional protection because the First
Amendment “protect[s] even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure
that we do not stifle public debate.”41 Even intentionally false speech,
absent a showing of specific harm, enjoys strong constitutional protection.42 Thus, the First Amendment has been something of a growth
stock during the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts.43
On the other hand, in several important areas, expressive freedoms
have actually been contracting, rather than expanding, over time. For
those seeking to use government property to speak,44 government employees who seek to speak out about matters of public concern,45 persons
engaged in news gathering and reporting,46 students and faculty at the
37

But cf. Arizona Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S.
724 (2008).
38
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
39
See Ronald L.K. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First Amendment,
and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 412–13 (2012) (arguing that Supreme Court has
afforded “near absolute protection to expression” and positing that the Roberts Court “has re-conceptualized the way we think about certain free speech issues”).
40
See, e.g., Nat’l Instit. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014); Brown v. Entm’t.
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); United States
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
41
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54–56 (1988) (holding that intentionally outrageous, offensive parody, designed
to inflict emotional damage on the subject, enjoys robust First Amendment protection because
imposing civil liability for outrageous parodies “has an inherent subjectiveness about it which
would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression”).
42
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
43
But cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 725–34 (arguing that the Roberts Court has been
inconsistent in enforcing core First Amendment values).
44
Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–68 (2009); Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F. 3d 1145,
1159–62 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F. 3d 545, 552–54 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
45
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
46
Animal League Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Alan K. Chen
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nation’s public schools, colleges, and universities,47 and persons and organizations engaged in transborder speech activities,48 free speech
rights have been declining, rather than expanding, in the contemporary
United States.49
Some very capable First Amendment scholars, including, as noted
earlier, Kathleen Sullivan and Gregory Magarian,50 have made precisely this argument, positing that the contemporary Supreme Court
simply favors wealthy would-be speakers over less well-off would-be
speakers who require some kind of government assistance in order to
speak.51 In other words, the Supreme Court has adopted a form of social
Darwinism that reposes broad, if not unlimited, faith in private speech
markets. Private individuals, organizations, and even publicly-traded
corporations—not the government—will structure, if not control, the
political marketplace of ideas.52 However, could an alternative thesis
provide a better account for the Justices’ behavior under Chief Justices
John G. Roberts, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist?
Such an account does exist and consists of precisely this: the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts consistently have abjured First Amendment
doctrinal tests that vest judges with broad discretionary authority to
vindicate, or reject, free speech claims on a case-by-case basis. Rather
than a laissez-faire Lochnerian approach, the modern Supreme Court
has sought to wring out virtually all discretion from the adjudication of
First Amendment claims by adopting and applying bright line, categorical rules that strictly limit the ability of judges to select free speech
winners and free speech losers. By way of contrast, the Warren Court,53
and to some extent, the Burger Court as well,54 both developed and deployed open-ended tests that required trial courts and appellate courts
alike to balance free speech claims against the government’s claims of
managerial necessity.

& Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV.
1435, 1439–40, 1466–71 (2015).
47
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
48
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–40 (2010); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transborder Speech, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 473 (2018).
49
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 18, 215–18, 223–25 (2019).
50
See supra text and accompanying notes 15 to 21.
51
Id.
52
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–42 (2010); see also OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM
DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996).
53
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131 (1966).
54
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); Branzburg v. Hayes,
438 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972)
(per curiam).
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Balancing tests can give rise to an appearance of content, viewpoint, or even speaker discrimination because reasonable jurists can
and will reach conflicting results in cases featuring very similar facts.55
Bright line rules, by way of contrast, will produce consistent and predictable results in such cases. Consistent results in cases presenting
similar facts is certainly desirable—but so is “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open”56 public debate about government officials, candidates for
public office, public figures, and matters of public concern.57
Free speech rules that require judges to exercise discretion will produce free speech winners and losers who have similar, if not identical,
constitutional claims. But, this approach, which was a hallmark of the
free speech jurisprudence of the Warren Court,58 has the virtue of
broadly facilitating the democratic discourse essential to making elections an effective means of securing government accountability.59 Balancing tests usually will protect more speech than categorical tests that
almost always favor the government in circumstances where a wouldbe speaker is seeking the government’s assistance in order to speak; in
such circumstances, a bright line rule will almost invariably favor the
government’s legitimate managerial interests.60
Accordingly, and drawing on the title of this symposium—“What’s
the Harm?: The Future of the First Amendment”—the “harm” of First
Amendment bright line rules is a less vibrant, open, and inclusive marketplace of political ideas. This harm also constitutes a cost that the
Roberts Court needs to address more directly and forthrightly when it
jettisons balancing tests in favor of categorical free speech rules in contexts where doing so protects fewer speakers and less speech.
An important caveat at the outset: it would be mistaken to posit
that First Amendment jurisprudence should not feature any bright line
55

KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 35–46.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (observing that the First Amendment
exists to ensure that the public debate about public officials and matters of public concern is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).
57
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4, at 22–27, 88–91.
58
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 15–17.
59
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4, at 88 (arguing that “if men are to be their own rulers” then
“whatever truth may become available shall be placed at the disposal of all citizens of the community” and that the First Amendment’s primary purpose “is to give every voting member of the body
politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of these problems with which the
citizens of a self-governing society must deal”).
60
See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164–65 (1996). Professor Post
observes that “[w]ithin managerial domains, the state organizes its resources so as to achieve specified ends” and that these governmental managerial domains are “necessary so that a democratic
state can actually achieve objectives that have been democratically agreed upon.” Id. at 164. For
an extended discussion of the problems and difficulties of disentangling the government’s legitimate managerial domains from the operation of the free and open democratic discourse essential
to maintaining a system of self-government, see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995).
56
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rules. Bright line rules can and do play an important role in safeguarding the process of democratic deliberation from ham-fisted government
efforts to censor or even simply reshape the political marketplace of
ideas.61 Even so, however, bright line rules are not enough.
The federal courts should work to create a bifurcated system of free
speech jurisprudence that provides a floor, safeguarded by categorical
rules that strictly limit the government’s ability to engage in censorship
of political speech (for example, the categorical First Amendment doctrinal rules against prior restraints, viewpoint discrimination, and content discrimination), and also a ceiling, that involves more open-ended
free speech rules that permits courts to require the government to facilitate speech activity when it has the means to do so without undue
inconvenience or disruption, but lacks the will to facilitate speech activity by ordinary citizens who require governmental assistance in order
to participate in the process of democratic self-government.62 This approach would establish and protect an important free speech baseline
(the “floor” created by categorical rules) but also leave open the possibility of a broader and more vibrant political marketplace of ideas (via
the “ceiling” created through the use of balancing tests that permit caseby-case, context sensitive, evaluations of efforts by would-be speakers
to seek and obtain the government’s assistance to facilitate their speech
activity).
II. THE ROBERTS AND REHNQUIST COURTS EMBRACE CATEGORICAL
RULES, NOT BALANCING TESTS, IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
In a variety of areas, the Warren and Burger Courts embraced
open-ended balancing tests to frame and decide First Amendment
cases, whereas the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts consistently adopted
bright line, categorical rules. Examples include cases involving access
to public property for speech activity, the speech rights of government
employees, and the speech rights of students in the nation’s public
schools.63 This section will demonstrate how the Warren Court broke
61

See Vincent A. Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 449–56 (1985). Professor Blasi suggests that “[i]n crafting standards to govern specific
areas of first amendment dispute, courts that adopt the pathological perspective should place a
premium on confining the range of discretion left to future decisionmakers” and that “[c]onstitutional standards that are highly outcome-determinative of the cases to which they apply are thus
to be preferred.” Id. at 474.
62
See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
260 (1961) (positing that “universal discussion is imperative” and lamenting “how inadequate, to
the degree of non-existence, are our public provisions for active discussions among the members of
our self-governing society”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE
AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, ix (2017) (arguing that “[m]embers of a democratic public will not do well
if they are unable to appreciate the views of their fellow citizens”).
63
Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509–11 (1969)
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important new First Amendment ground by requiring the government
to use its vast resources to support, rather than to impede, civic discourse. In all of these areas, however, the Warren Court found it
essential to take the government’s legitimate managerial necessities
into account—and doing so required the adoption of open-ended balancing tests rather than categorical rules.
A. A Presumption of Access to Public Property for Speech Activity
Versus the Public Forum Doctrine
The Warren Court, as well as the Burger Court, adopted a general
presumption that government property otherwise suitable for expressive activity should be available for such activity—even if the property’s
principal purpose had nothing to do with exercising First Amendment
rights. For example, a public library is not self-evidently a logical forum
for collective, public protest activity, but the Warren Court held that
civil rights protesters could engage in a silent protest in a racially segregated Louisiana public library.64 The conclusion followed because the
protest, which lasted around 15 minutes,65 did not disrupt the library’s
regular operation.66 On these facts, the Supreme Court invalidated
breach of the peace convictions, essentially holding that the protesters
possessed a First Amendment right to use the public library for their
silent protest.67
The Burger Court also followed this general approach—by, for example, holding that the U.S. Army could not close Fort Sam Houston, a
San Antonio, Texas military base, to leafletters who sought to promote

(vindicating public school students’ free speech claims under an open-ended balancing test that
weighs a free speech claim against the risk that student speech activity will substantially and
materially disrupt a public school’s regular educational activities) with Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393, 403, 408–10 (2007) (rejecting a public high school student’s First Amendment claim using
a categorical test that vests school officials with broad authority to proscribe even nonsense speech
that could arguably have been interpreted to advocate the use of marijuana) and Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) (applying a categorical test to deny any First
Amendment protection to a student’s vulgar or scatological speech at a school-sponsored event). It
bears noting that Justice Clarence Thomas has argued that Tinker’s open-ended balancing approach should be completely jettisoned in favor of a categorical approach that would sustain virtually any and all government restrictions on students’ speech. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 422
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (objecting to the growing “patchwork of exceptions” to the Tinker standard
and calling for Tinker to be overruled in favor of a categorical rule favoring the government).
64
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (observing that “[i]t is an unhappy circumstance that the locus of these events was a public library—a place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge,
and to beauty” but nevertheless concluding that the silent protest in the public library constituted
a “lawful, constitutionally protected exercise of their fundamental rights”).
65
Id. at 135–38.
66
Id. at 142 (“Fortunately, the circumstances here were such that no claim can be made that
use of the library by others was disturbed by the demonstration. . . . Were it otherwise, a factor
not present in this case would have to be considered.”).
67
See id. at 143.
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an anti–Vietnam War protest rally.68 In a three-page, per curiam opinion, rendered without full briefing and oral argument, the 6-3 majority
held that “[t]he base commandant can no more order petitioner off this
public street because he was distributing leaflets than could the city
police order any leafleteer off any public street.”69
To be sure, the Burger Court also issued the decision Greer v.
Spock,70 which denied Dr. Benjamin Spock, the People’s Party candidate for president in 1972, access to the Fort Dix Military Reservation,
a U.S. Army base in New Jersey, for a campaign rally.71 However, Justice Potter Stewart’s First Amendment analysis did not begin and end
with a declaration that Fort Dix was a non-public forum and therefore
could be closed categorically to any and all First Amendment activity.
Justice Stewart required the army to justify the ban on political activity
on the base, and found that the army had a persuasive rationale for
allowing most speech activity on base—but with the exception of partisan political activity.72 In other words, the Greer majority engaged in a
balancing exercise that considered Spock’s interest in speaking against
the army’s interest in closing the base property to partisan campaign
activity—and concluded that the constitutional balance favored the government on these facts.
Today, however, all three cases would be decided differently and on
a much more summary basis. A military base is a non-public forum and
any reasonable regulations would be deemed constitutional.73 A public
library is, at most, a limited purpose public forum and the government
could limit the kinds of First Amendment activity that it permits to occur in such spaces.74
Professor Timothy Zick correctly observes that “[u]nder current forum analysis, the library, like most contested places, would most likely
be considered a ‘non-public’ forum.”75 This is so because the Supreme
68

Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198–99 (1971).
Id. at 198.
70
424 U.S. 828 (1976).
71
Id. at 830–35.
72
Id. at 839 (observing that “[w]hat the record shows . . . is a considered Fort Dix policy, objectively and evenhandedly applied, of keeping official military activities there wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind,” thus ensuring that “the military as
such is insulated from both the reality and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan
political causes or candidates.”).
73
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797, 802–06 (1985).
74
Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (discussing the concept of a limited purpose public forum in which the government limits access to government property based on speakers, speech content, or both); see also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561
U.S. 661 (2010) (holding that government support for student organizations at a government-operated law school created a limited purpose public forum that could impose restrictions on membership rules as a condition of using the forum).
75
Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
69
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Court has used a very narrow, tradition-bound test to identify “traditional public forums”; the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts have essentially categorically excluded government property associated with activities that did not exist in 1791 (such as commercial airports).76 Lower
federal courts have found that government property, such as national
parks and monuments, do not constitute traditional public forums.77
Thus, as Zick posits, contemporary First Amendment analysis would
“fail[ ] to place the library [at issue in Brown] in local and more general
historical perspective”78 and would permit the government to arrest,
try, and convict civil rights protestors who had engaged in unauthorized
speech activity in a public library.
A categorical approach to making public property available has the
effect of closing most government property to speech activity—even
when the government, with little if any inconvenience, could make the
property available. This provides a clear example of how a balancing
test can and would protect more speech activity than a categorical test.
More specifically, a balancing exercise would open up more public
spaces to First Amendment activity than a categorical approach. Courts
will not—and should not—permit would-be protesters to commandeer
at will any and all public property that they wish to use for speech activity. However, it is entirely possible to imagine a First Amendment
world in which courts require the government to provide a plausible
reason for denying access to specific public property for speech activity.
The Warren Court, and to a lesser degree, the Burger Court, took exactly this approach—whereas the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have
not.

439, 497 (2006).
76
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682 (1992) (holding that
an airport concourse does not constitute a traditional public forum and, in consequence, that the
First Amendment permits any and all “reasonable” government regulations restricting speech activity in airports); cf. Stephen G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1634 (1998) (arguing that the government should always bear a burden of justification that shows proposed speech activity is inconsistent with the regular uses of
particular government property and that “only if the speech would otherwise significantly interfere
with the government’s ability to carry out its legitimate duties” should a court not require the
government to make the property available for First Amendment activity).
77
See, e.g., Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F. 3d 1145, 1159–62 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Oberwetter v. Hilliard,
639 F. 3d 545, 552–54 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 615 F. 3d 508, 515
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
78
Zick, supra note 75, at 497.
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B. Government Employee Speech About Matters of Public Concern
Versus the Government’s Managerial Necessities as an Employer
In Pickering v. Board of Education,79 the Warren Court pioneered
First Amendment protection for government employees who speak out
about a matter of public concern. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing
for a unanimous bench on this point, explained that “[t]he problem in
any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher,
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.”80
In other words, federal courts must weigh a government employee’s
interest in speaking out about a matter of public concern against the
risk that the speech activity could disrupt the government’s workplace.
In Pickering, the balance favored Marvin L. Pickering, a public school
teacher in Illinois, and the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected his public comments about the school district’s efforts
to get local voters to approve a bond issue to improve the local public
schools.81 This conclusion held true, moreover, even though Pickering’s
speech, a letter to the editor published in a local newspaper, contained
some factual errors.82
The Roberts Court, by way of contrast, took a different approach in
Garcetti v. Ceballos83—and adopted a categorical rule that systematically favors government employers over government employees. Richard Ceballos, an assistant district attorney, objected both orally and in
an office memorandum to the office permitting a law enforcement officer
to provide allegedly false information to a state court judge in order to
obtain a search warrant.84 Ceballos believed that he suffered official retaliation as a result of these actions and sought the protection of the
First Amendment under Pickering.85
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment provided Ceballos with literally no protection against official retaliation for his

79

391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 568.
81
Id. at 572–73 (observing that school board failed to show that Pickering’s speech had “in
any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom
or . . . interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally” and that on these facts “the
interest of the school administration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member
of the general public”).
82
Id. at 570–73.
83
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
84
Id. at 412–15.
85
Id. at 413–15.
80
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whistleblowing speech.86 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the
5-4 majority, found that government employees enjoy no First Amendment protection for speech about a matter of public concern if that
speech falls within the scope of their official duties.87 Simply put, “[t]he
First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an
employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.”88
Thus, “[b]ecause Ceballos’ memo falls into this category,” the majority
concluded that “his allegation of unconstitutional retaliation must
fail.”89
In Pickering, the Warren Court adopted a balancing test that would
lead to meaningful First Amendment protection for at least some government employees, some of the time. The test is problematic because
it incorporates a heckler’s veto: an adverse reaction by a government
employee’s co-workers may serve as a valid basis for firing the government employee who speaks out about a matter of public concern.90 However, weak or imperfect First Amendment protection in this context is
probably unavoidable because of the government’s legitimate managerial concern in maintaining functional offices.
The Roberts Court, by way of contrast, has embraced a categorical
approach that wrings out judicial discretion to validate government employee speech claims when the speech arguably relates to the employee’s official duties. The Garcetti approach will lead to very consistent and predictable outcomes—but the outcomes will consistently
favor the government over would-be speakers. Consistency of this sort
comes at simply too high a price. Government employees should be permitted to participate in the process of democratic deliberation.91 Moreover, whistleblowing speech by government employees could well be essential to empowering voters to hold government accountable through
their ballots.92
To be sure, the Warren Court’s balancing approach in Pickering
will require judges to exercise discretion in an open and transparent
way. However, if the effective choice is between an open-ended balancing test that may from time to time under-protect government
86

See id. at 420–24.
Id. at 424–26.
88
Id. at 424.
89
Id.
90
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 88–90.
91
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“To the extent that the Illinois Supreme
Court’s opinion may be read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters
of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it
proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this
Court.”).
92
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 91–94.
87
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employees, but will protect at least some government employees who
speak out about a matter of public concern and deter official government retaliation against employees who embrace speech over silence,
and a categorical rule that provides no protection at all to government
employees, core First Amendment values would be best served by
adopting and applying the balancing approach. If the First Amendment
exists to facilitate the process of democratic deliberation, then more
speech activity should be preferred to less speech activity.
C. Decreasing First Amendment Protection for Speech Activity in the
Nation’s Public Schools, Colleges and Universities
The Warren Court pioneered First Amendment protection for students and faculty in the nation’s public schools. In Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,93 Justice Abe Fortas, writing
for a 7-2 majority, held that high school and middle school students enjoyed a First Amendment right to wear black armbands, while on campus, to protest the Vietnam War.94
Perhaps most famously, Justice Fortas observed that “[i]t can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”95 In addition, however, he carefully explained that public school
officials must tolerate political speech by their students in order to vindicate core First Amendment values:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school
are “persons” under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our system,
students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only
that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally
valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to
freedom of expression of their views.96
This stirring celebration of the First Amendment, however, does not actually provide the governing legal test.
93
94
95
96

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See id. at 504, 513–15.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 511.
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Despite this soaring and relatively absolute language, the Tinker
test actually involves an open-ended balancing exercise. More specifically, school officials may proscribe on-campus speech if the speech
plausibly presents a risk of materially and substantially interfering
with the regular daily operations of the school.97 On the facts at bar, the
Des Moines public school officials failed to show such a risk existed and,
accordingly, the students were entitled to engage in their protest of the
Vietnam War while on campus.98
The Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts, unlike the Warren
Court, limited the jurisprudential scope of Tinker by adopting categorical rules that permitted school administrators to ban ribald speech,99
comprehensively regulate curricular speech,100 and proscribe speech
that supposedly advocated the use of marijuana.101 When a student engages in ribald speech while on campus, speaks incident to an official
curricular activity, or speaks ambiguously about illegal drugs, no balancing exercise applies and school officials may censor the student’s
speech with an entirely free hand (including punishing a student for
uttering it by suspending her, denying her the right to participate in
extracurricular activities, or banning the student from commencement
exercises).
The categorical approach the Justices adopted and deployed in
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick will produce very consistent results
on a predictable basis. But, these cases essentially zero out a public
school student’s interest in speaking out about matters of public concern without the government having to shoulder any meaningful burden of justification for censoring the student’s speech. Tinker requires
judges to weigh facts and circumstances on a case-by-case basis—and
judges deciding cases with similar facts will reach different conclusions.
But one cannot gainsay that the Tinker balancing approach will facilitate more speech activity related to the process of democratic self-government than the categorical approach of Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and
Morse.

97

Id. at 509–10.
Id. at 511 (upholding the right of the school students to wear the black arm bands on campus and explaining that “the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without
evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline, is not constitutionally permissible”).
99
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Fraser was decided by the Burger
Court.
100
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The Rehnquist Court decided
Kuhlmeier.
101
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). The Roberts Court handed down Morse.
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The Warren Court routinely embraced open-ended balancing tests.
This had the effect of protecting more expressive activity than would
have been the case under a less flexible approach. Moreover, reliance
on balancing tests to decide First Amendment claims tended to benefit
marginalized speakers who lacked the financial wherewithal to disseminate a message using their own money or property.
Whenever government has a legitimate managerial justification for
withholding its assistance to would-be speakers, a balancing approach
permits courts to weigh carefully the competing, and conflicting, interests in a specific context.102 At least in some cases, this exercise will
result in a court ordering a government defendant to facilitate speech
activity when it would rather not do so.103 Because democratic deliberation is essential to the legitimacy of our governing institutions, requiring the government to facilitate speech when it can do so would represent a better approach than hewing to categorical rules that treat all
would-be speakers equally—but equally badly.104
III. BALANCING TESTS OR CATEGORICAL RULES?: CONSIDERING THE
POTENTIAL VIRTUES AND VICES OF BOTH APPROACHES TO FRAME AND
DECIDE FIRST AMENDMENT DISPUTES.
As explained in the previous Part, in cases involving expressive
freedoms the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts—unlike the Warren and
Burger Courts—have not routinely embraced tests that require the
open exercise of discretion by federal judges. This raises the question:
102

Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966); see also Gey, supra note 76, at 1566–76
(arguing that federal courts have failed to make sufficient public space available for First Amendment activities and positing that a more functional approach to public forum analysis would help
to address this failure successfully).
103
See, e.g., Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 106–09 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (requiring the
federal and state governments to facilitate a mass, five-day march from Selma, Alabama to Montgomery, Alabama to protest a state-wide system of official disenfranchisement of African American
voters). Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. recognized that the proposed five-day march, over the main
regional highway, would be highly disruptive to those seeking to use the road for local and interstate travel. He explained that the right to engage in disruptive protest should be, at least to some
extent, commensurate with the “enormity” of the wrongs being protested and petitioned against:
[I]t seems basic to our constitutional principles that the extent of the right to assemble,
demonstrate and march peaceably along the highways and streets in an orderly manner
should be commensurate with the enormity of the wrongs that are being protested and
petitioned against. In this case, the wrongs are enormous. The extent of the right to
demonstrate against these wrongs should be determined accordingly.
Id. at 106.
104
Gey, supra note 76, at 1536–38, 1542–55, 1576–77. Professor Gey argues that the government should be allowed to deny access to public property for speech activity “only if the speech
would otherwise significantly interfere with the government’s ability to carry out its legitimate
duties” and posits that “[r]igorous enforcement of this interference standard would stem the current trend toward a narrowing of the public forum.” Id. at 1634.
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What is objectionable, if anything, about using open-ended balancing
tests to decide First Amendment disputes?
Balancing is quotidian in other areas of the law. For example, in
deciding whether the government has satisfied the requirements of procedural due process federal courts apply a three part balancing test that
considers the nature of the private interest at stake, the government’s
interest in using the procedures that it voluntarily provided, and the
probability that additional process would reduce the risk of error.105 To
be sure, some members of the Supreme Court rejected this approach
because it can produce inconsistent results.106 However, the Justices
who raised these objections to Mathews v. Eldridge balancing have done
so exclusively in dissenting opinions.
Is there something particularly problematic with discretion in the
context of free speech cases? Arguably, there is: the open exercise of
discretion in First Amendment cases can give rise to an appearance of
content-, viewpoint-, or even speaker-based discrimination. What’s
more, balancing tests will produce conflicting results in cases featuring
very similar facts. Federal judges, attempting to decide close cases in
good faith, will reach different outcomes that will be difficult to reconcile (precisely because reasonable minds can and will differ about how
to fix the balance in close cases).
A fair-minded observer might posit that these different outcomes
are the product of judicial sympathy—or antipathy—toward particular
would-be speakers.107 Thus, play in the joints in First Amendment
cases—meaning a non-trivial risk of courts reaching different outcomes

105

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (reviewing precedent and holding
that procedural due process analysis “generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”
that include (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail”).
106
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 561–62 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107
Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911–15 (1982) (holding protected a boycott that included the use of threats because “the boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity” and “the nonviolent elements of petitioners’ activities are entitled to the
protection of the First Amendment”), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568–75 (1965) (holding
protected a large civil rights protest proximate to a local courthouse), with Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703, 719, 725–30 (2000) (sustaining a highly targeted Colorado law aimed at preventing protest near abortion clinics and suggesting that the speech ban did not even regulate speech at all
but rather was “a regulation of the places where some speech may occur”), and Madsen v. Women’s
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762–64, 769–71 (1994) (sustaining, in part, an injunction that
prohibited anti-abortion protests near a family planning clinic). Dissenting in Hill, Justice Scalia
observed that “it blinks reality to regard this statute, in its application to oral communications, as
anything other than a content-based restriction upon speech in the public forum, Hill, 530 U.S. at
748, and objected that “[r]estrictive views of the First Amendment that have been in dissent since
the 1930s suddenly find themselves in the majority,” id. at 765.
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in cases presenting substantially identical facts—could give rise to the
appearance of bias by federal and state judges. This, in turn, could easily have a corrosive effect on public confidence in the courts—and thus
undermine their legitimacy with the body politic.108
By way of contrast, categorical rules—rules that strictly limit judicial discretion—will generate consistent outcomes across a decentralized system of federal and state courts.109 Consistent results in free
speech cases, that are the product of categorical, bright-line rules, avoid
the risk of judges appearing biased toward, or against, particular
would-be speakers. But, at what price?
Bright line rules will provide less protection for free speech generally, at least in circumstances where the government possesses, to use
Professor Robert Post’s wonderful turn of phrase, a legitimate claim
over its managerial domain.110 A categorical rule, in the context of access to public property, the government’s workplace, and in public
schools, colleges, and universities, will almost inevitably favor the government over would-be speakers.
Professor Post argues that “[t]he constitutional question in each
case is whether the authority to regulate speech is necessary for the
achievement of legitimate institutional objectives.”111 Post predicts, correctly, that federal judges will be wary of “second-guessing [a government supervisor’s] managerial authority regarding speech.”112 If a court
did this, “that authority would pro tanto diminish.”113 Accordingly, the
risk of this kind of “damage” means “that before engaging in judicial
review a court must determine whether such review would itself diminish the authority at issue to such an extent as to impair the ability of
the bureaucracy to attain its legitimate ends.”114 The requisite analysis

108

Claims of this sort have been made with respect to the Supreme Court’s state action doctrine decisions prior to the enactment of comprehensive federal civil rights laws; these decisions
sometimes seemed to strain in order to find state action in order to proscribe racially discriminatory behavior and policies. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (1959) (objecting to a state action decision finding state court
enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant running with the land to constitute state action for
purposes of applying the Equal Protection Clause); see also Jonathan D. Varat & Vikram D. Amar,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1071 (15th ed. 2017) (observing that “[b]y the end
of World War II through 1968, all Supreme Court decisions that reached the question whether
unconstitutional state action was present decided that it was” but “[s]ince 1970, most Supreme
Court decisions considering the same issue have not found unconstitutional state action” in cases
that do not involve racial discrimination).
109
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary: On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021 (2014).
110
Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 60, at 164–67.
111
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 60, at 237.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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involves careful consideration of “the relationship between the practice
of judicial review and the nature of the managerial authority at issue.”115
Accordingly, even very progressive jurists, such as Justice Thurgood Marshall and Abe Fortas, were unwilling to completely disregard
the government’s need to achieve its programmatic objectives. A categorical First Amendment rule that requires the government to always
accommodate would-be speakers would be unacceptably disruptive to
the government’s legitimate managerial plans and interests. If federal
courts are to validate speech claims in these contexts, there simply
must be balancing of the government’s interest in achieving its managerial objectives efficiently against the value of private citizens engaging in First Amendment activity.116
The balancing is also difficult—and fraught—because of the incommensurable values at stake. How does a federal district judge weigh the
risk of disruption in a public school facing serious racial tensions if a
middle school principal prohibits students from wearing both
“Trump/Pence 2020 ” and “Black Lives Matter” t-shirts while on campus? A reasonable school administrator could anticipate that both
shirts would result in material and substantial disruption to the
school’s operations—and accordingly proscribe the wearing of both.117
On the other hand, a “Tom Steyer 2020” t-shirt probably would not present a similar risk of disruption. To permit the Steyer shirt while banning the others, however, could reasonably be perceived as a form of
content- or viewpoint-based discrimination. In reality, however, it is
not.118
Nevertheless, in order to avoid an appearance of censorship, a riskaverse school administrator might attempt to ban all clothing that carries a political message while on campus. This zeroes out both potentially disruptive and wholly innocuous speech (e.g., “I Support the
World Wildlife Fund”)—but it avoids any appearance of political or ideological favoritism. Federal courts cannot be faulted too harshly for taking the same approach when the government can identify a non-speech
related managerial reason for refusing to accommodate First Amendment activity.
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Id.
See id. at 235–39.
117
See, e.g., West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F. 3d 1358, 1365–66 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a school district could reasonably conclude that a hand-made drawing of a Confederate battle flag could present a substantial and material risk of disruption to the school’s operations
and explaining that the school’s administration “had reason to believe that a student’s display of
the Confederate flag might cause disruption and interfere with the rights of other students to be
secure and let alone”).
118
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 113–15.
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Of course, the Warren Court recognized the risk of appearing to
play favorites among speakers—but more often than not would insist
that government incur inconvenience and expense in order to facilitate
more speech. Or, to be more precise, the Warren Court adopted tests
that routinely required lower state and federal courts to consider carefully whether the balance of equities in a particular case favored the
would-be speaker over the government.119
Categorical rules in times of national tumult and distress are even
more potentially pernicious in exacerbating the chasm between free
speech haves and free speech have nots. As Professor Christina Wells
has persuasively argued, judges are not any more immune to mass
panic and irrational fear than everyone else.120 Drawing on social psychology research, Wells warns that “[t]o the extent that individuals perceive a group as threatening due to ostensible risks associated with it,
we know that substantial errors in risk assessment occur in particular
circumstances.”121 This effect also correlates strongly with the perceived
nature of the risk: “The potentially catastrophic nature of the threat can
further exacerbate the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of an
event. Social influences often reinforce this skewed risk assessment
through the phenomena of informational and reputational cascades,
which can cause widespread, though erroneous, beliefs regarding the
likelihood of an event.”122
Wells concludes that taking affirmative doctrinal steps to attempt
to address the risk of judges holding irrational fears during times of
national stress and tumult will not be enough. This is so because, allowing these perceived risks to cloud their judgment, “[j]udges may still
fall prey to fear and prejudice or they may simply make the strategic
determination that they do not wish to involve themselves in these matters.”123
Thus, at the very moments when, under Professor Vincent Blasi’s
“pathological perspective,”124 the process of democratic self-government
most requires judicial courage,125 Wells’s research suggests that the
judges are most apt to be AWOL. We may want judges to exhibit civic
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Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 &
559 (1965).
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Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV.
115, 117 (“Judges are, after all, human. They remain subject to the same passions, fears, and
prejudices that sweep the rest of the nation.”).
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Id. at 170.
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Id. at 170–71.
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Id. at 222.
124
Blasi, supra note 61, at 449–52.
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courage in such times,126 and Professor Blasi’s normative argument has
much to recommend it—the process of democratic deliberation is obviously most critical at times of national crisis. When the stakes are potentially astonishingly high, “We the People” must engage in careful,
thoughtful, and well-informed public discourse.127
Wells tells us that although this may be what we want and also
what a democratic polity needs, it is not likely to be what we will get
from the courts.128 From this perspective, and as Blasi argues in his
iconic article, it might be desirable to adopt and enforce strict bright
line rules that delimit judicial discretion—and hence make it arguably
harder for frightened judges to shirk their constitutional duties.129 As
Blasi states his case in chief, “[t]he adjudicative methodologies and doctrines that can best protect the core commitments of the first amendment in pathological periods are those that are consciously designed to
counteract the unusual social dynamics that characterize such periods.”130
Even so, however, the most likely potential beneficiaries of these
categorical rules are would-be speakers who have the financial means
to speak. In good times and bad times alike, categorical rules will burden marginalized speakers more heavily than wealthy and socially-empowered speakers—at least when the categorical rule implicates the
government’s managerial domain. For example, if courts permit the
government to restrict access to government property for speech activity based on “security” concerns,131 the categorical rule will fence out
both wealthy and poor would-be speakers. But wealthy speakers have
126

Vincent A. Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 692–96 (1988).
127
Id. at 686 (observing that for Justice Louis Brandeis and Thomas Jefferson “the key to a
successful democracy lies in the spirit, the vitality, the daring, the inventiveness of its citizens”);
see also ROBERT POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
39–42 (2012) (discussing, in some detail, the importance of democratic deliberation to the project
of democratic self-government). Post observes that “[f]or the last eighty years, First Amendment
jurisprudence has been founded on the premise that ‘speech concerning public affairs is . . . the
essence of self-government.’” Id. at 40.
128
Wells, supra note 120, at 117–18, 168–72, 214–22.
129
Blasi, supra note 61, at 467–68 (arguing that “one of the most important ways in which
adjudication in ordinary times might influence the course of pathology would be by helping to
promote an attitude of respect, devotion, perhaps even reverence, regarding those central norms”
and suggesting that “an emphasis in adjudication during normal times on the development of procedures and institutional structures that are relatively immune from the pressure of urgency by
virtue of their formality, rigidity, built-in delays, or strong internal dynamics” would be helpful in
safeguarding free speech in times of national stress).
130
Id. at 513.
131
See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004). The federal courts are all
too credulous when the government argues that “there might be trouble” if speech activity occurs
proximate to incumbent government officials and high-ranking party officials. See RONALD J.
KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST,
AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 31–54 (2012).
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the option of simply renting or buying real property for the purpose of
engaging in First Amendment activity; poor speakers do not have the
luxury of renting or buying space for public protest.132
In sum, bright line rules—such as those against content- or viewpoint-based regulations of speech, or prior restraints—facilitate the
ability of those with the property necessary to speak to do so. But what
if a would-be speaker needs access to government property, a government job, a high school or college education, or a license from the state?
Categorical rules will almost never favor would-be speakers over the
government in these circumstances. The social cost of categorical rules
will be distributed against financially marginal speakers—and particularly those who espouse highly unpopular causes.133
If we actually believe in the equality of all citizens as participants
in the process of democratic self-government,134 then this outcome
should be completely unacceptable. A vision of equality limited to the
equal voting weight of all ballots is both empty and unduly formalistic.135 The ability to participate meaningfully in the process of democratic deliberation that informs the act of voting must be part of the
overall constitutional picture.
IV. CAN FIRST AMENDMENT RULES SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMMODATE
“PLAY IN THE JOINTS”?
Does a solution exist to the problem of judges incurring an unacceptable risk of the appearance of bias if the Supreme Court were to
once again regularly embrace balancing tests rather than categorical
rules in First Amendment cases? In this brief Essay, I cannot hope to
address this question in a comprehensive fashion across all areas of
First Amendment law.136 It is possible, however, to sketch out some preliminary thoughts that should inform the answers to this question. Despite the scope of the question and the difficulty in formulating satisfactory answers to it, the problem is one that merits sustained
consideration and engagement.
132

KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, 1–18, 22–26, 238–39 n.2.
See SHIFFRIN, supra note 21, at 110–18, 124–30. Professor Shiffrin posits that “the First
Amendment spotlights a different metaphor than the marketplace of ideas or the richness of public
debate; instead, it supports the American ideal of protecting and supporting dissent by putting
dissenters at the center of the First Amendment tradition.” Id. at 128.
134
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558, 560–63 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1962).
135
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 215–18.
136
My recent book, THE DISAPPEARING FIRST AMENDMENT, engages these questions at some
length and in some detail, and proposes specific doctrinal reforms in several discrete areas of First
Amendment jurisprudence that would, quite literally, create more space and opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate meaningfully in the process of democratic self-government. See
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, passim.
133
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Many, if not most, serious theories of the First Amendment place
the relationship of freedom of expression to the process of democratic
self-government at the epicenter of the First Amendment. Leading free
speech scholars, including Alexander Meiklejohn,137 Harry Kalven,
Jr.,138 Owen Fiss,139 Cass Sunstein,140 and Vincent Blasi,141 all posit that
speech merits judicial protection because of its integral relationship to
the process of democratic self-government. Accordingly, we should be
open to the idea that the First Amendment imposes not only negative
limitations on the ability of the government to censor speech, but also
affirmative duties to facilitate speech related to the process of democratic deliberation.142 As I will explain below, expanding the First
Amendment “ceiling” need not imply abandoning a serious commitment
to protect, through robust judicial enforcement of mandatory, categorical rules, a First Amendment “floor.” The federal courts could, at least
in theory, pursue both goals concurrently; were they to do so, our democracy would be the better for it.
A bifurcated First Amendment jurisprudence that creates a First
Amendment “floor” that automatically safeguards speech through categorical rules, but also includes a “ceiling” that offers expanded First
Amendment rights when necessary to facilitate the ability of ordinary
citizens of average, or below average, means to participate freely in the
process of democratic deliberation that informs the casting of ballots on
election day could provide a viable potential solution to the problems
associated with relying solely on categorical free speech rules. One certainly cannot gainsay that categorical rules play an important role in
safeguarding the process of democratic deliberation. As Professor Blasi
has observed, bright line, categorical rules make it easier for judges to
vindicate First Amendment claims by unpopular speakers seeking to
advocate for disliked causes.143 Judges are able to attempt to deflect responsibility for controversial free speech decisions by invoking the
bright line rule: “I wish I could do otherwise, but my hands are tied!”144
137

MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4, at 22–27, 89–91.
HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 89–105 (Jamie
Kalven ed., 1988); HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140–45 (1965).
139
OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 781 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408–
16 (1986).
140
SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at ix-xi, 44–48, 202–06; SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 19–22.
141
Blasi, supra note 61, at 449–52.
142
SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at ix (“The idea of free speech has an affirmative side.”).
143
Blasi, supra note 61, at 468–73.
144
Justice Kennedy took this approach in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the Supreme
Court’s landmark First Amendment decision that held flag burning to be protected expressive conduct. In his concurring opinion, Kennedy noted that his vote in the case “exact[ed] a personal toll,”
id. at 420, and more-or-less apologized for it:
138
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As Professor Fred Schauer has explained, judges are always responsible for their decision—and whether to apply, modify, or abolish a
legal precedent.145 He observes that “[w]hen lawyers argue and when
judges write opinions, they seek to justify their conclusions, and they
do so by offering reasons.”146 Reasons provide legitimacy for an outcome:
“Having given a reason, the reason-giver has, by virtue of an existing
social practice, committed herself to deciding those cases within the
scope of the reason in accordance with the reason.”147
There’s a danger, however, to framing rules in the present to govern the future because, “[i]f the reasons provided by courts constrain
future decisions, then giving reasons can be opposed as undesirably encouraging courts to influence decisions arising in contexts at which they
can only guess.”148 The more specific and categorical a judge’s reason,
the greater the risk of making a blown call. Schauer explains that “giving reasons requires decisionmakers to decide cases they can scarcely
imagine arising under conditions about which they can only guess, in a
future they can only imperfectly predict.”149 Because of this effect—limiting the discretion of future judges to decide a case using the best possible justifications—giving reasons (i.e., creating categorical rules) creates potential social costs that have to be considered when evaluating
their utility.150

The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them
because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see
them, compel the result. And so great is our commitment to the process that, except in
the rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for the result, perhaps for fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the decision. This is one of those rare cases.
Id. In other words, Justice Kennedy felt obliged to publicly apologize for vindicating the application
of the First Amendment bright line rule against the government engaging in content-based (and
arguably viewpoint-based) censorship of core political speech. If the Constitution lacked a First
Amendment with a Free Speech Clause, would Justice Kennedy have voted the same way? Of
course, it is impossible to know the answer to this question. The constitutional text—and the categorical rule associated with that text—clearly made it more difficult for Kennedy to follow his
heart rather than his head. But cf. id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he ideas of
liberty and equality have been an irresistible force in motivating . . . the Philippine Scouts who
fought at Bataan, and the soldiers who scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach” and positing that “[i]f
those ideas are worth fighting for—and our history demonstrates that they are—it cannot be true
that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power is not itself worthy of protection from unnecessary desecration”). It bears noting that Justice Stevens permitted his personal reverence for the
U.S. flag and what it symbolized for him to color his legal judgment. See id. at 437 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The value of the flag as a symbol cannot be measured. Even so, I have no doubt that
the interest in preserving that value for the future is both significant and legitimate.”).
145
See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).
146
Id. at 635.
147
Id. at 656.
148
Id. at 654.
149
Id. at 658.
150
See id. (observing that “the advantages of giving reasons come at a price” and explaining
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These observations have some immediate relevance in considering
the desirability of categorical rules over balancing tests in First Amendment law. Even if categorical rules are helpful in constraining judicial
discretion in future cases, and are necessary to secure important First
Amendment values, we should nevertheless remain open to the possibility of open-ended balancing exercises that provide judges with the
flexibility to permit “as applied” challenges to otherwise constitutionally-valid speech regulations.151 In other words, one could imagine a
more subtle, nuanced First Amendment world in which categorical
rules play an important role in constraining the government’s censorial
impulses—but which operate in conjunction with more open-ended balancing tests of the sort embraced by the Warren Court.152
Categorical rules, such as the rules against content and viewpointbased speech regulations and the rule against prior restraints, play an
important role in facilitating open access to the political marketplace of
ideas. Accordingly, it would be a mistake—and a big one—to posit that
categorical rules have no role to play in interpreting and applying the
First Amendment. Categorical rules do important work vindicating expressive freedoms. But to acknowledge the potential of categorical rules
is not to rule out the possibility of balancing tests adding something
important to the adjudication of free speech disputes. A dual system of
rules that incorporates a mix of categorical rules and balancing tests
could better secure expressive freedoms than a system that relies exclusively on only one kind of decisional rule.
Access to public property provides an example of an area of First
Amendment jurisprudence where such a bifurcated system could be implemented in a fashion that would do considerably more good than
harm to core First Amendment values. Cases like Flower v. United
States,153 Brown v. Louisiana,154 and Williams v. Wallace155 all demonstrate that it is entirely possible to imagine a First Amendment world
in which the government could be required to make non-public forums
available for speech activity without undue disruption or inconvenience.156
Yet, the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions, such as United
States v. Kokinda157 and International Society for Krishna
that “[n]ot only does giving reasons take time and sometimes open up conversations best kept
closed, it also commits the decisionmaker in ways that are rarely recognized”).
151
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 29–31, 40–42.
152
See supra text and accompanying notes 64 to 104.
153
Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1971).
154
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
155
Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
156
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 131, at 194–202, 204–05.
157
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
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Consciousness v. Lee,158 adopt and apply a rigid categorical approach
that removes literally any burden of justification from the government
for banning speech activity on a military base, at a post office, or using
a main regional highway. If government property constitutes a nonpublic forum, then that is that—would be speakers enjoy no First
Amendment rights of access to it.
Would it be wholly unreasonable to imagine a First Amendment
world in which some would-be speakers—but not all would-be speakers—might be able to access a military base for that expressive activity?
Suppose that serious allegations of sexual harassment arise against a
base commander (borrowing the facts of Greer for this hypothetical) and
persons wish to protest the base commander’s failure to fully and fairly
address these allegations. Public outrage erupts. In the age of the #MeToo movement, would a mass public protest on the base’s property related to the base commander’s indifference to the allegations be entirely
unthinkable? Should a protest on base property directed against the
failure to investigate the allegations—hybrid speech that implicates not
only the freedoms of speech, association, and assembly, but also the
right of petition,159 be permitted via an appropriate judicial order?160
In my view, would-be speakers who can establish a nexus between
particular property for speech activity and protest should have an opportunity to make their case—even if, in general, military base property
is not available for public protest activity.161 Over time courts would
work out an analytical framework that establishes clear rules of the
road (so to speak); as decisions accrete over time, one would expect to
see greater consistency of results. This is, in important respects, the
essence of the common law method of adjudication.162 Inconsistency of
results, in theory, should decline with the passage of time.

158

Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 131, at 1–10, 208–16.
160
See, e.g., Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 106 – 109.
161
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding a ban on partisan political rallies on a
New Jersey military base). But cf. Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1971) (permitting leafletting on a Texas military base notwithstanding the base commander’s desire to prohibit it).
162
Some federal agencies have used case-by-case adjudication, rather than quasi-legislative
rulemaking, using so-called notice and comment informal procedures, to establish regulatory policies. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) provides perhaps the best example of a federal
agency taking this approach—using adjudication rather than rulemaking to establish major regulatory policies. See Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991). The reason is obvious—virtually all NLRB cases involve the need
to balance carefully an employer’s interest in operating a workplace efficiently against labor organizers or unions seeking to exercise collective bargaining rights. See generally Charlotte Garden,
Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs. Adjudication, 64 EMORY L.J. 1467
(2015).
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Professor Tim Zick has written lucidly and persuasively about the
importance of place to public protest.163 Place and spatial topography
can be essential to the ability of would-be speakers to disseminate a
message to a particular audience.164 First Amendment doctrinal rules
should be sufficiently flexible to take this important reality into account.
In fact, in the wider world, constitutional courts routinely engage
in balancing exercises to determine whether the government may enforce a law or regulation that abridges a fundamental right.165 As one
group of legal scholars has explained, “[t]o speak of human rights is to
speak of proportionality.”166
Proportionality analysis generally involves a two-step process:
First, a plaintiff seeking to invoke a constitutional right must establish
that the government’s actions violate an established constitutional
right. Once the plaintiff successfully invokes a constitutionally-protected right, the burden shifts to the government to establish that the
abridgment of the right is prescribed by law and demonstrably necessary in a free and democratic society, which means that the measure
advances an important or pressing government interest, does so directly, and is narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s objective
(i.e., constitutes a “minimal impairment” of the right).167
Simply put, there’s no good reason why the First Amendment could
not reflect and incorporate a kind of balancing exercise that vests
judges, federal and state alike, with the discretion to require the government to facilitate speech activity when it has the ability—but not
the will—to do so. The First Amendment, like the Roman god Janus,
could have two faces: a negative scope of application (which would encompass categorical rules against content- and viewpoint-based discrimination, the ban on prior restraints, and the invalidity of press licensing measures) and, at the same time, a positive aspect that imposes
affirmative obligations on the state to empower ordinary people to
163

TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN
PUBLIC PLACES (2009).
164
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 131, at 4–10, 50–54, 197–216.
165
AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
(Doron Kalir trans., 2012); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in the Age of Proportionality, 124
YALE L.J. 3094 (2015).
166
Grant Huscroft, et al., Introduction in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS,
JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 1, 1 (Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller & Grégoire Webber eds., 2014).
These legal scholars posit that “[i]t is no exaggeration to claim that proportionality has overtaken
rights as the orienting idea in contemporary human rights law and scholarship.” Id. For a thoughtful explanation and overview of the centrality of proportionality review to securing fundamental
rights in many democratic polities, see id. at 1–4.
167
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 112 (Can.); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional
About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 804 (2004) (“Canada has played a particularly
influential role in the transnational development of proportionality testing in constitutional law.”).
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access and engage the political marketplace of ideas. The negative aspect would constitute a kind of “floor,” whereas the positive aspect
would serve as a kind of “ceiling.”
Adopting this approach would not level down any would-be speaker
currently protected under existing doctrinal rules; it would not suffer
from the vice of diminishing any existing First Amendment rights. At
the same time, taking this approach would have the distinct First
Amendment virtue of expanding the universe of protected expression
by facilitating more speech related to the process of democratic self-government. If free speech is integral to the process of democratic self-government, then interpreting and applying the First Amendment to impose affirmative duties on the government to facilitate speech of this
kind would be good for democracy. Accordingly, federal courts should
embrace, not reject, doctrinal innovations that make it easier for more
citizens to speak their version of truth to power. Moreover, they should
do so even if this requires the courts to embrace an affirmative role for
the First Amendment in literally creating the space necessary for democracy to function.
Taking this approach would, of course, involve the risk of judges
appearing to favor some speakers over others. But this holds true in any
context where a judge must openly and transparently exercise discretion to resolve a pending dispute.168 The amount of discretion associated
with proportionality review is quite broad and open-ended. It vastly exceeds the more limited scope of discretion that this Essay proposes as a
new aspect of First Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover, constitutional courts in liberal democracies that practice proportionality review,
such as Canada, Germany, and South Africa, nevertheless enjoy broad
public confidence and institutional legitimacy.169 This suggests that the
presence of judicial discretion in the process of enforcing constitutional
168

KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at xiii-xiv, 217–18, 223–25; KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 131,
at 202–07.
169
It bears noting that Justice Stephen Breyer has tentatively endorsed the use of proportionality analysis—and has done so specifically in the context of the First Amendment. See Ysursa v.
Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 367 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the federal
courts, when deciding a First Amendment question, should ask “whether the statute imposes a
burden upon speech that is disproportionate in light of the other interests the government seeks
to achieve,” observing that “[c]onstitutional courts in other nations also have used similar approaches when facing somewhat similar problems,” and citing and describing cases from Canada,
Israel, South Africa and the European Court of Human Rights that use proportionality analysis
in cases involving expressive freedoms); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In this case I would ask whether Vermont’s regulatory provisions
work harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate to their furtherance of legitimate
regulatory objectives.”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 841 (2000) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (arguing that “a judge [should] not . . . apply First Amendment rules mechanically”
but instead “decide whether, in light of the benefits and potential alternatives, the statute works
speech-related harm (here to adult speech) out of proportion to the benefits that the statute seeks
to provide (here, child protection)”).
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rights need not be antithetical to the reputations of judges as honest
brokers (or neutral adjudicators). Discretion need not seriously diminish, much less destroy, public confidence in the federal courts.
If free and open democratic deliberation is an essential condition
for elections to serve as an effective means of securing government accountability, and also the principal means of conveying democratic legitimacy on the elected institutions of government, the ability to participate in this process must be self-evidently open to any and all citizens.
Simply put, elections conducted without free and open public debate
cannot convey democratic legitimacy on the institutions of government.
To the extent that the process of democratic deliberation is more open
and inclusive, democracy will be the stronger for it.
V.

CONCLUSION

Alexander Meiklejohn famously argued for public subsidies to support and facilitate the process of democratic deliberation.170 He suggested “[i]n every village, in every district of every town or city, there
should be established at public expense cultural centers inviting all citizens, as they may choose, to meet together for the consideration of public policy.”171 It might be unrealistic to expect the government to build
free speech community centers for the purpose of engaging in democratic discourse. Nevertheless, the First Amendment has a positive, or
affirmative, role to play in securing the process of democratic deliberation.172
Our doctrinal First Amendment rules should facilitate, not impede,
the ability of ordinary citizens to participate meaningfully in the process of democratic self-government. If this is our objective, we have a lot
of work left to do—yet, unfortunately, the needle seems to be moving in
the wrong direction. Rather than pressing the government to facilitate
speech when it has the ability to do so without undue inconvenience or
disruption to its operations, the Supreme Court instead seems quite
content to permit the government to manage its resources more or less
like a private citizen or corporation.173 In a polity that purports to
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See Davis v. Commonwealth, 167 U.S. 43, 47–48 (1897) (“The Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States does not destroy the power of the States to enact police regulations as to the subjects within their control . . . and does not have the effect of creating a particular and personal right in the citizen to use public property in defiance of the constitution and
laws of the State.”). Thus, the government, like a private property owner, enjoys the right to decide
who may use its property for speech activity. See id. at 48 (holding that “[t]he right to absolutely
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maintain a serious commitment to the equality of all citizens—“one person, one vote” in the words of the Supreme Court174—we can and must
do better to enable ordinary citizens of average means to participate in
the political marketplace of ideas.
In conclusion, contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence all
too often has come to resemble a Procrustean bed. In its efforts to exorcise judicial discretion from cases involving expressive freedoms, the
Roberts Court has disregarded relevant facts—while at the same time,
stretched certain relevant legal and policy considerations beyond their
ability to support a result.175 The Aristotelean virtuous mean176 lies between the vicious extremes of embracing a First Amendment universe
featuring only unfettered judicial discretion or categorical rules that
produce consistent results on a predictable basis, but sanction farreaching government efforts to stifle or squelch dissenting voices. The
truth—if the Roberts Court could but find the wisdom to see it—is that
a democratic polity requires both categorical rules and balancing tests
to ensure that democratic discourse is “uninhibited, robust, and wide
open.”177
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of action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job”).
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Aristotle, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 42-53, paras. 1106a5–1109b (Terence Irwin trans.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1985); see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions
of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 286–88 (1996) (describing and discussing the
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N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“Thus we consider this case against
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Defending Speech Crimes
Judith Miller†

The First Amendment is supposed to provide important protections
against criminal prosecutions for speech crimes. In practice, however,
those protections are inadequate: in a world of vanishing trials, criminal defendants lack meaningful opportunities to litigate often factbound First Amendment questions. Through the lens of prosecutions
for false speech, this article proposes refocusing First Amendment protections in criminal cases on criminal procedure rather than substantive questions about what the First Amendment protects. It suggests
two procedural reforms—revitalizing the indictment and unanimity requirements—to help make the First Amendment’s ostensible protections more of a reality for criminal defendants.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Alvarez1 the Supreme Court expressly held, for
the first time, that false speech is entitled to First Amendment protection in its own right. The Court concluded that the First Amendment
requires any such prohibition either to map onto a common law crime
(e.g., fraud, defamation) or to criminalize only a narrow slice of speech
or conduct, focused specifically on the harm to be avoided.2 Subsequent
Alvarez litigation and the related academic analysis focus almost entirely on the substantive question of what kinds of false expression the
First Amendment allows the state to prohibit.3 Questions in First
Amendment criminal case law and academic literature more broadly
†

Tremendous thanks go out to my extraordinarily patient editors at the University of Chicago Legal Forum and to the other participants in the autumn false speech symposium, my devoted
and insightful research assistant Elisabeth Mayer, and also to William Baude, Genevieve Lakier,
David Owens, Erica Zunkel, Andrew Mackie-Mason, and Max Samels.
1
567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion).
2
Id. at 709; Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, Developing a Taxonomy of Lies Under the First
Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 665–70 (2018).
3
See, e.g., Chen & Mereau, supra note 2; Louis W. Tompros et al., The Constitutionality of
Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social MediaObsessed World, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65 (2017); David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the
First Amendment’s Protection of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70 (2012).
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likewise reflect this focus on substantive questions of just what the
First Amendment protects or prohibits.4
These substantive questions about the reach of the First Amendment are largely orthogonal to the world of actual criminal practice. In
criminal practice, substantive First Amendment questions are typically
as-applied challenges—that is, questions of the form “Does criminalizing this or that alleged misconduct violate the First Amendment?”
These questions are litigated almost exclusively mid-trial or post-trial:
mid-trial, at a jury instruction conference, after the evidence is in, or
post-trial, via a sufficiency of the evidence challenge.5
But by then the First Amendment offers little protection. Post-trial
motions offer the most thorough place to litigate the issue, but of course

4

Take, for example, the last decade of Supreme Court criminal cases involving the First
Amendment and related statutes: Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017)
(finding that a state statute prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing social networking
sites violated the First Amendment); Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (holding
that negligence could not support conviction for transmitting threats); Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730
(concluding “[t]he Stolen Valor Act infringes upon speech protected by the First Amendment.”);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (holding that a statute criminalizing depictions
of animal cruelty violated the First Amendment). Leading First Amendment articles in the last
decade are the same. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J.
246 (2017); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016); Genevieve Lakier,
The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron & Mary
Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014); Frederick
Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81 (2011). Research reveals only
sporadic exceptions, further underscoring the axiom that the exceptions prove the rule. See, e.g.,
Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First
Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215 (1987) (arguing for a revised approach to procedural law in First
Amendment libel law); cf. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants,
80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1449, 1476 (2005) (examining interplay between First Amendment values and
defendants’ silence in criminal cases).
5
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. A defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence via motion
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The motion can be raised up to three times: first, at
the close of the government’s case, second, at the close of evidence but before the jury’s verdict,
and third, after the verdict. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a), (c). However, judges may reserve ruling on
either the first or second form of the motion until the evidence is complete, the jury is deliberating,
the jury is discharged without a verdict, or even after the jury has returned a verdict. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 29(b). As a practical matter, this means that there is often effectively only one sufficiency of the
evidence challenge, litigated via a post-trial motion.
Declaratory judgments are unlikely to fix this problem. To be sure, plaintiffs who suspect
themselves to be a likely target for criminal prosecution can in theory seek out a declaratory judgment declaring the law (or the law as applied) unconstitutional. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 15–16 (2010). But that is no solution for run of the mill criminal defendants, who are largely indigent and less sophisticated than the plaintiffs in cases such as Humanitarian Law Project. Approximately ninety-three percent of federal criminal defendants need appointed counsel. See 2017 REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ACT 17 (2018), https://cjastudy.fd.org/ [https://perma.cc/FGV3-GDJD]. Even when repeat-player
appointed defense attorneys recognize a statute’s weakness to a class of clients, they may face
serious institutional challenges in bringing such a challenge, see, e.g., id. at 71, 89–92, 104, if their
statutory underpinnings even allow such challenges. See, e.g., id. at 67–69.
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a post-trial motion requires a trial—a rare event in our world of vanishing trials.6 Moreover, judges are understandably reluctant to disturb a
jury’s verdict. And, in any event, the legal standard substantially favors
the prosecution by prohibiting the judge from reversing a conviction unless the judge concludes that no “rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of [the] crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” evaluating the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution[.]”7
Jury instructions fare little better. The court finalizes jury instructions at a jury instruction conference after the close of evidence and before closing arguments.8 There, either party can object to the court’s
proposed instructions and any refusals to present party-proposed instructions.9 In relevant part, the parties can raise as applied challenges
to prevent the jury from convicting or acquitting for unconstitutional
reasons raised by the evidence.10 But case law, again, puts a thumb on
the scale against issuing such instructions: district courts are typically
safe from reversal for instructional error where the instructions “read
as a whole . . . completely and correctly state[] the law.”11 And even
when an appellate court finds constitutional error, another level of deference still requires affirming the verdict when the error is ostensibly
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.12 Jury instructions, too, are thus
not an especially effective mechanism for enforcing the First Amendment in criminal cases.

6

The “vanishing trial” is a widely used shorthand that refers to the dramatic decrease in the
percentage of civil and criminal cases resolved via trial, as opposed to settlement (civil), guilty
pleas, or other means. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
7
See United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
8
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 30. Note that experienced practitioners will prepare and even submit
key jury instructions before trial, especially instructions about the elements of the offense. See
generally F. Lee Bailey & Kenneth J. Fishman, Criminal Trial Techniques § 49:3 (2019). However,
a judge need not rule on the proposed instruction until before closing arguments, per FED. R. CRIM.
P. 30(b), and in any event can revise earlier rulings at that time. See id. For an overview of the
many stages of jury instructions in a criminal trial, see 6 Wayne R. Lafave et al., Principles of
Criminal Procedure: Investigation § 24.8(a) (4th ed. 2019).
9
FED. R. CRIM. P. 30(d); Lafave et al., supra note 8, at § 24.8(b).
10
An example may be illustrative for those unfamiliar with the intricacies of trial practice.
Take United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1012, 1018–20 (7th Cir. 2012), a solicitation case.
After defense objection, the district court issued a First Amendment instruction outlining some of
the relevant limits to criminal solicitation that the government’s evidence raised, in addition to
issuing standard solicitation instruction setting out the elements of the offense. See White, 698
F.3d at 1012, 1018–20.
11
United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. DiSantis 565 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 2009)).
12
There are different standards of appellate review for the different ways in which these issues could come up, but all include some deference to the trial verdict. See infra Part V.B.
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Ultimately, substantive litigation, at trial and after, over what the
First Amendment prohibits provides inadequate protection against unconstitutional convictions. In response, this paper proposes expanding
opportunities for First Amendment litigation throughout the criminal
process by shifting focus from substantive to procedural litigation. Expanding sites for meaningful First Amendment litigation strengthens
First Amendment protections by offering not only more opportunity to
raise such issues but also greater variety of such challenges.
In a world of vanishing trials, such expansion is especially critical.
First Amendment cases are often especially fact-intensive. Abandoning
any analysis of the facts of a charge until trial in effect means abandoning most meaningful First Amendment challenges. A turn to criminal
procedure helps solve this problem.
This article explores this shift to procedure through the lens of false
speech cases. These cases provide relative clarity about what a more
procedurally oriented First Amendment could look like, as well as the
challenges facing criminal defendants under the current doctrine. That
is because Alvarez gives constitutional weight to the “non-lying” elements of any offense involving false expression. In other words, following Alvarez, any legally valid false speech charge must involve more
than simply a claim that an offender is lying; lying as such cannot be
criminalized.13
This article focuses on two procedural mechanisms for strengthening the First Amendment within the criminal legal system: robust
grand jury/indictment and unanimity requirements. These requirements help vindicate the First Amendment by testing the facts of a case
against the constitutionalized elements of the offense. Specifically, they
require the government to offer up specific facts that meet each and
every one of the elements of an offense—including, for false speech, the
constitutionalized “non-lying” elements.
Under the Fifth Amendment, a grand jury cannot return an indictment charging someone with a crime unless the grand jury finds facts
constituting probable cause to believe that a defendant has violated
each and every element of an offense.14 The Sixth Amendment requires
that the resulting indictment inform a defendant of the key facts of the
charges against him—the “nature and cause” of the charges.15 And, finally, Due Process and the Sixth Amendment require that a federal

13

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012) (plurality opinion).
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 361 n.3 (5th Cir.
2001), on reh’g en banc sub nom. United States v. Longoria, 298 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2002) (requiring
“assurance that the grand jury found probable cause for each of the elements of an offense”).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14
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trial jury’s verdict be unanimous on the facts demonstrating the central
elements of an offense.16
The existing law of grand juries/indictments and unanimity already goes part of the way to providing considerable procedural protections for criminal defendants charged with false speech crimes. A First
Amendment overlay serves to strengthen what doctrine already ostensibly requires; it does not require a radical transformation of criminal
procedure. Part II of this article explains how, following Alvarez, criminal prohibitions on false speech are unconstitutional unless they are
coupled with elements limiting the scope of that prohibition. Part III
then shows how the intertwined grand jury/indictment requirements
carry those First Amendment limitations from the text of the statute to
the initiation of a criminal case: the grand jury must determine whether
the government has evidence supporting those constitutionally required First Amendment limits, and the indictment notifies a defendant
how the resulting case complies with the First Amendment requirement. Part IV, in turn, argues that convicting someone requires a petit
jury to unanimously conclude that those First Amendment limiting
facts—and not some others—occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that they make out the applicable limiting elements. Finally, Part V
takes a step back and responds to counterarguments. It argues, first,
the First Amendment provides ample reason to reinvigorate criminal
procedure’s sometimes empty formalisms, and, second, that trial level
procedural changes like these matter.
II. FALSE SPEECH’S LIMITING ELEMENTS
In United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court struck down the
Stolen Valor Act of 200517 as an unconstitutional prohibition on protected speech.18 Alvarez was an impersonation case, and a sad one. Mr.
Alvarez was convicted of claiming to be a Congressional Medal of Honor
recipient when he was not. He had introduced himself at a public water
board meeting as a Medal recipient, but he made no attempt to obtain
any benefits or privileges reserved for Medal holders.19 As the Supreme
Court observed, his false claims “were but a pathetic attempt to gain
respect that eluded him.”20

16

U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; see also Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)
(“[A] jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element.”).
17
Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat 3266 (2006), invalidated by Alvarez,
567 U.S. 709.
18
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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A divided Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act, which prohibited
such lies.21 Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice Kennedy applied
“the most exacting scrutiny” to conclude that the Stolen Valor Act was
unconstitutional.22 Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan agreed that the
Act was unconstitutional but applied intermediate scrutiny.23
Although no opinion garnered a majority, the upshot from both
opinions was similar: lies are not categorically outside the protection of
the First Amendment. Instead, the state can criminalize lies only when
they falls into a categorically unprotected category of speech (e.g., fraud,
etc.) or when the elements of the offense require not only a lie but also
“some other legally cognizable harm.”24 Those elements, in the words of
the concurring judges, impose “limitations on . . . scope” that narrow
the offense to “lies most likely to be harmful or . . . contexts where such
lies are most likely to cause harm.”25
The absence of these limiting elements distinguished the unconstitutional Stolen Valor Act from the parade of federal and state statutes
that the government and amici complained would be jeopardized by
striking down the Act.26 To the plurality and concurring justices, the
Stolen Valor Act was different because it criminalized “all false statements” on a given subject “in almost limitless times and settings.”.27
Constitutionally valid “false statements” statutes avoided the bogeyman of criminalizing mere lies by adding additional limiting elements. The Court illustrated this principle by walking through the limiting elements in the three statutory categories the government claimed
would be put at risk if the Court found false speech to be constitutionally protected—false statements to officials (Section 1001), perjury, and
impersonation. First and foremost, federal law prohibits making a false
statement to federal officials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. But
§ 1001 punishes only materially false statements made to government
21

Id. at 715; id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 724 (plurality opinion) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642
(1994)).
23
Id. at 732 (Breyer, J., concurring). In addition to the plurality and concurrence, Justices
Alito, Scalia, and Thomas also dissented. Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting).
24
Id. at 717–19 (plurality opinion).
25
Id. at 737–38 (Breyer, J., concurring).
26
The government, for example, highlighted false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), perjury, and
the various statutes criminalizing falsely representing oneself to be acting on behalf of the government. Brief for Petitioner at 29–32, United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (No. 11-210).
First Amendment scholars Eugene Volokh and James Weinstein listed no less than thirteen categories of federal and state offenses, many with multiple subcategories—all of which would be implicated in finding First Amendment protection for false speech. Brief for Professors Eugene Volokh and James Weinstein as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3–11, United States v.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (No. 11-120).
27
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723; see also id. at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[F]ew statutes, if any,
simply prohibit without limitation the telling of a lie, even a lie about one particular matter.”).
22
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officials, about official matters; it does not punish mere false statements.28 Second, perjury prosecutions do not punish mere false speech
as such but, rather material false speech under oath, in an official proceeding or document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623.29 There is
little risk that prosecuting such false speech, under oath, will impinge
on “lies not spoken under oath and simply intended to puff up oneself.”30
Finally, impersonation statutes, too, are distinct from mere false speech
in that they require showing that the communication appears to hold
some kind of official authorization and “implicate fraud or speech integral to criminal conduct.”31
The logic of Alvarez is not 100% pellucid, but its takeaway is much
more so: a statute criminalizing false expression is unconstitutional unless it falls into a category of historically unprotected speech, or its elements meaningfully limit its scope. The exact contours of these limiting
elements are defined by statute, but they are nonetheless required by
the Constitution. The rest of this paper explores what it means to enforce the limits these constitutionalized elements impose.
III. INDICTMENTS AND GRAND JURIES
For better or worse, our criminal system is one of vanishing trials.
Only two percent of federal cases go to trial.32 As the Supreme Court
famously recognized, “the reality [is] that criminal justice today is for
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”33 The absence
of trials is self-reinforcing in cases that raise potential First Amendment issues: the constitutional limits of such offenses aren’t tested because so few cases go to trial, and few such cases go to trial because trial
is even more risky when the contours of the offense are unknown. Following Alvarez, one would have expected extensive litigation over the
28

See id. at 720 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 721 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring).
30
Id. at 721 (plurality opinion).
31
See id. The elements of federal impersonation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912, are much
more controverted than the elements of perjury and § 1001 violations. The plurality and concurring opinions thus agree less as to the nature of the limiting element for a § 912 case than they do
for perjury and § 1001 violations. Both opinions agree, however, that the limiting elements—whatever they are—play an important role. See id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting United
States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943)). The plurality quotes in the text above would require
elements analogous to fraud or speech integral to criminal conduct, while the concurrence focuses
on “acts of impersonation, not mere speech” that “may require a showing that, for example, someone was deceived into following a ‘course [of action] he would not have pursued but for the deceitful
conduct.’” Id. (citing Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704).
32
John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who Do Are
Found Guilty, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-foundguilty/ [https://perma.cc/K9T7-YU6S].
33
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
29
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contours of the limiting elements in false statement offenses.34 But that
hasn’t happened: a review of all federal criminal cases citing Alvarez
reveals few cases even challenging criminal prohibitions on false expression, and just one case striking down a statute.35
The prospect of defendants facing unconstitutional charges until a
trial that never happens is itself a First Amendment problem. Just the
threat of an improper conviction chills speech, regardless of whether the
speech is ever prosecuted, and regardless of whether the speech is even
prohibited.36 As the Court has observed, the threat of criminal sanctions
“may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate”
potentially lawful “words, ideas, and images.”37 And “[e]ven the prospect of ultimate failure of such prosecutions by no means dispels their
chilling effect on protected expression.”38 In a world of vanishing trials,
that threat is real.
Shifting focus to pretrial procedure is one mechanism for breaking
this vicious cycle. But there is no need to invent new procedural steps.
To charge someone with a crime, the government must already produce
facts supporting each and every element of the charges and informing
the defendant of the gist of the resulting charges. Specifically, a federal

34

The Court takes only important cases. See SUP. CT. R. 10. And, as noted above, the government and amici argued that striking down the Stolen Valor Act would topple a host of other federal
and state statutes. See supra Part II. In addition, Alvarez’s lengthy discussion of the limiting elements of existing “false statements” offenses provides ample opportunity for defense lawyers to
argue that their case falls outside the limiting elements as defined in Alvarez.
35
Unsuccessful challenges: United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 536 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Because the acts-as-such clause prohibits more than mere lies, it falls outside the scope of Alvarez’s
holding.”); United States v. Nabaya, 765 Fed. Appx. 895, 899 (4th Cir. 2019) (upholding federal
statute prohibiting retaliating against federal employees and officers by filing a false lien or encumbrance); United States v. Ackell, 907 F.3d 67, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[W]e are unconvinced
that we must administer the ‘strong medicine’ of holding the statute facially overbroad.”); United
States v. Glaub, 910 F.3d 1334, 1338 (10th Cir. 2018) (“The Supreme Court, however, has held
that the submission of a false claim to the government is not protected by the First Amendment.”)
(citing Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723); United States v. Baumgartner, 581 Fed. Appx. 522, 530–31 (6th
Cir. 2014) (finding that federal misprision statute did not violate the First Amendment); United
States v. Tomsha-Miguel, 766 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 912 did
not violate the First Amendment); United States v. Harkonen, 510 Fed. Appx. 633, 636 (9th Cir.
2013) (“The First Amendment does not protect fraudulent speech . . . .”); United States v. Chappell,
691 F.3d 388, 393–94 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding a state personation statute); United States v.
Hamilton, 699 F.3d 356, 374 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that Alvarez does not call the constitutionality
of federal insignia statutes into question); United States v. Keyser, 704 F.3d 631, 639–40 (9th Cir.
2012) (finding that defendant’s hoax speech was not protected speech); United States v. Williams,
690 F.3d 1056, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that federal statutes were constitutional regulations
of true threats).
Successful challenge: United States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d 299, 303–04 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc) (striking down 18 U.S.C. § 704(a), a federal statute prohibiting unauthorized wearing of
military medals).
36
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997).
37
Id. at 872.
38
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).
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felony case typically begins when a grand jury returns an indictment.39
The grand jury can do that only when the government’s evidence provides probable cause to believe that the individual charged committed
each and every element of an offense, including, in the case of false
speech offenses, the constitutionalized limiting elements.40 The grand
jury returns those charges in the form of indictment, which itself provides notice of the charges against a defendant—both the elements and
“essential facts” of the offense.41
When analyzed through a First Amendment lens, these intertwined grand jury and indictment requirements enable part of First
Amendment challenges to be litigated before trial, circumventing the
vanishing trial problem. The grand jury already is supposed to evaluate
whether the government has produced facts supporting the critical limiting elements of a false speech offense. In theory, the grand jury thus
helps prevent defendants from being indicted for conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. Including those constitutionally salient
facts in the resulting indictment would demonstrate that the grand jury
did, in reality, find such facts.42 The indictment would then also provide
notice to a defendant of the nature of the pending charges, and, critically, would ensure from the outset of a proceeding that the constitutional facts underpinning the government’s charges actually comply
with the applicable First Amendment limits. Already, notice must involve the “essential facts” underpinning a charge.43 In a post-Alvarez
world, those “essential facts” should include the facts found by the
grand jury to support the constitutionally relevant limiting elements.
The government is then held to that notice at trial.44

39

Federal criminal cases can also be commenced via complaint or continued with an information. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 3, 7(b). However, both are subject to significant limitations such that
their use is largely limited to cases involving early guilty pleas. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1, 7(b).
40
This is a foundational principle on which the grand jury operates. See, e.g., United States
v. Cole, 784 F.2d 1225, 1227 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986) (“If the grand jury had not found all elements of
the offense, the indictment is invalid . . . .”)
41
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1); see also United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007).
42
Grand juries have famously been criticized for being willing to indict a ham sandwich. See
Josh Levin, The Judge Who Coined ‘Indict a Ham Sandwich’ Was Himself Indicted, SLATE (Nov.
25, 2014), https://slate.com/human-interest/2014/11/sol-wachtler-the-judge-who-coined-indict-a-h
am-sandwich-was-himself-indicted.html [https://perma.cc/98GF-ABBD] (providing history of “indict a ham sandwich” phrasing).
43
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1); see also Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102.
44
See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218–19 (1960).
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A. The Law of Grand Juries and Indictments
The Fifth Amendment’s grand jury requirement and the Sixth
Amendment’s indictment requirement are supposed to work in tandem
to protect federal defendants.45
The grand jury serves a dual role as a “sword” investigating and
charging crime and as a “shield” protecting the accused from “unfounded criminal prosecutions.”46 The grand jury is thus centrally concerned with assessing facts—”whether there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge.”47 Any resulting indictment defines the scope of
the government’s trial case: the Fifth Amendment demands that the
“allegations in the indictment and the proof at trial match . . . .”48 The
remedy for a fatal variance is dismissal for violation of a defendant’s
Fifth Amendment rights.49 The prosecution thus has every incentive to
persuade the grand jury to return as broad an indictment as possible so
as to provide maximum flexibility over the evidence presented at trial.
The Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure’s
Rule 7(c)(1) requirements for what an indictment must contain limit the
breadth of that indictment.50 Under the Sixth Amendment, an indictment must provide notice of “the nature and cause” of the charges
against a defendant.51 Notice is not an elaborate affair. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure require only a “plain, concise, and definite
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged . . . .”52 The Sixth Amendment likewise demands only the elements of the offense, and adequate facts to “fairly inform[]” the defendant of the charge(s), with sufficient specificity to protect against future
double jeopardy problems.53 In addition, an indictment serves the corollary purpose of informing “the court” about the facts alleged, “so that

45

When this article began, the indictment and grand jury requirement had not been incorporated against the states. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Since then, the Supreme
Court reversed course and concluded that juror unanimity is now incorporated against the states.
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020). It is too soon to say with confidence what effect, if any,
this will have on the unincorporated indictment requirement.
46
See Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 101 (4th ed.
2010); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
47
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992).
48
United States v. Trennell, 290 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2002).
49
Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218–19.
50
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
51
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
52
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
53
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; see also United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007)
(quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)).
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it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction . . . .”54
All the action, so to speak, is in the second part of the Sixth Amendment test, which seemingly overlaps with Rule 7(c)(1): which elements
require factual specificity in order to “fairly inform[]” a defendant of the
charges? The Supreme Court’s two most recent cases seem to say that,
in most cases, simply reciting the language of the statute (or the elements of the offense) and providing the date and location of the offense
will typically suffice.55 On the other hand, the Court’s third leading indictment case, United States v. Russell, recognizes that certain charges
and elements “depend so crucially upon . . . a specific identification of
fact” as to demand additional specificity.56
The appellate courts have elaborated on this tension by requiring
an indictment to contain some facts that “pin[] down the specific conduct
at issue,” without imposing overly strict limits on the government’s
case.57 Any “essential element of the offense” thus must be charged with
some factual specificity.58 But, even then, “a defendant is not entitled to
know all the evidence the government intends to produce [at trial], but
only the theory of the government’s case.”59
B. Indictments After Alvarez
As discussed in Part II, Alvarez frames valid “false speech” cases in
terms of two components: the lie and limiting element(s) that bring the
statute within the ambit of the First Amendment.60 Both must be set
out with some factual specificity in the indictment. Doing so meaningfully ensures—from the beginning of a case—that the grand jury does
not authorize charges that violate the prohibition on prosecuting bare
lies, that the government does not pursue an unconstitutional case, and
of course that a defendant does not face such. Without such protection,
there is little way to ensure such a result until trial—which likely will
never happen in our world of vanishing trials.

54

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 768 (1962).
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense
in the words of the statute . . . .”); see also Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 102 (recognizing language
of statute “coupled with the specification of the time and place” of offense satisfied indictment
requirement).
56
Russell, 369 U.S. at 764 (finding indictment insufficient).
57
United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 2000).
58
United States v. Locklear, 97 F.3d 196, 199–200 (7th Cir. 1996).
59
United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 135 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Giese,
597 F.2d 1170, 1181 (9th Cir. 1979)).
60
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion).
55
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The misrepresentation element

Even before Alvarez, courts largely agreed that an indictment must
specify the lie in a false speech case. Impersonation cases provide perhaps the clearest example. As far back as the nineteen-teens the Supreme Court in United States v. Barnow recognized that “the mischief
to be cured” in an impersonation case “is the false pretense.”61 The next
year, it concluded that an impersonation indictment must contain the
lie: the “name and official character of the officer whom the accused [is]
charged with having falsely personated.”62 Practice conforms to the
rule. In the Seventh Circuit, for example, every indictment available on
PACER as of fall 2017 complies with the requirement to specify the lie.63
The case law of other false speech statutes is perhaps not quite as
neat, but nonetheless reaches the same conclusion: an indictment for
false speech must factually specify the false statement. Indeed, though
indictments are rarely found insufficient, a handful of cases have reversed convictions in false speech cases for failing to comply with this
requirement. In United States v. Nance, for example, the D.C. Circuit
overturned a conviction for ten counts of obtaining something of value
by false pretenses when none of the counts set out the applicable false
representations.64 In United States v. Frankel, the Third Circuit likewise affirmed the dismissal of mail fraud and wire fraud charges where
the alleged underlying false statement was not, in fact, a false statement.65 And even the United States Attorneys’ Manual concedes that a
perjury indictment must specify the false statement, just as a mail
fraud or wire fraud indictment must set out the fraudulent scheme—
the lie—on which the charges depend.66

61

United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 78 (1915).
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 116 (1916).
63
See Table 1, Appendix. There is one exception: In United States v. Bonin, the government
filed a superseding indictment with one impersonation charge that did not specify the lie. See
Superseding Indictment, United States v. Bonin, No. 1:15-cr-00022, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2017), Dkt.
138. My colleague Professor Erica Zunkel, my students, and I challenged the sufficiency of that
indictment for that charge based on the legal theory described in the text above. Id. at Dkt. 184
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2017). The government dismissed the charges ten days later without responding,
after the coincidental death of a witness. Id. at Dkts. 186 (N.D. Ill Oct. 24, 2017), 188 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 26, 2017).
64
United States v. Nance, 533 F.2d 699, 700–01 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Note that the
underlying statute was a District of Columbia offense, and therefore not one of the usual enumerations of federal false expression offenses. Id. The principle still stands, however.
65
United States v. Frankel, 721 F.2d 917, 917–19 (3d Cir. 1983).
66
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1755 (4th ed. 1997) (“The indictment
must set forth the precise falsehoods alleged and the factual basis of their falsity with sufficient
clarity to permit a jury to determine their verity and to allow meaningful judicial review.”); id. at
§ 971 (“[A] mail fraud or wire fraud indictment should contain a reasonably detailed description of
the particular scheme the defendant is charged with devising to ensure that the defendant has
sufficient notice of the nature of the offense.”) (collecting cases).
62

177]

DEFENDING SPEECH CRIMES
2.

189

The limiting element

But, of course, no one can be prosecuted merely for lying; that is
the upshot of Alvarez. From the defendant’s perspective, an indictment
that fails to factually specify the constitutionally relevant facts underpinning the limiting element(s) effectively prosecutes him or her simply
for lying. Such an indictment provides no evidence that the grand jury
considered whether or how the defendant did more than just lie. It likewise fails to notify the defense as to how this particular case avoids the
Alvarez problem, nor can the court make such an assessment. And it
sets out no limits on the government’s case at trial besides the lie itself
and the language of the statute.
Following Alvarez, the better course is to require a “false expression” indictment to specify not only the false expression but also the
facts supporting the constitutionally critical limiting element(s). That
is because guilt in a false expression case depends not only on the specific false expression but also on whether (or how) that false expression
is cabined by the facts supporting constitutionalized limiting element.
Following Alvarez, not just the lie but also the limiting element are the
“very core of criminality” of the charges.67 Pinning down the “specific
conduct at issue” in a given case—as opposed to just false expression
that otherwise would be constitutionally protected—thus requires an
indictment that specifies that conduct.68 Without such specificity, not
only the defendant but also the court are at sea until trial.
Alvarez confirms that the First Amendment harm of potentially
criminalizing mere lies applies pretrial: “[T]he mere potential” exercise
of government power to criminalize lies as such creates “a chill the First
Amendment cannot permit.”69 And that is what happens with an indictment that omits facts supporting the constitutionally relevant limiting
elements. The only thing defendants would learn about what, exactly,
they did to violate the law is that they told a lie (and perhaps the date
and location). In a false statements charge (§ 1001), that would be the
lie absent materiality or jurisdiction; in a perjury charge, the lie absent
any specific sworn proceeding; in an impersonation charge, the lie absent any particular actions to enact it. To be sure, any conviction presumably would have to rely on facts fulfilling the limiting elements of
the offense. But in our criminal system without trials, the indictment
alone may be all the government ever has to show. Such indictments
thus chill speech in the fashion Alvarez contemplated—risking prosecution on the basis of no other misconduct (or mis-speech) than lies alone.
67
68
69

Id. at 764.
United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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The Russell test would reach the same conclusion: when “guilt depends . . . crucially upon such a specific identification of fact” the indictment must include that fact.70 In Russell itself guilt depended, first, on
refusing to answer questions from Congress71 (which may well have
been protected by the First Amendment) where, second, those questions
were about a subject matter on which Congress was holding a hearing.72
The Court accordingly concluded that the indictment must specify that
limiting factor, the subject matter at issue.73
Moreover, an indictment that omits the First Amendment’s necessary limiting facts (materiality, etc.) side-steps the relationship between the Sixth Amendment’s indictment requirement and the Fifth
Amendment’s grand jury requirement. That is, if the indictment does
not specify the limiting facts, then there is no evidence that the grand
jury ever considered such facts. Or, even if it did, then there is no guarantee that those facts in reality survive constitutional scrutiny, much
less that the theory of guilt on which the grand jury relied will be the
same theory presented at trial. To be sure, criminal prosecutions routinely lack such protections. But First Amendment prosecutions—and
especially such prosecutions for lying—are different because of the
unique harms created by the mere threat of improper charges.
Some prosecutors may well be complying with Alvarez’s constitutional limitations already. The law already requires them to present
evidence to grand juries about the constitutionally salient limiting factors for false expression cases, and there is no evidence that they have
failed to do so. But neither is there evidence they comply with the constitutional limitations. Worse yet, courts have not yet required that the
indictment—the sole consistent public documentation of the grand
jury’s decision-making—demonstrate compliance.74
In any event, relying on prosecutorial discretion does not solve the
problem. “[T]he First Amendment protects against the Government.”75
No less than the Supreme Court recognizes the circularity of relying on

70

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764 (1962).
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 771–72.
74
Grand jury proceedings are secret. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B). A transcript is kept, but it
cannot be produced except under two relevant circumstances. First, and most importantly, the
defense is entitled to grand jury testimony of a witness testifying at trial or certain other proceedings who previously testified before the grand jury about the same subject. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2;
18 U.S.C. § 3500. However, such transcripts need not be produced until trial itself. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500(a). Second, defendants are entitled to their own grand jury testimony early in a case. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B)(iii). However, given the rarity of a defendant testifying before the
grand jury, that entitlement offers little assistance in solving the problem.
75
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010).
71
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prosecutorial “restraint” to protect against the risk of improper prosecutions in First Amendment cases.76 Far from helping solve the First
Amendment problem, relying on prosecutorial discretion risks exacerbating it because of the concomitant risk of “discriminatory enforcement”—itself a separate First Amendment problem in criminal law.77
C. Consequences
Robust enforcement of the intertwined grand jury and indictment
requirements is straightforward, with system-supportive effects. Unlike other procedural protections, doing so provides meaningful pretrial
protections without any concomitant risk of releasing defendants on a
“technicality.”
On the one hand, the government suffers little from a marginally
more robust indictment requirement. The government likely will have
little problem meeting a robust indictment requirement in the first
place, and, in the rare cases where it does not, it gets a free “do-over”
until it gets the indictment right. Assuming prosecutors are already following the law, there is little more work to do before the grand jury
because the prosecution is already presenting the relevant evidence.
That is, the government has already worked through the facts of its case
before presenting that case to the grand jury, which should make it easy
to draft an indictment that includes the constitutionally critical limiting
facts.
Even if a case is ultimately dismissed for an insufficient indictment, the remedy—re-filing the case with a superseding indictment—
also imposes little cost on the government. That is because such a dismissal is typically “without prejudice,” meaning that the government
can simply to re-file a corrected indictment.78 Moreover, the government
has six months to file the new indictment, even if the limitations period
has already run.79
On the other hand, robust enforcement could provide real protection for defendants and the law. An indictment that includes additional
facts constrains the prosecution at trial to a case matching those facts.80
Though an indictment need not include facts supporting each and every
element of the offense, it is critically important to do so for the constitutionally mandatory elements of the offense—the limiting elements.

76
77
78
79
80

Id.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997).
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); Wright & Miller, supra note 46, at § 801.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3288–3289.
United States v. Trennell, 290 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2002).
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An indictment that spells out the facts underpinning those limiting elements also provides the defense with critical information for moving
to dismiss charges that fail to comply with the constitutionally relevant
requirements of a false expression charge. This may result in more litigation, or it may have a hydraulic effect of prompting the government
to avoid bringing cases that risk such challenge. Regardless, Alvarez’s
prohibition on prosecuting mere lies will have a real effect if robust
grand jury and indictment procedures in fact block such prosecutions.
IV. UNANIMITY
Opportunities for vindicating First Amendment interests also arise
in trial procedure—as distinct from the substantive First Amendment
jury issues also litigated at trial. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(a), require that a criminal jury
verdict must be unanimous not just as to guilt but also as to the facts
underpinning the elements of the offense.81 “[I]t is an assumption of our
system of criminal justice . . . that no person may be punished criminally save upon proof of some specific illegal conduct.”82
Unanimity matters. Non-unanimity can cover up “wide disagreement among the jurors about just what the defendant did, or did not,
do.”83 Non-unanimity likewise encourages jurors presented with a wide
array of evidence to convict just because “where there is smoke[,] there
must be fire.”84
This kind of equivocation about what a defendant did or did not do
is anathema to First Amendment-required elements. Following Alvarez, the point of the limiting elements is to limit—to constrain. They fail
in that function when they fail to meaningfully cabin jurors’ decisionmaking; they become no more than “statutory afterthoughts.”85
Juror unanimity in a false speech case is indisputably required as
to the specific facts of misrepresentation element(s). Requiring unanimity for a statute’s constitutionally mandated limiting element(s) would
further ensure that the limiting elements in fact bar prosecutions for
bare lies.

81

U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI; FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). As discussed above, the right to juror
unanimity was not incorporated against the states when this article was first presented but has
been since then. See discussion in supra note 45. Exactly how this change will apply to the unanimity issues discussed in the text above is still an open question. That said, the most straightforward inference is that the unanimity issues discussed in the text above now apply to the state as
well as federal charges.
82
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 633 (1991) (emphasis added).
83
Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 819 (1999).
84
Id.
85
United States v. Griggs, 569 F.3d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 2009).
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Requiring juror unanimity as to facts supporting the limiting elements also supports the broader goal of protecting the First Amendment by providing opportunities for litigating First Amendment issues
outside of substantive fights over jury instructions and as-applied trial
issues.86 To be sure, unanimity is a jury instruction issue that is litigated at trial. But it differs from fine-grained substantive litigation over
the elements and how they apply to the conduct in a particular case
because it is wholly independent of the alleged misconduct in any particular case. Whatever misconduct the government claims happened, it
must show that that particular misconduct actually occurred—rather
than something else entirely. Moreover, unanimity need never be relitigated. Once established, it serves as a First Amendment guardrail over
the course of a case: From the moment charges are filed, the government and defense both know that the petit jury must agree unanimously on the conduct that distinguishes a specific case from a conviction for mere lies. That knowledge will undoubtedly affect their
decision-making from the outset.87 Firmly settling unanimity on the
side of the First Amendment thus strengthens the First Amendment
not only before the petit jury but also throughout the entirety of the
criminal legal process.
A. The Law of Unanimity
Current legal doctrine requires unanimity for some elements of an
offense but not all: “[A] federal jury need not always [agree] . . . which
of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of
the crime.”88 The question is always: which elements require unanimity
and which do not. In the classic hypothetical, a jury could convict a defendant of robbery by force even if the jury disagreed about the means
by which the government proved the force element—say, with a knife
or a gun.89 But there are also constitutional limits: Justice Scalia famously observed, “We would not permit, for example, an indictment
charging that the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on

86

The line—or lack thereof—between procedure and substance is much discussed. See, e.g.,
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004). This article is not trying to
stake a claim about that distinction. Rather, it characterizes as “substance” questions about what
the statute prohibits and everything else as “procedural.” That distinction may or may not be “correct” for other areas, but it is the relevant one here.
87
For an excellent discussion of how the “shadow of the law” literature applies in criminal
cases, see William J. Stunz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
88
Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817.
89
Id.
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Wednesday . . . .”90 This Section sets out the legal framework in broad
strokes. The following Sections argue that unanimity must be required
for the facts underlying both the misrepresentation element(s) and the
limiting element(s) in false expression cases.
Courts and commentators have struggled—to put it mildly—to develop a clear test for determining when jurors must be unanimous about
the facts underpinning an offense, and when those facts are nothing
more than mere “means.”91 The problem is a certain “indetermina[cy]”
in determining when “differences between means” amount to “separate
offenses.”92 Rather than rest on “metaphysical” distinctions, the Supreme Court instead asks courts to use statutory interpretation, fairness, history, and practice to determine which elements of the offense
require juror unanimity about the underlying facts, and which do not.93
The two leading Supreme Court cases are illustrative: in Schad v.
Arizona, the Supreme Court focused on history, practice, and moral reasoning to conclude that a defendant could properly be convicted of first
degree murder even if the jury did not unanimously agree on whether
his mental state amounted to that of premeditated murder or felony
murder—factually, very different scenarios.94 The common law, the
criminal code in many American jurisdictions, and a wide variety of
state Supreme Courts had equated the two mental states, and they likewise “reasonably reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpability[.]”95
Nearly twenty years later, in Richardson v. United States, the
Court returned to tradition and fairness, as well as statutory interpretation, to conclude that a jury must be unanimous about which specific
violations of the drug laws constituted the “continuing series of violations” elements of the federal continuing criminal enterprise statute.96
Here, close analysis of the statute yielded the opposite result as in
Schad: there was no legal tradition reading “violations” to avoid unanimity, and the breadth of the potential “violations” varied greatly in
culpability from, for example, possession of a controlled substance to
endangering life while manufacturing a controlled substance.97

90

Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 651 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, Alternative Theories of the Crime, 22–23 (Nov. 10, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1501628 [https://perma.cc/TJ2P4Y5N]) (summarizing debate).
92
Schad, 501 U.S. at 633–34.
93
Id. at 635, 637; Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818–20.
94
Schad, 501 U.S. at 640–643.
95
Id.
96
Richardson, 526 U.S. at 815.
97
Id. at 818–20.
91
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B. The Misrepresentation Element
The circuits vary widely as to which elements of which offenses require unanimity and which do not. There is strikingly little variation,
however, on how to treat the misrepresentation or “false expression”
element of the core false statement offenses.98 In circuit after circuit,
the “false statement” is the gravamen of these offenses, and a jury must
therefore be unanimous as to which statement, specifically, was false.
In United States v. Fawley, for example, the Seventh Circuit reversed a
conviction where a jury verdict in a perjury case may not have been
unanimous as to which of the defendant’s false statements “formed the
basis” of the conviction.99 The First and Fourth Circuits reached the
same conclusion.100 The Fifth Circuit, joined by the Second and Fourth
Circuits, likewise concluded that unanimity was required as to the false
statement at issue in each count of the crime of false statement to federal officials; allowing a single count to contain multiple false statements would “embrace[] two or more separate offenses.”101
The only substantive point of disagreement is over the level of generality. For example, some circuits characterize each fraudulent wire
transaction as an individual wire fraud offense, rather than each false
statement contained in a given wire transaction.102 Those circuits accordingly don’t require unanimity as to “a particular false statement
within a wire” but rather unanimity that a specific transaction was indeed fraudulent, even if the jurors disagree as to which part of it was
false.103 Other circuits characterize the false statement itself as the offense, in which case unanimity is required.104 The focus on falseness or
fraud never varies, however. The government must always prove that
a specific statement or transaction was false or fraudulent; it is never
enough to gesture vaguely at a series of lies.

98

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (perjury), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statement to federal official).
137 F.3d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1998).
100
See United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 1998) (perjury, false statements); see also United States v. Glantz, 847 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1988).
101
United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 927 (5th Cir. 1991) (false statements); Sarihifard,
155 F.3d at 310 (perjury, false statements); see also United States v. Crisci, 273 F.3d 235 (2d Cir.
2001).
102
United States v. Nanda, 867 F.3d 522, 529 (5th Cir. 2017).
103
See id.; see also United States v. LaPlante, 714 F.3d 641, 647 (1st Cir. 2013) (characterizing
“the specific false statement” as merely the “means” by which offender carried out the “fraudulent
scheme”).
104
Compare United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring unanimity for
each false statement in charges for making and preparing a false tax return under 26 U.S.C.
§§ 7206(1), (2)), with United States v. Fairchild, 819 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 2016) (allowing non-unanimity as to the “means” of accomplishing each false tax return because the offense is return by
return).
99
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C. The Limiting Element
No case appears to have addressed how—if at all—Alvarez adds to
the analysis. But it must. Following Alvarez, the core of a false expression charge is not only the false statement or transaction but also the
limiting element.105 Without that limiting element, the statute itself
would be unconstitutional. But an element is only as good as its facts.
Allowing any number of different factual “means” to serve as the limiting element allows for “wide disagreement among the jurors about just
what the defendant did, or did not, do.”106 Indeed, coupling a verdict
that doesn’t even purport to be unanimous on the facts of the limiting
element, with an indictment that similarly fails to specify the precise
conduct at issue, would raise a serious question about whether the limiting element limits much of anything at all.
1.

Perjury, false statement to federal officials (Section 1001)

Requiring unanimity for the limiting elements may not prove especially burdensome for some offenses. As discussed above, perjury, for
example, already requires unanimity as to the specific false statement
at issue. As a practical matter, once the jury agrees on which statement
is at issue, then the jury also almost necessarily agrees on some of the
other central facts—whether the statement was under oath and the proceeding during which the statement was made.107 Likewise with a false
statement to a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 1001: once the false
statement itself is identified, then the government branch to whom the
statement was directed almost immediately follows.108
Perjury and § 1001’s shared “materiality” requirement presents
only marginally more of a challenge.109 A false statement is “material”
when it has “a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.”110 Unanimity as to materiality therefore means that the jury
must agree on the facts underpinning the statement’s materiality, even
where the government presents multiple ways in which it could have
been material.111
105

Supra Part II.
Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 819 (1999).
107
See 18 U.S.C. § 1623.
108
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (prohibiting false statements made “in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States”).
109
Perjury prohibits making or using a “false material declaration.” 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). The
criminal prohibition on false statements to officials prohibits three different kinds of false statements, all of which require that the falsehood is “material.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(1), (2), (3).
110
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (definition).
111
See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 523 (1995) (holding that materiality is a jury
106
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Practically speaking, once the false statement itself is specifically
identified, there may well be a very limited range of ways in which it
could be material. Unanimity would carry some small bite only for those
prosecutions involving a false statement where prosecutors propose
multiple theories of materiality.112
But that is what Alvarez implies. The upshot of Alvarez was that
the constraining elements of false speech offenses must actually constrain false speech prosecutions, else the offenses risk the same problems as the unconstitutional Stolen Valor Act. Non-unanimity would
mean that half the jurors could conclude that the prosecution proved
one set of constraining facts, and the other half could reject that conclusion in favor of wholly different set of facts. Such disagreement over the
core facts is hardly a meaningful constraint on false expression prosecutions.
Nor does statutory interpretation lend itself to reading materiality
as an element for which the facts don’t especially matter. Materiality is
a unifying feature of the statement itself, whereas other elements of the
offense are expressly listed as disjunctive means. Thus, one can violate
§ 1001 if one, for example, “falsifies, conceals, or covers up” a material
fact “by any trick, scheme, or device.”113 One likewise violates it by making a materially “false fictitious, or fraudulent” misrepresentation or by
making or using a false document containing any “materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement.”114
Perjury has a similar structure: materiality is the unifying element
across the multiple means of committing perjury. Thus, one violates the
law by making a “false material declaration” by book, paper, document,
record, recording, or other material. To the degree unanimity is required for the false statement itself—which the courts unanimously
find—the statement’s materiality cannot be disentangled.
The common-law history of § 1001, perjury, and related statutes
such as mail and wire fraud further confirms the centrality of “materiality” to the offenses. “Materiality” is a concept with a long-standing
common-law history, and a relatedly “uniform understanding” in the
numerous federal statutes that incorporate it.115 It has been central to

question).
112
The indictment itself also limits how much of a change this might make. As discussed above,
variance between an indictment and the proof presented at a federal trial violates the Fifth
Amendment’s grand jury guarantee. To the degree the facts underpinning the limiting elements
already must be specified in the indictment, then there is no question that unanimity is required
at trial. The question of unanimity arises only when the facts need not be specified in the indictment.
113
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1).
114
Id. at §§ 1001(a)(2), (3).
115
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 770 (1988).
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the historical understanding of the various “false statements to federal
officials” offenses such as § 1001 and perjury, dating back to the common law.116 Even related misrepresentation offenses such as mail and
wire fraud, which lack any express “materiality” requirement, are nonetheless interpreted to incorporate a materiality element based on the
common law history.117 It is not a “statutory afterthought;” rather, failing to agree on materiality means that “the jury fails to agree on the
crime that the defendant committed.”118
Requiring factual unanimity not just for a defendant’s misrepresentation—the false statement or document—but also for the related
constraint of materiality further disaggregates the First Amendment
substantive questions into a mixture of substance and procedure. The
materiality limiting element is much more limiting when jurors must
agree on its facts. The further the jury is from unanimity, the less the
materiality element actually prevents a general prohibition on lies.
Here, the question is easy; even setting Alvarez aside, text, history, and
constitutional avoidance all point in the same direction, supporting
unanimity. There is thus little reason for the courts to allow juries to
disagree about the facts underlying the materiality elements of perjury,
§ 1001, and related offenses.
2.

Impersonation

Impersonating a federal officer is the third core “false statements”
statute addressed in Alvarez. Some of the same logic applies as in perjury and § 1001: impersonating a federal agent in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 912 has two parts (1) the impersonation (the lie), and (2) an act (the
limiting element).119 First, an offender impersonates a federal officer
when he “falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting
under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or
officer thereof.”120 Second, the offense is complete when an offender either “acts as such” or “in such pretended character demands or obtains
any money, paper, document, or thing of value . . . .”121 Impersonation
plainly requires unanimity for the first part, for the same reasons as all
the other false statement offenses. Indeed, it would be a gross anomaly
to allow conviction for impersonating a federal agent by a jury that was
not unanimous on the false statement or impersonation itself.
116

Id. at 769–70.
See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (holding that materiality was an implied
element of federal mail and wire fraud statutes based on a common law understanding of fraud).
118
United States v. Griggs, 569 F.3d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 2009).
119
See 18 U.S.C. § 912.
120
Id.
121
Id.
117
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But unanimity also must be required for a defendant’s “act,” just
as unanimity is required for the limiting element for the other false expression offenses. An impersonation statute that criminalized falsely
claiming to be a federal agent, without more, would prohibit “all false
statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and settings,”
in violation of Alvarez.122 The statute’s “act” element is what prevents
this unconstitutional outcome.
The best counterargument is unavailing. At least three circuits
have rejected juror unanimity requirements for federal conspiracy’s
“overt act” requirement.123 If impersonation’s “act” element is analogous
to that “overt act” element, then the logic of the conspiracy cases means
that impersonation’s “act” can be fulfilled by any number of different
means. But that analogy fails.
Conspiracy’s “overt act” requirement is a “statutory afterthought.”124 The reason for requiring an “overt act” is to show that the
conspirators did something—anything—to put the conspiracy in motion.125 The core of the offense is still the conspiracy itself. Indeed, other
federal conspiracy statutes do not even include any overt act requirement.126
Impersonation’s “act” requirement is totally different. It is not an
afterthought; following Alvarez, it’s part of the core of the offense. Without the “act,” the statute would violate the First Amendment. Impersonation’s parallel false expression statutes likewise differ from conspiracy. Where the federal conspiracy statutes only sometimes include
an overt act requirement, all the parallel false speech statutes require
proof of their limiting elements. Indeed, a statute that didn’t require
such proof would be unconstitutional.
V. RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS
The arguments in this paper are not without their detractors. Indeed, my students and I spent approximately five years litigating these
and other issues in the federal courts, to little avail. Here I address the
most significant of these objections. First, it is fair to ask why my students and I lost if, as this paper argues, we were right that existing law
largely supports us. Moreover, a critic might argue, this article seems
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United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722–23 (2012) (plurality opinion).
United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2011); Griggs, 569 F.3d at 343;
United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1202 (5th Cir. 1981).
124
Griggs, 569 F.3d at 341.
125
See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
126
Most famously, federal drug conspiracy has no overt act requirement. 21 U.S.C. § 846.
123
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to argue for substantively different procedural rules in First Amendment criminal cases—an argument that directly contradicts our system
of trans-substantive criminal procedure. Second, one might question
about whether any of this article’s mucking about in trial practice on
the front end makes a meaningful difference; perhaps the higher courts
catch everything that matters on the back end. In other words, is there
a real problem here? I respond in two ways:
A. The First Amendment Matters
First, the First Amendment matters. This article applies existing
criminal procedural rules and standards in the context of the First
Amendment. Criminal procedure is indeed trans-substantive,127 but
there is nothing substantive, distinct, or unusual about the bog-standard point that broad legal rules and standards apply differently, depending on the different contexts in which they apply.128 Here, that context is the First Amendment, or, in the more specific example of this
article, false speech.
Accounting for the First Amendment does not require modifying
the test for what goes in an indictment, what requires unanimity, or
anything else. It requires only recognizing that the First Amendment
must be accounted for in applying those tests. And there is ample reason to think that it must be. There is Alvarez itself, for all the reasons
previously discussed in this article. There are also the broader constitutional doctrines that emphasize the uniqueness of the First Amendment context—de novo review of so-called constitutional facts and doctrinal skepticism of prosecutorial discretion in First Amendment cases,
for example.129
A turn to the First Amendment also follows the courts’ lead. There
is a disquietingly empty formalism to much of criminal procedure’s ostensible protections: the formal rules may protect important rights, but
127

See, e.g., Russell L. Christopher, Appointed Counsel and Jury Trial: The Rights That Undermine the Other Rights, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 703, 715–16 (2018) (“Most [procedural] rights
are transsubstantive: the rights to a public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to confront one’s accusers, to compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses, to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, to a speedy trial, to have the prosecution provide proof of each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, to due process, and to equal protection of the
laws.”).
128
See, e.g., David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1191, 2003–04 (2013) (arguing that “nominally trans-substantive rules can lend
themselves to patterns of application organized around antecedent regimes”).
129
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (“[I]n [ ] First Amendment cases, the court is
obligated ‘to “make an independent examination of the whole record” in order to make sure that
“the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.””’)); Alvarez,
567 U.S. at 733 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–41
(1974)) (recognizing that the threat of criminal prosecution chills speech).

177]

DEFENDING SPEECH CRIMES

201

they too often serve as fig leaves for the real rule, namely, “defendant
loses.”130 In the Seventh Circuit, for example, stacks of precedent over
decades of cases reject all but two modern-era indictment challenges.131
Lower courts cannot help but get the message.
That empty formalism does not extend to the First Amendment.
The First Amendment requires and is regularly given robust protection.
As many scholars have recently observed, recent Supreme Court decisions have profoundly expanded the First Amendment’s reach.132 But
even before that, courts recognized the First Amendment’s role in protecting a robust debate on public issues,133 democratic self-governance,134 and freedom of thought,135 among other things, regardless of
any distaste for the speaker.136
Courts have not yet worked out how to handle the intersection of
criminal procedure and the First Amendment, but a resurgent First
Amendment demands respect. The argument of this article is that the
robust enforcement of procedural rights helps provide that respect—
even where the courts have previously derogated such enforcement in
mine-run criminal cases.137
B. Trial-Level Procedures Matter
To say that the higher courts will catch all important problems
means at best accepting the blunt devastation the criminal legal system
imposes on each criminal defendant, and the societal cost of processing

130

See Ronald F. Wright, How the Supreme Court Delivers Fire and Ice to State Criminal Justice, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1439–40 (2002) (describing how the Burger Court used procedural tools like harmless error to undermine Warren Court’s criminal procedure precedents); Akhil
R. Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1125 (1996)
(outlining the history of the decline of defense-protective constitutional criminal procedure).
131
The two exceptions are: United States v. Locklear, 97 F.3d 196 (7th Cir. 1996) and United
States v. Hinkle, 637 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1981). Notably, even the most recent of these exceptions
is over twenty years old.
132
See Shanor, supra note 4, at 191–93 (discussing the expansion of the scope of protected
speech); see also Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1243 (2020).
133
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
134
See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456, U.S. 45, 52 (1982).
135
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535, U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
136
See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 423 (1996).
137
This article owes a debt to James Burnham’s important piece calling for more factually
robust criminal indictments so as to enable criminal defendants to file motions to dismiss much
like civil defendants. See generally James M. Burnham, Why Don’t Courts Dismiss Indictments?,
18 GREEN BAG 2D 347 (2015). Burnham’s article is compelling and, in this author’s view, correct.
But it offers little reason for the same courts that have undermined defendants’ procedural rights
to change course and adopt what is ultimately a pro-defendant procedural innovation. This article,
too, argues for the reinvigoration of largely dead-letter procedural rules. It roots that renewal,
however, not in criminal procedure alone but rather in the resurgent First Amendment.
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so many people, their friends and families, and communities through
its maw. Let’s assume that the higher courts catch all First Amendment-related flaws in a prosecution. Even so, higher courts’ deference
to a trial level guilty verdict puts a significant thumb on the scale
against reversing convictions for conduct that was at least potentially
protected by the First Amendment. And even in the nearly-nonexistent
case where a higher court finds error and the conviction is vacated, that
still ignores the damage done by the trial and appellate process itself.
Finally, given our system of pleas, relying on appellate review simply
ignores the countless individuals who pled guilty when their conduct
may not even have been a crime at all.
Higher courts are required to defer to lower courts, even in cases
involving First Amendment problems. Setting aside facial challenges,
there are, in essence, two forms of First Amendment challenges: constitutional errors (e.g., omitting an element of the offense or misinstructing the jury on an element of the offense) and sufficiency of the evidence
challenges.138 For the former, even where an appellate court finds constitutional error, it must nonetheless uphold the guilty verdict if it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.139 As to
the latter, appellate courts will not even find error unless a jury could
not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when “view[ing] the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government . . . [and] ‘defer[ing] to the
credibility determination of the jury[.]’”140 Either way, the First Amendment problem in the original proceeding does not necessarily mean a
new trial. And, as many have pointed out, even the supposedly defendant-friendly “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard still puts

138

A sufficiency of the evidence challenge can be an as-applied First Amendment challenge in
that it asks whether the evidence presented at trial rises to the level of a statutory violation, where
the statute is interpreted through the lens of the First Amendment. See, e.g., United States v.
Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing conviction for threatening
the President because insufficient evidence of intent to threaten, as understood through First
Amendment lens). There is a third form of First Amendment challenge, namely, a facial challenge.
In a facial challenge generally, a defendant argues that the statute is unconstitutional in all applications or “lacks any ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472
(2010) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). First Amendment also allow
for facially invalidating a law as overbroad when “a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 473 (quoting
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)). A successful
facial challenge requires vacating the conviction altogether. Id. at 482 (affirming the vacation of
defendant’s conviction after successful First Amendment facial challenge). As a practical matter,
however, successful facial challenges in the appellate courts are extraordinarily rare; the action is
in as-applied challenges.
139
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (holding that under harmless error review,
courts ask whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found
the defendant guilty absent the error”). The Court in Neder held that harmless error applies to the
omission of elements. Id.
140
Id. (quoting United States v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 284 (7th Cir. 1999)).
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a substantial thumb on the scale in favor of the prosecution.141 For
many defendants, the limited appellate review comes too late to ensure
real First Amendment protection.
Moreover, even where an individual defendant’s conviction is vacated by the higher courts, that doesn’t undo the harm caused by the
criminal process itself. When defendants are detained pretrial, they
may lose their health, jobs, homes, and sometimes their children.142 And
even when defendants are released on bond, they face enormous process
costs associated with going to trial.143 Courts easily recognize the severe
process costs imposed by the civil system in the context of qualified immunity in civil cases.144 That is why there are special procedures in
place to help accused officials avoid those costs where possible.145 In the
criminal context, consequences and costs are even more severe, and the
remedies proposed in this paper more limited.
Relatedly, vacating an individual conviction does nothing for the
scores of other defendants who already pled guilty. As discussed above,
the “vanishing trial” means that our criminal legal system has become
a sea of guilty pleas. Defendants may wisely choose to plead guilty to a
crime that has a First Amendment defense rather than undergo the
risks of trial.146
The upshot is: The higher courts may or may not catch all important First Amendment problems that come their way. (My guess is
that they don’t.) But the answer to that question doesn’t much matter.
By the time the question gets to a higher court, enormous and irreparable damage has already been done.

141

Scholars frequently criticize the constitutional harmless error doctrine. See, e.g., Justin
Murray, Prejudice-Based Rights in Criminal Procedure, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (2020); Jeffrey O.
Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme Court’s Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 309 (2002); David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can
Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 483 (2000).
142
Alison Siegler & Erica Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy to Change the Culture of
Detention, CHAMPION (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5) (on file with author).
143
See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1132–34 (2008) (discussing the personal and financial costs defendants face such as legal fees, lost wages, anxiety, and
reputational damage).
144
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
145
See David L. Noll, Note, Qualified Immunity in Limbo: Rights, Procedure, and the Social
Costs of Damages Litigation against Public Officials, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 927–932 (2008) (discussing qualified immunity and procedural alternatives to protect officials from litigation costs).
146
See id. at 1134 (“In low-stakes cases, process costs dominate, and plea bargaining is a potential way out.”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 1010 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1928 (1992) (arguing that indigent defendants would be at a worse disadvantage in the
criminal process without plea bargains).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper originated with a federal impersonation case that my
students, colleagues, and I litigated from its initial charge through a
petition for certiorari over the course of five years.147 The arguments I
raise in this paper rose out of ones we made in district court—to little
avail. Some of our substantive arguments about how the statute must
be interpreted in light of the First Amendment were ultimately vindicated by the Court of Appeals. But that decision came over four years
after our client was charged with a federal felony—his first and only
felony. And by the time the Court of Appeals concluded that we had
been right all along, the trial evidence had long been in. The appellate
court had little difficulty quickly and easily concluding that the error
was harmless—erroneously, in my opinion.
The dispiriting experience left me convinced that the only real
chance my client and others like him have to avoid losing years and
years of their lives to unconstitutional charges and their significant collateral consequences is to shift the locus of First Amendment litigation
more pervasively throughout the case, away from the substantive trial
and post-trial issues. The constraining elements upon which Alvarez relies to save false statement statutes are meaningful only to the degree
they actually constrain prosecutions for lying. The indictment constrains the grand jury and the prosecutor (and, to a limited degree, the
petit jury). The unanimity requirement constrains the petit jury at trial,
and awareness of this very real constraint would have influenced the
government and my decision-making throughout the criminal process.
Focusing exclusively on a substantive First Amendment misses these
critical moments for shaping a criminal case to protect the First Amendment. A procedural First Amendment highlights them.

147

Although his consent was not required, my client authorized me to draft this paper referencing his litigation.
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CASE: 1:15-CR-00022 DOCUMENT #: 184 FILED: 10/16/17 PAGE 6
OF 16 PAGEID #:1929
TABLE 1
Caption

Case
Number
15-cr-30036

Court

Indictment Language

C.D. Ill.

“a Special Agent of the Department of Homeland Security”

US v. Wheeler

15-cr-10048

C.D. Ill.

US v. Wallace

16-cr-54

N.D. Ill.

US v. Harrison

14-cr-576

N.D. Ill.

US v. Rozycki

14-cr-13

N.D. Ill.

US v. Baer

“a United States Marshal”
“an employee of the Federal Housing Administration”
“the United States Marshals Service”
1: “an employee of the United States Marshals Service”
2: “an employee of the United States Marshals Service”

US v. Cortes

14-cr-13

N.D. Ill.

US v. Hoffer

13-cr-928

N.D. Ill.

US v. Butler

13-cr-918

N.D. Ill.

US v. Walsh

09-cr-1049

N.D. Ill.

US v. Abbas

09-cr-840

N.D. Ill.

US v. Hemphill

06-cr-747

N.D. Ill.

US v. Muham-

06-cr-548

N.D. Ill.

mad

“an employee of the United States Marshals Service”
2: “an employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”
1: “an officer of the United States Air Force”

“a special agent of the United States Department of State”
2: various, including “United States Department of Housing and Urban Development”
2: “the Federal Bureau of Investigation” 2s: “the Federal
Bureau of Investigation”
1: “an officer and employee acting under the authority of
the United States, and acted as such at Midway International Airport by signing the TSA Armed Law Enforcement Officer's Log”
2: “a federal law enforcement officer for the Department of
Justice”
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CASE: 1:15-CR-00022 DOCUMENT #: 184 FILED: 10/16/17 PAGE 7
OF 16 PAGEID #:1930
Caption
US v. Limane

Case Number
05-cr-834

Court
N.D. Ill

Indictment Language
10: “an employee of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services”
11: “an employee of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services”

US v. Gaylor

05-cr-199

N.D. Ill

1: “an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”
2: “an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”

03-cr-1020

N.D. Ill

02-cr-366

N.D. Ill

US v. Lovejoy

01-cr-791

N.D. Ill

US v. Han-

17-cr-15

N.D. Ind.

US v. Guzman et al.
US v.

“an employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration”

“an agent of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service”

Jamaleddin

cock
N.D. Ind.

11-cr-169

N.D. Ind.

13-cr-30053

S.D. Ill.

US v. Lowery

07-cr-30181

S.D. Ill.

US v. Eads

11-cr-239

S.D. Ind.

US v. Eicher

16-cr-17

W.D.
Wis.

elen
US v. Mohammed
US v. Mar-

1: “an agent of the Department of Homeland Security”
2: “an agent of the Department of Homeland Security”

12-cr-40

US v. Mitsch-

1: “an agent of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service” 2:
“an agent of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service” 3: “an
agent of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service”

cotte

“a Deputy of the United States Marshal Service”

1: “an employee of the Internal Revenue Service”

5: “a duly authorized representative of the United States as a warranted contracting officer”
2: “a United States Marshal” 3: “a United States Marshal”

4: “a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”

“Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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CASE: 1:15-CR-00022 DOCUMENT #: 184 FILED: 10/16/17 PAGE 8
OF 16 PAGEID #:1931
Caption
US v. McLaughlin

Case Number
14-cr-20019

Court
C.D. Ill

Indictment Language

US v. McLaughlin

12-mj-7214

C.D. Ill

US v. Ottley

03-cr-40093

C.D. Ill

US v. Toran

01-cr-30011

C.D. Ill

US v. Coe

98-cr-20031

C.D. Ill

US v. Clay

14-mj-454

E.D.
Wis.

(dismissed before indictment)

US v. Alberts

98-cr-231

E.D.
Wis.

(indictment not available on PACER)

US v. Treloar

98-cr-35

E.D.
Wis.

(indictment not available on PACER)

US v. Gendreau

16-cr-50057

N.D. Ill.

US v. Neal

07-cr-279

N.D. Ill.

US v. Al-Arouri

07-cr-184

N.D. Ill.

US v. Ventura

07-cr-70

N.D. Ill.

US v. Rizzo

04-cr-733

N.D. Ill.

US v. Akram

00-cr-968

N.D. Ill.

US v. Urschel

13-cr-75

N.D.
Ind.

(indictment waived)

US v. Davis

07-mj-110

N.D.
Ind.

(dismissed before indictment)

US v. Parisi

04-cr-15

N.D.
Ind.

(indictment waived)

US v. Grissom

04-cr-43

W.D.
Wis.

(indictment not available on PACER)

(transfer of jurisdiction for supervision, no indictment)
(extradition/transfer to EDNC, no indictment)
(indictment not available on PACER)
(indictment not available on PACER)
(indictment not available on PACER)

(extradition/transfer to SDNY, no indictment in
NDIL file)
(extradition/transfer to SDFL, no indictment)
(dismissed before indictment)
(extradition/transfer, dismissed)
(indictment waived)
(indictment waived)

Discrimination, the Speech That Enables It, and
the First Amendment
Helen Norton†

Imagine that you’re interviewing for your dream job, only to be
asked by the hiring committee whether you’re pregnant. Or HIVpositive. Or Muslim. Does the First Amendment protect your interviewers’ inquiries from government regulation? This Article explores that
question.1
Antidiscrimination laws forbid employers, housing providers, insurers, lenders, and other gatekeepers from relying on certain characteristics in their decision-making.2 Many of these laws also regulate
those actors’ speech by prohibiting them from inquiring about applicants’ protected class characteristics;3 these provisions seek to stop illegal discrimination before it occurs by preventing gatekeepers from eliciting information that would enable them to discriminate. Although

†

Rothgerber Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law, University of Colorado
School of Law. Thanks to Bethany Reece, Jessica Reed-Baum, Virginia Sargent, and Jonathan
Smith for outstanding research, and to the University of Chicago Legal Forum for excellent editorial assistance. Thanks too for thoughtful comments from Rachel Arnow-Richman, Rebecca Aviel,
Amal Bass, Alan Chen, Terry Fromson, Beto Juarez, Margot Kaminski, Margaret Kwoka, Vicki
Schultz, Nantiya Ruan, Derigan Silver, Scott Skinner-Thompson, Catherine Smith, and the participants at the Colloquium on Scholarship on Employment and Labor Law at Texas A&M School
of Law, the Free Expression Scholars Conference at Yale Law School, and the symposium on
What’s the Harm? The Future of the First Amendment, at the University of Chicago Law School.
1
I explored related issues in earlier work. Helen Norton, You Can’t Ask (or Say) That: The
First Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 727 (2003). As this Article explains, a great deal has since changed. Among other things,
legislatures increasingly regulate gatekeepers’ reliance on and inquiries about certain characteristics to achieve equality and other public welfare goals. See infra notes 22–52 and accompanying
text. And the antiregulatory turn in First Amendment law increasingly inspires certain litigants
to attack related efforts. See infra notes 60–72 and accompanying text.
2
In this Article, I use the terms “gatekeepers” and “decisionmakers” interchangeably to describe those individuals and institutions empowered to select among applicants for important opportunities and services.
3
In this Article, I use the terms “protected characteristic” and “protected class status” interchangeably to refer to attributes that a legislature has protected from discrimination by forbidding
gatekeepers from relying on those attributes when distributing important opportunities and services.
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these laws generated little if any First Amendment controversy for decades, they now face new constitutional attacks inspired by the antiregulatory turn in the Supreme Court’s Free Speech Clause doctrine.4
Part I of this Article starts by describing how gatekeepers’ inquiries
about applicants’ protected characteristics enable illegal discrimination. It then outlines the wide variety of efforts by federal, state, and
local legislatures to tackle thorny problems of inequality by restricting
gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected characteristics. Next,
it identifies the potential collision course between these measures and
the recent antiregulatory turn in First Amendment law and litigation.
Part II examines the theory and doctrine that support these laws’
constitutionality, explaining why the government’s restriction of the
speech that enables conduct that the government has legitimately regulated triggers no First Amendment scrutiny. More specifically, the
First Amendment permits the government to restrict speech that initiates or accomplishes conduct that the government has regulated—
speech that does something and not just says something, to use legal
scholar Kent Greenawalt’s vocabulary.5 As an illustration of speech that
is unprotected because it initiates or accomplishes illegal conduct, the
Court has repeatedly pointed to gatekeepers’ speech that enables illegal
discrimination: “Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from
discriminating in hiring on the basis of race. The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign reading ‘White Applicants Only’
hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the
employer’s speech rather than conduct.”6
In other words, a gatekeeper’s statement “White Applicants Only”
is unprotected because it declares certain transactions and opportunities as off limits to protected class members; precisely because of gatekeepers’ power, their speech in these transactional settings thus does
something and not just says something. Once we understand why the
First Amendment does not protect those statements, we can see that
the First Amendment similarly permits the government to regulate
gatekeepers’ transaction-related inquiries about candidates’ protected
class status—inquiries that enable illegal discrimination by deterring
candidates based on their protected class status as well as by eliciting
the information that facilitates gatekeepers’ discriminatory decisions.

4

See infra notes 60–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of this turn.
See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF
SPEECH 6 (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 59 (1989).
6
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006); see also Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (offering “White Applicants Only” as an example of speech that is
unprotected by the First Amendment as incidental to illegal conduct).
5
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Part II next explains how the Court’s longstanding commercial
speech doctrine captures these insights by holding that the First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activity. It then applies this doctrine to the antidiscrimination laws identified in Part I, concluding that the government’s restriction of gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status triggers no First
Amendment scrutiny because those inquiries constitute commercial
speech related to the illegal activity of discriminatory employment,
housing, and other transactions.
Part III briefly considers the First Amendment implications of
other antidiscrimination provisions that regulate transactional parties’
speech in various ways, sometimes by restricting speech and sometimes
by requiring it. It shows how here too the Court’s commercial speech
doctrine provides the relevant analysis, with its focus on protecting
speech that furthers listeners’ First Amendment interests while permitting the regulation of speech that frustrates those interests.
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS THAT PROHIBIT GATEKEEPERS’
RELIANCE ON, AND INQUIRIES ABOUT, APPLICANTS’ PROTECTED
CHARACTERISTICS
As this Part explains, gatekeepers’ inquiries that elicit candidates’
protected class status facilitate illegally discriminatory decisions about
important opportunities and deter candidates from pursuing those opportunities.7 Legislatures thus often enact laws prohibiting gatekeepers
not only from relying on, but also from inquiring about, applicants’ protected class status to stop illegal discrimination before it happens. Legislatures’ interest in stopping discrimination before the fact is especially strong because after-the-fact enforcement is frequently slow,
costly, and ineffective.
A. How Gatekeepers’ Inquiries About Applicants’ Protected Characteristics Enable Illegal Discrimination
Information about applicants’ protected characteristics enables
gatekeepers to discriminate, intentionally or otherwise, against those
applicants. When gatekeepers know (or think they know) candidates’
race, gender, or other protected characteristic, they too often rely on
that information to discriminate in their decisions about jobs, housing,
credit, and other opportunities and services.8 Consider, for instance, a
7

See infra notes 8–21 and accompanying text.
See Ignacio N. Cofone, Antidiscriminatory Privacy, 72 SMU L. REV. 139, 149–51 (2019) (describing when and how gatekeepers’ access to information about candidates’ protected class status
fosters discrimination); Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM.
8
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Harvard Business School study, which found that Airbnb hosts used
information collected and shared by Airbnb to discriminate against prospective guests with “distinctively African-American names.”9 In the
same vein, Facebook recently settled complaints filed by nonprofit civil
rights organizations alleging that Facebook used information about its
users’ protected class status to enable housing providers to steer users
to—or away from—certain housing opportunities based on that status.10
Gatekeepers often acquire the information that enables discrimination by asking candidates about their protected class status in applications, interviews, negotiations, and more. Sometimes decisionmakers
intentionally seek information about candidates’ protected characteristics to inform their discriminatory decision-making. For example, a
Congressional committee report on the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) explained:
Historically, employment application forms and employment interviews requested information concerning an applicant’s physical or mental condition. This information was often used to exclude applicants with disabilities—particularly those with socalled hidden disabilities such as epilepsy, diabetes, emotional
illness, heart disease, and cancer—before their ability to perform the job was even evaluated.11
Even when gatekeepers seek this information for benign rather than
nefarious purposes, that information, once obtained, remains available

& MARY L. REV. 2097, 2143–46 (2015) (offering examples of how decisionmakers have used previously unknown information about applicants’ age, religion, national origin, disability, gender at
birth, and other protected characteristics to discriminate against those applicants).
9
Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence From a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 1, 1–2 (2017) (finding
that prospective guests “with distinctively African-American names are 16 percent less likely to
be accepted relative to identical guests with distinctively white names”); see also OLIVIER SYLVAIN,
DISCRIMINATORY DESIGNS ON USER DATA 13–14 (2018) (describing how Airbnb elicited information
from prospective guests that permitted prospective “hosts” to rely on “illicit biases—against, say,
Latinos or blacks—that do not accurately predict a prospective guest’s reliability as a tenant. In
this way Airbnb’s service directly reinforces discrimination when it requires users to share information that suggests their own race”).
10
See Settlement Agreement and Release, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18 Civ.
2689 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FINAL-SIGNE
D-NFHA-FB-Settlement-Agreement-00368652x9CCC2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRJ7-4LE6]; Summary of Settlements Between Civil Rights Advocates and Facebook, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/3.18.2019_joint_statemen
t_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K93A-XAZH].
11
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 72 (1990).
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for the gatekeeper’s later use, consciously or unconsciously, in screening, selecting, or compensating applicants.12
And once discrimination does occur, efforts to identify and rectify
it after the fact are notoriously slow, costly, and difficult. Complaintdriven enforcement—that is, an enforcement regime that relies on individuals to file claims after they believe they have suffered illegal discrimination—is poorly-equipped to redress discriminatory selection
practices and other front-end discrimination. In part, this is because an
applicant denied a job or an apartment seldom receives a reason for her
rejection from a potential employer or landlord and is unlikely ever to
learn the successful candidate’s identity, much less his comparative
qualifications or other relevant attributes.13 Other factors that contribute to the ineffectiveness of after-the-fact enforcement include the limitations of overworked and underfunded enforcement agencies, challengers’ difficulties in securing legal representation, and a wide range
of procedural, evidentiary, and doctrinal barriers to proving a decisionmaker’s discriminatory intent.14 For these reasons, legal scholar
Cynthia Estlund describes antidiscrimination law’s dependence on after-the-fact enforcement as its “Achilles’ heel.”15 The greater the barriers to effective after-the-fact enforcement of civil rights protections, the
greater the value in preventing discrimination before the fact by denying gatekeepers the information that enables them to discriminate. As

12

See Roberts, supra note 8, at 2122 (“If an employer cannot access a particular kind of information, she cannot discriminate on the basis of that information. However, once an employer acquires the ability to discriminate, the knowledge of an employee’s protected status may influence
the employer’s decisions in conscious, as well as unconscious, ways.”).
13
See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1492 (1996) (“In the absence of an
obvious motive or a relevant comparison group, potential plaintiffs have a difficult time recognizing that disparate treatment in hiring has occurred, let alone convincing a court of that fact.”).
14
See, e.g., ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON, & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL:
HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 13 (2017) (documenting how
and why “only a tiny fraction of possible targets of workplace discrimination take formal action
[and when they do] they are likely to settle or lose”); Charlotte S. Alexander, #MeToo and the
Litigation Funnel, 23 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 17 (2019) (documenting plaintiffs’ difficulties in
winning claims under Title VII); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009) (finding
that Title VII plaintiffs who file in federal court are less successful than plaintiffs in other types
of cases); Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1282–83 (2012) (“Indeed, of every 100 discrimination
plaintiffs who litigate their claims to conclusion (i.e., do not settle or voluntarily dismiss their
claims), only 4 achieve any form (de minimis or not) of relief.”); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1409–
10 (1998) (explaining “the ironies of a complaint-based [approach to civil rights enforcement],
namely that many, perhaps even a majority, of discrimination claims are missed because the discrimination occurs in the contract formation when claims are significantly less likely to be filed”).
15
Cynthia Estlund, Truth, Lies, and Power at Work, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 349, 349
(2016).
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law professor Ignacio Cofone observes, “[d]iscrimination is better
avoided than compensated.”16
Moreover, because these inquiries are generally made of a less powerful applicant by a more powerful gatekeeper, a candidate’s response
may be coerced: either she gives the requested information and risks
discrimination if the gatekeeper relies on that information to withhold
opportunities, or she refuses to provide the information only to be rejected for the opportunity altogether.17 For instance, one employer declined to hire an applicant after she refused to answer an interview
question about her plans to have a family; one of the interviewers responded to her reticence by stating that he “did not want to hire a
woman who would get pregnant and quit.”18 Another employer fired a
worker when she refused to answer questions about her reproductive
choices, questions that included “whether she was pregnant, had ever
been pregnant, or was planning to become pregnant; whether she had
ever had an abortion, miscarriage, or live birth, and if so, how many
times; and whether she was on birth control and, if so, what type.”19
Inquiries of this sort can also deter applicants from pursuing important opportunities by signaling the decisionmakers’ discriminatory
preferences.20 Think, for instance, of an applicant with a disability: confronted by an employer’s questions about her medical status or use of
prescription drugs, she may well conclude that the job is unavailable to
those with certain medical conditions.21

16

Cofone, supra note 8, at 140; see also Lior J. Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 374 (2008) (“Information-based antidiscrimination policies will be
most effective at combating statistical discrimination when traditional enforcement methods are
least effective.”).
17
See Adam M. Samaha & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell—And Other Combinations, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 969 (2015) (“Don’t Ask, May Tell examples are often linked to onesided worries about the vulnerability of respondents to questioner power.”); id. at 938 (“[O]ne simple reason for Don’t Ask is to prevent unwelcome pressure.”).
18
Barbano v. Madison Cty., 922 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that the hiring committee’s acquiescence to these questions supported the conclusion that the employer had illegally
discriminated on the basis of pregnancy in its hiring decision).
19
Garlitz v. Alpena Reg’l Med. Ctr., 834 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
20
See Samaha & Strahilevitz, supra note 17, at 926 (“Questions are themselves telling, in the
sense that statements correctly formulated as questions usually reveal something about the questioner’s interests or beliefs.”); id. at 929 (“A question is a special device for information collection:
it is an interactive call for information that alerts an audience to the collection effort and that
usually reveals something about the questioner . . . . Questions reveal somebody’s interest in and
comfort with additional information on a given topic . . . .”).
21
See Fredenburg v. Contra Costa Cty. Dep’t of Health, 172 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the ADA’s restriction on pre-employment medical inquiries and examinations
“prevents employers from using HIV tests to deter HIV-positive applicants from applying”); see
also SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON, AIDS AND THE LAW 3–79 (6th ed. 2020) (explaining how the ADA
protects applicants from having to disclose private medical information that makes them “vulnerable to discrimination”).
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B. How Legislatures Regulate Gatekeepers’ Inquiries That Enable Illegal Discrimination
Legislatures often seek to prevent illegal discrimination before it
happens by not only forbidding decisionmakers from relying on certain
characteristics (that is, from using information about protected class
status) in their decision-making, but also by forbidding decisionmakers
from eliciting that information.22 Thus, antidiscrimination laws often
regulate both gatekeepers’ conduct—that is, their decisions about how
and to whom to distribute opportunities and services—as well as the
speech that enables them to engage in discriminatory conduct.23
Many of these antidiscrimination laws include provisions that prohibit decisionmakers from making certain inquiries altogether.24 For
example, Pennsylvania’s state law bars employers from relying on a variety of protected characteristics in their employment decisions and also
forbids them from “[e]licit[ing] any information . . . concerning the race,
color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin, past handicap
or disability” of any applicant.25 After the Pregnancy Discrimination
22

See, e.g., Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and
Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 936 (2014) (“[The ADA
was] designed to prohibit discrimination in employment preemptively. The ADA focuses on regulating the transmission of potentially stigmatizing data during the hiring phase because, as studies have found, the most common form of discrimination against individuals with disabilities is
the denial of a job for which the individual is qualified, followed by the refusal of an interview on
the basis of a disability.”).
23
As Part III discusses, legislatures can and do make different choices when drafting antidiscrimination laws. See infra notes 151–176 and accompanying text.
24
Unless and until a statute provides otherwise, the default rule in American jurisdictions
permits employers to ask whatever they wish of applicants. Other countries choose different default rules. See Matthew W. Finkin, Pay Privacy in Comparative Context, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 355, 368 (2018) (“In Germany, out of concern for employee privacy, the employer bears
the burden to prove the question is necessary under a strict standard of relatedness to job qualification. In America, out of concern for managerial liberty, the state bears the burden to prove the
restriction is necessary to further a specific public end grounded in labor market outcomes.”).
25
43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(b)(1) (West 2019). For a few of the many other
examples, see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.240(3) (West 2019) (prohibiting landlords and real estate
agents from making “a written or oral inquiry or record of the sex, marital status, changes in
marital status, race, religion, physical or mental disability, color, or national origin of a person
seeking to buy, lease, or rent real property”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502(1)(a) (2019) (same); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2254(C)(6) (2019) (prohibiting owners or others engaging in a real estate
transaction from making “a record or inquiry in connection with a prospective real estate transaction, which indicates, directly or indirectly, an intent to make a limitation, specification, or discrimination” based on an unrelated disability); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4581-A(1)(A) (2019)
(prohibiting landlords, owners or agents who are renting or selling housing from making “any
written or oral inquiry concerning the race or color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental
disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or familial status of any prospective purchaser, occupant or tenant”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-318(5) (2019) (making it unlawful to “cause to be made any
written or oral inquiry or record concerning the race, color, religion, national origin, handicap,
familial status, or sex of a person seeking to purchase, rent, or lease any housing”); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-12(c) (West 2019) (prohibiting employers’ inquiries into “race, creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual
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Act26 amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to make clear that illegal
job discrimination “on the basis of sex” includes discrimination based
on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,”27 the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission interpreted the statute to prohibit most employer inquiries about applicants’ pregnancy status.28 As
another illustration, the decades-old Equal Credit Opportunity Act regulations forbid lenders from asking about applicants’ race, national
origin, sex, religion, marital status, and reproductive decisions to prevent illegally discriminatory credit decisions.29
Some antidiscrimination laws instead regulate inquiries about protected characteristics at certain key junctures in the decision-making
process. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), for instance, prohibits employers from relying on disability status in their decision-making, and prohibits certain disability-related inquiries at various stages
in the employment process to prevent discrimination from infecting employers’ ultimate decision-making. More specifically, the ADA starts by
forbidding employers from asking “whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability”
before extending any job offer; instead, an employer “may make
preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform jobrelated functions.”30 After an applicant receives a conditional job offer
but before she begins work, her employer may pose disability-related
inquiries regardless of their job-relatedness, so long as the employer
makes the same inquiries of all new employees in the same job category.31 Finally, after an employee has started work, an employer may
orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, nationality, pregnancy or breastfeeding, or
sex” or military status); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.030(1)(d) (West 2019) (same).
26
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(k), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k).
27
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
28
29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2019) (“Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with prospective employment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation, specification, or discrimination as
to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.”); see also King
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 258 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (“[Q]uestions about pregnancy
and childbearing would be unlawful per se [under Title VII] in the absence of a bona fide occupational qualification.”); Snyder v. Yellow Transp., Inc. 321 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2004)
(denying defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment in light of evidence that it had asked
questions about the plaintiff’s marital status, parental status, and plans to have children, questions that constituted a per se Title VII violation).
29
12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b) (2019) (“A creditor shall not inquire about the race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex of an applicant or any other person in connection with a credit transaction.”); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(1) (2019) (prohibiting inquiries into the marital status of applicants
for certain types of credit); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b)(2) (2019) (prohibiting inquiries into applicants’
sex); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(3) (2019) (prohibiting inquiries into applicants’ “birth control practices,
intentions concerning the bearing or rearing of children, or capability to bear children”).
30
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2012).
31
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2012). An employer may then rescind an individual’s conditional
offer only when the exclusionary decision is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012).
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ask only those disability-related questions that are “job-related and consistent with business necessity.”32
Some antidiscrimination laws prohibit not only gatekeepers’ direct
inquiries of applicants, but also their efforts to learn about applicants’
protected characteristics from other sources. For instance, the federal
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)33—which bars
health insurers and employers from relying on, and asking about, genetic information in making insurance and employment decisions—
“generally prohibits employers from seeking to obtain genetic information at any time during employment and, notably, the GINA’s implementation regulations explicitly apply to the Internet.”34 Similarly,
some states forbid employers from “seek[ing] [or] obtain[ing]” applicants’ protected class information “from any source.”35
Although many of these antidiscrimination laws prohibit decisionmakers’ reliance on, and often their inquiries about, characteristics
long thought immutable (like race or national origin),36 newer measures
reflect legislatures’ expanding understanding of the wide variety of barriers to equality. A growing number of state and local jurisdictions now
prohibit employers from relying on, and asking about, applicants’ sexual orientation and gender identity.37 Commentators hail GINA—

32

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (2012) (limiting employers’ ability to “request, require, or purchase
genetic information” of potential employees and current employees or their family members); see
also id. (defining genetic information to include genetic test results for applicants and their family
members as well as family medical history); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(b)(11) (West 2019)
(prohibiting employers’ inquiry into applicants’ genetic information); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 711(e) (2019) (same).
34
Paul-Emile, supra note 22, at 937; see also id. at 938 (“This provision includes searches of
court records and medical databases. Although the law outlines certain limited exceptions, including inadvertent acquisition, the EEOC regulations emphasize that receipt of genetic information
will not generally be considered inadvertent unless the employer instructs the source of the material to exclude genetic information. The law also includes safe harbor language for commercial or
publicly available information; however, covered employers are precluded from searching such
sources with the intention of acquiring an individual’s genetic information.”).
35
See MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 subd. 4(2) (2017) (prohibiting an employer from “seek[ing] and
obtain[ing] for purposes of making a job decision, information from any source that pertains to”
the applicant’s protected characteristics).
36
See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 476 (2010) (“When invoked within antidiscrimination law, immutability stands for the proposition that entities should not discriminate on the basis
of traits that a person did not choose and cannot change or control without serious cost.”).
37
E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a), (d) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on, and inquiries
into, an applicant’s or employee’s sexual orientation, marital status, and other protected characteristics); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(1)(a), (d) (2017) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into
an applicant’s sexual orientation); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(1)(A), (C) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s sexual orientation and gender identity); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(1), (3) (West 2018) (same); MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.03 subd. 44,
363A.08 subd. 2, subd. 4(a)(1) (2017) (same); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(1)(i), (ii), (4)(i), (iii) (2017)
(same).
33
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enacted by Congress in 2008 with a near-unanimous vote—as particularly innovative in its determination to stamp out genetic discrimination before a discriminatory culture had the time to develop by prohibiting decisionmakers’ reliance on, and inquiries about, applicants’
genetic information.38 And many other recent antidiscrimination laws
prohibit gatekeepers’ reliance on, and often inquiries about, certain life
experiences like applicants’ marital or reproductive choices,39 current
unemployment status,40 credit histories,41 status as domestic violence
victims,42 certain arrest records,43 and veteran status.44 Some bar reliance on, or inquiries about, these sorts of characteristics to achieve public policy objectives in addition to equality goals. For example, “ban-thebox” laws limit employers’ inquiries about applicants’ criminal record
at various points in the employment process in part because of the evidence that ex-offenders’ unemployment strongly predicts their risk of
recidivism.45
38

See Roberts, supra note 36, at 441 (“[GINA’s proponents presented the legislation] as a
unique opportunity to stop discrimination before it starts. It is this preemptive nature, basing
protection on future—rather than past or even present—discrimination, that truly makes GINA
novel.”); see also id. at 472–73 (“[T]he fear of genetic-information discrimination was preventing
many potential research subjects from participating in studies, thereby slowing the rate at which
genetic technology could progress” and “supporters of genetic antidiscrimination legislation also
maintained that the fear of genetic tests was harming the general public—people were not seeking
diagnoses and treatments that could improve or sustain their health. For example, one-third of
the women offered a genetic test related to breast cancer declined, citing potential discrimination
as the reason.”).
39
E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(3) (West 2019) (forbidding employers’ inquiries into
employees’ marital status); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(d) (West 2019) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 711(j) (2016) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against applicants or employees
based on their reproductive health decisions); St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 70459 (Feb. 1, 2017) (prohibiting employers’ reliance on and inquiries into applicants’ “reproductive health decisions or
pregnancy”).
40
E.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1362 (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against applicants because of their current unemployment); N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 8-107(21) (2019) (same).
41
E.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.320 (West 2018) (prohibiting employers’ inquiries into applicants’ credit history).
42
E.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-504 (West 2014) (prohibiting insurers from discriminating
against applicants because they have been victims of domestic violence); N.Y. REAL. PROP. LAW
§ 227-d (McKinney 2016) (prohibiting housing providers from discriminating against applicants
because they have been victims of domestic violence).
43
E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(1)(A), (C) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on and
inquiries into applicants’ arrest records); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.030(1)(a), (b), (d) (West 2017)
(prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s expunged juvenile record).
44
E.g., 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against members
of the uniformed services by relying on military status when making employment decisions).
45
See Dallan F. Flake, Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work?, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1082
(2019) (explaining that “ban-the-box” laws seek to address the “grim situation [that] has emerged
in which the very people who most need to work—both for their own benefit and for the benefit of
society as a whole—often experience tremendous difficulty finding gainful employment”); see also
Genevieve Douglas, ‘Ban the Box’ Laws Finding Inroads in Red States, Too, BLOOMBERG LAW
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/ban-the-box-laws-findinginroads-in-red-states-too [https://perma.cc/TB7T-A5ZY] (“Nearly one in three adults in the U.S.
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As another illustration, state and local legislatures have recently
begun to deploy related strategies when wrestling with tenacious gender- and race-based pay disparities.46 More specifically, a growing number of jurisdictions now prohibit employers from relying on, and inquiring about, applicants’ salary history in making decisions about hiring
and pay. Concluding that candidates’ prior pay too often reflects race or
gender discrimination or other factors unrelated to merit,47 these policymakers challenge many employers’ reliance on the (often inaccurate)
assumption that prior pay is an accurate measure of a candidate’s skill,
experience, and responsibility to reject applicants whose past salaries
are perceived as too low.48 These policymakers also seek to address the
even more common practice in which employers base workers’ starting
pay on how much those workers earned at their last job49—a practice
that ensures that pay disparities continue to follow women and people
of color from job to job.50 For all these reasons, these policymakers reject
has an arrest or conviction record that can show up on an employment background check, according to the National Employment Law Project. That makes the potential impact on the labor market
huge for more widespread ban the box measures.”).
46
See Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows & The Future of Pay Equity,
120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 553 (2020) (“According to the latest report from the U.S. Census Bureau,
American women still earn an average of 80 to 83 cents for every dollar earned by their male
counterparts.”). The pay gap is even greater for women of color. Id.
47
E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(a), (b) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into
an applicant’s “salary history information”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B(b) (West 2017) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s “compensation history”); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 378-2.4(a) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance and inquiries into an applicant’s “salary history”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A(c)(2) (West 2018) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s “wage or salary history”); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 194-a(1) (McKinney 2020)
(prohibiting all employers from seeking, requesting or relying upon “wage or salary history” from
an applicant); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495m(a) (West 2018) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries
into an applicant’s “current or past compensation”). Similar legislation is currently pending in
Congress and several other states and localities. E.g., Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 116th Cong.
§ 10 (2019) (proposing to prohibit employers from relying upon “wage, salary, and benefit history”
in their hiring or pay decisions and from seeking prospective employees’ “wage, salary, and benefit
history”).
48
See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al. as Amicus Curiae supporting
Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 8, Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949
F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020) (Nos. 18-2175 & 18-2176) (“By prohibiting employers from inquiring about
[or relying on] pay history, [Philadelphia’s salary history law] denies them useful information for
evaluating the quality of candidates during the hiring process.”).
49
See PAYSCALE, THE SALARY HISTORY QUESTION: ALTERNATIVES FOR RECRUITERS AND
HIRING MANAGERS 3 (2017) (reporting the study’s results that showed 43 percent of job applicants
were asked about prior pay at some point during the application process); Elizabeth LesterAbdalla, Salary History Should be Her Story: Upholding Regulations of Salary History through a
Commercial Speech Analysis, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 703 (2018) (“When hiring a new employee, Fresno County takes the new hire’s most recent salary and increases it by about 5 percent
to place them on a level within the County’s salary classification bracket.”); Valentina Zarya, Amazon Joins Growing List of Employers That Won’t Ask About Your Salary History, FORTUNE (Jan.
18, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/01/18/amazon-salary-history-wage-gap/ [https://perma.cc/9NK
L-CDQY] (explaining how Google and other large companies are no longer asking about applicants’
salary history, sometimes in response to jurisdictions’ enactment of salary history laws).
50
See, e.g., Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male
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the assumption that a worker’s salary history necessarily reflects an
accurate assessment of, and reward for, her job performance.51
In sum, all of these antidiscrimination laws reflect legislatures’
conclusions that relying on (and thus asking about) certain characteristics or experiences when distributing important opportunities is morally wrong, instrumentally unwise, or both.52
C. New First Amendment Challenges to These Laws
Hundreds of federal, state, and local laws now protect certain characteristics from discrimination by prohibiting gatekeepers from both relying on, and also asking about, those characteristics. Sometimes these
measures generate heated political opposition from regulated entities
who resist regulation they characterize as disruptive.53 This is nothing
new. As one of many examples, some employers opposed the enactment
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal law barring job
discrimination based on race, sex, color, national origin, and religion.54
And some business owners and associations opposed enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, including its protections for HIV-

Students, 109 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT. ACADEMY OF SCI. 16474 (2012) (describing the results of
a randomized double-blind study that found that decisionmakers often pay women less than men
even from the very beginning of their careers when there are no differences in male and female
workers’ experience, education, or family caregiving responsibilities: the study’s participants offered an average starting salary of approximately $30,000 for the male candidate but only about
$26,000 for the identically-qualified female candidate).
51
See BENJAMIN HARRIS, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, INFORMATION IS POWER: FOSTERING
LABOR MARKET COMPETITION THROUGH TRANSPARENT WAGES 9 (2018) (citing research that employers’ initial wage offers were higher by nine percent when those employers could not ask about
applicants’ salary history); Lobel, supra note 46, at 573 (“The first negotiation difference, which I
call the negotiation deficit, is that women negotiate less frequently and ask for less when they do.
This deficit can be mitigated, though not erased, with a salary inquiry ban. The salary inquiry ban
has the potential to positively shift the process from letting job applicants lead with a starting
point figure to employers implementing a practice of more actively suggesting a fair salary.”); id.
(“Salary inquiry bans can also counteract the negative assumptions employers may make when
women refuse to reveal their prior salary in a regime that allows salary inquiry. This is a separate
effect, which I call the negative inference—when employers assume women who refuse to disclose
their pay earn less.”).
52
And the more that legislatures address arbitrary barriers to employment and other important opportunities, the more inclusive their choices become, and the more those choices may
appeal to those on both the political right and the left. See ROBIN L. WEST, CIVIL RIGHTS:
RETHINKING THEIR NATURAL FOUNDATION 83 (2019) (urging that we embrace a broader understanding of the civil right to employment as one that should not be denied for any irrational reason
unrelated to performance).
53
See infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text (describing certain business associations’ opposition to Philadelphia’s salary history law).
54
See CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
220 (2014) (describing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s warning that Title VII “could be seriously
harmful to the conduct of American business” and requesting “that Title VII be stripped from the
[Civil Rights Act]; if that was not possible, then it should be limited to a role of conciliation and
persuasion”).
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positive workers.55 Yet disrupting gatekeepers’ practices that legislatures have identified as harmful is precisely the point of these efforts.
Recall Justice Brandeis’s memorable explanation of the power and
value of legislative experimentation in responding to pressing problems:
[T]here must be power in the states and the nation to remold,
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the
states which ratified it, intended to deprive us of the power to
correct the evils of technological unemployment and excess productive capacity which have attended progress in the useful arts.
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.56
Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized legislatures’
constitutional power to challenge and change longstanding practices
judged to be unjust, inefficient, or both. This includes state and local
jurisdictions’ constitutional power to regulate the terms and conditions
of employment and other transactions (subject only to rational basis
scrutiny),57 as well as Congress’s Article I interstate commerce clause

55

See LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENABLING ACTS: THE HIDDEN STORY OF HOW THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT GAVE THE LARGEST U.S. MINORITY ITS RIGHTS 161–216 (2015) (describing some
business owners’ and associations’ opposition to the ADA); id. at 171–73, 204–16 (describing some
business owners’ and associations’ opposition to extending ADA protections to HIV-positive workers).
56
New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
majority opinion’s abrogation was recognized in Wolverine Fireworks Display v. Towne, No. 1210426, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63259 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
57
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018)
(“It is unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes
of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and
conditions as are offered to other members of the public.”); Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas
Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416–17 (1983) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a Kansas
law that regulated gas prices as a proper use of police power based on “significant and legitimate
state interests . . . to protect consumers”); Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Cont’l Air Lines,
Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963) (concluding that state antidiscrimination law does not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423–25
(1952) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a Missouri law that prohibited employers from deducting wages from employees for taking time out for voting); Railway Mail Ass’n. v. Corsi, 326
U.S. 88, 94 (1945) (holding that there is “no constitutional basis for the contention that a state
cannot protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color or creed”); West Coast Hotel
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power to regulate these matters through federal legislation (again, subject only to rational basis review).58 When a legislature bars gatekeepers from relying on certain characteristics in distributing opportunities
and services, it requires those gatekeepers to use what it believes to be
better indicia of candidates’ ability and merit. Regardless of whether
one agrees with a specific legislature’s conclusions, whether and when
legislatures should choose to regulate employers’, lenders’, insurers’,
and housing providers’ decision-making is a policy question rather than
a constitutional question. In other words, legislatures’ constitutional
power to regulate decisionmakers’ reliance on credit history, salary history, or certain other experiences and histories is no different from its
constitutional power to regulate decisionmakers’ reliance on characteristics like race, religion, or gender.
Again, antidiscrimination law prohibits gatekeepers from relying
on information about certain characteristics in their decision-making
when the legislature concludes that such reliance is unfair, unwise, or
both. And once legislatures so regulate, it then makes sense for them to
restrict gatekeepers’ inquiries eliciting the information that enables
what is now illegal discrimination.59

Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937) (“In dealing with the relation of employer and employed,
the Legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations
designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom from oppression.”).
58
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Congress’s Article I power
to prohibit public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of race); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (same); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding Congress’s Article I power to regulate the terms and conditions of employment through the National Labor Relations Act).
59
Note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop did not resolve the question whether a baker has a Free Speech Clause right to discriminate on the basis of his customers’
sexual orientation in providing certain (arguably expressive) goods and services. See Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1719 (concluding instead that state agency had demonstrated hostility
towards the baker’s religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause). If (and only if) some
decisionmakers do have a constitutional right to discriminate in some circumstances, then presumably they would then have the constitutional right to speak in related ways, perhaps by asking
applicants and customers questions about their protected class status. But, as the Court has repeatedly made clear, gatekeepers generally do not have a constitutional right to discriminate on
the basis of protected characteristics. E.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting law firm’s claim that Title VII’s requirement that it refrain from sex discrimination in its
partnership decisions violated its First Amendment rights); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (rejecting nonprofit organization’s claim that state law prohibiting discriminatory conduct by public accommodations violated its First Amendment rights); Newman v. Piggie
Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam) (rejecting business owner’s constitutional challenge to the Civil Rights Act’s bar on racial discrimination in public accommodations
based on his view that racial integration “contraven[ed] the will of God”). The Supreme Court has
recognized exceptions to this general rule in certain limited circumstances outside of the commercial setting. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 640 (2000) (holding that the First
Amendment’s implied freedom of association permitted the Boy Scouts of America to exclude gay
Scoutmasters despite state public accommodations law that prohibited discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation).

209]

DISCRIMINATION, SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

223

Until very recently these laws generated little, if any, constitutional controversy. But the contemporary antiregulatory turn in First
Amendment law and litigation has emboldened new attacks on governmental efforts to address sticky problems of inequality through the
sorts of antidiscrimination laws described above. This turn—characterized by some as the “weaponization” of the First Amendment60—has
been described at length elsewhere,61 and includes corporate and other
commercial entities’ increasingly successful efforts to resist regulation
in a variety of settings.
Most relevant to this Article, the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of
Commerce [hereinafter “Philadelphia Chamber”] recently challenged
Philadelphia’s salary history law that prohibits employers from relying
on, and asking about, applicants’ prior pay when making hiring and
compensation decisions.62 In so doing, the Philadelphia Chamber and
other industry associations made several sweeping arguments inspired
by the Court’s antiregulatory turn, arguing that the First Amendment
protects gatekeepers’ ability both to rely on, and ask about, salary history when choosing among and compensating applicants for available
job opportunities.63 If accepted, these arguments would also threaten
many other antidiscrimination laws, both longstanding and new.
Most aggressively, the Philadelphia Chamber claimed that Philadelphia’s law unconstitutionally restricted employers’ ability to express
their view—through their actual employment decisions—that salary
history is relevant to workers’ merit. As its brief argued, “[a]n employer
who relies on an applicant’s wage history when formulating a proposed
salary is communicating a message about how much that applicant’s

60

See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the majority as “weaponizing the First Amendment, in
a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy”); Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2161 (2018) (“The Supreme Court’s ‘weaponized’ First Amendment
has been its strongest antiregulatory tool in recent decades, slashing campaign-finance regulation,
public-sector union financing, and pharmaceutical regulation, and threatening a broader remit.”).
61
See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2018); Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2018); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace:
Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016).
62
See Principal and Response Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Greater Phila. Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. Nov. 21, 2018) (Nos. 18-2175 & 18-2176).
63
The Third Circuit recently denied the Philadelphia Chamber’s request for a preliminary
injunction of the city’s provision forbidding employers from relying on prior pay in hiring and compensation decisions as well as the city’s provision forbidding employers from asking about applicants’ prior pay. Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 132–
36 (3d Cir. 2020). I note that I served pro bono as co-counsel on behalf of amici civil rights organizations defending Philadelphia’s law. See Brief for Women’s Law Project, et al. as Amicus Curiae
supporting Philadelphia, Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d
116 (3d Cir. 2020) (Nos. 18-2175 & 18-2176).
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labor is worth to the employer: the higher the proposed salary, the more
valuable the applicant is to the employer.”64 The Philadelphia Chamber
thus characterized the government’s regulation of employers’ reliance
on information in its hiring and pay decisions as the regulation of speech
that should trigger, and fail, heightened scrutiny.65 Indeed, the lawsuit
described the entire statute not as a regulation of commercial conduct
that triggers only rational basis review, but instead as a regulation of
speech based on “disagreement with employers’ message that an employer’s assessment of a prospective employee’s appropriate salary, as
reflected in the employer’s salary offer, can be informed by the prospective employee’s salary history.”66 In other words, the Philadelphia
Chamber’s lawsuit attacked the government’s constitutional power to
regulate discriminatory conduct by restricting gatekeepers’ use of certain information in distributing important opportunities.
Some businesses and employers in 1964 similarly resisted enactment and enforcement of the Civil Rights Act because they felt that requiring them not to discriminate on the basis of race interfered with
their ability to communicate their views about race.67 And some employers argued that their assessment of an applicant’s suitability or value
is, and should be, informed by sexual orientation or other characteristics now increasingly protected from discrimination by law.68 Many employers believed the same about pregnancy or disability or age because
they felt that those characteristics predict workers’ cost or ability; some
continue to believe it.69 And some employers no doubt think the same
about credit history or arrest record or salary history—i.e., they believe

64

Principal and Response Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 62, at 29.
Id. at 25–27.
66
Id. at 16. But as described infra notes 94, 99, 100, 102–104 and accompanying text, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the First Amendment does not protect a gatekeeper’s statement “White Applicants Only,” even though this speech also communicates a message about the value a prospective employer places on certain applicants because of their protected
class status.
67
See Newman, supra note 59 (rejecting business owner’s constitutional challenge to the Civil
Rights Act’s bar on racial discrimination in public accommodations based on his view that racial
integration “contraven[ed] the will of God”).
68
As an illustration, a 1950 U.S. Senate Subcommittee report argued just this. See SUBCOMM.
ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXEC. DEP’TS, EMPLOYMENT OF
HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. No. 81-241, at 3–4 (1950) (“In
the opinion of this subcommittee homosexuals and other sex perverts are not proper persons to be
employed in Government for two reasons; first, they are generally unsuitable, and second, they
constitute security risks. . . . [I]t is generally believed that those who engage in overt acts of perversion lack the emotional stability of normal persons. In addition, there is an abundance of evidence to sustain the conclusion that indulgence in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber
of an individual to a degree that he is not suitable for a position of responsibility.”).
69
See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which employers declined to hire women they feared might become pregnant).
65
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that those characteristics are important to hiring and compensation decisions because they might predict candidates’ ability. As we’ve seen,
however, the Court has long made clear that legislatures have the constitutional power to prohibit gatekeepers’ reliance on such characteristics in distributing opportunities and services once those legislatures
conclude that such characteristics are not—or should not be—relevant
to decision-making.70 The Third Circuit recognized this when it denied
the Philadelphia Chamber’s request to preliminarily enjoin the provision of Philadelphia’s law that forbids employers from relying on applicants’ salary history in hiring and compensation decisions.71
The Philadelphia Chamber also specifically challenged legislatures’ power to restrict gatekeepers’ inquiries that enable illegal discrimination. Although deployed so far to challenge laws regulating employers’ inquiries about salary history, these arguments would apply
with equal force to the wide range of federal, state, and local statutes
described above that prohibit gatekeepers’ questions about religion, national origin, disability, pregnancy, sexual orientation, and many other
protected characteristics. We may anticipate similar challenges to other
statutes, perhaps starting with laws of relatively recent vintage like
statutes prohibiting employers from asking about, and relying upon,
applicants’ genetic information, credit history, and reproductive decisions.72
As the next Part explains, these challenges should not succeed.
Once a legislature prohibits certain transactions as illegally discriminatory, First Amendment theory and doctrine support the legislature’s
choice also to restrict the speech that enables this now-illegal conduct,
including but not limited to gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’
protected class status.
70

See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. An employer illegally relies on salary history
when it pays a salary that relies on the candidate’s prior salary, not when it communicates this
decision to the applicant. If communicating a salary offer that relies on a protected characteristic
is protected speech, then the same would be true of communicating a salary offer that relies on
other protected characteristics like religion, race, or gender.
71
Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 132–36 (3d Cir.
2020).
72
As law professor Charlotte Garden has observed, “[A]lthough many of these theories are a
stretch for now, individual deregulatory First Amendment cases should not be viewed as outliers:
the outward push is occurring simultaneously on multiple fronts, and its standard-bearers include
some exceedingly well-respected and influential lawyers.” Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory
First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (2016); see also id. at 362 (“[E]ven
First Amendment arguments that are unlikely to be accepted can matter; for example, Chicago
reportedly considered a minimum wage ordinance modeled on Seattle’s, but abandoned it in light
of [an industry group’s unsuccessful First Amendment challenge to Seattle’s increase in its minimum wage, alleging that the increase would leave its members with less resources available to
spend on speech activities]. . . . Thus, one problem with the emerging deregulatory First Amendment is that it can accomplish some of its aims without the courts ever adopting it; the increasingly
real threat of expensive litigation by high-profile litigators can stay regulators’ hands.”)
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II. WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT SPEECH THAT
ENABLES ILLEGALLY DISCRIMINATORY TRANSACTIONS
This Part starts by examining why the First Amendment does not
protect speech that initiates or accomplishes conduct that the government has regulated—in other words, speech that does something and
not just says something. It then explains how the speech that enables
illegal conduct more generally—as well as the speech that enables illegal discrimination more specifically—exemplifies speech that does
something and not just says something. Next, this Part demonstrates
how the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine has long captured
this insight by holding that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activity such that the government’s regulation of such speech triggers no First Amendment scrutiny. It closes
by describing this doctrine’s application to the laws described in Part I,
concluding that the First Amendment does not protect gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status because those inquiries
constitute commercial speech related to the illegal activity of discriminatory employment, housing, and other transactions.
A. Why the First Amendment Does Not Protect Speech That Enables
Regulated Conduct More Generally
The government routinely, and in a variety of settings, restricts
speech that enables regulated conduct without triggering any First
Amendment scrutiny. Antitrust law, for instance, “restricts the exchange of accurate market, pricing, and production information, as well
as limits the advocacy of concerted action in most contexts; yet it remains almost wholly untouched by the First Amendment.”73 Nor does
the First Amendment protect solicitations of, and conspiracies to engage in, illegal activity.74
73

Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2004); see also id. at 1770 (“[N]o First
Amendment-generated level of scrutiny is used to determine whether the content-based advertising restrictions of the Securities Act of 1933 are constitutional, whether corporate executives may
be imprisoned under the Sherman Act for exchanging accurate information about proposed prices
with their competitors, whether an organized crime leader may be prosecuted for urging that his
subordinates murder a mob rival, or whether a chainsaw manufacturer may be held liable in a
products liability action for injuries caused by mistakes in the written instructions accompanying
the tool.”).
74
See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal
transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection. . . . Many long established criminal proscriptions—such as laws against conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech (commercial or not) that is intended to induce or commence illegal activities.”); New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect the
“advertising and selling of child pornography” because they “provide an economic motive for and
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A number of thoughtful commentators have considered this dynamic, explaining it as involving a sufficiently close relationship between speech and regulated conduct that leaves us confident that the
government has targeted conduct rather than ideas. Kent Greenawalt,
for instance, identifies a universe of what he calls “situation-altering”
speech that falls outside of the First Amendment’s protection because
it does something rather than just says something. In other words, this
speech “dominantly represent[s] commitments to action” rather than
“assertions of facts or values or expressions of feeling” that have First
Amendment value.75 Under this view, “communications whose dominant purpose is to accomplish something rather than to say something
are not reached by a principle of free speech or are reached much less
strongly than are ordinary claims of fact and value.”76 This approach
explains why, for example, offers and agreements to commit a crime
receive no First Amendment protection.77
Expression’s capacity to do something rather than just say something can increase with the power of the speaker. This is the case, for
example, of comparatively powerful speakers’ threats and orders:
“[a]nother kind of situation-altering utterance is when a boss gives a
direct order of behavior to a subordinate. That is effectively a way for
the boss to get done what he has ordered.”78 “Such situation-altering
utterances,” Greenawalt concludes, “are not the sort of speech that warrants protection under a guarantee of free speech.”79 Targeting actions
rather than ideas, the government’s restriction of such threats and orders triggers no First Amendment scrutiny.80

are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the
Nation”); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972) (stating
that the First Amendment does not protect speech that is an “integral part” of illegal conduct);
Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 388 (2009) (“Fraud and crime-facilitating speech, for example, are thought to
be entirely outside the bounds of the Amendment, and no balancing is required to suppress them
in a given case.”).
75
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS supra note 5; see also GREENAWALT, THE USES OF
LANGUAGE, supra note 5 (“Thus, with some roughness, we can speak of assertions of fact and value
as making claims about what already exists in the listener’s world. Situation-altering utterances
purport to change that world.”); id. at 239 (describing “communications that I claim fall outside
the coverage of the First Amendment” as “too far removed from ordinary statements of fact and
value to deserve even moderately stringent constitutional protection”).
76
GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 40.
77
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 5.
78
See Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Exercise by Private Individuals and Organizations, 72
SMU L. REV. 397, 400 (2019).
79
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 5, at 79.
80
See Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 732 (2016)
(“[W]hen speech begins to resemble conduct, such as when it impairs discrete, material interests
through direct processes and through the fault mostly of the speaker, then courts should consider
those conduct-like harms in their consequentialist calculus.”).
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The government’s routine regulation of contractual and other
transaction-related speech offers another illustration of this broader dynamic where the government restricts speech because it does something, and not just says something. Indeed, contract law regularly regulates transactional speech without raising First Amendment
discussion, much less litigation.81 As law professor Rod Smolla explains,
“[A] statement of transaction is the use of language to propose or conclude some form of transaction[,] [such as] ‘I will rent to you this apartment if you will pay me $300 per month.’ . . . . Because virtually all
transactions are effectuated through language, freedom of speech never
has been thought to encompass all use of language.”82 In other words,
once the government exercises its constitutional power to regulate certain transactions, this inevitably requires the regulation of the speech
that makes those transactions possible: “To regulate the language is to
regulate the transaction.”83
Legal scholar Daniel Farber makes a similar point about speech
that serves a contractual function, observing that “[c]ontract law consists almost entirely of rules attaching liability to various uses of language.”84 To help us determine whether the government’s regulation of
transactional speech impermissibly targets ideas or instead permissibly
targets conduct, Professor Farber proposes the following test:
A justification for regulating the seller’s speech relates to the
contractual [as opposed to informational, and thus constitutionally protected] function of the speech if, and only if, the state

81

See Schauer, supra note 73, at 1773 (observing as a descriptive matter that “the speech with
which we make contracts is, in general, not within the scope of ‘the freedom of speech’ and thus
not covered by the First Amendment”); G. Edward White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72
SMU L. REV. 513, 525 (2019) (“No current court would find that the First Amendment shields false
or misleading speech affecting the creation of a contract from exposing the speaker to contract
damages, or speech asking another to commit a murder from criminal sanctions.”).
82
Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 171, 186–87 (1990); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436
U.S. 447, 456–57 (1978) (describing the government’s constitutionally permissible regulation of “a
business transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate component”); GREENAWALT,
FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 5, at 83 (“Smolla’s core idea of ‘statements of transaction’ is very
close to what I have called situation-altering utterances, remarks that do something rather than
tell something.”).
83
Smolla, supra note 82, at 187; see also id. (explaining that “the laws governing the language
that must appear on a negotiable instrument[] never have been thought to implicate freedom of
speech”). Note that transactions may or may not be commercial, depending on whether they involve the exchange of goods and services for compensation. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S.
285, 298 (2008) (“Offers to provide or requests to obtain unlawful material, whether as part of a
commercial exchange or not, are similarly undeserving of First Amendment protection. It would
be an odd constitutional principle that permitted the government to prohibit offers to sell illegal
drugs, but not offers to give them away for free.”).
84
Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 372,
386 (1979).
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interest disappears when the same statements are made by a
third person with no relation to the transaction. If the same interest is implicated by the third party’s speech, the interest obviously cannot relate to any contractual aspect of the speech,
since the third party is not involved in the contract.85
Law professor Jane Bambauer suggests a related approach for parsing
the government’s permissible regulation of speech that does something
from its impermissible regulation of speech because it says something,
observing that “[w]hen the state has a legitimate, non-speech-related
reason to manage a relationship, it will typically manage many nonspeech aspects of the relationship as well.”86 And that’s what we see
with respect to the government’s regulation of gatekeepers’ speech, as
the government regularly regulates the conduct of employers, lenders,
housing providers, and other commercial actors to prevent discrimination and promote fairness and efficiency.87
B. Why the First Amendment Does Not Protect Speech That Enables
Illegal Discrimination More Specifically
So far, we’ve seen that the First Amendment does not protect
speech that accomplishes illegal conduct, nor does it protect speech that
performs a contractual function: both involve speech that does something, not just says something. The speech that enables illegally discriminatory transactions thus involves two sets of circumstances
“where the regulation of expressive activities seems incontrovertibly
outside the ambit of First Amendment concerns: speech in the formation of contracts and speech solicitaing [sic] [illegal] activity.”88
85

Id. at 388–89.
Jane R. Bambauer, The Relationships between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1941, 1948 (2016).
87
As Kent Greenawalt explains: “The argument against the relevance of a free speech principle is strongest when the information disclosed is so narrowly specific that no significant subject
of discussion or learning is involved. [The reasons for free speech protections] apply less strongly
if speaker and listener care only about an immediate practical objective and not about any increase
in general understanding or expression of personal feelings and attitudes.” GREENAWALT, THE
USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 47; see also Schauer, supra note 73, at 1801 (interpreting
Greenawalt’s argument to distinguish between speech that is “face-to-face, informational, particular, and for private gain” from speech that “is public rather than face-to-face, when it is inspired
by the speaker’s desire for social change rather than for private gain, when it relates to something
general rather than to a specific transaction, and when it is normative rather than informational
in content” and concluding that the First Amendment is “irrelevant” to the former, and “plainly”
implicated in the latter); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1102–
05 (2005) (suggesting that the First Amendment affords greater protection to “dual-use” information that provides information to a wide public audience even if it enables some listeners to
commit illegal acts than it does to single or limited use information that enables the parties in oneon-one conversations to commit illegal acts).
88
White, supra note 81, at 525.
86
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For example, courts and commentators have long recognized (without constitutional controversy) that quid pro quo harassment—in which
an employer threatens on-the-job punishment or offers an on-the-job
reward based on a worker’s response to unwelcome sexual advances—
is unprotected by the First Amendment.89 As Greenawalt explains more
generally, “Since someone who orders another is not engaging in expression, but is attempting to have his way through power or authority,
a political principle of freedom of speech is no impediment to forbidding
undesirable orders.”90 In other words, the First Amendment permits the
government to bar quid pro quo threats and promises because they seek
to change the terms and conditions of employment through the
speaker’s power over the employment relationship.
For decades the Court has also recognized that harassing workplace speech warrants the government’s constraint when sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment based on protected class status.91 Think, for instance, of workers regularly forced to
endure an onslaught of racial or sexual slurs that alter the terms and
conditions of their employment and signal certain job opportunities as
off-limits to targeted individuals based on protected class status.92 For
these reasons, the Court has stated that the First Amendment permits
the content-based regulation of such verbal harassment as “incidental”
to the government’s permissible regulation of discriminatory conduct:

89

See Nadine Strossen, The Tensions between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the
First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701, 704 (1995) (“Even the most diehard free
speech absolutist recognizes that the speech involved in quid pro quo harassment is tantamount
to threats or extortion, expression that has long been punishable without raising substantial free
speech concerns in any context.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1800 (1992) (stating that quid pro quo harassment “would seemingly be as
unprotected by the First Amendment as any other form of threat or extortion”).
90
GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 85.
91
See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510
U.S. 17 (1993).
92
See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (“Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run
a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living
can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.”) (quoting Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Expression
in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 689–90
(1997) (“A hostile work environment imposes serious discriminatory burdens on female employees
and helps to maintain sexual segregation of many segments of the workforce by marking certain
workplaces or certain levels of the workplace hierarchy off-limits to women. Similarly, harassment
targeting racial minorities, such as persistent racial taunts, ridicule, or threats, retards progress
toward racial integration and equality in the workforce and burdens the work lives of minority
employees . . . .”); Volokh, Workplace Harassment, supra note 89, at 1809 (“When women and minority employees suffer such intolerable abuse, the abuse both interferes with their ability to make
a living, and creates barriers for them that others in the workplace do not have to overcome.”).
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[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed
not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason,
for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach
of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for
example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other
words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition
against sexual discrimination in employment practices.93
Along the same lines, on multiple occasions the Court has made clear
that the First Amendment poses no bar to laws that forbid gatekeepers’
statements of discriminatory preference like “White Applicants Only”94
or “Jobs Of Interest to Men.”95 In so doing, the Court has identified
these laws as exemplifying the government’s constitutionally permissible regulation of speech that enables the doing of something that the
government has legitimately regulated.96
Consider, for instance, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst.
Rights.97 There the Court held that the First Amendment permits Congress to regulate certain conduct by requiring universities to provide
military recruiters with the same access to campus facilities as they
provide other employers—even though this law also regulated speech
by requiring universities to send emails or post notices on recruiters’
behalf:
93

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (citations omitted).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights,
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
95
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 379 (1973)
(holding that the First Amendment did not protect employers’ statements of discriminatory preference in the form of advertisements of “Jobs—Male Interest”); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (citing the facts in Pittsburgh Press as an
example of commercial speech unprotected by the First Amendment because of its relationship to
illegal commercial activity).
96
See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62–66. Note that laws that prohibit gatekeepers’ discriminatory
advertisements or other statements of discriminatory preference are almost as prevalent as laws
that prohibit gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status; e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(c) (2012) (prohibiting housing providers from “indicat[ing] any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin”); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012) (making it unlawful “to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to employment . . . indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 29
U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment
agency to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating
to employment by such an employer or membership in [such an organization or] classification or
referral . . . by such an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination, based on age.”); see also Norton, You Can’t Ask (Or Say) That, supra note 1, at 732–
33 (canvassing state and local laws that prohibit gatekeepers’ discriminatory advertisements or
other statements of discriminatory preference).
97
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
94
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As a general matter, the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must do—afford
equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may
not say. . . . The compelled speech to which the law schools point
is plainly incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of
conduct, and “it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”98
As an illustration of speech that is unprotected because it “initiates” or
“carries out” illegal conduct (in other words, speech that does something
and not just says something), the Rumsfeld Court pointed to gatekeepers’ speech that enables illegal discrimination: “Congress, for example,
can prohibit employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of
race. The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign
reading ‘White Applicants Only’ hardly means that the law should be
analyzed as one regulating the employer’s speech rather than conduct.”99
In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., the Court again offered “White Applicants Only” as an example of speech unprotected by the First Amendment because it does something and not just says something.100 There,
a 5-4 Court held that Vermont violated the First Amendment when it
restrained the exchange of information (about doctors’ prescribing practices) that would inform disfavored but legal marketing practices (phar-

98

Id. at 60–62 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). As
the Court notes, speech can “initiate” or “carry out” illegal conduct; such is the case of threats,
offers, agreements, statements of discriminatory preference, and other “situation-altering” statements. In this Article, I use the terms “enable” or “facilitate” to describe these connections between
certain speech and regulated conduct. The Court also notes the use of speech as “evidence” of a
speaker’s illegal motive for its conduct, which describes a slightly different relationship between
speech and illegal conduct, and one that is also endemic throughout the law. See Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (“The First Amendment, moreover, does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.”); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 125–26 (1993) (explaining that a letter
saying, “You’re fired, because I won’t let blacks work here” is “simply evidence of what is unlawful,
a discharge based on discrimination. Use of the letter to prove discriminatory motive is hardly
unconstitutional even if the letter is speech.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a challenger can offer a decisionmaker’s question about a candidate’s protected class status as evidence
of the ultimate decision’s discriminatory motive and thus its illegality. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1328 (D.N.M. 1998), aff’d, 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t
is reasonable to infer from the testimony presented at trial that the asking of the question [about
disability status] set off a chain of events that ultimately led to Wal-Mart’s discriminatory conduct
of refusing to hire [the plaintiff].”).
99
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62.
100
564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011).
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maceutical companies’ marketing of brand-name drugs directly to doctors).101 Yet in so holding, the majority distinguished unprotected
speech that the government may restrict free from First Amendment
scrutiny because of its close relationship to illegal conduct:
It is true that restrictions on protected expression are distinct
from restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on nonexpressive conduct. It is also true that the First Amendment
does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct
from imposing incidental burdens on speech. That is why a ban
on race-based hiring may require employers to remove “White
Applicants Only” signs . . . .102
In other words, “White Applicants Only” is unprotected because it declares certain transactions and opportunities as off limits to protected
class members. Precisely because of gatekeepers’ power, their speech in
these transactional settings thus does something and not just says
something.103 By deterring applicants from pursuing available opportunities based on protected class status, gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference like “White Applicants Only” enable illegal discrimination and thus can be regulated without triggering First
Amendment scrutiny.104

101

Id. at 557.
Id. at 567; see also Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017)
(“[A] law requiring all New York delis to charge $10 for their sandwiches . . . would simply regulate
the amount that a store could collect. In other words, it would regulate the sandwich seller’s conduct. To be sure, in order to actually collect that money, a store would likely have to put ‘$10’ on
its menus or have its employees tell customers that price. Those written or oral communications
would be speech, and the law—by determining the amount charged—would indirectly dictate the
content of that speech. But the law’s effect on speech would be only incidental to its primary effect
on conduct . . . .”); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018)
(identifying malpractice and informed consent requirements as examples of the government’s constitutionally permissible “regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech”).
103
GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 244 (defining a situation-altering
order as a statement “by someone in authority, concerning acts as to which his authority generally
extends”).
104
See Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 652
(6th Cir. 1991) (“Without the regulation of advertisements, realtors could deter certain classes of
potential tenants from seeking housing at a particular location, effectively discriminating against
these classes without running afoul of the FHA’s prohibition against discriminatory housing practices. Congress obviously recognized the key role housing advertisements play in potential real
estate transactions and concluded that the regulation of real estate advertisements is warranted.”); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]e read [the Fair
Housing Act’s bar on discriminatory advertisements] to describe any ad that would discourage an
ordinary reader of a particular race from answering it.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning
and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV.
787, 795 (1992) (explaining that law treats speech like “Whites Only Need Apply” as “‘discriminatory practices’ and outlaw[s] them under federal and state civil rights legislation because they are
more than speech”).
102

234

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

Once we understand why the First Amendment does not protect
gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference like “White Applicants Only,” we can see the implications for other speech that enables
illegal discrimination. Gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status, like their statements of discriminatory preference,
take place in an environment in which their speech does something and
not just says something precisely because of their power in that transactional setting. More specifically, these inquiries can both deter certain candidates from pursuing available opportunities and also elicit
the information that makes illegal discrimination possible. First, because the gatekeeper’s query signals a preference for a term of the proposed transaction where the speaker has the functional power to insist
on that term, a gatekeeper’s inquiries about candidates’ protected class
status deters certain listeners from pursuing important opportunities.
Think, for example, of an employer’s questions about an applicant’s religion, HIV-status, or pregnancy. Just as is the case when a decisionmaker announces its preference for “White Applicants Only,” these
inquiries communicate certain opportunities as off limits to protected
class members and are made by decisionmakers who have the power to
enforce those limits. Second, gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’
protected class status also make illegal discrimination possible by eliciting information that remains available, consciously or unconsciously,
for later use in their decision-making about available opportunities.
These inquiries do something rather than just say something because
they enable the speakers to limit their targets’ opportunities through
their power over the transaction, rather than through the power of their
ideas.
The next section explains how the Court’s modern commercial
speech doctrine captures these insights by holding that the First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activity, including commercial speech that enables illegal discrimination.
C. Why the First Amendment Does Not Protect Commercial Speech
Related to Illegal Activity, Including Commercial Speech Related
to Illegal Discrimination
By prohibiting employers, insurers, housing providers, lenders,
and other gatekeepers from denying opportunities and services based
on protected class status, antidiscrimination law regulates the use of
certain information in determining the terms and conditions of commercial activity (i.e., the exchange of money for labor, credit, housing, insurance, and more). And when legislatures forbid commercial actors
from relying on certain characteristics in their decision-making, those
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actors’ inquiries about candidates’ protected characteristics then constitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment
because it facilitates illegal commercial activity.105
1.

Commercial speech related to illegal activity more generally

In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,106 the Court held for the first time that the Free Speech
Clause provides some protection for commercial speech, striking down
Virginia’s law that forbade pharmacists from advertising their prescription drug prices.107 The majority underscored the expression’s value to
vulnerable prescription drug consumers like “the poor, the sick and particularly the aged,” observing that those consumers share an “interest
in the free flow of commercial information[] that . . . may be as keen, if
not keener by far, than [their] interest in the day’s most urgent political
debate.”108 In so holding, the Court explained that free speech protections are “enjoyed by the appellees [i.e., the consumers] as recipients of
the information, and not solely, if at all, by the advertisers themselves.”109
Shortly thereafter, the Court again described commercial expression’s First Amendment value (and thus its protection from the government’s regulation) as turning primarily on its ability to facilitate listeners’ informed decision-making about legal activities. Under this
framework, commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to
illegal activity offers no constitutional value to listeners and is thus unprotected from the government’s regulation, subject only to rational-basis review.110 As the Court explained in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission:

105

Despite the contemporary antiregulatory turn in its Free Speech Clause doctrine, the Court
continues to apply this commercial speech framework. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744,
1763–65 (2017) (discussing commercial speech doctrine with respect to the government’s regulation of trademarks); Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) (discussing commercial
speech doctrine with respect to the government’s regulation of retailers’ communication about
prices).
106
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
107
Id. (overruling Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)).
108
Id. at 763.
109
Id. at 756.
110
See Schauer, supra note 73, at 1776 n.49 (“The Central Hudson approach demands a threshold inquiry into whether the speech is misleading. Thus, misleading commercial advertisements
are akin to legally obscene materials in that they are regulable under minimal rational basis scrutiny without regard to First Amendment standards or values. Indeed, misleading commercial
speech is arguably simply not covered by the First Amendment.”); White, supra note 81, at 527
(“False commercial speech falls outside the coverage of the First Amendment and can be regulated
with impunity.”).
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The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising. Consequently,
there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public
about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or
commercial speech related to illegal activity.111
In contrast, accurate commercial speech about legal activity (like accurate speech about prescription drug prices) is valuable to listeners, and
thus the government’s regulation of such speech triggers First Amendment suspicion in the form of heightened—that is, intermediate—scrutiny.112
Although the Court has yet to offer a precise definition of commercial speech, the term includes commercial advertising and other speech
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”113 Because
the speech that proposes a commercial transaction includes the speech
involved in communicating and negotiating the terms and conditions of
that transaction,114 the Court has recognized speech other than advertisements as commercial for First Amendment purposes, like speech
that communicates the price of goods and services.115 As legal scholar
Felix Wu explains, “[w]hat makes speech commercial is the extent to

111

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980) (striking down governmental ban on electric utilities’ promotion of electricity consumption) (citations
omitted).
112
Id.; see also id. at 562 (noting that the Court’s “decisions have recognized ‘the “commonsense” distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech’”) (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
113
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
The Court has also characterized commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
114
See Smolla, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
115
E.g., Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (characterizing New
York law as a regulation of commercial speech because it regulated retailers’ communication of
the price of goods and services); Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (characterizing product demonstrations in campus dormitory rooms as commercial speech); Beeman v.
Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 315 P.3d 71, 74–75 (Cal. 2013) (characterizing a regulation requiring “prescription drug claims processors to compile and summarize information on pharmacy
fees and to transmit the information to their clients” as the regulation of commercial speech); Carrico v. City of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing a law prohibiting landlords
from coercing tenants to vacate their homes through offers of payment, accompanied by threats
and intimidation, as the regulation of commercial speech); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC,
555 F.3d 996, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (characterizing the government’s regulation requiring carriers
“to obtain opt-in consent from a customer before disclosing that customer’s information to a carrier’s joint venture partner” as regulating commercial speech); Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d
1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (characterizing consumer credit reports as commercial speech).
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which the speech should be understood to be part of a commercial transaction. Pricing information is quintessential commercial speech, because pricing is a key component of any commercial transaction.”116
Recognizing that the employment relationship is a type of commercial relationship in which a worker exchanges her labor and talent for
pay, the Supreme Court has identified job advertisements as “classic
examples” of commercial speech.117 Lower courts regularly apply this
reasoning to conclude that employers’ recruitment efforts, interviews,
and negotiations about the terms and conditions of employment also
constitute commercial speech that initiates and completes commercial
transactions.118 Along the same lines, gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected characteristics—along with gatekeepers’ statements
like “White Applicants Only”—take place in the context of communicating and negotiating about potential commercial transactions.119
Again, the Court’s commercial speech doctrine provides that commercial speech is unprotected by the First Amendment when it is false,
misleading, or “related to illegal activity.”120 In that case, such speech
is entirely open to the government’s regulation subject only to rationalbasis scrutiny—as recounted in Part I, the Court has long recognized
legislatures’ constitutional power to regulate commercial transactions,
which includes their power to prohibit decisionmakers from enforcing
discriminatory terms or conditions in providing opportunities and services.121 And when a legislature exercises its constitutional power to
prohibit certain commercial activity, speech that facilitates that nowillegal activity loses its First Amendment value to listeners, and thus
its constitutional protection. Examples include speech that advertises
or inquires about the availability of goods and services that legislatures

116

Felix T. Wu, Commercial Speech Protection as Consumer Protection, 90 U. COLO. L. REV.
631, 644 (2019).
117
Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385 (“Each [job advertisement] is no more than a proposal
of possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic examples of commercial speech.”).
118
E.g., Centro De La Comunidad Hispana De Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d
104 (2d Cir. 2017) (characterizing potential employers’ solicitation of day laborers as commercial
speech because it involves advertisements and negotiations for work); Valle Del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2013) (same); Nomi v. Regents for Univ. of Minn., 796 F. Supp. 412, 417
(D. Minn. 1992) (“[Military job] recruiting proposes a commercial transaction; the purpose of recruiting is to reach an agreement under which services will be exchanged for compensation.”),
vacated as moot, 5 F.3d 332 (8th Cir. 1993); Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33
S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tex. App. 2000) (concluding that speech asserting that a former employee was
subject to, and in violation of, a non-compete agreement was commercial speech).
119
Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020)
(concluding that employers’ inquiries about candidates’ salary history in the context of job applications and negotiations constituted commercial speech).
120
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980).
121
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
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have prohibited, like drugs and drug paraphernalia, prostitution, and
income tax evasion services.122
As an illustration, the production and sale of any particular substance remains legal commercial activity unless and until a legislature
chooses to make it illegal. Until that time, advertisements for, inquiries
about, and negotiations over the price and availability of that substance
constitute commercial speech related to legal activity, with the government’s regulation of such speech subject to intermediate scrutiny. But
once a legislature chooses to prohibit the production and sale of that
substance (and recall that its regulation of such commercial activities
generally triggers only rational-basis scrutiny123), advertisements for,
inquiries about, and negotiations over the availability of that product
then constitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First
Amendment because of its relationship to what is now illegal activity.
(To be sure, some listeners very much want to receive such information
as potential purchasers of illegal drugs or illegal services—but once the
legislature makes that activity illegal, that interest is no longer protected by the Constitution.)
2.

Commercial speech related to illegal discrimination more specifically

Along the same lines, a characteristic does not become “protected”
from private parties’ discrimination as a legal matter unless and until
a legislature passes a statute prohibiting gatekeepers from relying on
that characteristic in their decision-making. For example, gatekeepers’
discriminatory reliance on pregnancy (or disability or religion or salary
history, etc.) in their decision-making does not become illegal unless
and until a legislature enacts a statute to that effect.124 Upon such a
122

See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 561 F.3d 718, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2009) (characterizing the
advertising of materials that advocated not filing federal income tax returns as unprotected commercial speech related to illegal activity); Wash. Mercantile Ass’n v. Williams, 733 F.2d 687 (9th
Cir. 1984) (characterizing drug paraphernalia advertisements as unprotected commercial speech
related to illegal activities); New England Accessories Trade Assocs., Inc. v. City of Nashua, 679
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Fla. Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213
(11th Cir. 1982) (same); Kan. Retail Trade Coop. v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1982) (same);
State v. Johnson, 324 N.W.2d 447 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (characterizing advertisements for prostitution as unprotected commercial speech related to an illegal commercial transaction); Washington v. Clark Cty. Liquor and Gaming Licensing Bd., 683 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1984) (same); see also United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008) (holding that offers to provide, and requests for,
child pornography are unprotected by the First Amendment because the distribution and possession of child pornography is itself illegal).
123
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
124
This Article focuses on statutes that protect certain characteristics from discrimination by
nongovernmental or governmental employers and other gatekeepers. Of course, apart from any
statutory requirements, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit the government from discriminating based on certain characteristics in its decisions. E.g.,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down the government’s race-based segregation
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statute’s enactment, however, gatekeepers’ inquiries about candidates’
protected class status then constitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment because they relate to—that is, enable—the now-illegal activity of relying on those characteristics when
making key decisions.
Indeed, in Central Hudson itself, the Court offered gatekeepers’
speech that enables illegal job discrimination as an illustration of commercial speech unprotected by the First Amendment because of its relationship to illegal commercial activity.125 More specifically, it cited its
holding in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, a decision rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a local antidiscrimination law that not only prohibited sex-based employment decisions, but also prohibited gatekeepers’ publication of “any notice or
advertisement relating to ‘employment’ or membership which indicates
any discrimination because of . . . sex.”126 The Pittsburgh Press Court
held that sex-segregated job advertisements constituted unprotected
commercial speech because they proposed the illegal commercial transaction of discriminatory hiring. In so holding, the Court analogized the
contested job listings (which consisted of columns headed “Jobs—Male
Interest” and “Jobs—Female Interest”) to constitutionally unprotected
advertisements for illegal drugs or prostitution.127 As it explained, “Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal
commercial activity under the Ordinance . . . . The advertisements, as
embroidered by their placement, signaled that the advertisers were
likely to show an illegal sex preference in their hiring decisions. Any
First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the
governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent
when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.”128 In
other words, advertising that “I’ve got a job for a man” or stating that
“Only whites need apply” is just as related to illegal activity for commercial speech purposes as advertising that “I’ve got cocaine for sale.”

of public schools on equal protection grounds); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down the government’s exclusion of women from the state’s Virginia Military Institute on equal
protection grounds).
125
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
126
413 U.S. 376, 378 (1973).
127
Id. at 388 (“We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes. Nor would the result be different if the nature of the transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned ‘Narcotics for Sale’ and ‘Prostitutes Wanted’ rather than stated within the four corners of the
advertisement.”).
128
Id. at 388–89.
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All of these statements facilitate illegal commercial transactions. All
thus do something, and not just say something.
So too is the case of gatekeepers’ inquiries about candidates’ religion, sexual orientation, pregnancy, prior pay, credit history, or other
characteristics protected from discrimination by the relevant jurisdiction. Asking an applicant if she’s pregnant (or HIV-positive, or Muslim)
is not meaningfully distinguishable for these purposes from saying “No
pregnant [or HIV-positive, or Muslim] people need apply,” as the query
deters applicants based on protected class status and elicits information
that facilitates illegal decision-making.
The doctrinal recognition that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activity thus separates the government’s constitutionally permissible interest in regulating commercial transactions from the government’s constitutionally impermissible
interest in censoring a message it disfavors. This insight also explains
why laws regulating gatekeepers’ speech that enables illegal discrimination (like laws regulating commercial speech related to illegal activity more broadly) do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny even though
they target certain speech by certain speakers.129 As the Court has recognized, the First Amendment permits these distinctions because only
certain speakers have the power to engage in the conduct that the legislature has regulated. In other words, only employers and other gatekeepers have the power to make illegally discriminatory decisions, and
only some of their inquiries and statements enable that illegal conduct.130

129

See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015) (stating that the government’s content-based or speaker-based regulation of speech generally triggers strict scrutiny). But
as many thoughtful commentators have observed, the Court’s First Amendment doctrine justifiably includes numerous exceptions (including but not limited to its commercial speech doctrine) in
which it upholds the government’s speaker- and content-based distinctions without applying strict
scrutiny. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 80, at 695 (canvassing precedent to conclude that “free speech
consequentialism, more than being ubiquitous, is in fact inevitable”); James Weinstein, Speech
Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1100 (2004) In summary, the popular view that all content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional unless the speech falls within some unprotected category is not an accurate snapshot of First Amendment doctrine. Speech is too ubiquitous with too many real-world consequences for there to be any such rule. Rather, the strong
presumption against content discrimination operates only within a limited (albeit extremely important) domain.
130
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (noting that the First Amendment
permits the government to regulate gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference like
“White Applicants Only” that initiate or carry out illegal discrimination); Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (noting that the First Amendment permits the government
to regulate gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference that are incidental to the government’s regulation of “commerce or conduct”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992)
(“[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against
conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up

209]

DISCRIMINATION, SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

241

For related reasons, the Court’s commercial speech framework also
explains why its decision in Sorrell is inapposite to antidiscrimination
laws that restrict gatekeepers’ inquiries about candidates’ protected
class status. Recall that Sorrell held unconstitutional a Vermont law
that restricted the transmission of specific information (individual doctors’ prescribing practices) to prevent that information’s use in disfavored but legal choices (marketing brand-name pharmaceuticals to individual doctors).131 Contrast antidiscrimination laws that instead
restrict gatekeepers’ questions that elicit specific information about individual candidates’ now-protected characteristics to prevent that information’s use in illegally discriminatory conduct.132
Recall too Daniel Farber’s proposal for parsing the government’s
permissible targeting of speech for its contractual functions from its impermissible targeting of speech because of the ideas expressed. We can
be confident that the former is at work if the government’s regulatory
interest in those statements or inquiries disappears when made by
those who are not parties to a potential transaction.133 The antidiscrimination provisions discussed herein apply only to speech by one party to
a potential job, housing, or other transaction about the terms of that
transaction because only that party has the power to engage in the regulated conduct. In other words, the government regulates these inquiries because they do something and not just say something.134

incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s
general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices.”) (citations omitted).
131
See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 578–79 (“The State may not burden the speech of others in order to
tilt public debate in a preferred direction.”).
132
For a more accurate parallel to Sorrell in the antidiscrimination context, consider instead
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, where the Court upheld a First Amendment
challenge to a law that barred “For Sale” and “Sold” signs on real estate to prevent “panic” selling
by whites who feared that the town’s racial integration would drive down property prices; such
sales remained legal even though disfavored by the town. 431 U.S. 85, 85 (1977). Note that Linmark predates Central Hudson; under the Central Hudson framework, the law at issue in Linmark
would now be understood as a regulation of accurate commercial speech related to legal activity
and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. The Court has generally rejected the government’s paternalistic regulation of speech for fear that listeners will make unwise, yet legal, decisions. But
the antidiscrimination laws described in Part I apply to gatekeepers’ inquiries that enable illegally
discriminatory transactions, and thus restrict speech that the First Amendment does not protect.
133
See Farber, supra note 84, at 400 (describing the government’s regulation of discriminatory
job advertisements as “relat[ing] to the contractual function of the ads [as offers of employment],
rather than to the suppression of the free flow of information”).
134
Furthermore, the limitations of after-the-fact enforcement of antidiscrimination laws mean
that alternatives—like simply prohibiting reliance on (i.e., use of information about) protected
class status in decision-making—will not effectively achieve the government’s objectives. Nor
would prohibiting only inquiries made with the intent to inform illegal conduct: not only does advance screening of “innocent” inquiries from those related to illegal decisions pose an unmanageable challenge, but even “innocent” queries can deter applicants from continuing to seek the opportunity at stake and can elicit information about protected class status that remains available,
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Contrast inquiries by a speaker who does not hold power over the
listener: such inquiries that “do not accomplish a significant change in
normative relations or other aspects of the listener’s environment” because they are “not accompanied by inducements or threats or made in
circumstances where a positive response is obligatory.”135 Think, for instance, of how the government’s antidiscrimination interest in questions about an applicant’s pregnancy (or disability or religion or salary
history or other protected characteristic) evaporates when the question
is asked by a friend or neighbor rather than by an employer or other
transacting party. For these reasons, gatekeepers’ statements or inquiries that are not “in connection with” or “with respect to” a regulated
transaction do not implicate the government’s interest in the enforcement of antidiscrimination law, and thus these laws appropriately do
not extend to communications outside of the transactional context.136
For instance, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s regulations limit only
inquiries into protected class status made “in connection with a credit
transaction,”137 Title VII regulations address similar inquiries only “in
connection with prospective employment,”138 and the Fair Housing Act
prohibits discriminatory statements “with respect to the sale or rental
of a dwelling.”139 Gatekeepers (and everybody else) remain free to express any political, moral, religious, or other opinion outside the transactional context through letters to the editor, testimony, lobbying, and
more. As the Court emphasized in Pittsburgh Press, “Nothing in our
holding allows government at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to
publish and distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance,
the enforcement practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex
preferences in employment.”140
Some may contest the closeness of the relationship between gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected characteristics and gatekeepers’ illegal reliance on those characteristics.141 For instance, some
consciously or unconsciously, for later use in decision-making. See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text.
135
GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 75, at 68.
136
See Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706, 710 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985) (observing the First Amendment problem if the Fair Housing Act prohibited housing providers’ statements of discriminatory
preference that did not relate “to a specific discriminatory and illegal transaction”); IMDB.com,
Inc. v. Becerra, 962 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2020) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, California law that prohibited the general publication of truthful age-related information about those
in the entertainment industry when the law did not regulate the conduct and speech of parties
engaged in a commercial transaction).
137
12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b) (2019).
138
29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2002).
139
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000).
140
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973).
141
See Tung Yin, How the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Prohibition on Pre-EmploymentOffer Disability-Related Questions Violates the First Amendment, 17 LAB. LAW. 107, 118–19 (2001)
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may argue that asking an applicant about her religion or whether she
has a disability does not carry the same deterrent effect as saying “No
Jews” or “No folks with disabilities need apply”—or that asking an applicant about her age or salary history does not mean that the gatekeeper will rely on her answer to make hiring and compensation decisions.142 (Note, however, that the challengers to Philadelphia’s salary
history law acknowledged that they sought to rely on those answers to
make hiring and compensation decisions.143) But the Court has never
required that commercial speech related to illegal activity lead inevitably and only to that activity to lose First Amendment protection. Consider Pittsburgh Press, where the defendant argued that because sexsegregated advertisements did not expressly deny employment to
women, they were not inevitably, and thus sufficiently, related to illegal
discrimination to lose First Amendment protection.144 The Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that listing job openings in sex-segregated columns signaled that employers were “likely” to discriminate
and thus would deter at least some women from applying for male-designated jobs (and vice versa).145 So too do gatekeepers’ inquiries about
(accepting Pittsburgh Press’s analysis with respect to discriminatory advertisements while arguing
that the ADA’s prohibitions on disability-related inquiries do not “automatically deter” certain
applicants in the way that sex-segregated job advertisements do).
142
The Third Circuit denied the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce’s request to preliminarily
enjoin both the reliance and the inquiry provisions of Philadelphia’s salary history law. Greater
Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020). Although I agree
with the appellate court’s decision to deny the injunctions, I disagree with the portion of its analysis where it declined to describe employer inquiries about prior pay as “related to” illegal activity
even though reliance on the answer constituted illegal activity under Philadelphia’s law. There
the appellate court mistakenly (in my view) asserted that contested speech must always, and only,
be related to illegal conduct to lose First Amendment protection under Central Hudson’s framework. Id. at 141–42. The court instead characterized the provision as regulating commercial speech
about legal activity, applied intermediate scrutiny, and then found that the provision survived
such scrutiny. Id. at 142–57.
143
See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al., supra note 48, at 8 (“By
prohibiting employers from inquiring about [or relying on] pay history, [Philadelphia’s salary history law] denies them useful information for evaluating the quality of candidates during the hiring
process.”).
144
Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388 (“The illegality in this case may be less overt [than advertisements for the sale of illegal drugs] but we see no difference in principle here.”); see also id. at
381 n.7 (recounting the defendant’s argument that sex-segregated advertisements simply reflected
men’s and women’s relative interest in certain job categories and that women might find them
helpful in their search for employment); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496–97 & n.9 (1982) (describing ads marketing pipes and other paraphernalia
as unprotected commercial speech related to the illegal sale of drugs even though those products
could also have been used for lawful activity other than drug use); id. at 497 (“[T]he overbreadth
doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.”).
145
Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 389 (“The advertisements, as embroidered by their placement,
signaled that the advertisers were likely to show an illegal sex preference in their hiring decisions.”); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 150–52 (1996) (observing that even if the Pittsburgh Press ads did not explicitly exclude women from applying for male-designated jobs, they
made such applications substantially less likely).
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candidates’ protected class status signal that the answers are likely to
influence gatekeepers’ choices and deter some applicants—especially
when we recall that once a jurisdiction has prohibited reliance on pregnancy or other characteristics in commercial transactions, there’s no
constitutional value in commercial actors’ inquiries about those characteristics.
Indeed, both theory and doctrine have long recognized that the
First Amendment provides no protection to the speech that enables illegal conduct even if that speech does not always accomplish such conduct. Speech that solicits, or conspires to engage in, illegal conduct is
not protected by the First Amendment even though it doesn’t always
lead to illegal conduct, as the solicitation may be rejected or the conspiracy may not succeed.146 For instance, the First Amendment does not
protect A’s inquiry as to whether B has cocaine for sale or if B would be
willing to eliminate A’s enemy for a certain price—even if B declines A’s
offer or fails to deliver on a promised exchange. What matters is that
those inquiries are likely to accomplish illegal conduct. For the same
reason, the First Amendment does not protect gatekeepers’ statement
“White Applicants Only;” it is likely to deter nonwhite applicants even
though it may not always succeed in so doing.
Gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status are
especially likely to enable illegal discrimination (and thus lose First
Amendment protection) when they do not elicit information that is valuable apart from its ability to inform illegal discrimination, or when
that information is available through other means or in other settings
that do not threaten to infect gatekeepers’ decision-making about specific candidates on illegal bases. Recall, for, example, that the challengers to Philadelphia’s law argued that salary history inquiries not only
informed their hiring and compensation decisions, but also permitted
them to identify applicants with unaffordable salary expectations and
to learn about prevailing pay scales for certain jobs.147 But employers
can and do obtain more accurate information about the market for
wages through other, aggregate sources outside of negotiations with a
specific applicant for a specific transaction.148 And employers can learn
146

See Kristina E. Music Biro et al., Solicitation generally, 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 153
(Nov. 2019) (“Solicitation is complete once the request to join in a crime is made and is punishable
irrespective of the reaction of the person solicited; therefore, the fortuity that the person solicited does not agree to commit or attempt to commit the incited crime plainly should not relieve the
solicitor of liability when otherwise he would be a conspirator or an accomplice.”); John Bourdeau,
Nature and extent of liability—Liability of person joining existing conspiracy, 16 AM. JUR. 2D
CONSPIRACY § 21 (Nov. 2019) (“One becomes a member of an existing conspiracy by knowingly cooperating to further the object of the conspiracy. One may join a conspiracy by word or by deed.”).
147
See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al., supra note 48, at 9.
148
See HARRIS, supra note 51, at 4 (“[M]any employers use compensation surveys to know precisely where their workers fall in the distribution of wages.”); Joanne Sammer, Banning Salary
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whether they can afford a specific applicant simply by telling her the
job’s salary or by asking for her salary expectations—just as the ADA
permits employers to ask applicants if they can perform a job’s functions
with or without a reasonable accommodation while forbidding employers from asking applicants whether they have a disability.149
In sum, legislatures regulate commercial activity when they prohibit commercial actors from relying on certain characteristics in their
decision-making, and those actors’ inquiries about candidates’ protected characteristics then constitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment because it facilitates illegal commercial
activity—in other words, because it does something and not just says
something.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF OTHER
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS THAT REGULATE COMMERCIAL
PARTIES’ SPEECH
This Part briefly considers the commercial speech framework’s application to antidiscrimination provisions that regulate commercial
speech in ways other than those discussed in Parts I and II—in other
words, in ways apart from forbidding gatekeepers’ discriminatory statements of preference and inquiries about candidates’ protected class status when reliance on the answer is illegal. As we’ll see, some statutes
prohibit decisionmakers’ inquiries about applicants’ characteristics
without forbidding decisionmakers from relying on those characteristics in their decision-making. Other statutes require decisionmakers to
disclose certain accurate information about the terms and conditions of
available opportunities. Finally, some statutes forbid gatekeepers’ reliance on certain protected characteristics for some reasons and not others, and thus forbid gatekeepers’ inquiries for some purposes and not
others.

History Questions: A Game Changer?, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/pages/banning-salary-history.aspx [https://perma.cc/MPL9-YWP9]. When managers base salary offers on a combination of
an applicant’s current salary and what the pay budget allows—rather than on what the market is
paying for a given position, skills and experience—the hiring process is less likely to yield the best
candidate. With no access to applicant salary information, employers have an opportunity to move
toward a broader approach to hiring.”).
149
See PAYSCALE, supra note 49, at 7 (suggesting alternatives for employers like asking
“[w]hat are your salary expectations?” or describing their pay range to applicants). Note that although laws like Philadelphia’s bar employers from relying on an applicant’s prior pay for decisionmaking purposes, they permit employers to rely on, and ask about, an applicant’s salary expectations in their hiring and compensation decisions. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B(d) (West
2017) (allowing inquiries into “compensation expectations” so long as the employer does not inquire
into “compensation history”).
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An exhaustive treatment of these statutes is beyond the scope of
this Article.150 Here, I simply show how the Court’s longstanding commercial speech doctrine again provides the relevant analysis. Recall
that this doctrine exemplifies a listener-centered approach to certain
First Amendment problems by protecting commercial speech that furthers listeners’ interests (like accurate commercial speech about lawful
activity) while permitting the regulation of commercial speech that
frustrates those interests (like false or misleading commercial speech,
or commercial speech related to illegal activity)—in other words, by
privileging listeners’ interests over commercial actors’ interests as
speakers when their interests collide.151 The Court’s commercial speech
doctrine itself thus relies on speaker- and content-based distinctions
precisely because those distinctions are relevant to commercial expression’s potential for First Amendment harm and First Amendment
value.152
A. Antidiscrimination Laws That Regulate Decisionmakers’ Inquiries About Certain Characteristics Without Prohibiting Reliance
On Those Characteristics
First, some laws prohibit or delay gatekeepers’ inquiries about certain characteristics without ultimately prohibiting gatekeepers’ reliance on those characteristics. In other words, sometimes legislatures
block (or delay) gatekeepers’ inquiries to candidates about certain characteristics when gatekeepers’ use of that information is not illegal. For
example, some states and localities have enacted “ban-the-box” laws

150

I explored related issues in Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 61 (urging that we
understand employers’ speech about the terms and conditions of employment as both protected
and regulated to the extent that it furthers or frustrates workers’ First Amendment interests as
listeners).
151
See supra notes 106–23 and accompanying text; Wu, supra note 116, at 631–32 (“Commercial speech doctrine cares primarily about informing consumers, and that is the lens through which
courts should determine how much scrutiny to give to a commercial speech restriction. In commercial speech cases, courts should not be applying the kind of speaker-focused approaches they would
be using in cases involving noncommercial speech.”).
152
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (noting
that its “decisions have recognized ‘the “commonsense” distinction between speech proposing a
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation,
and other varieties of speech’”) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56
(1978)); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389–90 (1992) (“When the basis for the content
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been
adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment
protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class. . . . [T]o take a
final example, a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in others,
because the risk of fraud (one of the characteristics of commercial speech that justifies depriving
it of full First Amendment protection), is in its view greater there.”) (citations and internal references omitted).
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that “generally prohibit employers from inquiring about a job applicant’s criminal record until later in the hiring process, such as after an
initial interview or once a conditional employment offer is made” in
hopes that employers will be more likely to hire qualified ex-offenders
if they assess candidates before learning of any criminal record.153
Because gatekeepers’ inquiries about characteristics that are not
protected from discrimination do not enable illegal activity, they do not
fall within Central Hudson’s categories of commercial speech that are
entirely unprotected by the First Amendment. This means that the government’s restrictions of such inquiries must satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Recall Central Hudson’s holding that the government’s regulation
of accurate commercial speech related to legal activity triggers a form
of intermediate scrutiny because that speech has constitutional value
for listeners:
The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by
restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory
technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation
on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s
goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two
criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s
purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.154
In assessing whether the government’s means directly advances its
ends, the Court has applied Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny to
permit the government to rely on “studies[,] anecdotes[,] . . . history,
consensus, and ‘simple common sense’” to justify its choice, emphasizing that the standard requires “a reasonable,” rather than a perfect,
fit.155 Relatedly, the Court has also declined to require the government’s
153

Flake, supra note 45, at 1084. To be sure, some jurisdictions prohibit both reliance on, and
inquiries about, certain arrest or other criminal records. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
And although, as discussed in Part I, many jurisdictions prohibit both reliance on, and inquiries
about, applicants’ salary history, some prohibit inquiries about salary history without prohibiting
reliance on such information in employment decisions. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.357 (West
2017).
154
Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 564 (1980).
155
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555–56 (2001). There the Court considered a
challenge to a state law that restricted the use of billboards to advertise tobacco products within
100 feet of schools and parks to discourage young people from using tobacco. It found that the state
had demonstrated a sufficiently direct link between tobacco advertising and minors’ tobacco use.
Id. at 561. But it ultimately concluded that the law failed the narrow tailoring requirement because those restrictions operated as essentially a complete ban on advertising a product lawfully
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regulation to be the “least restrictive” alternative, but instead requires
“a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”156 In other words, in these settings the government’s
regulation does trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Nevertheless, appropriately designed antidiscrimination provisions that delay or block
gatekeepers’ access to certain information about candidates where reliance on that information is not directly prohibited may survive such
scrutiny.157
B. Antidiscrimination Laws That Require or Permit Certain Disclosures
Next, antidiscrimination laws sometimes require employers, housing providers, lenders, insurers, and other commercial actors to make
certain accurate disclosures to expose or deter discrimination, or to
achieve other equality goals. For example, as part of their efforts to
ameliorate stubborn and unjustified pay disparities, some legislatures
have enacted laws that require employers to disclose their pay scales
and practices.158 These measures seek to address asymmetries in information about pay, where employers know what they pay their own
workers but workers generally don’t know what their colleagues are

used by adults (due to urban density, for example, no space within the city of Boston would be
available for tobacco billboards under the statute). Id. at 561, 565.
156
See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478, 480 (1989) (“[This Court has]
not insisted that there be no conceivable alternative, but only that the regulation not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests . . . . and
[the Court has] been loath to second-guess the Government’s judgment to that effect.”) (citations
omitted).
157
See, e.g., King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that
Fair Credit Reporting Act requirement that credit reports exclude outdated arrest record information regulates accurate commercial speech and thus triggers Central Hudson intermediate
scrutiny, and then upholding the provision under that scrutiny); see also Greater Phila. Chamber
of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the city’s law prohibiting employers’ inquiries about applicants’ salary history survived Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny); Lester-Abdalla, supra note 49 (proposing that salary history laws should trigger, and
survive, intermediate scrutiny).
158
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(c) (West 2019) (requiring employers to provide information
about their pay scales upon an applicant’s reasonable request); Rebecca Greenfield, Making Salary
Information Public Helps Close the Gender Pay Gap, BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-05/making-salary-information-public-helpsclose-the-gender-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/5W7E-QHJP] (citing a study by Columbia University
and University of Copenhagen researchers that found a seven percent reduction in the pay gap
between men and women after Danish law required employers to disclose pay data by gender).
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paid.159 As legal scholar Sylvia Law observes, “[e]very story of a successful challenge to the gender wage gap begins with a woman discovering
that she is earning less than a male colleague who does similar, or less
demanding, work.”160 Other examples of required disclosures for antidiscrimination purposes include laws that require employers and other
gatekeepers to disclose truthful information about applicants’ legal
rights.161
These sorts of disclosures have a long pedigree throughout the commercial speech context more broadly, where the government routinely
requires commercial actors to make certain accurate disclosures to inform and further listeners’ decision-making.162 Consumer protection
law and securities law, for example, rely on an array of informationforcing mechanisms to address informational asymmetries between
speakers and their listeners.163
Again, the Court’s commercial speech doctrine supplies the relevant First Amendment analysis. As it explained in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, “the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of
the information such speech provides.”164 For this reason, the Court has
applied only deferential review to laws requiring commercial speakers

159

See HARRIS, supra note 51, at 4 (“In the U.S. labor market, information on wages and compensation is decidedly asymmetric. Employees frequently do not know how their pay compares to
comparable workers, either within or outside their firm, and are reluctant to seek this knowledge
out of fear of retaliation, social norms, or general inertia. In stark contrast, many employers use
compensation surveys to know precisely where their workers fall in the distribution of wages. In
other markets characterized by asymmetric information, the entity with more complete information maintains a distinct advantage.”); Lobel, supra note 46, at 549 (“[A] central innovation of
the new laws is to reverse information flows in the wage market. Efforts to eradicate wage discrimination have failed in large part due to information asymmetries and difficulties in identifying
and proving discrimination.”).
160
Sylvia A. Law, Income Disparity, Gender Equality, and Free Expression, 87 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2479, 2494 (2019).
161
See Norton, supra note 61, at 32–33.
162
See Leslie G. Jacobs, Compelled Commercial Speech as Compelled Consent Speech, 29 J.L.
& POL. 517, 522 (2014) (“This government regulatory power to require the disclosure of facts material to informed consent is not limited to commercial contracts. Consent is a crucial element that
renders many types of transactions legal and enforceable. Governments have always had the authority to define the facts that must be communicated and the circumstances that must exist to
create this critical element of consent.”); Andrew Tutt, Commoditized Speech, “Bargain Fairness,”
and the First Amendment, 2017 BYU L. REV. 117, 148 (2017) (“Commentators have been puzzled
for decades by the fact that some areas of intensely content-based speech regulation remain subject
to, at best, modest First Amendment scrutiny. But a judicial concern for ensuring bargain fairness
readily explains the lack of rigor. The purpose of the measures in question is to level the bargaining
positions of the parties, thereby helping individuals to obtain a better deal in circumstances of
significant information asymmetry.”).
163
See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1631 (2017) (“The law of consumer protection has long concerned itself with
information and power asymmetries among market participants.”).
164
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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to make accurate disclosures to their listeners to protect those listeners
from deception, upholding such requirements when they are “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”165 Lower courts have also often applied this deferential review to
disclosure requirements intended to inform consumers even when the
regulated commercial speakers have not engaged in deception.166 The
sorts of antidiscrimination laws described above167 that require truthful
disclosures by commercial actors will generally survive this review.
Despite its more recent antiregulatory turn, the Court has yet to
repudiate Zauderer’s deferential review as applied to required commercial disclosures.168 In any event, the disclosures described above can
also satisfy Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard. As I’ve
written elsewhere, “[G]overnment requirements that employers disclose truthful information about workers’ rights and other working conditions can provide considerable value to workers as listeners while imposing little, if any, expressive costs. They thus can readily satisfy not
only rational-basis scrutiny but also intermediate or even exacting scrutiny when appropriately drafted to achieve the government’s strong interest in informing and protecting workers.”169
Relatedly, note that some antidiscrimination laws that forbid gatekeepers from asking candidates about their protected class status nevertheless sometimes permit candidates to disclose that status to achieve
equal opportunity. Think, for example, of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which forbids employers from inquiring into workers’ disability
status while permitting—indeed, encouraging—workers to disclose
their disability status to explore possibilities for reasonable accommodations.170 Think too of laws that protect workers from their employers’
165

Id.
E.g., CTIA v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying Zauderer analysis
to permit the government to “compel truthful disclosure in commercial speech as long as the compelled disclosure is ‘reasonably related’ to a substantial government interest, and involves ‘purely
factual and uncontroversial information’ that relates to the service or product provided”) (citations
omitted); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014); N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n
v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009).
167
See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
168
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (quoting
Zauderer as permitting government to require commercial actors to disclose factual and uncontroversial information).
169
Norton, supra note 61, at 75–76; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech
and the Consumer “Right to Know”, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 438–39 (2016) (urging that compelled
commercial disclosures receive heightened scrutiny but concluding that many such disclosures will
survive such scrutiny, especially when motivated by government’s substantial interests in consumer protection or regulatory enforcement).
170
See Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 643 (2011) (“The ADA is, by and large, an antisubordination statute. It seeks to elevate the status of a particular historically disadvantaged group: people with disabilities.”); id. at 646 (explaining that prohibiting employer inquiries about workers’
166
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punishment for sharing their salary information with other workers.171
For purposes of First Amendment analysis, gatekeepers’ inquiries
about disability or other protected characteristics are distinguishable
from candidates’ disclosure of those characteristics when the former are
related to illegal discrimination while the latter enable reasonable accommodation and other equality goals.172 These measures change the
dynamic from one where gatekeepers have all the information and
power to one where applicants have some too. As noted above, these
sorts of measures to address informational asymmetries between transactional parties have a long pedigree in the commercial speech context.173
C. Antidiscrimination Laws That Permit Gatekeepers to Collect (And
Sometimes Rely on) Information About Protected Characteristics
Finally, some antidiscrimination laws permit gatekeepers to collect
information about applicants’ protected class status in certain circumstances to achieve equality objectives. More specifically, some antidiscrimination laws permit gatekeepers to collect data about applicants’
protected characteristics to assess the success of their equal opportunity
efforts or to determine whether their selection practices have an illegally disparate impact. For example, Title VII (unlike some other anti-

disability status while permitting workers to disclose their status helps achieve both anticlassification and antisubordination goals). Legal scholar Bradley Areheart has advocated a similar approach to the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in which gatekeepers would be forbidden
from inquiring about applicants’ genetic information to prevent discrimination, but applicants
could disclose such information when doing so enabled reasonable accommodation or other equality goals. Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 706
(2012).
171
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(i) (making it unlawful for employers to forbid employees
from talking about their pay with other workers); see also Lobel, supra note 46, at 590 (“Taken
together, the salary history inquiry ban and salary co-worker inquiry protection also correct a longexisting non-gender specific, double standard—employers often demand secrecy from their employees and usually do not reveal the pay scale of their employees when they interview but demand
salary history.”).
172
See Cofone, supra note 8, at 165 (“[A possibility] for making this method compatible with
affirmative action and other tools that address diversity concerns under an antisubordination logic
. . . would be to condition the information flow instead of banning it directly. When dealing with
explicitly diversity-concerned decision-makers, information could be released under the condition
of a specific use: if active diversity measures are to be established.”); Roberts, Protecting Privacy
to Prevent Discrimination, supra note 8, at 2168–69 (stating that this approach “capture[s] the
best of both worlds[:] [i]ndividuals could maintain autonomy by deciding how and when to disclose
information related to protected status, and potential discriminators would be unable to ask about
protected status unless the inquiry were explicitly designed to accommodate or to cultivate diversity”).
173
See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 163, at 1631 (“The law of consumer protection has long
concerned itself with information and power asymmetries among market participants.”).
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discrimination statutes) specifically forbids disparate impact discrimination in addition to intentional discrimination,174 and the Supreme
Court has interpreted Title VII to permit employers to consider candidates’ race or gender as part of an affirmative action plan so long as the
plan’s purpose mirrors that of Title VII and does not unnecessarily
trammel the rights of nonbeneficiaries.175 For this reason, the EEOC
explains:
Employers may legitimately need information about their employees[’] or applicant[’s] race for affirmative action purposes
and/or to track applicant flow [for purposes of complying with
Title VII’s disparate impact provisions]. One way to obtain racial
information and simultaneously guard against discriminatory
selection is for employers to use separate forms or otherwise
keep the information about an applicant’s race separate from the
application. In that way, the employer can capture the information it needs but ensure that it is not used in the selection
decision.176
IV. CONCLUSION
Antidiscrimination law regulates commercial conduct when it prohibits gatekeepers from relying on certain characteristics in setting the
terms and conditions of employment and other transactions. As theory
and doctrine both make clear, the First Amendment permits the government to restrict the speech that initiates or accomplishes this conduct—that is, speech that does something and not just says something.
More specifically, this includes commercial actors’ speech that enables
illegally discriminatory transactions, such as gatekeepers’ statements
174

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(A)(i) (prohibiting an employer from using an employment practice that disproportionately excludes or disadvantages protected class members unless the employer can “validate” the practice — i.e., unless it can show that the practice is “job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity”).
175
See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding county’s consideration
of sex or race as a plus-factor in promotions to remedy substantial underrepresentation of women
and people of color in traditionally segregated jobs); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding collective bargaining agreement’s dedication of a certain percentage of
openings in training programs to African-American workers to break down longstanding patterns
of racial hierarchy within those jobs).
176
Facts About Race/Color Discrimination, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-race.cfm [https://perma.cc/27C7-5Y47]; see also Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions & Medical Examinations, EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (1995), www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/preemp.html [https://p
erma.cc/U8E5-BN9S] (explaining that the ADA permits federal contractors to invite applicants or
employees to voluntarily self-identify as individuals with disabilities for purposes of complying
with federal law that requires federal contractors to engage in affirmative action that may require
the collection of applicant data).
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like “White Applicants Only” as well as inquiries about candidates’ protected class status. Because these inquiries enable illegal discrimination by deterring candidates based on their protected class status and
by eliciting the information that facilitates gatekeepers’ discriminatory
decisions, the First Amendment poses no bar to the government’s regulation of them.

Free Speech Overrides
Frederick Schauer†

I.

INTRODUCTION

The notion of an “absolute” First Amendment has been around for
generations.1 First Amendment absolutism was championed, although
not with exactly that term, by Justices Hugo Black and William O.
Douglas.2 And numerous commentators, perhaps Alexander Meiklejohn
most prominently,3 have joined the absolutist parade.4
Talk of an absolute First Amendment, however, is just that—talk.
Even putting aside the obvious and by-now familiar point that the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause does not even come close to covering
all speech,5 the protection the Free Speech Clause offers even to
†

Frederick Schauer is David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. This Essay was prepared for the University of Chicago Law School’s Conference
on What’s the Harm? The Future of the First Amendment, held on October 24, 2019.
1
See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., EMERSON, HABER, AND DORSEN’S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 45 (4th ed. 1976).
2
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456–57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140–
44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960);
Hugo L. Black & Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes,” A Public Interview, 37 NYU L. REV. 549 (1962); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and
the First Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 371 (1974). In N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971), Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, apparently addressing Justice Douglas, famously
argued as follows: “You say that ‘no law’ means ‘no law’ and that should be obvious. I can only say,
Mr. Justice, that to me it is equally obvious that ‘no law’ does not mean ‘no law,’ and I would seek
to persuade the Court that that is true.” Transcript of Oral Argument in Times and Post Cases
Before the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 1971, at 24. Justice Black was of the opinion,
however, that Griswold’s statement was addressed to him. See GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK
AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 431 (1977).
3
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (1961).
4
See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 125–93 (1992); Zachary S. Price, Our Imperiled Absolutist First Amendment, 20 U. PA. J. CON. L. 817 (2018); Solveig
Singer, Reviving First Amendment Absolutism for the Internet, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279 (1999).
The idea persists. See Tony Woodlief, Free Speech Absolutism Killed Free Speech, WALL ST. J., Aug.
31, 2020, at A17.
5
A great deal of communication, linguistic and otherwise, simply does not implicate the First
Amendment at all. In my preferred terminology, such communication (much of which is “speech”
in ordinary English) is not covered by the First Amendment, which is to be distinguished from
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communications within its scope—the communications that the First
Amendment does cover—is not absolute now, has never been absolute
in the past, and will not be absolute in the future. Rather, the protections of freedom of speech and freedom of the press—like the protections, prohibitions, and guarantees of other constitutional rights—are
subject to being overridden by other considerations if those other considerations present themselves with sufficient weight and immediacy.
In the context of equal protection, due process, and the free exercise of
religion, for example, the threshold for overriding under the so-called
strict scrutiny approach is typically the familiar “compelling interest”
standard.6 Much the same applies in many contexts to speech covered
by the First Amendment,7 and has ever since Oliver Wendell Holmes
gave us the idea of “clear and present danger.”8
Recent events, with the one in my own city of Charlottesville being
tragically the most notorious,9 make it important to think carefully
about the kinds of dangers—harms—that can override what are undoubtedly rights under the First Amendment. At least as a matter of
settled American free speech doctrine, for example, neo-Nazis,10
those communications that are covered but wind up not being protected after the application of
some First Amendment–inspired test. See Frederick Schauer, Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 346 (2015); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004);
Frederick Schauer, Every Possible Use of Language? in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 33 (Geoffrey
R. Stone & Lee C. Bollinger eds., 2019); Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 NYU. L.
REV. 318 (2018).
6
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (holding that the government must meet
the “compelling interest” standard when fundamental rights under the due process clause are infringed); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (holding that race–based distinctions are
permissible under the equal protection clause only if they serve a compelling governmental interest); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (same); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (holding that restrictions targeted at
religious practices are permissible only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest).
7
See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988) (restrictions on charitable solicitations); Williams–Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 445 (2015) (restrictions on speech of
candidates in judicial elections); Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989)
(restrictions on allegedly indecent speech); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 162–63 (2015)
(content–based restrictions generally). Slightly more complex is New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
761 (1982), in which the Supreme Court used the language of “compelling” interest to justify restrictions on non–obscene child pornography, and thus announced the general permissibility of
such restrictions, but did not require a showing of a compelling interest in particular applications.
8
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
9
For accounts of the events arising out of the Unite the Right rally in August 2017, see
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, FINAL REPORT: INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 2017 PROTEST EVENTS IN
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA (2017), https://www.huntonak.com/en/news/final-report-independent
-review-of-the-2017-protest-events-in-charlottesville-virginia.html [perma.cc/3787-LYKV]; see
also Complaint, Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765 (W.D. Va. 2018) (No. 3:17–CV–00072); Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, No. 3:17CV00056, 2017 WL 34754071 (W.D. Va. 2017); Frederick
Schauer, In the Shadow of the First Amendment, in CHARLOTTESVILLE 2017: THE LEGACY OF RACE
AND INEQUITY 65 (Louis P. Nelson & Claudrena Harold eds., 2018).
10
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Klansmen,11 white supremacists,12 homophobes,13 puppy torturers,14
and endorsers of sexual violence,15 among others, have a right to publish their views and voice them in the public forum. Typically, as these
examples illustrate, attempts to restrict such speakers have been met
with the usually successful response that the speakers can only be restricted if the state can show that the speech would produce a harm of
the greatest magnitude and immediacy, and that the harm could not be
alleviated by any approach less restrictive of a speaker’s First Amendment rights.16 Importantly, governments have almost universally been
unable to establish such a showing.17 Accordingly, it seems appropriate
in light of recent events, especially those involving hostile audiences,18
to survey the existing doctrine and offer some guideposts as to what it
would take actually to override the First Amendment in areas of its
central coverage.
Yet if the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press can
on occasion be overridden,19 then it follows that the possessors of such
rights may sometimes wind up losing what the rights purport to give
them. This in itself is hardly remarkable, as this conclusion flows logically from the nonabsolutism of the underlying right. But what is more
noteworthy is that those whose First Amendment rights are overridden,
even when properly so, wind up losing something—they lose what the
First Amendment guarantees them. Yet despite having lost the opportunity to exercise their First Amendment rights, they still receive nothing to acknowledge their loss, and certainly nothing to compensate
them for that loss.

11

Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
See HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, supra note 9.
13
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
14
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
15
Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
16
See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (holding that restrictions on
content of violent interactive videogames could be restricted only if the particular restriction was
“necessary” to serve a “compelling interest”).
17
Thus, each of the cases cited in supra notes 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16 was one in which the
government’s justification for its attempted restriction was invalidated. For recent examples, see
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
18
See Frederick Schauer, Costs and Challenges of the Hostile Audience, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1671 (2019). For accounts of recent events, many on or near university campuses, see Jamal
Greene, Constitutional Moral Hazard and Campus Speech, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 223 (2019); JD
Hsin, Defending the Public’s Forum: Theory and Doctrine in the Problem of Provocative Speech, 69
HASTINGS L. J. 1099 (2018); Timothy E. D. Horley, Rethinking the Heckler’s Veto after Charlottesville, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 8 (2018).
19
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (using the exact language of “override”).
12
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Although such non-compensation or other redress for the loss of the
ability to exercise a constitutional right seems so familiar as to fail to
even generate concern, it does stand in contrast to how we treat those
who have given up their property rights for the public good. In those
instances, the so-called Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,20 provides that
those whose property is taken by eminent domain, even if the taking is
justified, are nevertheless entitled to “just compensation.”21 But if those
whose property rights are taken for the public good are entitled to compensation for their loss, then why are not those whose First Amendment
rights are similarly taken (or restricted) for the public good also entitled
to compensation? That is a puzzle, and a secondary goal of this Article—
although one that emerges directly from the phenomenon of the override—is to present and examine this puzzle.
II. IT ALL STARTED WITH HOLMES
When Oliver Wendell Holmes first used the now-familiar phrase,
“clear and present danger,”22 it was for him not a carefully considered
choice of words at all. In Schenck v. United States,23 and then in Debs v.
United States24 and Frohwerk v. United States25 only months later,
Holmes treated the prosecutions as largely controlled by existing principles of criminal law. As in the criminal law, the defendant’s intent was
crucial, but Holmes, having found that Charles Schenck, Eugene Debs,
and Jacob Frohwerk all possessed the necessary intent to sustain their
convictions,26 did not treat the First Amendment claims of all three of
these defendants as worthy of serious consideration. So when Holmes
mentioned that speech could be restricted when a clear and present
danger existed, it was, at the time, little more than an aside.27 That
Holmes wrote for the Court in upholding all three convictions
20

See Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
21
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
23
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
24
249 U.S. 211 (1919).
25
249 U.S. 204 (1919); see also Schauer, supra note 9.
26
For contrasting views on the relevance of speaker’s intent under the First Amendment, see
LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 76 (2005); Larry Alexander,
Free Speech and Speaker’s Intent, 12 CONST. COMM. 24 (1995); Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and
Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255 (2014); Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling
Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633 (2013).
27
See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS
MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 102–03 (2013). Indeed, the accompanying “shouting fire in a crowded theater” example was not even original with Holmes, having first appeared in the prosecutor’s closing argument in the Debs trial. Id. at 91.
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underscores that he did not imagine that the idea of a clear and present
danger imposed very much of an impediment to a conviction that was
permissible under standard criminal law principles. Indeed, the fact
that a variant of clear and present danger appears in Holmes’s subsequent change of heart in Abrams v. United States28 only in the disjunctive29 further emphasizes that at the beginning of the modern First
Amendment the idea of clear and present danger did not do very much
work.
Given the results in Schenck, Debs, and Abrams, the idea of a clear
and present danger appears as a highly permissive standard.30 In theory, it need not be so. After all, under the “rational basis” test, the test
that is generally applicable to the evaluation of government restrictions
on conduct not covered by the First Amendment,31 the state is permitted
to take actions against dangers that are neither clear nor present. Rational basis review allows the state to speculate with respect to dangers
that are not clear and to regulate for future dangers that are not present. Few would argue these days, for example, that government may
not regulate the sale of electronic cigarettes or foods made with genetically manufactured organisms (GMOs), even though the alleged dangers of such products, being contested and speculative, are certainly not
clear.32 Even more obviously, the government plainly may take restrictive actions to combat the dangers of climate change, even though the
clear dangers of climate change are not “present” under any ordinary
understanding of that word.33 As a result, and contrary to the actual
results in the 1919 cases, it seems now safe to conclude, as the Supreme
Court and other courts concluded in the 1960s,34 that the idea of a clear
28

250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 629 (“Even if I am technically wrong and enough can be squeezed from these poor and
puny anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus paper . . . .”).
30
See RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
FREE SPEECH 212–18 (1987).
31
See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938); see also Ferguson v.
Skrupa 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
32
For information on GMOs, see Barbara de Santis et al., Case Studies on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs): Potential Risk Scenarios and Associated Health Indicators, 117 FOOD &
CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 36 (2018). For information on electronic cigarettes, see Jennifer Couzin–
Frankel, How Safe is Vaping? New Human Studies Assess Chronic Harm to Heart and Lungs,
Science Magazine, SCIENCE (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/11/how-safevaping-new-human-studies-assess-chronic-harm-heart-and-lungs [perma.cc/6MAP-NWET].
33
On the tolerance of the rational basis test for speculation, see Heller v. Roe, 509 U.S. 312,
320 (1993); Maria Ponomarenko, Administrative Rationality Review, 104 VA. L. REV. 1399, 1399
(2018); John A. Robertson, Science Disputes in Abortion Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (2015).
On the distinction between First Amendment standards and rationality review, see Felix T. Wu,
The Commercial Difference, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2005, 2036 n.145 (2017).
34
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,
229 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 316 (1957); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165
(1st Cir. 1969).
29
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and present danger is such as to require for the regulation of speech
covered by the First Amendment a showing of gravity, immediacy, and
specificity substantially greater than the showing sufficient to justify
the regulation of non-covered behavior.35 It is far too late in the doctrinal day to believe that speech is protected because it is harmless, and
thus that any harm-producing speech loses its protection for that reason.36 Rather, even harmful speech is routinely protected, and the import of the clear and present danger idea is that the harms must be
especially great and especially immediate for the protection typically
available for harmful speech to be forfeited.
III. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER REVISED—AND NOT
In Schenck, “clear and present danger” may have been little more
than the relatively casual observation that the First Amendment was
not absolute, but it soon became an actual test or criterion against
which restrictions on covered speech were to be measured. Initially, the
view that “clear and present danger” was a constitutional test rather
than merely an observation emerged in a series of dissents. First was
the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, in
Schaefer v. United States,37 explicitly referring to “clear and present
danger,” in objecting to the majority’s affirmation of the conviction of a
wartime dissenter.38 And Brandeis relied on the then-recent article by
Zechariah Chafee for the proposition that clear and present danger
should properly be understood as the test for the constitutionality of a
restriction on advocacy, even in times of war.39 To much the same effect,
shortly thereafter was Pierce v. United States,40 where Brandeis, again
joined by Holmes, once more used explicit “clear and present danger”
language41 in departing from the majority’s conclusion that Pierce’s
pamphlets were intended to produce military insubordination as their
“proximate result”42 and that a jury could find that those pamphlets
could have a “material influence”43 on such insubordination. And in the
same year, Brandeis still again dissented, here in Gilbert v.
35

See Frederick Schauer, Is It Better to Be Safe Than Sorry? Free Speech and the Precautionary Principle, 36 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 301 (2009).
36
See Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81 (2011).
37
251 U.S. 466 (1920).
38
Id. at 483, 486 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
39
Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 963 (1919). On
Chafee’s connections with Hand and Holmes at the time, see STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 369, 385, 393 (2019).
40
252 U.S. 239 (1920).
41
Id. at 255, 271, 272 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
42
Id. at 250.
43
Id.
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Minnesota,44 continuing to use “clear and present danger” as the description of the test from which he believed that the majority had departed.45 Brandeis reiterated that position several years later in his enduring “concurring” opinion in Whitney v. California.46 In Whitney,
Brandeis seemed to follow Holmes’s decision in Gitlow v. New York,47
where Holmes referred to “clear and present danger” in no uncertain
terms as the “criterion” and “test” for all restrictions on advocacy,48 not
only those in which a speaker was prosecuted under a general statute
not restricted to speech, as in Schenck, but also those in which the legislature had made a finding of the dangers resulting from speech of a
certain kind.49
The post-Schenck version of the clear and present danger standard
appeared to have been discarded when a Supreme Court plurality in
Dennis v. United States50 relied on the “gravity of the evil discounted by
its improbability” standard employed by Judge Learned Hand in the
decision below.51 However, it in fact persisted after Dennis: Something
very close to a strong version of the clear and present danger idea, arguably strengthened even further, was to be found in Yates v. United
States52 in 1957, and then in Scales v. United States53 and Noto v.
United States,54 both decided in 1961. And although Yates, Scales, and
Noto were undeniably more speech-protective than Dennis and Gitlow,
the standard they embodied was still not absolute and the idea that
behavior covered by the First Amendment could still be regulated, and
thus that First Amendment rights could be overridden under some circumstances, still persisted.

44

254 U.S. 325 (1920).
Id. at 335, 336, 338 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
46
274 U.S. 357, 374–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For more on the increasing divergence between Holmes and Brandeis on the exact limits of freedom of speech and thus on the
precise understanding of “clear and present danger,” see POLENBERG, supra note 30, at 265–71.
47
268 U.S. 652 (1926).
48
Id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
49
See id. at 673. Gitlow’s relaxed, so–called “bad tendency test” was based, in part, on the
view that clear and present danger was the appropriate test for evaluating the prosecution of
speech under a statute not aimed directly or specifically at speech as such, but that a test of less
stringency was appropriate where the legislature, in targeting speech of a certain kind or with a
certain effect, had already made a determination about the danger of the speech to which the
statute was addressed. See Hans A. Linde, “Clear and Present Danger” Reexamined: Dissonance
in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: Some
Modern Views—The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (1964).
50
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
51
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
52
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
53
367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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367 U.S. 290 (1961).
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In a narrow sense, Schenck is no longer good law. The specific context in which the clear and present danger standard first arose in
Schenck—the advocacy of unlawful conduct—was and remains superseded by the test that emerged from Brandenburg v. Ohio.55 The Brandenburg standard, arguably incorporating some version of the requirement of explicit incitement first introduced by Judge Hand a halfcentury earlier in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten56 and still retaining
(and strengthening) the evidentiary (“clear”) and temporal (“present”)
dimensions of the clear and present danger idea,57 superseded Schenck
and remains the applicable rule today.58 Indeed, to the extent that lower
courts have tended to apply Brandenburg to civil cases involving negligent causation of unlawful acts,59 the case has emerged as an even
broader and stronger protection of speech bearing a relationship to subsequent acts of illegality. Even so, however, the test is not absolute, and
it remains possible, at least in theory, for even Brandenburg to permit
the First Amendment to be overridden in cases of intentional, explicit,
advocacy of immediate substantial illegality when such illegality is
likely to occur.60
IV. THE PERSISTENCE OF CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
Although the test set forth in Brandenburg has superseded clear
and present danger as the standard to be applied to putative restrictions on the advocacy of unlawful conduct, it would be a mistake to
assume that Brandenburg represents the complete demise of the clear
and present danger test as an actual standard to be applied today to
actual restrictions. In some number of domains, the clear and present
danger standard persists, largely because the basic idea of requiring
reasons of special strength to override the First Amendment remains
55

395 U.S. 444 (1969). On the ins and outs of the Brandenburg test, see Larry Alexander,
Inciting, Requesting, Provoking, or Persuading Others to Commit Crimes: The Legacy of Schenck
and Abrams in Free Speech Jurisprudence, 72 S.M.U. L. REV. 389, 392–95 (2019); Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History,
27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975); Linde, supra note 49; Frank R. Strong, Fifty Years of “Clear and
Present Danger”: From Schenck to Brandenburg—and Beyond, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 41 (1969).
56
244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
57
See 395 U.S. at 447 (“[The] State [may not] forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
58
See, e.g., Higgins v. Ky. Sports Radio, LLC, 951 F.3d 728, 736 (6th Cir. 2020); United States
v. Daley, 378 F. Supp. 3d 539, 555–56 (W.D. Va. 2019).
59
See Eugene Volokh, Crime–Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (2005); James v.
Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F.2d 1264
(D. Colo. 2002).
60
Not everything that is ex ante likely to happen actually happens, and thus Brandenburg
would sometimes permit sanctions against a speaker urging immediate violent actions even if
those actions did not in fact occur.
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central, even though not all reasons of special strength fit the Brandenburg formula, designed as it is to deal with the specific problem of advocacy of unlawful conduct.
Consider, for example, the line of cases dealing with speech that
has the potential of interfering with the judicial process. It is now wisely
as well as widely accepted that newspaper and other public comments
about trials and judges, even during the pendency of the trial, are protected by the First Amendment.61 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court has explicitly established that clear and present danger to
the administration of justice is the relevant standard.62 And although
the cases so holding predate Brandenburg, it seems plain that the Brandenburg formula would fit poorly with a situation in which the potential
danger is to the impartiality of judges and jurors, and is not that some
reader or listener will engage in unlawful acts against those judges or
jurors (or litigants). When the Court in Cox v. Louisiana63 suggested
that physical parading and picketing outside a courtroom or a courthouse might be governed by different standards,64 it appeared implicitly
to reaffirm that clear and present danger would be the standard applied
to so-called pure speech about pending trials.
Although the Cox majority treated the physical aspect of parading
and picketing as grounds for its ambivalence about the applicability of
the clear and present danger standard, that ambivalence seems a bit
surprising. Twenty-five years earlier, in Thornhill v. Alabama,65 the
Court did indeed discuss clear and present danger as the standard appropriate to a situation in which the petitioners’ labor-related picketing
was held to be protected.66 Cox thus appears as a slight anomaly, and a
fair conclusion to be drawn from the cases just discussed—none of
which have been overruled or questioned—is that clear and present
danger still has its place even after Brandenburg, and that the Brandenburg formulation—for all of its enduring importance—still might be
understood as an exception to a more pervasive and persistent clear and
present danger approach.67
61

See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
62
See Wood, 370 U.S. at 384–87; Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 346; Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263; see
also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377 (1947).
63
379 U.S. 559 (1965).
64
Id. at 562–65.
65
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
66
See id. at 104–05. See also, in the same year, Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113 (1940),
and, a year later, Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941). And,
slightly earlier, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 447–48, 454 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting),
followed by Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261–64 (1937).
67
For a thorough exploration of the idea of clear and present danger as a “fall back” approach,
see Leslie Kendrick, On “Clear and Present Danger,” 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1655, 1662–63
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Much more importantly, however, clear and present danger retains
continuing—indeed, increasing—vitality in the context of what has
come to be understood as the problem of the hostile audience.68 The paradigm application of Brandenburg, a paradigm going back to Schenck,
is to a speaker (or writer) addressing an actually or potentially sympathetic audience and urging that audience to action. Charles Schenck,
Eugene Debs, Jacob Frohwerk, and Jacob Abrams, for example, each
tried to persuade those who were already inclined to share their socialist or anarchist or anti-war proclivities to put those proclivities into action by resisting the draft or in other ways interfering with the war effort.69 And Clarence Brandenburg, speaking to his fellow Klansmen
(and maybe some cows) on a field in southern Ohio, was prosecuted for,
again, encouraging predisposed followers to unlawful action.70
What makes this characterization of the line of cases from Schenck
to Brandenburg interesting here is precisely the fact that not all danger-producing speakers produce that danger by encouraging, urging, or
inciting their sympathetic followers to take socially detrimental and
typically unlawful actions. Even putting aside the cases typically applying Brandenburg to civil actions seeking to hold speakers (or, typically,
publishers) liable for negligently inspiring or facilitating unlawful action,71 there are many instances in which violence is the genuinely unintended (by the speaker) and truly undesired (by the speaker) byproduct of an otherwise lawful speech. Typically this occurs when an

(2019). For a concern about precisely this state of affairs, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Clear
and Present Dangers of the Clear and Present Danger Test: Schenck and Abrams Revisited, 72
S.M.U. L. REV. 415 (2019).
68
See generally Frederick Schauer, Costs and Challenges of the Hostile Audience, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1671 (2019). Contemporary conflicts on college campuses have generated a recent
and growing corpus of commentary. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Free Expression on Campus:
Mitigating the Costs of Contentious Speakers, 41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 163 (2018); Darrell A.
H. Miller, Constitutional Conflict and Sensitive Places, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 459 (2019);
Kevin Francis O’Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 LOY. L. J. 411 (1999); Christina
E. Wells, Free Speech Hypocrisy: Campus Free Speech Conflicts and the Sub–Legal First Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 533 (2018); see also Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951); Note,
Freedom of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1118
(1949).
69
On the activities of defendants Schenck, Debs, Frohwerk, and Abrams leading to their prosecutions, see HEALY, supra note 27; POLENBERG, supra note 30; GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS
TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
135–234 (2004)
70
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969); see also Steve Kissing, Brandenburg v.
Ohio, CINCINNATI MAG., Aug. 2001, at 14–15.
71
See Volokh, supra note 59; James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002); Sanders
v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F.2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002); see also Rice v. Paladin Enter., 128 F.3d
233 (4th Cir. 1997); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987); Olivia N. v.
Nat’l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981). See generally David A. Anderson, Incitement
and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957 (2002); Leslie Kendrick, Note, A Test for Criminally
Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L. REV. 1973 (2005).
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audience reacts violently to what a speaker non-violently has said, and
this, in a nutshell, is the problem of the hostile audience.
The hostile audience problem has been around and generating Supreme Court opinions for almost a century. Early on, Feiner v. New
York72 held it permissible to restrict the speaker in order to prevent violence brought about by an audience angry at the speaker (and thus not
incited or encouraged by the speaker).73 But a series of cases in the
1960s involving civil rights demonstrators and marchers effectively
overruled Feiner, and required that restrictive actions in cases of hostile
and potentially (or actually) violent reactions to speakers be directed
not against the speaker, but against those who engaged in or threatened
to engage in the reactive violence.74
As recent events have made clear, the problem of the hostile audience is not only still with us, but increasing at a rapid rate.75 And thus
the question persists—in an age of burgeoning listener violence—as to
when speakers might be restricted in order to deal with audience violence, or, more commonly, when an entire event might be shut down,
thus restricting the speakers as well as the audience.
Here again, it turns out that the clear and present danger standard
may still be with us. In what is perhaps the first hostile audience case,
Cantwell v. Connecticut,76 the Supreme Court explicitly used clear and
present danger as the standard to be applied when violence is threatened by those who react negatively to a speaker’s speech.77 And not only
did Terminiello v. City of Chicago78 nine years later employ the same
standard,79 but in the same year so also did Feiner v. New York, even if
the subsequent cases of the 1960s have made clear that the Feiner
Court’s toothless application of that standard could not satisfy the requirements of the First Amendment.
The fact that neither Cox, nor Edwards, nor Gregory employed
clear and present danger language in casting grave doubts on Feiner
suggests that the best conclusion, in light of Cantwell and Terminiello,
72

340 U.S. 315 (1951).
I put aside the complexities created by speakers who intentionally provoke or attract a hostile audience, and thus who can be said to encourage or desire angry listeners in just this sense.
74
See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992),
which held unconstitutional an attempt by the county to require the speakers the bear the financial costs of increased security occasioned by the hostile audience, can be understood as reaffirming
the basic thrust of Gregory, Cox, and Edwards, and thus as reaffirming the interment of Feiner.
75
For more on recent events, of which that in Charlottesville is the most well–known, see the
commentaries cited in note 68.
76
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
77
See id. 311.
78
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
79
See id. at 4.
73
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is simply that the question remains open. And that conclusion is supported by the way in which lower courts have wrestled with the issue,
with some of those courts concluding that clear and present danger remains the test for when a speaker or an event can be closed down because of the reactions of a hostile audience,80 while other courts and
judges do not mention clear and present danger in the process of protecting speakers from restrictions arising out of the reactions of a hostile audience.81
Although the law remains unfortunately unclear on the issue, it is
hard to imagine that speakers (or the events at which they are speaking) can never be restricted because of the actual or potential reactions
of a hostile audience. As a result, perhaps the best we can imagine as a
workable standard is some version of a clear and present danger test
combined with a least restrictive alternative approach. Consider, for example, a clear and present danger of violence that comes from the reaction of a hostile audience to a speaker who did not intentionally provoke
that audience. Such a scenario, increasingly common, might justify not
the immediate arrest of the speaker, but instead a dispersal order by
law enforcement, the disobedience of which might then, and only then,
justify actions against a speaker who disobeyed that order.82 Or, similarly, the existence of that clear and present danger might be grounds—
subject to judicial review—for ordering speakers to change locations or
times in the least restrictive way possible while still avoiding the danger, with, again, further restrictions on speakers (including prosecution) being permissible only if those orders to change times and/or
places are disobeyed. And whether the exact language of “clear and present danger” is employed or not, a fair conclusion seems to be that at
least some version of that idea must persist. When the just-described
less restrictive alternatives cannot prevent audience violence, and
when existing law enforcement resources are unable to do the same,
then it would be hard to imagine that the ability of speakers to speak
when and where they choose, even in the face of violence that reasonable law enforcement efforts cannot contain, is required by the First
Amendment. And whether it is clear and present danger or some variant thereof that represents the standard, it is equally hard to imagine
80

See Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975); Christian Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 751 F. Supp. 218, 220 (D. D.C. 1990).
81
For an example, see the thorough and complex opinions on both sides of the issue in Bible
Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015).
82
Indeed, Feiner itself is slightly unclear on the issue. Irving Feiner had disobeyed several
police requests (and then, seemingly, orders) to stop speaking before he was finally arrested. See
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1951). The question remains, and neither Feiner nor
any of the subsequent cases answer it, whether the standards for a non–punitive order (the disregard of which might then provide the basis for punishment) are or should be different from the
standards applicable to an immediate arrest or citation.
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that Brandenburg, designed for a very different kind of problem, would
be the starting or ending point of the analysis.
V.

THE QUESTION OF REDRESS

There is much more that could be said about the problem of the
hostile audience, and in light of recent events much of that is likely to
be said in the near future by both courts and commentators. But rather
than engage in further speculation, I want to examine a particular consequence of understanding First Amendment rights as overridable, and
thus of understanding the holder of First Amendment rights as vulnerable to losing the ability to exercise those rights because of overriding
circumstances. More particularly, I want to expose an anomaly in how
we treat overridden rights, an anomaly especially apparent in hostile
audience situations.
Whether it be by use of the clear and present danger test or with
some other test yet to be developed, it seems plain that there are at least
some instances in which speeches, parades, demonstrations, rallies,
and the like can be ordered to close down or to move because of the
reactions of a hostile audience. As a matter of state law, such responses
by state and local law enforcement authorities are typically effectuated
by means of a declaration of an unlawful assembly,83 but the exact details are not important here. What is important is that there are, and
have been instances in which some of the consequences of actions by a
hostile audience are such that speakers who would otherwise have First
Amendment rights to say what they are saying will have those First
Amendment rights restricted in some way because of the actual or potential reactions of their unsympathetic listeners.
Under such circumstances, we might then ask what is owed to
those, including many whose moral profile is vastly superior to the
“Unite the Right” demonstrators in Charlottesville, whose First Amendment rights have been curtailed through no fault of their own.84 If by
virtue of what is now commonly labeled the “heckler’s veto”85 a group of
speakers is justifiably restricted in the exercise of what would otherwise

83

See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–406 (West 2018).
I do not ignore the extent to which—especially these days—speakers, protesters, picketers,
paraders, and demonstrators often deliberately provoke the hostile audience, and often do so in
the hopes of a violent reaction. But this is not and need not always be so. Sometimes, not surprisingly, speakers prefer not to be assaulted, and sometimes prefer that violence not occur as a result
of their activities.
85
See R. George Wright, The Heckler’s Veto Today, 68 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 159 (2017).
The phrase originated in HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140–65
(1965) and made its first appearance in the United States Reports in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966).
84
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be within their First Amendment rights, then what rights of redress or
compensation do the restricted speakers have?
As should be apparent, the answer to this question, as a matter of
existing law and existing political practice, is “nothing.” If the reactions
of a hostile audience rise to the level of a genuine clear and present
danger, and thus if law enforcement is constitutionally justified in restricting the speakers by, for example, declaring an unlawful assembly
and bringing the event to a close, the prevailing practice is that the restricted speakers are entitled to no compensation or other redress. Law
enforcement having, by hypothesis, done the right thing, the state’s obligations come to an end.
But compare this scenario to the taking of land by eminent domain.
If the state takes (or even, sometimes, restricts the use of86) someone’s
land by eminent domain, then the land-owner who has been deprived of
her land (and therefore her property rights) is entitled to “just compensation” by order of the Fifth Amendment, and that is so even if the taking was entirely justified.
The anomaly should now be apparent: the land-owner whose property rights are overridden for the public good is compensated, but the
speaker or demonstrator whose First Amendment rights are overridden
or restricted is entitled to nothing.
This anomaly might be explained in some number of ways. Perhaps
the anomaly is a function of the longstanding belief that property is
tangible and valuable in ways that rights are not.87 Perhaps it is a function of the ability to place a monetary value on the property taken in
ways that would be far less possible for the deprivation of free speech
rights.88 Or perhaps it is simply a matter of historical path-dependence
or the power of the we’ve-never-done-it-before-so-we shouldn’t-do-itnow argument.
If none of these explanations are persuasive (and I offer them as
explanations and not as justifications), then perhaps the anomaly between how we treat rightful property deprivations and how we treat

86

See Maureen E. Brady, The Damagings Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV. 341 (2018) (explaining how
the law in some states provides compensation even for impairments that do not rise to the level of
takings).
87
The prevailing view now is that property is best understood as a “bundle of rights” and not
a physical thing. See Shane Nicholas Glackin, Back to Bundles: Deflating Property Rights, Again,
20 LEG. 1 (2014) (defending the bundle of rights account). But the longstanding lay belief that
property is defined by its physical presence has its contemporary academic defenders. See J.E.
Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996).
88
This explanation—the monetization explanation—seems odd, however. If the state wrongly
deprives someone of her free speech rights, she can bring a civil rights action to seek monetary
compensation for what she has lost. See generally JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION (4th ed., 2018). And if this is possible, then it is difficult
to see why there could not similarly be a monetary value attached to a rightful restriction.
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rightful free speech deprivations could be “cured” in some way. Assuming that the Constitution prohibits limiting the right to compensation
for takings of land, then the only other way to lessen the gap between
what we do for property takings and what we do for speech takings is
to at least think about compensating those who in some way have had
their free speech rights diminished for the public good. And although
we rarely think about this possibility—the possibility of compensating
those whose free speech rights are overridden—it is a possibility that
finds support from two other areas of thought.
One of these areas of thought is in private law, where the questions
about Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.89 are about whether one
who justifiably injures another’s property is required to compensate the
owner of the damaged property despite the justifiability of the action.
If, as in Vincent, someone who justifiably damages another’s dock in
order to keep from foundering in a storm must nevertheless compensate
the dock-owner for the damages caused, nevertheless, does the state
analogously owe damages to those whose rights are justifiably overridden for the public good?
Once the question is posed this way, it becomes clear that there is
also a relevant domain of philosophical thinking. Many of the philosophers who have thought about nonabsolute (and thus overridable)
rights—Judith Thomson,90 Frances Kamm,91 and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,92 for example—have argued that when rights are rightfully
overridden there is a moral residue,93 such that the infringer still owes
something by way of compensation or other redress to the right-holder
whose rights have been overridden. If these and other philosophers94
are right, then is there a constitutional residue when constitutional
rights are overridden, such that the overrider—the state—similarly
owes compensation even though the state has done the right thing?
89

124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (suggesting, even if not directly holding, that a shipowner who
justifiably saved his ship in a storm at the cost of damage to someone else’s dock would owe compensation to the dock-owner). Somewhat similar is Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908), concluding that the shipowner in an analogous situation was not liable in trespass. For commentary on
these cases and the issues they raise, see George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered
from the Legal and Moral Points of View, 48 DUKE L. J. 975 (1999); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin
C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
743, 765 n.89 (2016).
90
See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 84–86, 93–96 (1990); JUDITH JARVIS
THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 59–60, 71–72, 76–77 (1986).
91
F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE HARM 249–60
(2007).
92
WALTER SINNOTT–ARMSTRONG, MORAL DILEMMAS 44–53 (1988).
93
This is the term used by THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS, supra note 90, and SINNOTT–
ARMSTRONG, supra note 92. KAMM, supra note 91, calls it “negative residue.”
94
See also Rex Martin & James W. Nickel, Recent Work on the Concept of Rights, 17 AM. PHIL.
Q. 165 (1980).
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In the context of this article and this symposium I do not propose
to answer these questions here. But if we apply those questions specifically to free speech rights under the First Amendment, it turns out that
the questions raised by Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. and the
aforementioned philosophers are very real, especially in the context of
the problem of the hostile audience.
One qualification is worth noting. In many instances of speeches or
demonstrations that are justifiably restricted, it is the restricted
speaker who has triggered the restriction, and it might seem odd to
think that such a speaker is entitled to redress. If a modern-day Clarence Brandenburg intentionally and explicitly urges his audience to
take specific and immediate violent action against African-Americans
and Jews,95 he can be restricted according to the Brandenburg standard, but it would seem odd indeed to think that Brandenburg is entitled
to compensation. But, to use another hypothetical (and decidedly counterfactual) scenario, if the hostile audience reactions against a modernday Reverend Elton Cox96 are such that his otherwise protected demonstration must be curtailed, it seems less odd to think he might be entitled to something. Under existing doctrines and practices, however,
Reverend Cox would get nothing. Civil rights actions would provide redress if the restriction were wrongful, but when the restrictions are
rightful there is no route to a remedy, even if the injury to him—not
being able to speak—is the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have unsatisfyingly ended with a question to which I do not purport to provide an answer. Nor do I think that the question and the
anomaly that generates it are the most important things to consider
when we are addressing the kinds of issues that arise from the way in
which free speech rights can be overridden. But the anomaly and the
questions about how, if it all, to resolve them represent at least one potentially interesting corner of the larger question of free speech overrides generally. Given that the baseline free speech standards have become ever more speech protective, as the progression from Schenck to
Brandenburg shows, it is easy to lose sight of the nonabsolute character
of even the most highly speech-protective doctrines. But the hostile audience problem—no longer restricted to the epiphenomenal factual scenarios that characterized cases like Cantwell, Terminiello, and Feiner—
is no longer an epiphenomenal problem, and considering the standards

95
96

This was not the exact language he used. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969).
From Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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and consequences of the way in which free speech rights may be overridden turns out to be more germane than it was in the 1960s or even
in the more recent past.

Free Speech and the “Unique Evils” of Public
Accommodations Discrimination
Elizabeth Sepper†

INTRODUCTION
For over a hundred years, the U.S. Supreme Court—and an array
of state supreme courts—consistently rejected arguments that businesses open to the public have a constitutional right to provide less than
the full and equal services required by antidiscrimination laws.1 The
Supreme Court made clear that public accommodations law “does not,
on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content.”2
First Amendment claims involving unusual applications of public accommodations law have sometimes met success.3 But the Court drew a
sharp contrast between expressive associations—safeguarded from application of the law—and “commercial relationship[s] offered generally
or widely”—entitled to no First Amendment protection.4 First

† Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. I’m grateful to Kathryn
Garza for excellent research assistance and to the participants in the University of Chicago Law
School’s Legal Forum Symposium, What’s the Harm? The Future of the First Amendment, for
their comments and suggestions. I thank Nika Arzoumanian, Rebecca Boorstein, Austin Kissinger, Daniel Simon, Anna Porter, James Gao, Rebecca Roman, Claire Lee, Qi Xie, and the rest of
the journal staff for their superb organizing and editorial assistance.
1
E.g., W. Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 364 (1907); Messenger v. State, 41 N.W.
638, 639 (Neb. 1889); People v. King, 18 N.E. 245, 248–49 (N.Y. 1888).
2
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995) (observing that public accommodations laws “do not, as a general matter, violate the First
or Fourteenth Amendments”).
3
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572 (“In the case before us, however, the Massachusetts law has been
applied in a peculiar way.”); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000) (distinguishing entities like “taverns, restaurants, [and] retail shops” from non-commercial membership
organizations like the Boy Scouts that “may not carry with them open invitations to the public”).
4
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Hurley, 515 U.S. at
571; Dale, 530 U.S. at 657 (distinguishing entities like “taverns, restaurants, [and] retail shops”
from organizations that “may not carry with them open invitations to the public” or are not “clearly
commercial entities”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(observing constitutional “dichotomy” between the rights of expressive and commercial organizations).
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Amendment claims from businesses failed, regardless of whether they
were framed as rights of free speech, free association, or free exercise.5
But over the last decade, a movement for exemptions from antidiscrimination laws has taken hold.6 For-profit businesses refuse to take
photos or videos, bake cakes, print invitations, rent accommodations, or
arrange flowers for same-sex couples out of religion-based objections to
same-sex relationships. While religion motivates business owners, public accommodations laws easily meet the Free Exercise Clause’s requirements of neutrality and general applicability.7 These laws were
adopted to eradicate discrimination, not target religion, and are generally applicable, usually applying to every place open to the public.8 As
a result, the question at the heart of these cases is whether cake baking,
flower arranging, wedding hosting, or invitation lettering is speech. Objectors argue that requiring businesses to sell goods and services on
equal terms to a same-sex couple compels them to speak in favor of the
marriage.
Court after court rejected these arguments.9 But then, in 2019, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Arizona Supreme Court
became the first courts to hold that wedding businesses have a free
speech (and free exercise) right to refuse service.10 Two justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court, Thomas and Gorsuch, have indicated their agreement.11 In the near future, the Court will likely take up the issue. So—
as this symposium asks—what’s the harm?
Thirty-five years ago, the Supreme Court instructed that “unique
evils” inhered in discrimination in public commerce.12 In this essay, I

5

See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469–70 (1973) (noting that no court has ever granted “affirmative
constitutional protections” to private discrimination).
6
Sarah Posner, The Christian Legal Army Behind Masterpiece Cakeshop, NATION (Nov. 28,
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-christian-legal-army-behind-masterpiece-cakeshop/
[perma.cc/R7FH-RA5L].
7
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that neutral laws of general applicability do not offend the Free Exercise Clause).
8
See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 638–62 (2016) (describing the scope and limited exceptions from these laws).
9
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 68 (N.M. 2013); Gifford v. McCarthy, 137
A.D.3d 30, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo.
App. 2015); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 438–39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018)
(“The items [calligraphers] would produce for a same-sex or opposite-sex wedding would likely be
indistinguishable to the public.”), rev’d, 448 P.3d 890, 895 (Ariz. 2019); State v. Arlene’s Flowers,
Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1225 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-333 (Sept. 12, 2019); Klein v.
Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 289 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
10
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019); Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d
at 895.
11
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgement).
12
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
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evaluate what might be unique about public accommodations within
the civil rights framework. As Part I describes, by inviting the general
public, public accommodations generate expectations of service, expectations always realized by the in-group—often defined by race, religion,
and gender—and sometimes denied to minorities. Unlike employment,
housing, and other spheres of antidiscrimination, public accommodations operate according to accepted conventions of nonselectivity. The
public expects businesses to deliver goods and services on a first-come,
first-served basis, to charge the same prices, and to treat people with
respect for their status as consumers.
As Part II argues, the status of consumer entitles would-be patrons
to a modicum of respect for their dignity. By contrast to discrimination
in employment and housing, discrimination in consumer goods imposes
trivial monetary damages on any particular individual, even as it has
large aggregate effects in the market. But, as the law governing public
accommodations has understood, public-facing businesses have particular power to inflict damage to one’s status as a consumer and citizen.
Under the common law, courts recognized dignitary damages in order
to enforce businesses’ obligations to the public. Given the absence of
significant money damages for failing to honor a movie ticket or sell a
hamburger, dignitary damages provided an otherwise missing deterrent effect. They ensured marginalized groups would no longer have to
participate in the performance of their own inferiority before the audience inherent to businesses that welcome the public.
The final two Parts sketch the import of the unique evils of public
accommodation discrimination for free speech. Part III argues that this
arena manifests unified conventions of the consumer marketplace. The
law of public accommodations shapes a consumer capitalist market that
operates with an ideal of neutrality toward identity traits and aspires
to frictionless transactions and movement. The result is a consumer
marketplace where people and money flow freely in low-information,
low-stakes transactions.
Part IV indicates an overlooked asymmetry in the communicative
potential of service and denial. Because of social expectations of service,
a business communicates little, if anything, when it provides a good or
service to any particular customer. The wedding vendor signals no approval of the person or the use of the goods by its service. By contrast,
denial of service powerfully expresses that a person (or group) does not
merit status as a consumer. The message conveyed by breaking uniform
conventions of service does not depend on the artistic or bespoke nature
of the product sold or the celebration of any particular event. Free
speech claims built around denial of service cannot be so cabined.
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CONSUMER STATUS AND THE EXPECTATION OF SERVICE

Most spheres of life governed by civil rights laws—whether employment, housing, or credit—manifest selectivity. Consider employment,
the focus of most antidiscrimination scholarship. Employers use discretion and often subjective criteria in choosing among applicants. They
gather ample information, ranging from resumes and references to personality tests and credit checks. People find themselves denied jobs for
an array of legitimate reasons—a lack of experience, bad interview, improper fit, or preference for alumni of the boss’s alma mater.
Our expectations of employment are rejection and disappointment
or, at best, uncertainty about the direction of decision making. Applicants neither anticipate nor receive any response from many jobs to
which they apply. Employers routinely reject applicants, deny promotions, and turn down requests for raises.
By contrast, public-facing businesses—from restaurants to grocery
stores, from ballparks to theaters, from flower shops to bakeries—welcome all comers. People rarely offer their names, let alone personal details, in these places. The business tends to inquire only as to the
method of payment. Customers rarely anticipate or receive rejection
without good reason that the tables are booked or the tickets sold out.
Even rejection often serves as invitation to reserve for a future date or
to return for a later game.
Unlike employers, public accommodations do not have an interest
in, or practice of, choosiness.13 The business is organized around abstract customers—any member of the public is welcomed to deal.14 This
invitation generates expectations of service, expectations consistently
realized by the in-group—whether white, male, or heterosexual—and
sometimes denied to minorities. Over the twentieth century, the enactment and enforcement of public accommodations law secured consumer
status for increasing numbers of people. Today, proprietors and consumers alike assume a convention of equal access.
These expectations derive from a long history of business duties to
consumers. Even before the first public accommodations statute was
13

See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term Foreword: “State Action,” Equal
Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 102 (1967) (“It is not a warranted
assumption of our civilization that a lunch-counter proprietor will practice a general choosiness
about his customers, or that the law is expected to leave him alone in this regard.”); James M.
Oleske, “State Inaction,” Equal Protection, and Religious Resistance to LGBT Rights, 87 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1, 50 (2016) (“[T]he law did not assume bakers, florists, and caterers had such an interest
in being selective about their customers before same-sex couples requested equal service.”).
14
Amnon Reichman, Professional Status and the Freedom to Contract: Towards a Common
Law Duty of Non-Discrimination, 14 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 79, 108 (2001) (“The profession is
organized around an interaction with an abstract customer, any member of the public, and hence
is organized around serving the public. Consequently, equal access to the services provided by the
business as such is intrinsic to the profession.”).
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passed, the common law required equal access to businesses open to the
public. As Joseph Singer has demonstrated, prior to the Civil War the
common law rule dictated that “[t]hose who hold themselves out as
ready to serve the public thereby make themselves public servants and
have a duty to serve.”15 The rule appears to have applied broadly, to
barber shops, victuallers, bakers, tailors, and traders.16 Having invited
consumers in, a business could not exclude any one of them without
good cause.
Under the common law, the status as a consumer was closely linked
to citizenship. Thus, after the Civil War, it briefly seemed that newly
freed slaves would gain full and equal access to public businesses under
the common law.17 The Mississippi Supreme Court, for example, observed that the common law had “always” demanded that inns, common
carriers, and “public shows and amusements” be open to all “unless sufficient reason were shown.”18 During Reconstruction, state supreme
courts often concluded that that even in the absence of a statute, black
people were due equal treatment.19 And when the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down the federal Civil Rights Act in 1883, it too assumed that
state common law—and the duty of equal access it encompassed—
would still govern.20 But as Reconstruction ended, legislatures in the
South rejected the duty-to-serve rule in favor of a right, and eventually
duty, of businesses to exclude black people.21 And in many states, courts
came to interpret common law to permit segregation even by core common carriers like trains and inns.22

15

See generally Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1321 (1996) (reviewing American and English treatises, case
law, and custom).
16
Id. at 1327–31.
17
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 515 (1985) (“At the
time the fourteenth amendment was ratified, it still was believed that the common law provided
protection against private interference with individual rights.”).
18
Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 680–81 (1873).
19
Decuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1, 5 (1875) (“In truth the right of the plaintiff to sue the
defendant for damages would be the same, whether [the act] existed or not . . . .”), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718, 720 (Mich.
1890) (“The common law as it existed in this state before the passage of this statute, and before
the colored man became a citizen under our constitution and laws, gave to the white man a remedy
against any unjust discrimination to the citizen in all public places.”).
20
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883); id. at 25 (“Innkeepers and public carriers, by
the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to
furnish proper accommodation[s] to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them.”).
21
Singer, supra note 15, at 1388 (noting that by 1900, every state in the former Confederacy
and in Kentucky had statutes requiring segregation).
22
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 89 (2004) (“Common-law challenges to racially unequal railroad
accommodations had frequently succeeded through the mid-1880s, but such cases virtually disappeared thereafter.”).
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Slowly, however, the class of persons entitled to consumer status
expanded. White men had enjoyed access so long as they could pay.
White women were marginal actors, whose status in the consuming
public grew beginning in the mid-nineteenth century and fluctuated
through much of the twentieth.23 Racial minorities had a much more
tenuous grasp on consumer status. Although many Northern states enacted public accommodations statutes prohibiting race and color discrimination after the Civil War, these laws often were honored in the
breach into the early twentieth century.24
To be sure, minority groups were purchasers of goods and services. In some places, they had ample choices.25 Retail stores solicited
the trade of black customers even in the Deep South.26 But service came
with mistreatment and norms that gave priority to white customers. At
other times, disfavored minorities were restricted to a market niche.
For example, before the Civil Rights Era, Mexican, Asian, and Sikh
farm laborers in California might frequent the one market willing to
serve them, while otherwise encountering signs reading “White Trade
Only.”27 Parallel markets sometimes developed as groups launched
their own businesses. In South Texas, Mexicans could shop in “their
own dry goods stores, grocery stores, meat markets, tailor shops and a
number of other shops.”28 Minority groups had access to goods and services, but their status as consumer-citizens entitled to move and spend
freely was denied.29
23

LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN
POSTWAR AMERICA 136, 147 (2003) (noting that after WWII, “female consumers withdrew from the
civic arena as wartime citizen consumers and even to some extent as post war purchasers as citizens” as female homemaking became the contrast to male worker-citizen-consumer).
24
Lisa G. Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 238–
40 (1978); see also THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH 134 (2008) (noting that antidiscrimination laws were frequently ignored in Northern cities and states).
25
Harry T. Quick, Public Accommodations: A Justification of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 660, 708 (1965) (observing that black people “have patronized theaters,
restaurants, amusement parks, and public conveyances, in some locales [in Ohio], to such an extent that their presence is unnoted”); JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 109–
10 (1959) (examination found virtually no discrimination in restaurants in D.C. and New York
City in 1954); Charles Abrams, “. . . Only the Very Best Christian Clientele,” COMMENTARY, Jan. 1,
1955, at 15 (reporting that half of resorts in Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire allowed Jews
as guests).
26
GREENBERG, supra note 25, at 113.
27
NAT’L PARK SERV., CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: RACIAL DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS 92–93 (2009).
28
DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836–1986 167
(1987).
29
E.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 27, at 116 (noting that throughout the twentieth century, “there was uneven consistency in how and when denials of services” confronted Asian American residents); GRACE E. HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN THE
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The importance of one’s status as a consumer grew over the twentieth century. As historian Lizabeth Cohen explains, engagement in
commerce served as an increasingly important mark of citizenship as
the United States became a “consumers’ republic.”30 After World War II
in particular, ideals of economic abundance and democratic freedom
aligned to create a civic responsibility of mass consumption.31 As histrion Thomas Sugure observes, “[a]ccess to consumer goods—the right
to buy—was a defining characteristic of what it meant to be an American citizen.”32
The black civil rights movement against segregation in stores and
restaurants claimed black people’s status as consumers. While it would
eventually become viewed as a struggle for integration, “what first
drove blacks who challenged discrimination in public accommodations
after World War II was a demand for equality of access.”33 Some civil
rights leaders explicitly sought to reclaim the antebellum view of the
common law.34 Protestors targeted the theaters, restaurants, and pools
that represented “the promise of American consumer culture.”35 They
asserted “the right to eat and drink, to spend their money, where they
pleased.”36
In this period, black activists and their allies secured the passage,
amendment, and enforcement of city and state laws against public accommodations discrimination.37 And after sustained protests and
bloody attacks, they won the passage of federal public accommodations
law—Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196438—that would end consumer
segregation in the South. As historian Louis Hyman explains, this
movement proved so successful in part due to its inherently conservative claim of a right to spend money.39
SOUTH, 1890–1940 Loc. 3791–3800 (2010) (noting black access in practice to most commercial establishments in 1930s Southern towns with a “constant uncertainty”).
30
See generally COHEN, supra note 23 (analyzing the crucial significance of consumption to
ideals of citizenship, from the Great Depression through the late twentieth century).
31
COHEN, supra note 23, at 127.
32
SUGRUE, supra note 24, at 135.
33
COHEN, supra note 23, at 174.
34
GREENBERG, supra note 25, at 81–87, 96–101.
35
SUGRUE, supra note 24, at 135, 143.
36
Id. at 143.
37
David F. Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory Choice
and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943–1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1101–02 (2011) (discussing numerous successful race discrimination suits in Northern and Western states in the
1930s and 1940s); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259–60 (1964) (noting that by the year of the Civil Rights Act’s passage, thirty-two states had public accommodations
laws).
38
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2018).
39 Gaby Del Valle, How the Sears Catalog Transformed Shopping Under Jim Crow, VOX (Oct.
19, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/19/18001734/sears-catalog-bankruptcy-jim-
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Over the twentieth century, an increasing number of people—
women, people with disabilities, and LGBTQ people—demanded this
right and their status as consumers.40 They too secured legal reform.
Today, nearly all states guarantee “the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
a place of public accommodation” without regard to race, color, national
origin, religion, sex, or disability.41 Many jurisdictions also reach gender
identity and sexual orientation discrimination.42 Reinforced by these
laws, shared norms today dictate that public businesses will serve the
customer at the front of the line first. People anticipate being able to
purchase goods in all shops, not just some shops.
II. DIGNITY AND THE POWER OF THE PUBLIC
Many antidiscrimination laws primarily safeguard access to economically important opportunities. Each individual transaction has
economic weight—the job, apartment, loan, or insurance policy denied.
Individual economic damages can be significant.
The individual injury of public accommodations discrimination,
however, is not primarily economic. As defendants have often argued,
not even “five cents damages” can be said to be inflicted by a restaurant
that serves a black man the same food as his white friends, alone and
in the kitchen.43 Or the movie theater that seats Mexican-Americans on
one side.44 Even where service is denied altogether, the monetary loss
seems trivial. The denial of a cake for a wedding, a lunch at the counter,
or a drink at the bar imposes minimal cost. But as civil rights activist
crow-racism-mail-order [perma.cc/3HX9-F24H]; see also COHEN, supra note 23, at 127 (observing
that one appeal of the Consumer’s Republic was that “it promised the socially progressive end of
economic equality without requiring politically progressive means of redistributing existing
wealth”).
40
Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L.J. 78, 107–08 (2019) (describing the feminist movement’s use of this language in the late 1960s and 1970s).
41
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2014); State Public Accommodations
Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 13, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/SHN6-JMZF].
42
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 41. In many states without such protections, city ordinances typically bar sexual orientation and/or gender identity discrimination in the
major cities. See Local Nondiscrimination Ordinances, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http
s://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_ordinances [https://perma.cc/C8RK-5ML
V].
43
Crosswaith v. Bergin, 35 P.2d 848, 848–49 (Colo. 1934) (rejecting the argument).
44
Movie theaters in the West and Southwest into the 1940s kept Mexican Americans from
the center seats—an experience Cesar Chavez recalls as launching his fight against discrimination. ALLISON VARZALLY, MAKING A NON-WHITE AMERICA: CALIFORNIANS COLORING OUTSIDE
ETHNIC LINES, 1925–1955 164 (2008); see also Guy v. Tri-State Amuse. Co., 40 Ohio C.C. 77, 80
(Ohio Ct. App. 1917) (rejecting defendant’s argument that black plaintiffs “had just as good an
opportunity to see the pictures or vaudeville performance . . . seated on the right hand side, as if
they were seated in the center section”).
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Ella Baker declared, this sort of discrimination is about “something
much bigger than a hamburger or even a giant-sized Coke.”45
Denial of equal treatment in public accommodations expresses an
ideology of a group’s inferiority, not merely an ordinary civil injury.46
The indignity—or humiliation—is different in kind from mere insult or
hurt feelings. Following Martha Nussbaum, this conception of dignity
is deeply tied to respect.47 When a business denies service or provides
unequal treatment, it expresses disrespect for the would-be patron’s
status as a consumer. As Deborah Hellman convincingly argues, wrongful discrimination, unlike differentiation, demeans its targets. It requires both expression—that the person is less worthy of equal respect—and power or status—that the person expressing disrespect is in
a position to subordinate the other.48 In this regard, the publicness of
the refusal further distinguishes public accommodations. Although
some discrimination takes place one-on-one, the presence of an audience of strangers sets public accommodations apart from employment
or housing. Before an audience of fellow citizens, the proprietor has the
power to impugn the standing of a person to participate in public commerce.
Courts have long conceptualized the denial of equal access as a dignitary harm. In the late nineteenth century, courts recognized that
granting a remedy for indignity inflicted by public accommodations was
essential, because otherwise the plaintiff would receive mere contract
damages—the cost of the ticket, for example—which would not adequately reflect the harm.49 One court summarized its state’s common
law, “[e]very person . . . has a right to go to any public place, or visit a
resort where the public generally are invited” with “freedom from insult, personal indignities, or acts which subject him to humiliation and
disgrace . . . .”50 In carrying on business with the public generally, a

45

Ella Baker, Bigger Than a Hamburger, SOUTHERN PATRIOT (May 1960), http://www.crmve
t.org/docs/sncc2.htm [perma.cc/B8E3-6N3R].
46
Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1591, 1620 (2001).
47
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 31
(2011).
48
DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG 35 (2008).
49
Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185, 190 (1870) (holding that where a common carrier
inflicts delay, vexation, and indignity by excluding a passenger, the actual pecuniary damages
sustained “would, most often, be no compensation at all”); see also Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Ball, 61
S.W. 327, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) (“That damages for mental pain, anxiety, distress, or humiliation suffered . . . may be recovered, though unaccompanied with physical injury, pain, or suffering, is now too well settled in this state to admit of question.”).
50
Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 207 (1904) (where amusement park employee insulted a white plaintiff’s character by mistaking her for another woman).
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proprietor assumed a duty to treat them with respect for their status as
a paying customer.
Public accommodations statutes imported this commitment to consumer dignity. Leading the National Organization for Women’s campaign to prohibit sex discrimination by the many male-only public
places of the late 1960s, Karen DeCrow wrote, “the most basic right of
all may be the right to equal treatment in places of public accommodation. It means the right to human dignity, the right to be free from humiliation and insult, and the right to refuse to wear a badge of inferiority at any time or place.”51 In upholding Title II in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, the Supreme Court emphasized that its “fundamental object . . . was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely
accompanies denials of equal access.’”52 Other courts describe “the injury to an individual’s sense of self-worth and personal integrity.”53
While incivility and disappointment are common in our society,
public accommodations have particular power to inflict humiliation for
three reasons. First, as common law often recognizes, commercial
sellers have the upper hand in their relationships with customers.54
Their social role dictates that businesses take greater precautions than
average individuals must.55 Free speech doctrine also approaches consumer-business relations with some awareness of power dynamics.56
Second, the practice of holding open an invitation to the public increases the likelihood of people encountering indignity unaware. As the
Supreme Court has noted, public accommodations laws structure “an
almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society.”57 The pervasive nature of public
accommodations means consumers are vulnerable to discrimination in
a way that is unrelenting. Whereas individuals apply to and interact
with relatively few potential employers or even landlords, they routinely—even daily—enter businesses open the public. In the absence of

51

Sepper & Dinner, supra note 40, at 111.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
53
King v. Greyhound Lines, 656 P.2d 349, 352 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
54 Some courts have ascribed the duty to avoid indignity and insult to the special relationship
between a public accommodation and its customers. See Meyer v. Hot Bagels Factory, 721 N.E.2d
1068, 1076–77 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (noting that in Ohio, this reasoning was recognized as early
as 1911).
55
Stephen D. Sugarman, Land-Possessor Liability in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Too
Much and Too Little, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1079, 1088 (2009) (explaining why, based on social
roles, commercial actors must take greater precautions to protect others than “ordinary folks”).
56
See, e.g., Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441,
468 (2019) (discussing how free speech doctrine acknowledges disparities in knowledge and sophistication between sellers and consumers—what she calls “expressive inequality”—to permit
greater regulation of the offers and exchanges in which they are engaged).
57
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
52
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equal access, members of marginalized groups face constant uncertainty about where, when, and how they will access goods and services.
People can avoid associating with their enemies, but often will find
themselves “invited to an establishment, only to find its doors barred to
them.”58
Third, in public accommodations, the presence of an audience enhances the impact of the business’s denial of service. Surveying cases
involving offenses to dignity, in 1938, Fowler Harper and Mary
McNeely concluded that these denials involved almost uniformly incidents that occurred in public, including accusations of theft and ordering of patrons out of amusement parks, theaters, and trains—in front
of an audience of other patrons.59 Adjudicating claims brought under
both the common law and public accommodations statutes, courts often
highlighted the size of the crowd of witnesses.60 The New York Court of
Appeals, for example, said, “it is the publicity of the thing that causes
the humiliation.”61
African American legal scholar Patricia Williams recounted her
own experience in a law review article.62 While Christmas shopping in
New York City, Williams rang a store buzzer, eager to enter the store
and purchase a sweater in the window for her mother. The salesclerk
glared and then mouthed “we’re closed.” Williams was not fooled, “It
was one o’clock in the afternoon. There were several white people in the
store who appeared to be shopping for things for their mothers.” Moved
nearly to violence, she recalls, “I am still struck by the structure of
power that drove me into such a blizzard of rage. There was almost
nothing I could do . . . that would humiliate him the way he humiliated
me.”63 She recognized the clerk’s power to disrespect her status as a
consumer. He would not acknowledge her, Williams says, “even at the
estranged level of arm’s length transactor.”64
Public accommodations discrimination requires its victims not
merely to listen but to perform. Most obviously, the Jim Crow system of
58

Evans v. Ross, 154 A.2d 441, 445 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-Examination of the Basis for Liability for
Emotional Distress, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 426 (1983).
60
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of a number of people”), aff’d, 264 A.D. 985 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942); Kelly v. Dent Theaters, Inc., 21
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Aaron v. Ward, 96 N.E. 736, 738 (N.Y. 1911).
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the South required compliance with a complex set of manners and customs in commercial space.65 Historian Grace Elizabeth Hale vividly describes one such performance: “[c]limbing above the ‘for white men’ only
restroom between the segregation sign and the Dr. Pepper advertisement, the black man can watch the same movie and drink the same
soda as a white patron as long as he declares his race and, by implication as well as the shabby surroundings, his inferiority as he enjoys his
purchases.”66 The audience understood what Bruce Ackerman calls the
“systematic degradation ritual”67 by virtue of the two speakers involved—the proprietor and the would-be patron. Public commercial
spaces functioned as a “theater” for the contradictions of segregation.68
While the minority group invariably is called upon to perform, the
conduct or speech compelled varies by time, space, and trait. As a black
woman, prominent educator Mary Church Terrell describes being unable to eat in Washington, D.C., “from the Capitol to the White House”
unless she “were willing to sit behind a screen.”69 At professional meetings in the 1960s, women of any race would need to peel off from their
colleagues or subordinates to go to ladies’ entrances and elevators. Gays
and lesbians performed the role of heterosexual and took care to wear a
minimum number of articles of “gender appropriate” clothing so as to
avoid scrutiny.
Unequal treatment by a business sends a message that the patron
or would-be patron is not worthy of respect. At mid-century, Jewish
groups worked to bar discriminatory signs, recognizing that “such
words as ‘selected clientele’ connote in the public mind that colored persons, Jews and others who are not lily-white need not apply.”70 Two decades later, encounters with the many bars that banned unescorted
women and the restaurants that excluded all women during businessmen’s lunch hours prompted “the realization that society thought—as
one woman said—that ‘women don’t belong in the outside world.’”71 In
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This civility demand on the racial minority persisted even as the laws of Jim Crow were
taken down. See generally Joseph Crespino, Civilities and Civil Rights in Mississippi, in MANNERS
AND SOUTHERN HISTORY 114 (Ted Ownby, ed. 2007) (demonstrating the way white elite weaponized civility against black civil rights movement).
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HALE, supra note 29, at Loc. 3861.
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BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 138 (2014).
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ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS
55–75 (1994).
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PAULA C. AUSTIN, COMING OF AGE IN JIM CROW DC Loc. 830 (2019).
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Camp-Of-The-Pines, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 53 N.Y.S.2d 475, 484 (Sup. Ct. 1945). For more
detailed history across the United States, see John Higham, Social Discrimination Against Jews
in America, 1830–1930, 47 PUBS. AM. JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y 1 (1957).
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Georgina Hickey, Barred from the Barroom: Second Wave Feminists and Public Accommodations in U.S. Cities, 34 FEMINIST STUD. 382, 389 (2008). For a full exploration of feminist advocacy during the late 1960s and 1970s, see Sepper & Dinner, supra note 40, at 80–81.

273]

EVILS OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS DISCRIMINATION

285

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Supreme Court likewise recognized that public accommodations discrimination treated gay couples “as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity
and worth.”72 Disfavored groups not only saw their standing fall in a
single business but also experienced “community-wide stigma.”73
Mistreatment by public accommodations—unlike an average social
interaction—is able to systematically change a person’s standing among
their fellows.74 Charlie Parker, an African American man born in the
1890s in Mississippi, remembered that at banks and post offices when
a white person came in, black people “would always get back and let
him go first, you come last.”75 These practices let black people know
their place in society and the market.76 It was not only black people in
the Jim Crow South who received this message. In the 1960s, public
accommodations discrimination affirmed the marginal nature of LGBT
people’s access to the public. Proprietors forced gay men to sit alone
with their back to other customers to eat a meal or to face the bar rather
than socialize with one another.77 That same decade, women too were
sometimes literally put in their place. At the National Press Club
awards dinner, for example, female journalists were seated with the
wives in a separate room.78 While the type of unequal treatment of each
of these groups differed in meaningful ways from each other, public accommodations discrimination designated their proper (and limited)
place both literally and figuratively.
Public accommodations thus have an inescapable power to demean
would-be customers. The public marketplace contains retail, service,
and amusement; it meets needs and wants for commerce and leisure.
Where norms of equal access and first-come, first-served are not universally observed, marginalized people live with constant potential for
discrimination. They risk conscription into a performance that signals
their inferior standing and limited claim to consumption before an audience of their fellow citizens.
72

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018).
Id.
74
Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2204–05 (1990) (noting
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As the next two Parts explain, the market and dignitary functions
of public accommodations laws help explain why doctrine has largely
carved out these commercial spaces from the reach of free speech. Conventions of equal-access structure expectations such that service does
not communicate a message to consumers and the broader public.
III. FREE SPEECH AND THE CONVENTIONS OF THE CONSUMER MARKET
First Amendment theorists have often puzzled over the boundaries
of First Amendment coverage. Speech in schools and public employment, for example, often lies outside the scope of free speech. In commercial settings, laws may target what otherwise might be thought to
be covered speech, such as laws requiring disclosure and setting parameters for dealing. Dignitary torts allow plaintiffs to seek damages
against speakers.79
Courts also have understood public businesses to play a distinct
social role, requiring regulation that is largely shielded from First
Amendment scrutiny. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, for example, Justice
Kennedy distinguished public accommodations from realms of freedom
of free exercise and expression. He observed that a clergy member
would clearly be protected from performing a marriage for a couple, and
religious organizations and individuals should be free to hold and “teach
the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and
faiths.”80 But the “general rule” was clear: “objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and
generally applicable public accommodations law.”81 As the Supreme
Court held long ago, in this marketplace “open to the public to come and
go as they please,” the state enjoys broad authority to create rights of
public access on behalf of its citizens.82
While this article makes no pretense to theorize the First Amendment’s scope, it helps clarify why it is that public accommodations laws
in particular have long enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with the First
Amendment. Consistent with sociological accounts of First Amendment
coverage, it argues that public accommodations operate according to
79

Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 347, 349 (Catherine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., 2000) (noting the absence
of “moderately workable and well-known doctrinal or theoretical standards to determine the scope
of the First Amendment’s coverage”).
80
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018)
(quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 679 – 80 (2015)) (noting that this exercise of religion
“gay persons could recognize and accept without serious diminishment to their own dignity and
worth”).
81
Id.
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Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
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fixed social conventions that require service and a modicum of respect
from the business toward the consumer. As Amanda Shanor argues, the
First Amendment tends not to reach where social norms are cohesive,
rather than pluralist, and speech acts are “straightforward in their effect” on the audience.83 These criteria are particularly likely to exist
within commerce. As Daniel Halberstam explains, whereas public debate allows for the construction and challenging of background norms
and suffers no bounds, a commercial transaction “does not leave much
room for cultural differences or diverging beliefs about the nature of the
transacted deal.”84 Engaged in bargaining, the “speakers” seek an
agreement, “ultimately objectified in a material transaction[;]” they do
not explore each other’s beliefs.85 Constitutional and common law take
buyer and seller to share a commitment to the rules governing commercial transactions.86
When consumers and proprietors meet in public accommodations—
a subset of the commercial world—they too assume a single set of background norms and values. In this “predefined communicative project,”87
the public accommodation invites all the world to transact business. Because its purpose is to serve the public, equal access is intrinsic to the
business. The baseline is that a business will serve “any member of the
public who is willing to pay.”88 And, as Parts I and II explained, an expectation of service and respectful treatment attaches.
This taken-for-grantedness of the governing norms is central to the
consumer market. Establishing discrimination is relatively straightforward as a result. Unlike in employment, proof that, for example, a black
patron was turned away and a white patron was seated would suffice.89
In Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court echoed this understanding
of rights of equal access, describing them as “taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need them.”90
Indeed, these norms are so uniform among the in-group that when a
restaurant or store refuses to sell, consumers demand answers.
Public accommodations may be a space where the First Amendment’s hands-off approaches to commercial transactions and to common
law torts, respectively, align. As Shanor explains, “the exclusion of
83

Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 344–45, 356 (2018).
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Id. at 834.
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common-law torts safeguards a space of cohesive social norms around
what it means to treat others with dignity and respect.”91 For example,
Robert Post argues that the tort of invasion of privacy, which has remained largely immune from the First Amendment’s reach, does not
have purely individualist goals. The tort instead “safeguards rules of
civility that in some significant measure constitute both individuals and
community.”92 In other words, it redresses individual injury to personality and upholds the norms that generate the community. Common law
torts built around equal access and dignified treatment share these
functions, constructing a public space of consumption. Originating in
these dignitary torts, public accommodations laws promote both individual remedy and market-wide structures.93
Unlike plural political debates, public accommodations manifest an
orthodoxy of identity-neutral capitalism. Antidiscrimination laws in
this area foster low-information exchanges: as a general rule, consumers do not have to provide qualifications to gain access to products. Nor
do businesses need to know much about a consumer. Proprietor and patron interact as strangers. The consumer market functions in a race-,
sex-, sexual orientation-, and other identity-trait neutral way.94 Ability
to pay becomes the sole concern of the transaction.95 Dollars are exchanged seamlessly, anonymously, and without need for introducing
search or information costs.
The dictates of service and dignity construct a uniform market of
full—not just equal—enjoyment. As Hubert Humphrey described Title
II, equality in public accommodations meant any customer could go to
“the nearest soda fountain,” “the nearest restaurant” and take “his pick
of the available motels and hotels.”96 More recently, dissenting from the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Telescope Media v. Lucero, Judge Kelly explained: these laws do not aim to ensure “access to some places of public
accommodation. They were passed to guarantee equal access to all
goods and services otherwise available to the public.”97 Consumers anticipate freely moving and purchasing in all businesses open to the public. There is no room for pluralism as to these ground rules.
91

Shanor, supra note 83, at 349.
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989).
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ONLINE 70 (2019).
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IV. THE SILENCE OF SERVICE AND THE EXPRESSION OF DENIAL
The unique nature of public accommodations law also adds to our
understanding of the “major contest” in the wedding vendor cases—
namely, whether the conduct of preparing a wedding service actually
communicates anything to the public at large.98 Until 2019, court after
court concluded that public accommodations law regulated wedding
vendors’ conduct—the baking and sale of a cake, for example. That conduct was not “inherently expressive” so as to be entitled to full First
Amendment protections.99 Regardless of whether the wedding vendors
intended to convey a message through their conduct, viewers were unlikely to understand providing a good or service in commerce to express
the vendor’s message about marriage.100 Courts worried that any other
decision would license “a public accommodation that serves only opposite-sex couples” or other in-groups, and would generate intractable
line-drawing problems. 101
But in 2019, in Telescope Media, the Eighth Circuit determined
that commercial videography of opposite-sex weddings constitutes expressive conduct conveying the business’s own views that marriage is
“a divinely ordained covenant” between a man and a woman.102 Requiring service for a same-sex couple—the court said—would instead compel the owners to speak favorably about same-sex marriage.103 The First
Amendment thus barred the application of public accommodation law.
The Arizona Supreme Court soon followed, granting a stationary company protection under the Arizona Constitution.104 Justices Thomas
98

State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1225 (Wash. 2019).
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 68 (N.M. 2013); Gifford v. McCarthy, 137
A.D.3d 30, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo.
App. 2015); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 438–39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018)
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indistinguishable to the public.”), rev’d, 448 P.3d 890, 895 (Ariz. 2019); Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d
at 121; Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
100
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and Gorsuch have already expressed their opinion that the sale of custom wedding cakes is expressive conduct that antidiscrimination law
cannot reach.105 The Supreme Court is likely to take up the issue in the
near future.106
In this kind of litigation, courts have typically presumed a symmetry between the ability of service and denial to communicate. The
Supreme Court of Washington, for example, noted that even the objecting florist admitted that service often did not communicate her endorsement of a wedding.107 She did not understand herself to endorse atheism
or Islam by arranging flowers for an atheist or Muslim wedding. Likewise, the court said, refusal could occur for various reasons—ranging
from religious objection to insufficient stock.108 To the court, service and
denial were equally non-communicative.
The long-standing conventions governing public commerce, however, indicate an asymmetry in the expressiveness of service and denial.
A public business fails to express any message, let alone a particularized one, through mere service, because we expect paying customers to
be served. The audience of other patrons discerns no communication
from a business pouring a coffee, selling a cake, or cutting a person’s
hair. We take for granted that the first person in line will be served,
and the wedding vendor will provide its usual goods if available.
The provision of service requires no reason giving. When a server
brings a meal to a table, they don’t explain that it’s because “you seem
like a nice Christian family.” When a photographer agrees to document
a wedding ceremony, they don’t tell you that they support your wedding
or opposite-sex weddings more generally. You understand that the price
is right and the date is available.
The fact that a business sells an item to someone does not imply its
endorsement. To be sure, serving a particular person might feel expressive of endorsement to the vendor—the baker, florist, etc. But to the
majority in-group, service doesn’t communicate approval of the customer, of their use of the product, or much of anything else. With fleeting interactions, customers and businesses typically experience little
intimacy and acquire little knowledge about one another.109 Even with
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wedding vendors hired for a special day in the lives of the celebrants,
the duration of the relationship is quite limited in time, space, and
depth. The offer to perform is made without exclusiveness, to one and
all. Under these circumstances, the proprietor and customers are not
associated with one another or united by any particular views.110
Whether or not the goods are artistic—a tattoo or handwritten invites—
the public’s expectations and perceptions remain the same.111
To the extent service expresses anything, it might send the message that the customer is entitled to be treated like any other customer—as Sam Bagenstos has pointed out.112 As he notes, if this is
right, then whenever a retail business provides a good, regardless of
what is sold, it engages in expression. While Bagenstos sees this message as forceful, it seems muted in contemporary consumer marketplaces. When the social norm was to subjugate a minority group, a business that seated people side by side would indeed powerfully
communicate a message of social equality both to the marginalized
group and to the audience of consumers. After the enactment of civil
rights protections, however, this same act might have expressed mere
legal compliance. And with the passage of time and the shift in consumer expectations, service has come to reflect the background norm of
treating consumers with dignity and respect. It signifies, as I have suggested, the intrinsic nature of a business organized around serving the
public—namely, that all paying customers are served. With decades of
experience of the Civil Rights Era settlement, to the extent that service
communicates a message of equality, it does so in a whisper.
Denial, by contrast, communicates loudly to both the would-be consumer and a larger audience. Denied flowers for his wedding to Robert
Ingersoll, Curt Freed understood the message that “our business is no
longer good business.”113 Rejected by a bed and breakfast on their vacation, unmarried same-sex couple Diane Cervelli and Taeko Bufford
heard that they were “inferior and unworthy of equal treatment in even
a routine business transaction.”114 When a business open to the public
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See also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The broad
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turns a person away, it powerfully expresses—as these couples understood—that the person does not merit status as a consumer.
Nor does denial invite multiple interpretations as service does.
While service requires no justification, denial calls for explanation. Because a refusal to serve or seat a patron is unexpected in light of social
norms governing public businesses, it often prompts the would-be patron to demand a reason. The vendor must explain that stock is depleted, a table reserved, or the shop closed.115 In the absence of a reason
that applies to all consumers, the message and meaning of denial is
one’s inferiority in the consumer marketplace.116
Of course, the free speech claims in current litigation could be
equally framed as either a denial or a provision of service. A wedding
vendor could be said to engage in expressive conduct (or speech)
through withholding a cake or invitations—sending a message that the
would-be patron’s wedding is lesser. But objectors to same-sex marriage
have explicitly framed their expression in terms of service to customers
who they prefer not to serve. They argue that nondiscrimination requires them to speak in favor of same-sex marriage. On this construction, it is service to the couple—whether preparing a cake or arranging
flowers—that communicates approval or endorsement.
The asymmetry between the messages of service and denial help
explain this choice. While service might communicate quietly or not at
all, denial as expression sends a clear message of gay inferiority. The
desire to express that message would make these business owners lessthan-sympathetic standard-bearers for the movement for exemptions
from public accommodations laws.
Courts moreover might be more concerned about where exemptions
framed to authorize denials of service would lead. Objectors paint their
requested free speech exemption as “narrow,” applying only to the production of expressive or artistic services.117 But denial of goods and services—not just expressive goods—powerfully communicates in a way
Breakfast, 415 P.3d 919, 935 (Haw. Ct. App. 2018) (No. 11-1-3103-12), 2011 WL 10604318.
115
Public accommodations sometimes—probably often—dissimulate. Historically, they also
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supra note 77, at 16-9 (describing a gay bar turning away African American patrons by using
“reserved” signs on tables); Sepper & Dinner, supra note 40, at 80 (documenting the use of “reserved” signs to prevent women from sitting).
116
Indeed, asking for reasons itself can be humiliating for patrons who suspect, but are not
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117
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[items]”); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 71 (N.M. 2013) (“Courts cannot be in
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that the provision of even expressive goods does not. Under the conventions that govern the consumer market today, denial speaks louder
than service.
CONCLUSION
The line between speech and conduct may not always be clear. But
states have long required nondiscriminatory service by public accommodations. Such obligations have co-existed peacefully with West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette’s invocation that “no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein.”118 The application of public accommodations
laws to commercial sales of even expressive goods and services has not,
pace the Arizona Supreme Court, “compel[led] uniformity of beliefs and
ideas.”119 Indeed, public accommodations laws expressly leave the social, private, and political free of restraint. Business owners retain their
“individual freedom of mind” and the component rights to speak and
refrain from speaking.120 Only in the licensed, regulated, and surveilled
commercial marketplace will duties of equal access apply.
Nor is public accommodation law aimed—as Justice Thomas
opined—“to produce a society free of . . . biases” against the protected
groups.121 Its overarching goal is to secure a consumer market of freely
moving people and currency. Given power imbalances between business
and individual consumers, it requires public-facing businesses to show
a modicum of civility and respect for dignity of would-be patrons.
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The expansionist project of free speech doctrine has public accommodations laws within its sights. If businesses prevail in their constitutional claims, a number of serious questions arise: What kind of a
consumer market will we be left with? In the absence of a shared expectation of service, will we see contestation over norms of the consumer
market as we did decades ago? Or will the market become balkanized
with stores organized around specific religious or other values rather
than abstract customers and their dollars? Will gay identity and relationships be sent back into the closet to be able to access consumer
goods? And will other civil rights protections in employment, housing,
and education remain unscathed? Is public accommodations discrimination sufficiently distinct in its focus on dignity and its impact on
realms of shallow, transient, arms-length relations? Are its “evils” so
“unique” that we might distinguish the rest of civil rights law?
What seems clear is that a constitutional privilege against public
accommodations law would destabilize longstanding conventions of service and civility in the consumer marketplace. Exceptions—however the
lines are drawn—would undermine an identity-neutral marketplace
where dollars and people flow freely without the friction of information
and search costs. They quite literally would reduce the space for individual dignity.

Lapidation and Apology
Cass R. Sunstein†

ABSTRACT
Groups of people, outraged by some real or imagined transgression, often respond
in a way that is wildly disproportionate to the occasion, thus ruining the transgressor’s day, month, year, or life. To capture that phenomenon, we might repurpose an old word: lapidation. Technically, the word is a synonym for stoning, but
it sounds much less violent. It is also obscure, which makes it easier to enlist for
contemporary purposes. Lapidation plays a role in affirming, and helping to constitute, tribal identity. It typically occurs when a transgressor is taken to have violated a taboo, which helps account for the different people and events that trigger
left-of-center and right-of-center lapidation. One of the problems with lapidation is
that it often accomplishes little; it expresses outrage, and allows people to signal
their identity, but does no more. Victims of lapidation might be tempted to apologize, but apologies can prove ineffective or even make things worse, depending on
the nature of the lapidators. Some forms of lapidation can and should be regulated,
consistent with First Amendment principles, but the primary responses must come
from the private sector.

This is not a sermon, not exactly, but we begin with a passage from
the Gospel according to John:
Jesus went unto the mount of Olives.
And early in the morning he came again into the temple, and all
the people came unto him; and he sat down, and taught them.
And the scribes and Pharisees brought unto him a woman taken
in adultery; and when they had set her in the midst,
They say unto him, Master, this woman was taken in adultery,
in the very act.
Now Moses in the law commanded us, that such should be
stoned: but what sayest thou?
This they said, tempting him, that they might have to accuse
him. But Jesus stooped down, and with his finger wrote on the
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ground, as though he heard them not.
So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and
said unto them, He that is without sin among you, let him first
cast a stone at her.
And again he stooped down, and wrote on the ground.
And they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, even unto
the last: and Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in
the midst.
When Jesus had lifted up himself, and saw none but the
woman, he said unto her, Woman, where are those thine accusers? hath no man condemned thee?
She said, No man, Lord. And Jesus said unto her, Neither do I
condemn thee: go, and sin no more.1
The English language needs a word for what happens when a group of
people, outraged by a real or imagined transgression, responds in a way
that is disproportionate to the occasion, thus ruining the transgressor’s
day, month, year, or life.2 I propose that we repurpose an old word: lapidation.3 Technically, the word is a synonym for stoning, but it sounds
much less violent. That is a major advantage, but as I understand it
here, lapidation need not be literally violent. It might include threats,
or provoke threats, and it might even provoke or include violence, but
it is hardly actual stoning. The proposed term is also obscure, which is
again an advantage; its obscurity makes it easier to enlist it for contemporary purposes.
To see what I have in mind, consider some diverse examples:
1. Ronald Sullivan is a Harvard Law professor who joined the
team of lawyers defending Hollywood producer Harvey
Weinstein against charges of rape and sexual abuse. A group
of students rallied and protested against him, attacked his
character, and called for his removal as Faculty Dean at Winthrop House. Their call succeeded. Harvard ended Sullivan’s
deanship.4

1

John 8:1–11.
It is of course fair to ask what counts as a disproportionate response, and who decides
whether it does. I bracket that question here and simply assume that the response counts as disproportionate.
3
See generally Darius Rejali, Studying a Practice: An Inquiry into Lapidation, 18 CRITIQUE:
CRITICAL MIDDLE E. STUD. 67 (2001).
4
See Kate Taylor, Harvard’s First Black Faculty Deans Let Go Amid Uproar Over Harvey
Weinstein Defense, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/us/ronald2
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2. Noah Carl is a young sociologist who was awarded a fellowship at Cambridge University’s St. Edmund’s College. Carl
has published research on trust and intelligence in well-regarded journals. He has also written some shorter and less
formal papers, involving immigration and racial differences,
that some readers found offensive. An investigation was duly
undertaken, and Carl was asked to leave St. Edmund’s.5
3. Representative Ilhan Omar made some statements, provocative or perhaps worse, about Israel and its American supporters. The comments provoked a flood of outrage.6 She ultimately received numerous death threats.7
4. At various points in her career, Senator Elizabeth Warren
has claimed that she has Native American ancestry. Those
claims affected her candidacy for presidency, in part because
President Donald Trump refers to her as “Pocahontas.”8
5. In 2017, former Senator Al Franken was accused of having
engaged in sexually aggressive behavior, including unwanted touching. He was essentially forced to resign from
the U.S. Senate.9
Each of these cases involves lapidation as I understand it here. In some
cases, lapidation is based on a lie, a mistake, or a misunderstanding. In
such cases, people are lapidated even though they did nothing wrong.10
They might have made some kind of misstatement and so have been
misinterpreted by reasonable listeners. Even so, they did not intend to
say what they were heard to say.

sullivan-harvard.html [https://perma.cc/5VE2-BSRE].
5
See Richard Adams, Cambridge College Sacks Researcher over Links with Far Right,
GUARDIAN (May 1, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/may/01/cambridge-univer
sity-college-dismisses-researcher-far-right-links-noah-carl [https://perma.cc/S6GP-EFU6].
6
See Zack Beauchamp, The Ilhan Omar Anti-Semitism Controversy, Explained, VOX (Mar.
6, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/3/6/18251639/ilhan-omar-israel-anti-semit
ism-jews [https://perma.cc/8PWQ-GM95].
7
See Associated Press, Rep. Ilhan Omar Says She’s Getting More Death Threats After Trump
Tweet, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-ilhan-omar-trumptweet-9-11-story.html [https://perma.cc/LW4Y-3XVQ].
8
See Gregory Krieg, Here’s the Deal with Elizabeth Warren’s Native American Heritage, CNN
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/29/politics/elizabeth-warren-native-american-pocahontas/index.html [https://perma.cc/888K-2VAC].
9
See Elana Schor & Seung Min Kim, Franken Resigns, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2017), https://
www.politico.com/story/2017/12/07/franken-resigns-285957 [https://perma.cc/JJ4H-E6G7].
10
Readers can make up their own minds about the category in which the cases in text should
be taken to fall.
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In other cases, the transgression is real, and lapidators have a legitimate concern. They are right to complain and to emphasize that people have been saddened, hurt, or wronged. The problem is that they lose
a sense of proportion. They want heads to roll. Someone makes a mistake, or a foolish or offensive comment, and lapidators come out in force,
often in a state of frenzy. Usually they are led by lapidation entrepreneurs, who have their own agenda. They might be concerned with selfpromotion. They might be concerned with promoting a cause or with
defeating an opponent, for whom the lapidation victim is taken to stand,
or can be made to stand. They may want to make the occasion for lapidation stand for the opponent, so that the opponent, or the cause for
which they stand, is that occasion. (“He is Spartacus,” more or less.)
Lapidation entrepreneurs may unleash something horrific. That might
be intentional.
To be sure, we can ask hard questions about the precise definition.
If there is a small burst of outrage on campus or on social media, ought
we to speak of lapidation? If people receive threats in the mail, have
they been lapidated? The best answer is that while some cases are de
minimis or a matter of trivial concern, lapidation can occur even when
the number of participations is low, and the outcry is not exactly loud.
Even if a few stones are thrown, people might get hurt. At the very
least, they might feel threatened or despised. In some cases, they might
lose their reputation, their jobs, their opportunities, and their friends;
they might be in some sense “canceled.”11
Can lapidation be justified? As defined here, it cannot be. No one
should doubt that groups of people, offended or outraged by statements
or actions, can be entirely right. What they seek, and what they do, may
not be disproportionate. Recall that lapidation, as understood here, occurs when a response to a statement or action is disproportionate. We
might therefore have hard cases, in which reasonable people dispute
whether lapidation is involved. What Senator Franken did was worse
than inappropriate. But it might well be doubted that he should have
been forced to resign.
In ancient times, people were lapidated for adultery and idolatry.12
This is a clue to what triggers the practice. Like its old namesake, contemporary lapidation typically occurs when a person or institution has
violated a taboo. Lapidators operate as a kind of private police force,
11

See, e.g., Brakkton Booker, White Woman Who Called Police on Black Bird-Watcher in Central Park Has Been Fired, NPR (May 26, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/26/862230724/white
-woman-who-called-police-on-black-bird-watcher-in-central-park-placed-on-le
[https://perma.cc/9KFF-5V88].
12
See Vincent J. Rosivach, Execution by Stoning in Athens, 6 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 232, 232
(1987); Catherine E. Winiarski, Adultery, Idolatry, and the Subject of Monotheism, 38 RELIGION &
LITERATURE 41, 44 (2006).
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enforcing some intensely held moral or political commitment that (in
their view) is at risk.13 That explains why lapidation comes in such diverse shapes and sizes, and why lapidation helps signal and constitute
tribal identity. People with different moral or political values, and different kinds of affiliations, will be inclined to lapidate in accordance
with those values and affiliations. Cases that seem, to some people, to
be self-evidently justified and proportionate responses will seem, to
other people, to be unambiguous lapidations.
Left-of-center lapidators typically point to what they see as racist,
sexist, and homophobic behavior.14 #MeToo produced some lapidation.
To be sure, some of the #MeToo movement was justified and hence does
not count as lapidation at all; consider the case of Harvey Weinstein.15
But other cases are much less clear. Identification of those cases would
produce a great deal of controversy, but if what is involved is highly
inappropriate flirting, and a suggestion of a fully consensual relationship (without any hint of sanctions for a refusal), a very strong collective
response might plausibly be counted as lapidation.
Right-of-center lapidators tend to focus on what they see as disloyalty, disrespect for authority, a despicable lack of patriotism, or hypocrisy (a particular favorite, for especially interesting reasons). In his
work on moral foundations, Jonathan Haidt contends that conservatives place a far greater emphasis than liberals on authority, loyalty,
and purity.16 Haidt’s work illuminates the distinctly right-of-center nature of some kinds of lapidation. When someone suggests some kind of
disloyalty, particularly to the nation itself, right-wing lapidators tend
to come out in force.
***
George Orwell’s 1984 is unquestionably the greatest fictional account of lapidation – the most astute, the most precise, the most attuned
to human psychology.17 One of its defining chapters explores the Two
Minutes Hate, which helps to establish and maintain Big Brother’s regime.18 As Orwell describes it, the Hate begins with a flash of a face on
a large screen. It is Emmanuel Goldstein, the Enemy of the People.
13

See, e.g., Robert F. Worth, Crime (Sex) and Punishment (Stoning), N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/weekinreview/22worth.html [https://perma.cc/J9RMF3D7].
14
See, e.g., Booker, supra note 11.
15
See generally Harvey Weinstein Timeline: How the Scandal Unfolded, BBC NEWS (May 24,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672 [https://perma.cc/7DNM-N8Y4].
16
See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS
AND RELIGION (2014).
17
See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 15–20 (1949).
18
Id.
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Goldstein produces fear and disgust. He was once a leader in the Party,
but he abandoned it and became a counterrevolutionary. Condemned to
death, he managed to escape and to disappear. “He was the primal traitor, the earliest defiler of the Party’s purity.”19 Goldstein was ultimately
responsible for heresies and treacheries of all kinds. In the first thirty
seconds of the Hate, Goldstein’s voice is heard, as he denounces the
party and calls for freedom of multiple kinds.20
The result is to produce rage and fear in the audience, and to do so
immediately. Somehow Goldstein managed to remain a serious threat.
Wherever he was, he commanded a kind of shadow army, a network of
conspirators. He was the author of a terrible book, including all the heresies.21
In the second minute of the Hate, people become frenzied. They
leap and shout, trying to drown out Goldstein’s maddening voice. Children join in the shouting. Orwell’s hero, Winston, finds himself unable
to resist. He too begins to shout, and also to kick violently. On his part,
this was no mere show. “The horrible thing about the Two Minutes Hate
was not that one was obliged to act a part, but, on the contrary, that it
was impossible to avoid joining in.”22 No pretense was necessary: “A
hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to
smart faces with a sledgehammer, seemed to flow through the whole
group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one’s
will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic.”23
Despite loathing Big Brother, Winston felt his feelings “changed
into adoration, and Big Brother seemed to tower up, an invincible, fearless protector, standing like a rock” against various threats. And as his
hatred mounts, it turns sexual. Winston fantasizes about raping and
murdering the girl who is standing behind him.24
At that point, the Hate rises to its climax. Goldstein’s voice becomes
that of an actual bleating sheep, and for a moment, his face is transformed into that of a sheep. Big Brother’s face then fills the screen, powerful, comforting, and mysteriously calm. Big Brother’s actual words
are not heard, but they are felt, as a kind of reassurance. At that point
the Party’s three slogans appear on the screen:

19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 15.
See id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18–19.
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WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH.25
A member of the audience seems to pray to Big Brother. For thirty seconds the audience chants in his honor, in “an act of self-hypnosis, a deliberate drowning of consciousness by means of rhythmic noise.”26 Winston chants with the rest, for “it was impossible to do otherwise.”27
***
What makes lapidation possible? A lot of the answer is provided by
the process of “group polarization,” which means that when like-minded
people speak with one another, they tend to go to extremes.28 (By likeminded people, I mean people who tend to agree with one another.)
More specifically, groups of people, engaged in deliberation together,
typically end up in a more extreme position in line with the tendencies
of group members before deliberation began. This is the phenomenon
known as group polarization. Group polarization is the usual pattern
with deliberating groups, having been found in numerous studies involving many countries.29
It follows that a group of people who think that immigration is a
serious problem will, after discussion, think that immigration is a horribly serious problem; that those who dislike the Affordable Care Act
will think, after discussion, that the Affordable Care Act is truly awful;
that those who approve of an ongoing war effort will, as a result of discussion, become still more enthusiastic about that effort; that people
who dislike a nation’s leaders will dislike those leaders quite intensely
after talking with one another; and that people who disapprove of the
United States, and are suspicious of its intentions, will increase their
disapproval and suspicion if they exchange points of view. Indeed, there
is specific evidence of the latter phenomenon among citizens of France.30
When like-minded people talk with one another, they usually end up
thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they
started to talk. It should be readily apparent that enclaves of people,
inclined to rebellion or even violence, might move sharply in that
25

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
27
Id.
28
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175, 176 (2002). I
draw on that treatment here.
29
ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 200–48 (2d ed. 1986)
30
See id. at 224.
26

302

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

direction as a consequence of internal deliberations. Political extremism
is often a product of group polarization.
Suppose that people begin with the thought that Ronald Sullivan
probably ought not to have agreed to represent Harvey Weinstein, or
that Al Franken did something pretty bad. If so, their discussions will
probably make them more unified and more confident about those beliefs, and ultimately more extreme. A key reason involves the dynamics
of outrage.31 Whenever some transgression has occurred, many people
want to appear at least as appalled as others in their social group.32
That can transform mere disapproval into lapidation.
***
Why do people lapidate? Consider this claim from Sandra Cason, a
protestor in the 1960s:
If I had known that not a single lunch counter would open as a
result of my action I could not have done differently than I did.
If I had known violence would result, I could not have done differently than I did. I am thankful for the sit-ins if for no other
reason than that they provided me with an opportunity for making a slogan into a reality, by turning a decision into an action.
It seems to me that this is what life is all about.33
This is a claim about the expressive nature of some political action. It
captures something important about lapidation—a sense that consequences are irrelevant. Note Cason’s proud suggestion that she “could
not have” acted differently even if her action were futile, and even if her
action were productive of violence and in that sense perverse.
We can better understand the expressive nature of some political
actions by reference to a distinction, often made within behavioral science, between two families of cognitive operations in the human mind:
System 1, which is fast, automatic, and intuitive, and System 2, which
is slow, calculative, and deliberative.34 When people recognize a smiling
face, add two plus two, or know how to get to their bathroom in the
middle of the night, System 1 is at work. When people first learn to
drive, or multiply 563 times 322, people must rely on System 2. System
1 tends to be expressive; System 2 tends to focus on consequences.
31

See Craig McGarty et al., Collective Action as the Material Expression of Opinion-Based
Group Membership, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES 839, 851 (2009).
32
See David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1139 (2000).
33
JAMES MILLER, DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS: FROM PORT HURON TO THE SIEGE OF
CHICAGO 52 (1987).
34
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
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System 1 is also associated with identifiable behavioral biases. People often show “present bias,” focusing on the short-term and downplaying the future.35 For better or for worse, most people tend to be unrealistically optimistic.36 In assessing risks, people use heuristics, or mental
shortcuts, that often work well, but that sometimes lead them in unfortunate directions.37 With respect to probability, people’s intuitions go
badly wrong, in the sense that they produce serious mistakes, including
life-threatening ones.38 Lapidation is typically a matter of System 1—
quick, automatic reaction to a real or perceived transgression.39 In behavioral terms, Cason’s action was the product of System 1.
Compare these words from Herbert Simon:
We are all Expressionists part of the time. Sometimes we just
want to scream loudly at injustice, or to stand up and be counted.
These are noble motives, but any serious revolutionist must often deprive himself of the pleasures of self-expression. He must
judge his actions by their ultimate effects on institutions.40
Lapidation is often expressive, not based on a judgment about its effects
on institutions. When people lapidate, they may think that they are
achieving something important. Even if lapidation is a grossly disproportionate response to the action in question, in the sense that it is
based on a lie or a falsehood, or is an excessive response to an admitted
wrong, maybe lapidators are bringing about desirable social change. By
targeting someone, and making that person stand for some kind of evil,
lapidators might be able to attract widespread attention and spur reform.
At a minimum, lapidators may succeed in ruining a reputation or
forcing a resignation. When their cause is just, that may be valuable
and in a sense good, and it might lead to much more. But if social change
is the goal, it is reasonable to ask whether the immense amount of time
and emotional energy expended on lapidation would be better spent
elsewhere—especially because a real person, or real people, are being
35

For references and discussion, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?: THE POLITICS OF
LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (2015).
36
See TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY POSITIVE BRAIN
(2011).
37
See Kahneman, supra note 34.
38
For a powerful demonstration, see Daniel L. Chen et al., Decision-Making Under the Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Officers, and Baseball Umpires, 131 Q.J. ECON.
1181 (2014).
39
See Daniel Kahneman & Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law (John M.
Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 36, 2000).
40
See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MY LIFE 281 (1991).
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hurt in the process. Recall that by definition, lapidation is a disproportionate response to the action in question, and in general, it is best to
live in accordance with the principle that the good ends do not generally
justify bad means.
For its victims, lapidation can be a horror, a kind of living nightmare. In some cases, they receive death threats. Even when their security is not at risk, they carry a stamp of shame. They may never fully
recover.
***
In response, what should the objects of lapidation do? A tempting
answer is simple: They should apologize. Put to one side the moral question and assume that their goal is solely strategic: to make it stop. Is an
apology a good idea?
It might be. An apology might give the lapidators a sense that they
have won. At least this is so if the apology is taken as not merely an
admission of wrongdoing but also as a kind of self-abasement, groveling, a way of begging for forgiveness.41 Lapidators might think: We have
achieved what we want to achieve. Now let us move on.
But there is an alternative possibility. Lapidators might smell
blood. They might think that they have received the equivalent of a confession, which means that lapidation will continue until there is some
kind of execution (a retreat from public life, a forced resignation, even
a criminal prosecution). Everything depends on the distribution of emotions and beliefs on the part of lapidators – on how merciful and focused
they are inclined to be.
It is important and true that lapidators might feel, or be, quite
weak, or relatively powerful, and they might be using whatever tools
they have. They might think that collective outrage is all they have.
They might be right. But the consequence might be to ruin individual
lives, for a short or long time, and the victims of lapidation might not
be able to do much about it.
There is not a great deal of empirical work on this topic, but some
evidence suggests that this admittedly vague account is broadly correct,
and that apologies will often fail. Richard Hanania conducted an experiment in which respondents were given two versions of real-life events
in which public figures made controversial statements (and were lapidated).42 In one version, the offender apologized; in the other, he did not.
41

Cf. Michael P. Haselhuhn et al., How Implicit Beliefs Influence Trust Recovery, 21(5)
PSYCHOL. SCI. 645 (2010).
42
See Richard Hanania, Does Apologizing Work? An Empirical Test of the Conventional Wisdom, BEHAVIOURAL PUB. POL’Y (2015), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioural-public-policy/article/does-apologizing-work-an-empirical-test-of-the-conventional-
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The first event involved Senator Rand Paul, who seemed to suggest that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was wrong to forbid private discrimination
on the basis of race.43 The second event involved Lawrence Summers,
at the time president of Harvard University, who offered controversial
statements about why there were so few women scientists and engineers.44
For example:
Version 1 (Apologetic):
In response, Rand Paul quickly took an apologetic tone and backtracked, saying he would never repeal the Civil Rights Act. In the
years since, observers argue that he has been bending over backwards to make up for his original statements, particularly
through minority outreach. He now says he does not question any
aspect of the Civil Rights Act. Paul won his Senate seat, and still
serves to this day.45
Version 2 (Non-apologetic):
In the days after the controversy, Paul refused to explicitly apologize for his statements. He went on the offensive, claiming that
his opponents were engaging in unfair political attacks. In response to one interviewer, he said “What is going on here is an
attempt to vilify us for partisan reasons. Where do your talking
points come from?” Paul won his Senate seat, and still serves to
this day.46
After respondents were shown one or the other version of the story, they
were initially asked: “How offensive did you find Paul’s comments when
reading about them?” They were also asked whether the controversy
made them less likely to vote for Paul. For Summers, the experiment
was similar, except respondents were asked, “Should Summers have
faced negative consequences for his statements?”47
For Paul, the apology had no effect in aggregate. For liberals, the
apology appeared to have a negative effect, but it fell short of

wisdom/D34F1D89E6FF6A6E32C22C75F0C5FE24 [https://perma.cc/5N32-46C4].
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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significance. For Summers, the apology turned out to have a (significant) negative effect in aggregate. Disaggregating across groups in the
Summers case, the negative effect was especially large among women
and liberals; there was no significant effect one way or the other among
men, conservatives, and moderates. For both Summers and Paul, the
effect of an apology was to make women more supportive of punishment, but there was no effect on men. There was no group, in either
case, that was less inclined to punish the offender as a result of an apology.48
It is not clear how to generalize these intriguing findings. Suppose
that a politician offends the political right, by saying (for example) that
the United States is a force for evil in the world and should own up to
its misdeeds; that those who want to regulate abortion believe in male
supremacy, and are seeking to preserve it; that hunting should be
banned; or that no white person can possibly understand what it is like
to be African American. We might imagine something like the mirror
image of the findings just described: Perhaps conservatives would seek
more punishment while liberals would be unmoved. Or perhaps an apology would have a beneficial effect, leading people, on average, to be less
inclined to favor punishment.
To obtain further perspective on these questions, I conducted a survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, presenting four scenarios on a random basis to different groups of 400 Americans, and asking whether an
apology would make people more inclined to support a public official,
less so, or neither:
1. Suppose that a recent nominee for the position of Secretary
of State said, a few years ago, “I think the United States
should apologize for the many terrible things that it has done
in the world.” Suppose that the comment has caused a great
deal of controversy. If the nominee said, “I apologize for that
statement; it was foolish of me to say that,” would you be:
2. Suppose that a presidential candidate said, a few years ago,
“People who want to ban abortion just don’t care about
women.” Suppose that the comment has caused a great deal
of controversy. If the candidate said, “I apologize for that
statement; it was foolish of me to say that,” would you be:
3. Suppose that a presidential candidate has been accused, by
a number of women, of inappropriate touching—of getting
too close to them, of hugging them too much, of hugging them

48

Hanania, supra note 42.
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too long. Some of the women have said, “I felt violated.” If the
candidate said, “I apologize for what I did; it was not right,
and I will cease and desist,” would you be:
4. Suppose that a nominee for the position of Attorney General
said, a few years ago, “Gays and lesbians are violating God’s
will. Marriage should be between Adam and Eve, not Adam
and Steve.” Suppose that the comments have become controversial. If the nominee said, “I apologize for that statement;
it was offensive, hurtful, and wrong,” would you be:
In all four questions, the general tendency was for people to become less
rather than more inclined to support a political figure as a result of an
apology. In the first question, 41.5 percent said that they would be less
inclined to support; 23 percent said that they would be more inclined to
support; 35.5 percent said neither. In the second question, 41.5 percent
said that they would be less inclined to support; 23 percent said that
they would be more inclined to support; 35.5 percent said neither. In
the second question, 36.5 percent said that they would be less inclined
to support; 19.95 percent said that they would be more inclined to support; 43.55 percent said neither. In the third question, 29.38 percent
said that they would be less inclined to support; 24.94 percent said that
they would be more inclined to support; 45.68 percent said neither. In
the fourth question, 36.84 percent said that they would be less inclined
to support; 21.8 percent said that they would be more inclined to support; 41.35 percent said neither.
In a diverse set of cases, then, an apology tended to decrease rather
than to increase support for people who said or did offensive things. To
be sure, there were interesting demographic differences. In the first
question, Democrats were far more likely to be less inclined to support
(50.29 percent as opposed to 17.71 percent), whereas Republicans were
equally divided (33 percent as opposed to 32 percent), and independents
were in the middle (37.19 percent as opposed to 23.97 percent). In the
second question, apologies made both Democrats and independents less
inclined rather than more inclined to support (42.35 percent/17.87 percent for Democrats, 43/15 for Republicans), whereas Republicans were
made more inclined rather than less inclined to support (24 percent less
inclined to support, 32 percent more inclined to support). In the third
question, both Democrats and Republicans were equally likely to become less inclined or more inclined to support, but puzzlingly, independents were made more inclined to support (42/22). In the fourth
questions, Democrats (33/26.9), independents (41.5/13.3), and Republicans (36.5/24) were all inclined to be less supportive.
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The differences here are intriguing, but the general lesson is clear.
Across the relevant populations, apologies did not make people more
inclined to support wrongdoers. To be sure, they did affect significant
numbers of people in a positive way, and we could certainly devise scenarios in which the most relevant group would be moved in a positive
direction by an apology. But to date, we have little evidence for the proposition that apologies are generally effective at decreasing the opprobrium directed at real or imagined wrongdoers.
***
Is lapidation protected by the First Amendment? To answer that
question, we need to know some details. Are lapidators engaging in libel? Is what they are saying true or false? In my view, the constitutional
issue deserves extended attention, with an emphasis on the inadequacies of existing constitutional law.49 For present purposes, some general
points will have to suffice; I will paint with a very broad brush.
There is no lapidation exception to the First Amendment. A vehement but factual attack on a public official or private citizen, not containing falsehoods, will almost certainly receive constitutional protection.50 Sarcasm and satire are certainly protected, and even if the line
is crossed to hatred and rage, the same conclusion follows.51 It follows
that under existing doctrine, a central question — and, usually, the central question — is whether the lapidation contains falsehoods. If it is, it
might be defamatory, and regulable under the current constitutional
standards, sharply distinguishing between public and private figures.52
Under the familiar test: For public figures, a lapidator might be held
liable if he or she knew that what was said was false, or acted with
reckless indifference to the question of truth or falsity.53 Some lapidations are indeed defamatory, and objects of lapidation can obtain compensation under existing constitutional standards. It is a fair question
whether those standards should be rethought in the modern era, so as
to allow more people to recover than currently can.54
There is also a question whether some forms of lapidation might be
counted as “fighting words.”55 By definition, we are speaking of personal
49

For a start, see Cass R. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 388 (2020).
50
Hustler Magazine, Inc. V. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
51
Id.
52
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–81 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974).
53
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–81.
54
For an argument to this effect, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LIARS: FREE SPEECH IN AN AGE OF
DECEPTION (forthcoming 2021).
55
See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 569 (1942); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
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attacks, and even if they do not contain falsehoods, they might amount
to a form of bullying, potentially falling within what was, at one point,
an unprotected category, and what might still qualify as that.56 Here, it
might seem, is an opportunity for constitutional restrictions on the most
extreme forms of lapidation. On the other hand, the fighting words doctrine was created before the post-1960 flowering of free speech doctrine,
and it is doubtful that current law would permit much regulation of
attacks on public figures that do not contain falsehoods. The reason is
that in general, such attacks do not count as fighting words, which
means that such figures must respond with their own words, and not
by invoking courts.57 Still, it is a fair question whether some highly personal lapidations can be seen as fighting words; here is an area that
deserves further attention.
If lapidation is generally protected by the First Amendment, notwithstanding the multiple harms that it causes, there is all the more
reason for private institutions, including social media providers, to reduce or even stop it, including under the rubric of prevention of bullying
and also the spread of misinformation.58 We could easily imagine more
aggressive standards, designed to protect against bullying as such. We
could also imagine reforms from social media companies, designed to
reduce the dissemination of falsehoods that are part and parcel of
U.S. 518 (1972). Note that the “fighting words doctrine,” as it is sometimes called, has not received
serious attention from the Supreme Court for many decades. Modern forms of personal attack, and
bullying, would appear to justify new attention.
56
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
57
See Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 57.
58
See Sunstein, supra note 49; see also Community Standards, Bullying and Harassment,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/bullying [https://perma.cc/7UCR-XM
WT], and in particular this excerpt, which is an excellent start:
Bullying and harassment happen in many places and come in many different forms, from
making threats to releasing personally identifiable information, to sending threatening messages, and making unwanted malicious contact. We do not tolerate this kind of behavior because it prevents people from feeling safe and respected on Facebook.
We distinguish between public figures and private individuals because we want to allow discussion, which often includes critical commentary of people who are featured in the news or
who have a large public audience. For public figures, we remove attacks that are severe as
well as certain attacks where the public figure is directly tagged in the post or comment. For
private individuals, our protection goes further: we remove content that’s meant to degrade
or shame, including, for example, claims about someone’s sexual activity. We recognize that
bullying and harassment can have more of an emotional impact on minors, which is why our
policies provide heightened protection for users between the ages of 13 and 18.
Context and intent matter, and we allow people to share and re-share posts if it is clear that
something was shared in order to condemn or draw attention to bullying and harassment. In
certain instances, we require self-reporting because it helps us understand that the person
targeted feels bullied or harassed. In addition to reporting such behavior and content, we
encourage people to use tools available on Facebook to help protect against it.
Id.
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lapidation. To be sure, there are hard line-drawing problems here. But
an understanding of the problem of lapidation casts new light on the
debate over misinformation on social media,59 and underlines the importance of new steps to reduce the spread of falsehoods.60 Community
standards might well be rethought with lapidation in mind.
We should not lapidate lapidators. But we might remind them of
the words of a great opponent of lapidation: “He that is without sin
among you, let him first cast a stone.”61

59

Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146
(2018).
60
See Philip Lorenz-Spreen et al., How Behavioural Sciences Can Promote Truth, Autonomy
and Democratic Discourse Online, 4 NAT. HUM. BEHAV. 1102 (2020).
61
John 8:1–11.

The Majoritarian Press Clause
Sonja R. West†

INTRODUCTION
In early 2018, stories began circulating that something troubling
was happening at the United States––Mexico border. The reports
claimed that the United States government was separating migrant
families and then holding children (as well as adults) by the thousands
in crowded, possibly inhumane environments. There were alarming accounts of children who were sick, dirty, hungry, neglected, and sleeping
on concrete floors.1
Americans, of course, demanded answers: What was happening at
these migrant detention centers? Why was it happening? What were
the official policies involved? Were the government’s actions appropriate? Were they legal? In other words, this was a textbook example of an
issue crying out for an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”2 public debate.
But before that could happen, the public needed to know what, exactly, was going on. The limited and sporadic information made it difficult for concerned citizens to understand the issues, and the often-unfamiliar sources behind these reports led to confusion about who or
what to believe. What the public needed at this moment, it seemed, was
a group of trusted, nongovernmental actors who could shed light on the
situation—skilled professionals with the necessary resources to gather
the pertinent information and disseminate it broadly. Ideally, these
third-party actors would also supplement this information with expert
analysis and place it in historical, social, and political context.
In the United States, we are fortunate enough to have such thirdparty entities—the press. According to Justice Potter Stewart, the press

†

Otis Brumby Distinguished Professor of First Amendment Law, The University of Georgia
School of Law.
1
See generally Simon Romero, et al., Hungry, Scared and Sick: Inside the Migrant Detention
Center in Clint, Tex., N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/06
/us/migrants-border-patrol-clint.html [https://perma.cc/2HMM-FXSG]; Caitlin Dickerson, ‘There
Is a Stench’: Soiled Clothes and No Baths for Migrant Children at a Texas Center, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-soap.html
[https://perma.cc/NB44-K5CX].
2
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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is “the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.”3 The First Amendment singles out the press, the
United States Supreme Court has explained, because its members serve
as the public’s “agent[s],”4 “surrogates,”5 and “eyes and ears.”6 Yet despite this explicit constitutional shout-out, there was little that journalists could do when the government refused to grant them to access to
the migrant detention centers. Indeed, very few members of the press
were ever allowed inside the centers,7 and those who did gain access
received only brief, heavily restricted tours that were limited to a small
part of the facilities.8 They also were prohibited from talking to any
children or taking photographs or videos.9
Thanks to these policies, the public was left without any images of
the insides of these centers that were taken by photojournalists.10 The
only available photos, rather, came from an entirely different source—
the government. And the government’s officially curated images, it
turned out, were not of the “horrific”11 or “tragic”12 living conditions that
some reports had suggested. They instead showed bright-colored bedrooms decked out with stuffed animals,13 game rooms complete with
Ping-Pong and air-hockey tables,14 and meals of pizza and cookies.15 The

3

Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (providing an excerpt from
an address on November 2, 1974, at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation in New
Haven, Connecticut).
4
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
5
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (plurality opinion).
6
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
7
David Bauder, Media Fight Access Restrictions on Child Detention Centers, PBS NEWSHOUR
(June 26, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/media-fight-access-restrictions-on-child-detention-centers [perma.cc/3VRQ-EGJB].
8
Paul Farhi, Migrant Children Are Suffering at the Border. But Reporters Are Kept Away
From the Story, WASH. POST (June 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/migrant-children-are-suffering-at-the-border-but-reporters-are-kept-away-from-the-story/2019/06/
24/500313a2-9693-11e9-8d0a-5edd7e2025b1_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q4Q5-Y29Q].
9
Id.
10
It does not appear that any independent photojournalists have ever been allowed to document the conditions inside one of these facilities. See Julia Waldow & Emily Kohlman, This is Why
There Are So Few Pictures of Migrant Children, CNN (June 20, 2018), https://money.cnn.com
/2018/06/20/media/media-press-photos-migrant-children/index.html [perma.cc/H9GG-RBJP].
11
Isaac Chotiner, Inside a Texas Building Where the Government is Holding Immigrant Children, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/inside-a-texas-bu
ilding-where-the-government-is-holding-immigrant-children [https://perma.cc/GU3M-KN5S].
12
Cedar Attanasio, Garance Burke, & Martha Mendoza, Attorneys: Texas Border Facility Is
Neglecting Migrant Kids, AP NEWS (June 21, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/46da2dbe04f54adbb
875cfbc06bbc615 [https://perma.cc/KM4Q-V39Q].
13
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Bristow VA: IMG_8498, FLICKR (June 20, 2018),
https://www.flickr.com/photos/hhsgov/albums/7215769695934349 [https://perma.cc/BR3F-8GZQ].
14
Id.
15
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, San Diego: 033A5759, FLICKR (June 20, 2018),
https://www.flickr.com/photos/hhsgov/albums/72157698632559615 [perma.cc/LB76-Q9KZ].
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government’s photos showed children playing soccer, going to classes,
and doing crafts.16
The news media (and, by extension, the public) can thank the
United States Supreme Court for putting them at the mercy of government officials for entry to these centers. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a constitutional right for the press
to access to many government-controlled places, including places of detention like jails and prisons.17 The Court has instead insisted that the
press has no unique constitutional rights or protections beyond those
awarded to the general public.18 Of course, journalists do enjoy the same
powerful First Amendment protections to speak that we all have,19 including key safeguards from prior restraints20 and content-based regulations by the government.21 But the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to recognize virtually any unique constitutional protection for the
distinct roles of reporters as newsgatherers, government watchdogs,
and public informants.
The Court’s stance might come as a surprise to some, especially
when considered in light of the First Amendment’s explicit guarantee
of press freedom—a guarantee that mirrors the Constitution’s muchcelebrated protection for freedom of speech. It might become even more
surprising when viewed in light of the historical evidence of the origins
of the First Amendment’s protections for the freedoms of speech and

16

U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Homestead Florida: 6e9Cb9TgQ5243YlhepVhtA,
FLICKR (June 20, 2018), https://www.flickr.com/photos/hhsgov/albums/72157668713957787 [https
://perma.cc/4UMZ-JG6Z].
17
See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
18
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (stating that the Court has “consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the context of
defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those enjoyed
by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities.”); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978) (rejecting the argument that newspapers have special immunity from
search warrants); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment does not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally.”).
19
See Stewart, supra note 3, at 633 (noting that the press is “guaranteed that freedom, to be
sure, but so are we all, because of the Free Speech Clause”).
20
See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (striking prior restraint on
media coverage of a criminal trial); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam) (striking prior restraint on publication of the Pentagon Papers); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (striking prior restraint against anti-Semitic newspaper).
21
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (striking a
law requiring cable operators to “scramble” sexually explicit programming); Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (striking a law
imposing financial burden on works describing author’s crimes); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987) (striking a content-based magazine tax).
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press. This historical evidence suggests that rather than prioritizing
the freedom of speech, as we do today, members of the framing generation were primarily focused on the protection of press freedom. Also, in
contrast to how we now tend to think of our First Amendment rights,
the historical evidence reveals that early Americans saw press freedom
less as a highly individualized right and more as a necessary structural
safeguard that protects the community at large. Indeed, the framing
generation valued the press because it fulfilled structural roles of public
informant and government watchdog—the very same roles that modern
journalists fulfill today when they undertake these public-serving activities.22 Yet despite these historical understandings, the Supreme
Court has nonetheless spent much of the last century focusing its attention on the Speech Clause (not the Press Clause) and most often as
an individual expressive right (not as a collective structural protection).
In other words, when it comes to allowing the Press Clause to fulfill its
intended constitutional role as a structural defender of the public’s collective interests, it appears that we somehow got off track.
Not only has the Press Clause been overshadowed by the Speech
Clause, but it has also been absorbed into the same individual rights
paradigm through which we primarily view speech rights. Classifying
press freedom as an individually held liberty as opposed to understanding its role as a communally shared protection is problematic. For one,
it makes the Press Clause a mere redundancy when it comes to the protection of individual expressive rights, because these rights are now
viewed as fully protected by the Speech Clause. But, more importantly,
it leaves us with a Press Clause that is powerless to address significant
gaps in the constitutional protection of key structural press functions.
This essay thus proposes a new way of thinking about the Press
Clause in which we reframe the Clause’s primary constitutional role.
Rather than continuing to view the Press Clause as merely the Speech
Clause’s toothless counterpart in the protection of individual expressive
rights, I suggest that, for purposes of constitutional analysis, we cede
this job entirely to the Speech Clause.23 Mentally jettisoning off the
Press Clause’s duties to protect personal expressive rights frees us to
focus on its other constitutionally assigned task—safeguarding our collective, majoritarian right to a republican form of government. The “Majoritarian Press Clause,” as I call this newly energized understanding
of the First Amendment’s guarantees, advances this shared structural
interest by concentrating our attention on the importance of two primary goals: protecting the expansive flow of information to the public

22
23

See infra notes 34–41 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
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on matters of communal concern and facilitating effective government
scrutiny.
I explore these ideas in three parts. First, in Part I, I discuss the
historical underpinnings of the First Amendment’s Press Clause and
the evidence revealing that members of the founding generation valued
press freedom as a primary and significant structural protection. In
Part II I describe how, contrary to this historical background, the U.S.
Supreme Court has instead focused almost exclusively on the Speech
Clause as an individual right, effectively leaving the Press Clause with
no constitutional role. Finally, in Part III, I explain how the Majoritarian Press Clause can provide a new framework for thinking about press
freedom that respects its historic significance, while also working with
(rather than against) our modern speech-centered First Amendment jurisprudence.
I. THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF A STRUCTURAL PRESS CLAUSE
To understand the Press Clause’s proper role, we start with the
historical evidence. When it comes to the question of the Press Clause’s
original meaning, scholars and historians are sure of one thing—the
framing generation cared deeply about protecting press freedom.24
James Madison referred to liberty of the press as one of the “choicest
privileges of the people” and proposed language to make press freedom
“inviolable.”25 Thomas Jefferson described it as one of the “fences which
experience has proved peculiarly efficacious against wrong.”26 John Adams praised the ways “[a] free press maintains the majesty of the people.”27 The Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason,

24

See LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY 214–15 (1960) (“Freedom of the press was everywhere a grand topic for declamation.”); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 487 (1983)
(“[F]reedom of the press, whatever it meant, was a matter of widespread concern.”); Steven J.
Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1288 (1998) (“Among the most important of these rights [needing specific protection], Antifederalists contended, were freedom of speech and press, which they characterized as inalienable rights of human nature and invaluable bulwarks against tyranny.”).
25
JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN
JOURNALISM 166 (1988) (quoting a letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (May 31,
1789) in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1787–1790, at 372, 377, 380 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1904)).
26
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster (Dec. 4, 1790) in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 342 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).
27
WENDELL BIRD, PRESS AND SPEECH UNDER ASSAULT: THE EARLY SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES, THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798, AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISSENT 153 (2016) (quoting
John Adams in CLYDE A. DUNIWAY, THE DEVELOPMENTS OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN
MASSACHUSETTS 143–44 (1906)).
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declared that “the freedom of the Press is one of the great bulwarks of
liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic Governments.”28
Beyond this basic understanding of press freedom’s historical
meaning, however, the picture grows far murkier. Unfortunately, we
only have a “sketchy history” of the Press Clause’s framing.29 There is
little evidence that the first Congress engaged in any real debate over
its meaning or reach,30 and other potential sources of historical evidence
are likewise sparse.31 Many scholars have concluded that the historical
meaning is hazy because, in the words of judicial philosopher Zechariah
Chafee, the framers themselves “had no very clear idea as to what they
meant by ‘the freedom of speech or of the press.’”32 Benjamin Franklin
all but confessed to as much when he described the liberty of the press
in 1789 as a freedom “which every Pennsylvanian would fight and die
for; tho’ few of us, I believe, have distinct Ideas of its Nature and Extent.”33
History, therefore, gets us only so far in our mission to uncover the
proper role of the Press Clause, and this brief essay is not intended to
provide a comprehensive overview of the original understanding of
press freedoms. Nevertheless, there are two key takeaways from the
28

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 12.
Anderson, supra note 24, at 487; see also LEVY, supra note 24, at 4 (“The meaning of no
other clause of the Bill of Rights at the time of its framing and ratification has been so obscure to
us [as the Free Speech and Press Clause].”); Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the
Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 640–41 (1975)
(“History casts little light on the question here posed.”).
30
S. DOC. NO. 112–9, at 1128 n.362 (2013); Anderson, supra note 24, at 485–86.
31
Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of
the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 18 (2011) (noting the “paucity of surviving evidence”).
32
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 898 (1949) (reviewing
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)); see also
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798
TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 42 (2004) (“In fact, the framers of the First Amendment had no common
understanding of its ‘true’ meaning. They embraced a broad and largely undefined constitutional
principle, not a concrete, well-settled legal doctrine.”); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE
AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 23 (1991) (“[I]t is simply impossible
to turn to discussions by the framers . . . for definitive answers on the scope of freedom of the
press.”); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 52 (2010) (“[T]he actual views of the drafters and ratifiers of the First Amendment are in many ways unclear.”); Lillian R. BeVier, The First
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 299, 307 (1978) (“History tells us little . . . about the precise meaning contemplated by
those who drafted the Bill of Rights.”).
33
Benjamin Franklin, An Account of the Supremest Court of Judicature in Pennsylvania, viz.,
The Court of the Press, 12 Sept. 1789, Writings 10:36–40, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 130, 130 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), http://press-pubs.uchicag
o.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs16.html [https://perma.cc/LRS2-CVQ8]; see also Stephen Botein, “Meer Mechanics” and an Open Press: The Business and Political Strategies of Colonial American Printers, in IX PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 127, 206 (Donald Fleming &
Bernard Bailyn eds., 1975) (“There is no reason to believe that many or even any printers in colonial America thought deeply or systemically about [press liberties].”).
29
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historical evidence that we do know with a fair amount of certainty and
that are vital to our understanding of its purpose.
The first is that between freedom of speech and freedom of the
press, the members of the framing generation were focused on the latter. In an influential 1983 article, David Anderson detailed the evolution of the constitutional right of press freedom from the pre-Revolutionary era through the first Congress.34 While acknowledging that the
framers lacked a “comprehensive theory of freedom of the press,”35 Anderson concluded that their principal concern was press freedom—not
speech rights.36 By the time of the framing, press freedom had attained
a widely embraced significance, yet freedom of speech was a far more
nebulous concept.37 Speech rights, according to Leonard Levy, evolved
only later “as an offshoot of freedom of the press, on the one hand, and
on the other, freedom of religion—the freedom to speak openly on religious matters.”38
The early state founding charters are perhaps one of the best illustrations of this separate and favored status of press freedom over speech
rights. Of the eleven revolutionary state constitutions, nine specifically
protected the freedom of the press,39 which made it one of the most commonly recognized state rights.40 Yet only one of the original states,
Pennsylvania, also protected the freedom of speech.41
It is likewise notable that the primary original drafter of the Bill of
Rights, James Madison, included among his proposed amendments a
provision that would have limited the power of the states to infringe on
only three rights, which he referred to as “the great rights.”42 In his
original wording, Madison declared the freedom of the press as one of
these great rights, but not freedom of speech.43 While it was not
34

Anderson, supra note 24, at 455.
Id. at 536.
36
Id. at 508 (“The textual antecedents of the first amendment reflect a greater concern with
press than with speech.”).
37
See id. at 487 (“As Levy showed, freedom of speech, unlike freedom of the press, had little
history as an independent concept when the first amendment was framed.”).
38
LEVY, supra note 24, at 5; see also Anderson, supra note 24, at 487 (“The hypothesis that
the Press Clause was merely ‘complementary to and a natural extension of Speech Clause liberty,’
advanced by Chief Justice Burger, is not supported by the historical evidence. Epistemologically,
at least, the press clause was primary and the speech clause secondary.”) (footnote omitted).
39
Anderson, supra note 24, at 487.
40
See BIRD, supra note 27, at 27 (noting that only freedom of religion and the right to a jury
trial were more prevalent).
41
PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 262, 263, 266 (1971).
42
4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amend
I_speechs14.html [https://perma.cc/5KER-VDYQ]; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As
A Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1148 (1991).
43
4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934, supra note 42. The other two “great rights” were the equal rights
35
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ultimately adopted, Madison later referred to this state-restricting provision as “the most valuable amendment in the whole list.”44
The second key lesson from the history of the Press Clause starts
with the understanding that the framing generation saw press freedom
as having two distinct functions—an individual, self-expressive function and a structural, government-monitoring function.45 To see this important distinction, we can return to Pennsylvania’s first state Constitution, which contained not one but two provisions protecting press
freedom.46 The first appeared in the document’s statement of rights and
declared, “the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing,
and publishing their sentiments: therefore the freedom of the press
ought not to be restrained.”47 Both freedoms of speech and of the press
appear in this provision as protections for individual rights. Listed
alongside other individual freedoms, such as the “right to worship,” “the
right to bear arms for the defence [sic] of themselves and the state,” and
the “right to assemble together,”48 this version of press freedom protected the ability of the people simply to express “their sentiments” regardless of the context.
Pennsylvania’s second provision referencing press freedom, however, suggested an entirely different purpose. In this provision, press
freedom was included among the more-structural provisions in the document, such as the vesting of the legislative and executive powers, the
creation of courts, and the detailing of election procedures. In this section, titled “Plan or Frame of Government for Commonwealth or State
of Pennsylvania,” this second provision declared that “[t]he printing
presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the
proceedings of the legislature, or any part of government.”49 Thus, in
contrast to reference to press freedom as an individual expressive right,
here press freedom is assigned a specific task—protecting those who
scrutinize the government.50 Also in contrast to the first reference, the
of conscience and the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases. Id.
44
Id.
45
See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1954) (“There is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is
to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not
only adopt the wisest course of action, but carry it out in the wisest way.”).
46
PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 266, 273 (1971).
47
Id. at 266.
48
Id. at 264, 266.
49
Id. at 273; see also Stephen A. Smith, The Origins of the Free Speech Clause, 29 FREE
SPEECH Y.B. 48, 62 (1991) (noting the committee draft of this provision continued to state “and the
House of Representative shall not pass any Act to restrain it: Nor shall any Printer be restrained
from printing any Remarks, Strictures, or Observations on the Proceedings of the General Assembly, or any Branch of Government, or any public proceeding whatever”) (citation omitted).
50
Timothy E. Cook, Freeing the Presses: An Introductory Essay, in FREEING THE PRESSES: THE
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second provision does not include a generalized protection for speech
rights, which serves to emphasize the unique importance of press freedom as a structural safeguard.
We can also again return to Madison’s initial proposal for the Bill
of Rights, in this case to the provision that ultimately became the First
Amendment. Madison’s language in his proposal likewise suggests separate meanings for the protections of speech and press, as well as a distinction between the press functions of individual liberty and a structural safeguard. His proposed text stated: “The people shall not be
deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their
sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks
of liberty, shall be inviolable.”51 Like the Pennsylvania Constitution,
Madison’s language indicates two separate rights. There is recognition
of both an individual right of the people “to speak, to write, or to publish
their sentiments” and a second right of “the freedom of the press.” This
second right, moreover, is notably distinct from the first; it is separated
by a semicolon and is itself the subject of the independent clause. It is
this guarantee that is alone identified for its structural role as “one of
the great bulwarks of liberty” and declared to be “inviolable.”52
The historical evidence thus tells us that members of the founding
generation viewed press freedom as furthering both an individual expressive function and a structural function. It further suggests that between the two, they appeared to be more focused on the structural
role.53 Indeed, the early rhetoric on the significance of press freedom
abounds with descriptions of its vital role in protecting the security of
the republic and the collective endeavor of self-government.54 Whether
it was by “discussing the propriety of public measures and political

FIRST AMENDMENT IN ACTION 1, 7 (Timothy E. Cook ed., 2005) (noting that the first section “values
the press as a public forum open to all” and the second “highlights the watchdog function”); see
also Anderson, supra note 24, at 489–90 (stating that Pennsylvania’s second Press Clause is “unmistakable” evidence of “the right to examine government”).
51
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 451 (1789).
52
Id.; accord Amar, supra note 42, at 1149.
53
See Anderson, supra note 24, at 490–91 (“Throughout the formative period, the focus of
discussion was on the role of the press in relation to the government. The Quebec Address shows
some awareness that the press also had a role in advancing ‘truth, science, morality, and arts in
general,’ but the primary thrust of that document, and the exclusive thrust of all other official
declarations, was that freedom of the press was a necessary concomitant of self-government.”);
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521,
538 (1977) (“There can be no doubt, however, that one of the most important values attributed to
a free press by eighteenth-century political thinkers was that of checking the inherent tendency of
government officials to abuse the power entrusted to them.”).
54
Yet press freedom was rarely discussed as a matter of individual expressive value. See
Thomas I. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 737, 744 (1977) (“The colonists were not thinking as intently as we do now in terms of
protecting the individual against the manifold pressures of the collective.”).
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opinions”55 or “scanning the conduct of administration, and shewing the
tendency of it,”56 the framing generation saw the free press as having
an essential job to do in the safeguarding of democracy. As William
Cushing wrote to John Adams in 1789, press freedom required constitutional protection because of its power to “save a state and prevent the
necessity of a revolution, as well as bring one about, when it is necessary.”57
II. THE MODERN FATE OF THE PRESS CLAUSE
A. The Supreme Court and the Press Clause
In light of the early understanding of the Press Clause as a provision of primary importance, it is striking that today it is viewed as a
seemingly secondary right with no meaningful role independent from
the Speech Clause. Yet that is precisely how our First Amendment jurisprudence has evolved.
Despite the textually similar standing of the Press and Speech
Clauses, the Supreme Court hardly could have treated these First
Amendment neighbors more differently. On the one hand, the Speech
Clause has grown over time into a constitutional powerhouse. Its reach
has continually expanded and adapted to ever-changing circumstances.
The justices brag about protecting it.58 The public reveres it.59 Litigants
search for ways to cloak their legal claims within it.60
The Press Clause, on the other hand, has been routinely sidelined.61
At best, the Court has relegated the Press Clause to a narrow role as
55

Smith, supra note 25, at 11 (quoting Benjamin Franklin).
WENDELL BIRD, PRESS AND SPEECH UNDER ASSAULT 155 (2016) (quoting a letter from William Cushing to John Adams (Feb. 18, 1789)).
57
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting a letter from William Cushing to John Adams (Feb. 18,
1789)).
58
See Tony Mauro, Roberts Declares Himself First Amendment’s ‘Most Aggressive Defender’ at
SCOTUS, NAT’L L. J. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/02/13/robert
s-declares-himself-first-amendments-most-aggressive-defender-at-scotus/ [https://perma.cc/9VBN
-2LG9] (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts as referring to himself as “probably the most aggressive defender of the First Amendment on the court now”).
59
See Americans Say Freedom of Speech is the Most Important Constitutional Right, According to FindLaw.com Survey for Law Day, May 1, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.pr
newswire.com/news-releases/americans-say-freedom-of-speech-is-the-most-important-constitutional-right-according-to-findlawcom-survey-for-law-day-may-1-300074847.html
[https://perma.cc/7ND9-CLQV].
60
See Marcia Coyle & Tony Mauro, It’s Not Free Speech as Usual at SCOTUS, NAT’L L. J.
(Feb. 28, 2018) https://middlebororeviewetal.blogspot.com/2018/02/the-1st-amendment-playbookits-not-just.html [https://perma.cc/2EH3-3UDU] (discussing the broader range of cases raising free
speech claims at the Supreme Court).
61
See Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2436 (2014) (describing
the Supreme Court’s different treatment of the Speech and Press Clauses); see also Anderson,
supra note 24, at 457 (“[N]o Supreme Court decision has rested squarely on the press clause,
56
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the Speech Clause’s trusty sidekick, a subsidiary right tasked merely
with ensuring the ability of speakers to publish and disseminate their
speech.62 This reading, however, appears to make the Press Clause redundant in light of the Court’s opinions empowering the Speech Clause
to protect the entire communicative act, including the freedom of speakers to choose their messages63 and to broadly distribute their speech,64
as well as the audiences’ rights to receive it.65 As a result, the modern
Press Clause cannot claim any explicitly recognized constitutional right
or protection as its own.66
The differing treatment of the two clauses raises crucial questions
of First Amendment jurisprudence. Chief Justice John Marshall admonished us that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”67 Yet the Press Clause seems
to have become just that—if not “mere surplusage,”68 then little more

independent of the speech clause.”). But see id. at 459 (“If the Court has never given the press
clause independent significance, neither has it foreclosed the possibility.” (footnote omitted)).
62
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“The
Speech Clause standing alone may be viewed as a protection of the liberty to express ideas and
beliefs, while the Press Clause focuses specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression
broadly. . . .”). But see Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 137 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“When applied to the press, the term freedom is not to be narrowly confined; and it obviously
means more than publication and circulation.”).
63
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) ([T]he
fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment[] [is] that a speaker has the autonomy
to choose the content of his own message”).
64
See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 800 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[T]here is no fundamental distinction between expression and dissemination.”); see, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(deciding a case about the right to broadly disseminate a documentary film solely under the Speech
Clause); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (finding that a law that restricts the dissemination of
certain content on the internet violates the freedom of speech but not mentioning the freedom of
the press); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (same).
65
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756
(1976) (holding that the Speech Clause’s protections extend “to the communication, to its source
and to its recipients both”).
66
See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (“[A]s a matter
of positive law, the Press Clause actually plays a rather minor role in protecting the freedom of
the press.”); C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing
Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 956 (2007) (“The Court has never explicitly recognized that the
Press Clause involves any significant content different from that provided to all individuals by the
prohibition on abridging freedom of speech.”); see also David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press in
Wartime, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 49, 69–70 (2006) (explaining that while early press cases did rely
explicitly on the Press Clause, over time the Court’s cases reveal an “abandonment of the Press
Clause as a specific source of constitutional authority” as “the Court gave the press whatever rights
it recognized under the Speech Clause”).
67
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); accord District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 643 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Nimmer, supra note 29, at 640 (“As
nature abhors a vacuum, the law cannot abide a redundancy. The presumption is strong that language used in a legal instrument, be it a constitution, a statute, or a contract, has meaning, else it
would not have been employed.”).
68
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174.
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than an extension of the Speech Clause, an afterthought, a side dish to
the main constitutional entree.69
B. What’s the Harm?
The topic of this volume asks the question, “What’s the harm?” And
it is a question worth asking—what is the harm of allowing our Press
Clause to lie dormant? What is the harm of adopting a speech-only focus
to the protection of our expressive liberties? Members of the press, after
all, enjoy the same robust speech rights that we all do, which happen to
be some of the world’s strongest. But there is harm, and it comes from
our failure to recognize the unique constitutional interest we all share
in the protection of the press’s public-serving functions. In particular,
this interest arises in a small, but significant, category of cases where
it might not make sense to recognize a particular First Amendment
right for all speakers, yet where our failure to recognize the right for
the press harms our collective interest in a well-informed populace and
a monitored government.
More practically, we see this harm in the everyday experiences of
American journalists. Journalists, for example, have no First Amendment rights of access to many government-controlled places,70 meetings,71 or documents.72 In addition to the limited access to migrant detention centers discussed earlier, there have also been recent

69

See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 800 (Burger, J., concurring) (describing the press freedom as
“complementary to and a natural extension of Speech Clause liberty”).
70
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684–685 (1972) (“Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded . . . .”).
71
But see Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987) (vacating
and dismissing as moot a lower court decision holding the public and the press have a First Amendment right of access to Mine Safety and Health Administration hearings); The Government in the
Sunshine Act, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/federalopen-government-guide/federal-open-meetings-laws/government-sunshine-act [http://perma.cc/L2
8S-RXZS] (“The Sunshine Act includes 10 exemptions or reasons that the government can refuse
to open an agency meeting.”); accord 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1)–(10) (2012) (listing exemptions).
72
See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1)–(10) (2012) (outlining exemptions to government’s obligation to
release information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552); Response
Times, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/federal-open- government-guide/federal-freedom-information-act/response-times [http://perma.cc/444J-LJB3] (“For
journalists, the nearly routine failure of agencies to provide timely access to records has triggered
the need to go outside the [Freedom of Information] Act . . . .”). For examples of cases rejecting
journalists’ FOIA requests under the statutory exemptions, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 757, 780 (1989) (rejecting journalist’s FOIA request
for FBI record of crime figure suspected of bribing congressman); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615,
631–32, 634 n.1 (1982) (rejecting journalist’s FOIA request for FBI records requested by President
Nixon); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 596, 602–03 (1982) (rejecting newspaper’s FOIA request for Iranian nationals’ passport application information); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec.
Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting public interest groups’
FOIA request for information on thousands of foreign nationals detained during September 11
investigation).
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controversies involving the White House stripping reporters of their
press passes73 and selectively banning them from the president’s meetings with foreign leaders,74 White House press briefings, and other
events.75 Journalists also have no, or only uncertain, constitutional protections from being subjected to government subpoenas, 76 searches,77 or
surveillance.78 We saw striking examples of this when it was revealed
in 2018 that federal prosecutors had seized years’ worth of a New York
Times reporter’s telephone and email records,79 and when we learned in
2020 that the Department of Homeland Security had compiled “intelligence reports”—the type typically reserved for suspected terrorists and
violent actors—on two American journalists covering highly contentious protests in Portland, Oregon.80 Finally, there is likewise no official
constitutional role in legal actions, such as civil lawsuits81 or even
73

Paul Farhi, Reporter Sues White House Over 30-day Suspension of Press Pass Following
Confrontation, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/report
er-sues-white-house-over-30-day-suspension-of-press-pass-following-confrontation/2019/08/20/e0
d0b768-c384-11e9-b5e4-54aa56d5b7ce_story.html [https://perma.cc/D5E3-FN9B]; Amy B. Wang &
Paul Farhi, White House Suspends Press Pass of CNN’s Jim Acosta After His Testy Exchange with
Trump, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/08/whitehouse-suspends-press-pass-cnns-jim-acosta-after-testy-exchange-with-trump/ [https://perma.cc/7
U4K-F2VA]; David R. Lurie, Trump’s Cold War with the White House Press Corps, SLATE (Aug. 8,
2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08/trump-cold-war-white-house-press-gorka.html
[https://perma.cc/TG4P-S2FV]; Mathew Ingram, White House Revokes Press Passes for Dozens of
Journalists, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (May 9, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/whit
e-house-press-passes.php [https://perma.cc/DS93-WJLG].
74
Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Bars U.S. Press, but Not Russia’s, at Meeting with Russian
Officials, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/politics/trump-russia-meeting-american-reporters-blocked.html [https://perma.cc/ABP5-3YKL].
75
Joe Concha, White House Excludes CNN from Annual SOTU Media Lunch, HILL (Feb. 4,
2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/481378-white-house-excludes-cnn-from-annual-sotumedia-lunch [perma.cc/RT3V-QRC6]; NPR Reporter Removed from Pompeo Trip in ‘Retaliation’,
Says Press Group, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/27/
npr-reporter-removed-from-pompeo-trip-in-retaliation-says-press-group [perma.cc/8S5P-VGLB].
76
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145–50 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (upholding contempt orders against journalists for refusing to comply with subpoena).
77
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b) (2012) (setting forth situations where police may seize media’s “documentary materials”); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 552–53 (1978) (rejecting
a Fourth Amendment challenge to police search of student newspaper office for photographs),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, as recognized in Sennett v. United States, 667 F.3d
531 (4th Cir. 2012).
78
Cora Currier, Government Can Spy on Journalists in the U.S. Using Invasive Foreign Intelligence Process, INTERCEPT (Sept. 18, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/09/17/journalists-fisacourt-spying/ [https://perma.cc/X9RB-ESVW].
79
Adam Goldman, Nicholas Fandos, & Katie Benner, Ex-Senate Aide Charged in Leak Case
Where Times Reporter’s Records Were Seized, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2018/06/07/us/politics/times-reporter-phone-records-seized.html [https://perma.cc/S6YZ-ZXD7].
80
Shane Harris, DHS Compiled ‘Intelligence Reports’ on Journalists who Published Leaked
Documents, WASH. POST (July 30, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/dhscompiled-intelligence-reports-on-journalists-who-published-leaked-documents/2020/07/30/5be5ec
9e-d25b-11ea-9038-af089b63ac21_story.html [https://perma.cc/JY5X-6UM7].
81
See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that journalists who lie on employment applications to gain access to private facilities or use
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criminal prosecutions, for evidence that a defendant is a journalist who
was engaged in an act of newsgathering or reporting. In 2010, for example, the Department of Justice took the unprecedented step of naming a reporter as a co-conspirator under the Espionage Act for his newsgathering efforts—a charge that carries a sentence of up to 10 years in
prison.82 More recently, the U.S. Press Freedom Tracker identified more
than 600 reports of law enforcement officers arresting, detaining, or engaging in acts of physical aggression against journalists who were attempting to report on the nationwide demonstrations against racially
discriminatory police violence.83
This is all happening, moreover, at the same time that most American news organizations are facing significant new struggles. The
Court’s refusal to recognize any constitutional differences between
members of the press and other speakers might have appeared for decades to be at most harmless error. Because, as it just so happened, the
Court determined much of the law in this area during the era that
turned out to be the high-water mark of the American press’s strength.
The press, during this period, was financially strong, enjoyed the public’s goodwill, and benefited from a mutually dependent relationship
with government officials.84 It was further bolstered by established
norms dictating that government officials will show the press at least a
minimum amount of respect.85 The press of that era, therefore, was an
institution that had the resources to aggressively defend itself as well
as the political capital to demand certain basic levels of accommodation.
Today, however, the American press stands on far shakier ground.
The newspaper industry is in a free fall thanks to declining advertising
revenues, challenges brought by the Internet age, and a public that has
become accustomed to getting its news for free.86 At the same time, the

secret cameras for newsgathering activities are not protected by the First Amendment and may
be liable for trespass or other offenses).
82
Ryan Lizza, The Justice Department and Fox News’s Phone Records, NEW YORKER (May 21,
2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-justice-department-and-fox-newss-phonerecords [https://perma.cc/KLS7-HB6G].
83
See U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER, https://pressfreedomtracker.us [https://perma.cc/JRC4PP8T] (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (tracking arrests and detentions of journalists); Paul Farhi &
Elahe Izadi, ‘The Norms Have Broken Down’: Shock as Journalists are Arrested, Injured by Police
While Trying to Cover the Story, WASH. POST (May 31, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lif
estyle/media/journalists-at-several-protests-were-injured-arrested-by-police-while-trying-to-cover
-the-story/2020/05/31/bfbc322a-a342-11ea-b619-3f9133bbb482_story.html [https://perma.cc/9R6VGCPS] (discussing “a number of incidents,” in which “journalists were injured, harassed or arrested even after identifying themselves as reporters” during the protests).
84
See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the Free American Press, 112
NW. U. L. REV. 567, 575–576 (2017).
85
Id.
86
Pew Research Center, Newspaper Fact Sheet, JOURNALISM.ORG (July 9, 2019), https://www
.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/ [https://perma.cc/ZR2C-J6ZU].
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public’s trust in the press has hit all-time lows,87 and government actors
are now far less dependent on the press in order to convey their messages to the public. Notably, this was the state of affairs even before the
election of a president who has declared a “running war” with the news
media,88 referred repeatedly to the press as “the enemy of the people,”
89 and has run roughshod over all the traditional norms of respect for
the essential role of a free press in our democracy.
The modern American press, therefore, is far weaker than in the
past and less able to rely on non-legal sources of strength. There might
be one helpful aspect, however, of this shift in the press’s relative powers, which is that it sharpens our understanding of the importance of
constitutional and legal protections for the press. The Supreme Court’s
stance that the Constitution is, for basically any practical purpose,
blind to the role of the press versus other types of speakers is simply far
less tenable today.
III. THE MAJORITARIAN PRESS CLAUSE
Something funny happened on our way to securing the constitutional guarantee of press freedom—this “inviolable” right, our “great
bulwark of liberty,” one of the most significant rights in our Constitution. It happened gradually and often with the best of intentions, but at
some point, we lost our way. Times changed, technology changed, and
professional identities changed, as did our understandings of individual
liberties, expressive freedoms, and equality.90 The result is that this
freedom of preeminent historical importance, which was designed as a
key structural support for the republic and as a collectively shared security, is now being treated as though it were penned in disappearing
ink.
It is necessary, therefore, that we adjust our framework for thinking about press freedom in a way that respects its prominent historical
role while also reflecting the modern recognition of expansive individual
speech rights. The first step is to openly acknowledge that the Speech
Clause now dominates the job of protecting individual expressive rights.

87

Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016), htt
ps://news.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx [perma.cc/WN
H9-2TDB].
88
Trump CIA Speech Transcript, CBS (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trumpcia-speech-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/G6L5-PPQP]
89
Remarks by President Trump at the Conservative Political Action Conference, WHITE HOUSE
(Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-cons
ervative-political-action-conference/ [https://perma.cc/PB43-TBAH].
90
See Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 89–104 (2016) (discussing
the interwoven evolution in journalism, mass communication technology and First Amendment
doctrine).
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While there might have once been a vibrant role for the Press Clause to
play in this task, that is simply no longer the case.
Yet the Press Clause’s duties do not end there; it still has important
work to do in its other role as protector of our shared structural rights.
Modern First Amendment jurisprudence, however, has trained us reflexively to view press freedom through the same individual rights paradigm that we apply to speech. We thus need a new way of thinking
about press freedom that emphasizes its collective function. I refer to
this new framework as the “Majoritarian Press Clause.”
A. The Majoritarian Press Clause Framework
Our discussion so far has been centered on the two primary functions of press freedom, which are protecting individual rights and
providing structural safeguards. Closely related to this basic dichotomy
is another important dividing line—the difference between the Press
Clause’s majoritarian and counter-majoritarian functions. In Federalist
No. 51, James Madison warned us of these two separate constitutional
concerns: the need to guard “one part of the society against the injustice
of the other part” (a counter-majoritarian protection) as well as to shield
“society against the oppression of its rulers” (the majoritarian protection).91
When we consider individual expressive rights, our focus tends to
be on counter-majoritarian protections.92 These protections are countermajoritarian in that they shield individuals, often minority or unpopular speakers, against the majority (a majority who might be using the
levers of a representative democracy as a means to silence them).93 To
be clear, counter-majoritarian expressive protections are extremely important. They further essential values, such as personal self-realization94 and a richly diverse public dialogue.95 These counter-majoritarian
91

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 206 (2014) (“The whole point of the First Amendment
is to afford individuals protection against such infringements [by the will of the majority].”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“[T]he purpose behind the Bill of Rights,
and of the First Amendment in particular [is] to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—
and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (“The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of
view different from the majority. . . .”).
93
See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]f
there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought that we hate.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, [the framers] amended the
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.”).
94
See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (arguing
that the freedom of speech serves the sole value of individual self-realization).
95
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional right of free expression
92
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protections also often have the incidental effect of benefiting the public
as a whole. But it is the protection of the individual as against all others
that typically lies at their core.
Under the Majoritarian Press Clause framework, we allow the
Speech Clause to continue to do this counter-majoritarian work by robustly protecting individual speakers from potentially antagonistic coalitions of their fellow citizens. The Press Clause, meanwhile, can then
focus on safeguarding our collective ability to challenge a potentially
tyrannical government and secure our communal right to a republican
form of government. By protecting separate, nongovernmental checks
to government power,96 the Majoritarian Press Clause’s primary mission is to ensure that our representative government is, indeed, reflecting the popular will of its constituents97— a mission it achieves through
the journalistic mechanisms of a well-informed populace and vigorous
government scrutiny. Once we shift our attention to the Press Clause’s
role of protecting the collective power of the public writ large as against
the government, it becomes easier to see how press freedom can complement, not compete with, speech rights.
Not only is this approach more faithful to the original understanding of press freedom, but it also helps to clarify the constitutional work
that the Press Clause can and should be doing today. Arguments
against giving practical meaning to the Press Clause typically suggest
that it would be too difficult to determine both what Press Clause protections should be recognized and which speakers should be allowed to
claim them.98 Underlying these assertions is usually a sense of inequality—the fear that recognizing any unique press rights would be akin to
bestowing special privileges on a favored class at the expense of everyone else. This reaction, of course, makes sense. We have been trained to
think about speech rights from a counter-majoritarian angle. Most of us
is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom
will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.”).
96
See Blasi, supra note 53, at 538 (stating that “one of the most important values attributed
to a free press by eighteenth-century political thinkers was that of checking the inherent tendency
of government officials to abuse the power entrusted to them”).
97
See Amar, supra note 42, at 1147 (noting that the First Amendment’s “historical and structural core was to safeguard the rights of popular majorities . . . against a possibly unrepresentative
and self-interested Congress”).
98
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(“The second fundamental difficulty with interpreting the Press Clause as conferring special status
on a limited group is one of definition.”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–704 (1972) (stating
that “[t]he administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order” and that the Court was “unwilling to embark the judiciary on
a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination”).
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thus naturally bristle at the notion that some speakers might be able to
claim a constitutional right while others could not. In the speech context, for example, we often demand that courts treat each idea, viewpoint, and speaker the same. We expect identical rights, because we
view speech through the individual rights lens, which dictates that it is
the right of each person to speak (or not to speak) and to weigh the value
of others’ messages.99
Yet this concern of inequality, while crucial in the counter-majoritarian context, is misplaced when considering majoritarian safeguards.
The Majoritarian Press Clause helps us see the difference by moving
our focus to the public’s collective interest in a truly representative government and how the free press advances this majoritarian endeavor
through effective government scrutiny and broad dissemination of information. Depending on the circumstances, constitutional protection
for these press functions may or may not necessitate treating all individual speakers the same. With this understanding in mind, determining which rights and speakers to recognize becomes, while maybe still
not an easy task, certainly an easier and more palatable one. The ultimate job for the Court becomes recognizing the constitutional tools that
are needed by those speakers who are best suited to work on the public’s
behalf in this effort to fortify our democracy.
B. The Majoritarian Press Clause in Practice
To better illustrate how the Majoritarian Press Clause would function, let us use as an example the case of Houchins v. KQED, 100 the last
in a trio of cases from the 1970s in which the Supreme Court denied the
requests of journalists to access jails and prisons for newsgathering purposes.101 In Houchins, a broadcasting station sought “reasonable access”
to a local county jail102 as part of an investigation into an inmate suicide103 as well as reports of rapes,104 beatings,105 and generally “shocking and debasing” conditions.106

99

United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (noting that when it
comes to judging the value of speech, “[w]hat the Constitution says is that these judgments are for
the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a
majority”).
100
438 U.S. 1 (1978).
101
See id.; Saxbe v. Wash. Post, Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
102
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3. Specifically, the journalists-plaintiffs sought access to the “Little
Greystone” portion of the jail and to be able to “interview inmates and make sound recordings,
films, and photographs for publication and broadcasting by newspapers, radio and television.” Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 5.
105
Id.
106
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (discussing the judge’s
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The Court held that the journalists did not have any special constitutional right to access the jail beyond the access granted to the general
public.107 When viewed through the individual rights paradigm, this
holding is understandable. On the surface, providing special access to
members of the press looks a lot like favoring certain powerful speakers
over other speakers. Our counter-majoritarian instincts tell us that this
must be unconstitutional. But if we put on our collective rights hat, the
analysis changes. The Majoritarian Press Clause instructs us to ask different questions, such as: Does the claimed right further a structural
press function? And if so, are these speakers likely to utilize the right
on the public’s behalf?
The answer to both questions in the Houchins case was clearly
“yes.” The reporters were seeking access to information about a matter
of significant public concern for the purposes of disseminating it to the
public and holding the government accountable.108 These are classic
structural press functions that aid the public in forming intelligent
opinions and acting as a restraint on misgovernment. Conditions of
prisons and jails, the Houchins Court acknowledged, “are clearly matters of great public importance.”109 As Justice Lewis Powell pointed out
in his dissent in another of the prison-access cases, a prohibition on
press access “precludes accurate and effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances,”110 including “[t]he administration of
these institutions, the effectiveness of their rehabilitative programs,
the conditions of confinement that they maintain, and the experiences
of the individuals incarcerated therein.”111
It is worth noting, moreover, that the Court simply recognizing that
a constitutional right involves a structural press function does not mean
that the government’s interests in limiting press access would become
immaterial or that the government would be forced to grant access to
any speaker who sought information. As Chief Justice Earl Warren observed, “[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed

personal visit to the jail and his observations that the conditions there “constituted cruel and unusual punishment for man or beast,” and led him to the “inescapable conclusion was that [the jail]
should be razed to the ground”).
107
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16.
108
See Affidavit of Melvin S. Wax at ¶ 3, Houchins, 438 U.S. 1 (No. 76-1310) (“We believe that
jails and prisons are public institutions managed by public officials who are accountable to the
public, and therefore information concerning such institutions should be reported by the news media.”).
109
See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8 (quotation marks omitted).
110
Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 854 (1974).
111
See id. at 861; see also Houchins, 438 U.S. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the
public’s interest in the criminal justice system “survives the judgment of conviction and appropriately carries over to an interest in how the convicted person is treated during his period of punishment and hoped-for rehabilitation”).
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by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.”112 Under the
Majoritarian Press Clause, as with other First Amendment rights,
courts would still weigh the collective public interest at stake against
the government’s interests.113 The government, for example, might have
a substantial interest114 in prohibiting press access to confidential or
privileged information115 or when unique factors would make press access to the jail unusually dangerous.116
Thus, the Majoritarian Press Clause has helped us determine that
press access to the jail in Houchins is the type of right that courts should
recognize as guaranteed by the First Amendment. But what about the
question of which speakers should be able to claim the right? The question of definition—who is or is not the press—is a difficult one. To some,
in fact, this definitional problem is practically fatal to assertions of
unique constitutional rights for the press.117 The Majoritarian Press
Clause approach, however, brings clarity to this potentially thorny issue.
In circumstances where recognizing a press right for all speakers
is feasible, both individual and structural First Amendment interests
dictate that the courts should do just that.118 It is in situations where it
112

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965).
See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Read
with care and in context, our decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that any
privilege of access to governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the
nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality.”).
114
Determining the level of heightened scrutiny that the Court should apply is beyond the
scope of this essay, but in Saxbe the Court rejected the argument that the government must show
“some substantial justification” for restricting access. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 856 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 861 (“I believe that this sweeping prohibition of prisoner-press interviews substantially impairs a core value of the First Amendment.”).
115
See id. at 861.
116
Mem. and Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 70, Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (No. 76-1310) (The district court noted in its order granting a preliminary
injunction allowing press access to the jail that “[o]f course, should a situation arise in which jail
tensions or other special circumstances make such implementation dangerous, defendant can restrict media access for the duration of such circumstances”).
117
See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796–802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(arguing that “the very task” of defining the press would be “reminiscent of the abhorred licensing
system of Tudor and Stuart England—a system the First Amendment was intended to ban from
this country”).
118
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (concluding that there is a general First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials for the public and the press). But see id. at 573 (acknowledging that “people now acquire [information about trials] chiefly through the print and
electronic media”); id. (noting that providing the news media with “special seating and priority of
entry so that they may report what people in attendance have seen and heard” aids the “public
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal
justice system.” (quotation omitted)); id. at 581, n.18 (noting that because “courtrooms have limited
capacity, there may be occasions when not every person who wishes to attend can be accommodated. In such situations, reasonable restrictions on general access are traditionally imposed, including preferential seating for media representatives.”); id. at 586, n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(observing that “[a]s a practical matter . . . the institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief
113
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is not workable to include everyone, however, that the Majoritarian
Press Clause framework is useful in determining the proper claimants
of a press right or protection. It is of little use to recognize a collective,
structural press right, after all, if the party or parties claiming the right
would not use it to further the public’s interest in representative government.
Under the individual rights view, there is no constitutional difference between members of the press and any random person who might
knock on the prison door.119 In the speech context, our counter-majoritarian instincts have primed us to balk at the prospect of the government deciding which speakers are allowed to speak. Speech rights
should not—indeed often cannot—be doled out based on who the
speaker is,120 what they have said in the past,121 or what they are likely
to say in the future.122 If we transfer this individual centered view to
the Press Clause, then the logical conclusion is that we must similarly
resist the idea of awarding press rights based on the identity of the
claimant.123 The individual rights approach, therefore, boxes the Court
into a stark binary choice—we either all have the right or none of us do.
But in the context of jails and prisons, it is not practical to recognize
access rights for everyone. Valid concerns about safety and prison administration are generally incompatible with a right of unfettered public access.124 So when the Court is forced by the individual rights framework to choose between access for everyone or for no one, then it is left
with little choice but to deny access to everyone, including to members
of the press. When considered in light of the Press Clause’s historical
and textual mandates, however, this conclusion is illogical. It fails both
at protecting the public’s interest in receiving information about the jail

beneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the ‘agent’ of interested citizens, and funnels
information about trials to a large number of individuals”).
119
See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 846–47 (upholding a blanket prohibition on press interviews with
individual inmates based, in part, on the fact that the policy “is applied with an even hand to all
prospective visitors, including newsmen, who, like other members of the public, may enter the
prisons to visit friends or family members. But, again like members of the general public, they
may not enter the prison and insist on visiting an inmate with whom they have no such relationship”).
120
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (“[T]he First Amendment generally
prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”).
121
See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 712, 723 (1931) (holding unconstitutional
a statute that subjected newspaper to prior restraint if it previously published “malicious” material).
122
Id.
123
See Sonja R. West, Favoring the Press, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 91 (2018) (arguing that the Press
Clause supports speaker classifications favoring the press).
124
See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“For good reasons, unrestrained public
access [to the prison] is not permitted.”).

332

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

and in ensuring that possible government malfeasance is effectively investigated.
The Majoritarian Press Clause framework, on the other hand, once
again guides us toward a more fitting solution by reminding us that the
objective is not necessarily to treat all speakers the same but to identify
those speakers who are fulfilling the unique public-serving press functions.125 The appropriate query, therefore, is not whether the speakers
before the Court are receiving special treatment (the counter-majoritarian concern) but, rather, whether the speakers are effectively working
to further the public’s interests (a majoritarian role). The plaintiffs in
Houchins easily met this standard—they were experienced journalists126 with an established audience and a proven record reporting on
issues related to jails and prisons in their area.127 They were seeking
access, moreover, in order to the gather and broadly disseminate information about a matter of significant public concern.128 If the choice is
between recognizing a right of access for these plaintiffs or for no one,
the majoritarian framework exposes how our collective First Amendment interests are best served by granting the journalists access.129
The Houchins case further illustrates how a member of the press
can be a proper trustee of the public’s shared right to information. In
that case, two local branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) joined the lawsuit as co-plaintiffs with the news station, KQED. Filing the complaint “on their own
behalf and on behalf of black people generally,”130 the NAACP chapters
did not seek access to the jail for any of their individual members. They
claimed, instead, that by blocking the news station’s access the prison

125

See Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729, 749–55 (2014) (drawing on
Supreme Court precedent to identify the two main “unique constitutional functions” of the press
as (1) news-gathering and dissemination, and (2) checking the government); see also Sonja R. West,
Press Exceptionalism, supra note 61, at 2443 (“The quest, therefore, should not be to define the
press but rather to train our courts to recognize them in action.”).
126
Mem. and Order at 66–67, Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (No. 76-1310) (The District
Court in the case described the plaintiffs as “a local non-profit, publicly-supported corporation engaged in educational television and radio broadcasting.”).
127
Affidavit of Melvin S. Wax, supra note 108, at ¶ 10 (declaring that as “a television journalist
with experience in reporting on jail and prison conditions, I believe that it is essential to public
understanding of the conditions prevailing at the Greystone facility and the Santa Rita jail in
general, that the news media report in detail on the exact nature of such conditions”).
128
Affidavit of William Schechner ¶ 4, Houchins, 438 U.S. 1 (No. 76-1310) (describing his reporting on an earlier news story regarding prison conditions and stating that being able to record
footage inside San Quentin prison “significantly enhanced my ability to convey to the public, on
the news program, the actual conditions at San Quentin”).
129
Questions, of course, will remain about the best methods for identifying speakers who are
fulfilling press functions. See Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, supra note 61, at 2453–2462
(discussing useful proxies and a beginning framework for identifying press speakers).
130
Complaint at ¶ 3, Houchins, 438 U.S. 1 (No. 76-1310).
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had violated their constitutional rights.131 In the complaint, the NAACP
members explained that they “depend on the public media to keep them
informed of such conditions so that they can meaningfully participate
in the current public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County” and
that they “rely regularly on KQED’s Newsroom program to keep them
informed on these issues.”132
This press function—serving as proxies for the public—is well recognized.133 As Justice Stewart observed in his concurring opinion in
Houchins, “[w]hen on assignment, a journalist does not tour a jail
simply for his own edification. He is there to gather information to be
passed on to others, and his mission is protected by the Constitution for
very specific reasons.”134 Unlike the individual rights framework, the
Majoritarian Press Clause both allows, indeed requires, the Court to
recognize those speakers who are doing this important constitutional
work.
IV. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment’s guarantee of press freedom is one of our
Constitution’s most significant accomplishments. The historical evidence shows that the framing generation valued press freedom, even
beyond speech rights, as both an individual freedom and as a key structural protection—a shared security of the people vis a vis their government. A free press was a vital tool necessary to ensure the survival of a
truly representative government.
Over the last hundred years, however, our focus has shifted from
protecting press freedom to securing speech rights more generally. Indeed, when it comes to the job of protecting our individual expressive
interests, today’s robust speech protections occupy the field. In the process, the Press Clause has been swept aside and treated, contrary to its
historical importance, as a superfluous tagalong to the Speech Clause.

131

Id. at ¶ 12 (asserting that barring the news station’s coverage of the jail “deprives the
NAACP plaintiffs’ members of their right to know and receive information on such conditions and
thus to participate meaningfully in the public debate, presently being conducted in Alameda
County, with regard to jail reform and the possible construction of new jail facilities”).
132
Id. at ¶ 3.
133
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (plurality opinion) (noting
that public reliance on the news media “[i]n a sense, . . . validates the media claim of functioning
as surrogates for the public.”); Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8 (“Beyond question, the role of the media is
important; acting as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the public, they can be a powerful and constructive force,
contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public business. They have served that function
since the beginning of the Republic, but, like all other components of our society, media representatives are subject to limits.”); see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (noting
that “the press serves as the information-gathering agent of the public”).
134
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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The United States’ unparalleled leadership in the protection of individual expressive rights is rightly celebrated and often also has the
secondary effect of furthering our shared, structural interests. But we
must be careful not to confuse the two jobs and, in the process, to fail to
understand the situations in which constitutional rights and protections are still needed. The Majoritarian Press Clause approach can help
us do just that, by reframing our understanding of when and how
unique press functions should be protected in order to benefit society as
a whole.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the Constitution specifically selected the press” for protection “as a constitutionally chosen
means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the
people whom they were selected to serve.”135 As the Court has declared,
the guarantees of press freedom “are not for the benefit of the press so
much as for the benefit of all of us.”136 The Majoritarian Press Clause
embraces this understanding and, in the process, shows us how the freedoms of speech and press can work together to more fully realize all of
the promises of the First Amendment.

135

Mills v. State of Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609 (noting
that “the press serves as the information-gathering agent of the public”).
136
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).

Climate Change Disclosures After NIFLA
Daniel Abrams†

I.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change1 represents one of the defining global problems of
the twenty-first century.2 The effects of warming have led to mass displacement, more extreme weather events, and degradation of natural
habitat.3 There is significant discord on the proper means to address
this global issue: whether it is the role of government alone or if industry must assume responsibility for its role in climate change.4 Even
within these different camps, there is dispute about the proper means
to address such an expansive issue.5 One method governments have in
their repertoire to combat climate change is disclosure requirements related to energy consumption or carbon emissions. Disclosures compel
the regulated party to provide information to consumers and the public.
The goal is to provide consumers with more information so that they
can make an informed choice and drive competition.
In the context of climate change, these disclosures can take many
forms. In New York City, as of May 2020, many buildings are required
to disclose their energy consumption and post an energy-efficiency

†

BA 2012, University of Michigan; JD Candidate 2021, The University of Chicago Law
School.
1
For the purposes of this comment, I will define “climate change” as the effects of anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases, or human caused warming of the planet through the discharge
of carbon, methane, and other pollutants.
2
Global Issues: Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issuesdepth/climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/Y5LR-F68G] (last visited Sept. 3, 2020) (“Climate Change
is the defining issue of our time and we are at a defining moment.”).
3
Climate Impacts, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/climate/impacts [https://perma.cc/CUE8-EZUT] (last visited Sept. 3, 2020).
4
See, e.g., Should Fossil-Fuel Companies Bear Responsibility for the Damage Their Products
Do to the Environment?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-fossilfuel-companies-bear-responsibility-for-the-damage-their-products-do-to-the-environment11574190219 [https://perma.cc/SSE3-3968].
5
See Saabira Chaudhuri, Companies Say They Want to Save the Planet—but They Can’t
Agree How, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-say-they-want-to
-save-the-planetbut-they-cant-agree-how-11575973800 [perma.cc/VC5C-4ZYE]; Lisa Friedman,
On Climate Change, Biden Has a Record and a Plan. Young Activists Want More., WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/climate%20/climate-change-biden.html%20
[https://perma.cc/D4SH-F3Y6].
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rating in a conspicuous place to inform the public.6 The logic behind this
plan is to increase competition between buildings to decrease their energy consumption and promote public pressure to stimulate behavioral
change through circulation of greater information. Japan has attempted a similar tactic by requiring food packaging to carry a carbon
footprint label.7 In the same vein, the Japanese food packaging disclosure requirement promotes more informed choices from consumers,
who may value a like product higher if it required less energy to manufacture. While disclosures are not the only method for governments to
address climate change, they can be successful while effectuating minimum intrusion on regulated parties by raising collective consciousness
and using the market to drive better behavior from regulated industries.
The government’s ability to force disclosures from private parties
is not unlimited. In the United States, the First Amendment can be a
barrier to implementing a climate change disclosure requirement. The
First Amendment cabins government efforts to restrict or compel
speech.8 However, its reach is not absolute. There are certain instances
where the government has the ability to regulate speech or compel a
factual disclosure. One instance occurs when there is “dissemination of
commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading.”9 Under the
standard created by Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,10 government regulation of commercial speech in the form of compelled disclosure is appropriate when (1) there is a substantial state interest to
which the regulation is reasonably related, (2) the regulation addresses
deception, (3) the information compelled is “factual and uncontroversial,” and (4) the regulation is not unduly burdensome. This standard
has come to be known as the Zauderer test. The Zauderer test has morphed over time,11 and has been used to both invalidate and to approve
of government attempts at regulating commercial speech.12

6

Devin Gannon, Starting Next Year, Big NYC Buildings Will Display Letter Grades Based
on Energy Efficiency, 6SQFT (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.6sqft.com/starting-next-year-big-nycbuildings-will-display-letter-grades-based-on-energy-efficiency/ [https://perma.cc/354V-T67P].
7
Justin McCurry, Japan to Launch Carbon Footprint Labelling Scheme, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20,
2008), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/aug/20/carbonfootprints.carbonemissions
[https://perma.cc/QES8-EPFR].
8
U.S. Const. amend. I.
9
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
10
Id.
11
See generally Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972 (2017) (discussing how
Zauderer’s scope and strictness have changed over time).
12
See CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 849 (9th Cir. 2019) (providing an example of a disclosure that was upheld because it properly addressed a public health concern); Entm’t Software v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006) (providing an example of a
disclosure that was invalidated as not rationally related to the harm).
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Compelled disclosure jurisprudence underwent “a profound shift”13
in 2018, when the Supreme Court passed down National Institute of
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA).14 The Court’s ruling in
NIFLA specifically changed the landscape around the Zauderer prong
of “factual and uncontroversial” by holding that disclosures related to
abortion were controversial.15 Whether the prong now excludes all political controversies, ideological or scientific disagreements, or any subject with opposing viewpoints is now up for debate.16
The impact of the changes in compelled disclosure standards and
the scope of NIFLA could have effects on federal, state, and local governments’ ability to inform the public about the threat associated with
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.17 Like abortion, climate
change is a much-discussed, much-debated issue, that could colloquially
be considered controversial. Were the Court to take this position, it
would limit the government’s ability to create regulations addressing
the effects of climate change.
In Part II, this Comment will address the history of compelled disclosure jurisprudence in order to understand the case law that persists
after NIFLA and the changes to the Zauderer standard as a result of
NIFLA, including what “factual and uncontroversial” means today.
Part III will distinguish climate change from abortion in order to set
any climate change disclosure apart from the disclosures in NIFLA.
Part IV will identify a pathway for a government regulation compelling
disclosure to overcome the new higher burden imposed by NIFLA with
regard to greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Part IV will
take a step-by-step approach through the Zauderer test and will argue
that a climate change disclosure requirement should easily survive
challenges under the first and second Zauderer prong under settled case
law. This analysis will utilize the New York and Japanese disclosures,
referenced above, as examples against which to test potential environmental disclosures that might be enacted in the United States, consistent with First Amendment disclosure law. Further, Part IV will argue that through a focus on scientific certainty, and the distinction from
abortion, climate change disclosure regulations can survive the third
and fourth prongs of Zauderer, which have shifted since the NIFLA
13

The Supreme Court 2017 Term—Leading Case, First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—
Compelled Speech—National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 132 HARV. L. REV.
347, 351 (2018).
14
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
15
Id. at 2372.
16
See Lauren Fowler, The “Uncontroversial” Controversy in Compelled Commercial Disclosures, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1651, 1676 (2019).
17
See Lauren Sherman, A Warning for Environmental Warnings, 27 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 240,
294–95 (2019).
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decision. Government entities must distinguish climate change from
abortion and emphasize the scientific certainty and “uncontroversiality” of the issue. This Comment will ultimately argue that the government can overcome NIFLA’s high bar by reframing the argument as a
debate about means to combat the ends, rather than the existence of
climate change.
II. THE HISTORY OF COMPELLED DISCLOSURE, ZAUDERER, AND NIFLA
A. Recognizing Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court first recognized a distinct category of speech,
“commercial speech,” in 1942. However, at the time the Court found it
ineligible for First Amendment protection.18 It took another three decades for the Court to afford commercial speech any level of constitutional protection.19 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,20 the Supreme Court defined commercial
speech as “speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”21 In striking down the law in that case, the Court pointed to
the fact that suppression of commercial information hurts vulnerable
populations the most.22 The Court also recognized the First Amendment
ideal of a free flow of information that improves and benefits the market.23 While the court found the statute in question unlawful, it held
that the state could regulate advertising but could not create an outright prohibition on the advertisements.24
In the wake of Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Supreme Court took
up the regulation of commercial speech again in 1980 in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of New York.25 In Central Hudson, a utility company challenged the state Public Service Commission’s
prohibition on promotional advertising by electrical utilities.26 The Supreme Court found the company’s advertisements to be commercial

18

Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint as respects purely commercial speech.”).
19
See Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV.
55, 58 (1999).
20
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
21
Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)).
22
Id. (“Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest
are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged.”).
23
Id. at 765.
24
Id. at 771.
25
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
26
Id. at 559–60.
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speech27 and, in the process, identified the value of such speech for informing the listener and for contributing to larger societal interests.28
At the same time, the Court held that the First Amendment extends
less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression, a distinction the Court referred to as being
based on common sense.29 In articulating the Central Hudson test, the
Court stated that “[f]irst, the restriction must directly advance the state
interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose. Second, if
the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”30 The Court noted that if the regulation only indirectly advanced
the state interest, it would not survive. Also, if the regulatory technique
employed exceeded the interest, the regulation also would not survive.31
The Central Hudson test has come to represent an intermediate scrutiny test for the regulation of commercial speech.32 Over time, the Central Hudson test has been cabined to apply to cases where the government prohibits or restricts commercial speech. The case to follow,
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,33 has been applied to compelled commercial speech.
B. Zauderer & Lower Constitutional Scrutiny
In contrast to the regulation in Central Hudson, in Zauderer, the
Supreme Court was presented with a government attempt to compel
information from a commercial entity.34 While the Court found in Central Hudson that the government needed to pass a heightened level of
scrutiny in order to regulate factual communications by commercial entities,35 Zauderer dealt with the state’s interest in supplementing information in order to avoid misleading or potentially deceptive communication.36
The controversy in Zauderer related to several attorney advertisements in Ohio, which violated the existing professional guidelines in

27

Id. at 560 (defining commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”).
28
Id. at 560.
29
Id. at 562–63.
30
Id. at 564.
31
Id. at 565.
32
See CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2019).
33
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
34
Id. at 629.
35
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
36
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637–38 (1985).
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the state.37 The Court held the prohibition on factual advertisements
unconstitutional under the framework of Central Hudson and cited the
benefits to the public from the free flow of information.38 However, the
Court also found that the other advertisements in question were potentially deceptive and that the state had an interest in regulating deceptive advertising.39 The Court went on to lay out a test that required a
lower level of scrutiny than Central Hudson.40 It justified this lower
level of scrutiny as follows:
[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the
information such speech provides[;] appellant’s constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal. . . . [W]e have emphasized
that because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interest than do flat prohibitions on
speech, “warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”41
The Court went on to add that the disclosure requirement could not be
“unduly burdensome” so that it chilled protected commercial speech.42
Additionally, the disclosure requirement only had to be “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”43 In
the process, the Court recognized that disclosures are a less intrusive
means to achieve the state’s interest and thus required a lower level of
scrutiny.44 At the same time, even under this lower standard, the state
could still overreach and chill constitutionally protected commercial
speech.45
Out of Zauderer came the test for compelled disclosure that persists
today. That test can be summarized in four prongs. To survive a First
Amendment challenge, a disclosure must (1) address a substantial state

37

Id. at 631.
Id. (“Appellant also put on the stand two of the women who had responded to his advertisements, both of whom testified that they would not have learned of their legal claims had it not
been for appellant’s advertisement.”).
39
Id. at 650.
40
See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (referring to Zauderer as a standard requiring “less exacting scrutiny”).
41
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)) (internal citations
omitted).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 650.
45
Id. at 651.
38
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interest, which the regulation is reasonably related to, (2) address consumer deception, (3) be factual and uncontroversial and (4) not be unduly burdensome.46 Courts have debated, redefined, or limited the scope
of these requirements over the years, but from Zauderer came a stable
body of law interpreted by the circuit courts to give the government
some latitude in requiring factual disclosures to benefit consumers and
the general society.
C.

Interpreting Zauderer

Zauderer stood as the definitive statement on compelled disclosure
up until NIFLA v. Becerra.47 While NIFLA has changed the landscape,
it is still informative to understand the case law built up in the circuit
courts around Zauderer, much of which still stands as good law after
NIFLA.48 This section will continue to utilize the New York energy-efficiency score and the Japanese food-labelling examples to help guide the
analysis.
1.

Prong one: substantial state interest

The first Zauderer prong requires that a compelled disclosure regulation address a substantial state interest.49 Stated differently, in order for the government to restrict constitutionally protected speech, the
state must have a substantial interest in the policy it seeks to advance
through regulation. Dating back to Virginia Pharmacy Board, courts
have recognized the goal of combatting deception as a valid state interest in regulating and compelling speech.50 In Zauderer, that interest
was “preventing deception of consumers.”51 One potential avenue for
success in any government compelled climate change disclosure would
be to argue that disclosures are necessary to combat the well-documented practice of deceptive advertising and misinformation campaigns by fossil fuel companies.52
Another set of well-established state interests that justify compelled disclosure in the eyes of the courts is protection of public health

46

Id.
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
48
Fowler, supra note 16, at 1689–91 (2019).
49
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.
50
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976);
see also Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. and Pro. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 141 (1994);
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982); Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 281 (3rd Cir. 2014).
51
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
52
See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Chevron, Greenwashing, and the Myth of “Green
Oil Companies”, 3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV’T. 133 (2012).
47
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and safety.53 Courts have used this broad category to validate disclosures related to mercury poisoning in light bulbs54 and the risk of radiation exposure from cellphones.55 A government entity could rest justification for climate change disclosure on the substantial health and
safety concerns associated with the impacts of climate change.56 These
effects include “increased respiratory and cardiovascular disease, injuries and premature deaths related to extreme weather events, changes
in the prevalence and geographical distribution of food-and water-borne
illnesses and other infectious diseases, and threats to mental health.”57
When courts have struck down disclosures based on the first Zauderer prong, it has often been because the state interest cited and the
harm addressed were not reasonably related. Examples of voided disclosures include a label related to milk from cows injected with growth
hormones (no scientific evidence supported harm caused by the milk) 58
and a disclosure of conflict diamonds harvested from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (unclear link between diamond disclosure and
resolving civil strife in Congo).59 In both cases, the courts rejected any
link between the disclosure and the harm it attempted to remedy. To
survive a First Amendment challenge, any climate change disclosure
will have to overcome this hurdle.
For both climate-related disclosures previously mentioned—the
New York building score, where each building’s energy consumption is
posted at the entrance and the Japanese labels, where the carbon footprint in the supply chain of the product is listed—the government could
argue the harm is excessive energy use, which translates to greenhouse
gas emissions and exacerbates issues associated with climate change.
This would fit the disclosure comfortably in the health and safety context, which is a valid state interest.
The takeaway from the “substantial state interest” prong of Zauderer is that a regulation is more likely to succeed when it addresses
deception or a health-and-safety concern affecting consumers. That
harm must be fully realized and not be merely “speculation or conjecture.”60 Additionally, a state regulation must reasonably connect the
regulation to the interest it purports to advance. Thus, climate change
53

See CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 844 (9th Cir. 2019); Nat’l
Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
54
Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115.
55
CTIA, 928 F.3d at 844.
56
Climate Effects on Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/effects/default.htm [https://perma.cc/ZR99-QALN].
57
Id.
58
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996).
59
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 525–27 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
60
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1994).
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disclosures designed to address health and safety through reduced
emissions and energy consumption will likely succeed on this prong.
2.

Prong two: addressing deception

The second prong of the Zauderer test asks whether the regulated
behavior is false, deceptive, or misleading.61 In the event that the regulated speech is not found to be misleading, false, or deceptive, the analysis shifts to Central Hudson and intermediate scrutiny applies. At that
point, the government is regulating truthful content.62 This distinction
was clear when the opinion in Zauderer was written, but the interpretation of the Zauderer standard and the line between it and Central
Hudson has changed.63
While Zauderer initially covered only deception, circuit courts have
expanded this prong to reach a broader set of behavior that includes
potentially misleading disclosures, or disclosures that serve a public interest in providing information. In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v.
United States,64 a tobacco industry trade group challenged a disclosure
requirement on cigarette packs.65 The Sixth Circuit noted that even “potentially misleading”66 speech regulation would fall under Zauderer rather than Central Hudson. The Second Circuit went a step further in
National Electrical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell,67 where plaintiffs
challenged a mercury-poisoning disclosure requirement.68 The court rejected the requirement to show deception to conduct the Zauderer analysis, although it admitted that the disclosure in question was not motivated by the need to dispel deception but rather to “better inform
consumers about the products they purchase.”69
Sorrell was decided in 2001 and, in wake of the move by the Second
Circuit, other circuit courts followed suit.70 The D.C. Circuit in American Meat Institute v. USDA71 held, similarly to the Second Circuit, that
“Zauderer in fact does reach beyond problems of deception.”72 The Ninth
Circuit held the same in CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley,

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
Id. at 646.
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 524.
Id.
272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 107.
Id. at 115.
See CTIA, 928 F.3d at 842; Am. Meat, 760 F.3d at 22.
Am. Meat, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 20.
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noting that “[u]nder Zauderer as we interpret it today, the government
may compel truthful disclosure in commercial speech as long as the
compelled disclosure is reasonably related to a substantial government
interest.”73 Any case resolving a dispute over climate change disclosure
would likely survive the second Zauderer prong, particularly because of
the recent expansion beyond deception. As the Ninth Circuit held, the
government must emphasize the reasonable relation of the disclosure
to the interests in public health and safety associated with climate
change.74
Due to the shift in scope of Zauderer away from deception toward
a more comprehensive look at compelled speech, courts have also reinterpreted Central Hudson to cover cases where speech was restricted.75
The Sorrell Court identified a binary decision between application of
Central Hudson and Zauderer.76 The court held that Zauderer controls
cases of compelled disclosure while Central Hudson governs cases of restrictions or prohibitions on speech.77 The Second Circuit configuration
was echoed by the D.C. Circuit in American Meat Institute v. FDA78 and
the Ninth Circuit in American Beverage v. City of San Francisco.79
The dispute over whether Central Hudson or Zauderer governs is a
battleground of litigation. It is often the plaintiff who argues that Central Hudson controls, thus compelling an intermediate scrutiny analysis, while the government entity argues for Zauderer and its looser
standard.80
Climate change disputes are no exception. There is no Supreme
Court precedent declaring that Zauderer or Central Hudson applies.
This dispute would ultimately relate to how the deciding court views
the second prong of Zauderer, whether the disclosure address deception.
If, as the test was originally designed, the lower standard is only called
for when the government is regulating deception, the Court may be
more likely to analyze a disclosure law under Central Hudson. If the
Court takes a more expansive view of Zauderer similar to what the D.C.,
Second and Ninth Circuits have adopted, the government will have
more success in arguing for the lower Zauderer standard.

73

CTIA, 928 F.3d at 842.
Id.
75
See Am. Meat, 760 F.3d at 22.
76
Nat’l Electrical Mfr.’s Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that Zauderer provides the test for compelled commercial speech and Central Hudson provides the test for
restricted commercial speech).
77
Id.
78
Am. Meat, 760 F.3d at 22.
79
916 F.3d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 2019).
80
See id. at 755; Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 280 (3rd Cir. 2014); Am. Meat, 760 F.3d at
22.
74
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Prong three: factual and uncontroversial

The third prong of the Zauderer test asks whether the governmentrequired disclosure is “factual and uncontroversial.”81 The Court explained in the context of its body of decisions on the First Amendment
that “appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not providing
any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.”82 Circuit court interpretations have shed light on what the Zauderer decision
may have meant by the factual and uncontroversial prong. While these
interpretations have largely been superseded and controverted by the
holding of NIFLA,83 they still provide color to the new questions that
have emerged after NIFLA.
Courts and legal scholars have debated “factual and uncontroversial” and come to a number of different conclusions as to the meaning
of the phrase. In American Meat,84 the D.C. Circuit treated “factual”
and “uncontroversial” as separate requirements under Zauderer.85 The
D.C. Circuit took for granted that country-of-origin labelling was factual.86 The court also found that the labelling requirement was not controversial.87 It explained, “[W]e also do not understand country-of-origin
labelling to be controversial in the sense that it communicates a message that is controversial for some reason other than dispute about simple factual accuracy.”88 Interestingly, current Supreme Court Justice
Kavanaugh wrote a concurrence in American Meat which could portend
future compelled disclosure cases at the highest Court. Then-Judge Kavanaugh identified the confusion in the “uncontroversial” prong at the
time, writing that it “may be difficult in some compelled commercial
speech cases in part because it is unclear how we should assess and
what we should examine to determine whether a mandatory disclosure
is controversial.”89 Rather than resolve the difficult question, thenJudge Kavanaugh found the disclosure in question “straightforward,
evenhanded.”90
Other circuit courts have taken a range of approaches to the third
Zauderer prong. At one time, the Sixth Circuit did not include the

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
Id.
NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
Am. Meat, 760 F.3d at 18.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Id.
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factual-and-uncontroversial prong in its Zauderer analysis,91 while the
Seventh Circuit, prior to NIFLA, treated the prongs as one combined
factor.92
Legal scholars have proposed several different readings of “uncontroversial” in this context, both before and after NIFLA.93 One reading
is that “factual and uncontroversial” refers simply to accurate, undisputed factual information.94 Even within this interpretation, scholars
have varying opinions as to the amount of disagreement allowed that
still qualifies within the threshold of “accurate”—whether that is any
disagreement, reasonable disagreement, or a completely unverified scientific claim.95 Another interpretation seemingly supported by NIFLA
and Zauderer requires both factual accuracy and that the disclosure not
“convey ideology.”96 There is enough uncertainty in NIFLA and Zauderer that either of these interpretations, and their various sub-readings, could be possible.
The factual-and-uncontroversial inquiry will be critical to the success of any climate-change disclosure. If “factual and uncontroversial”
refers to accuracy and consensus, a climate-change disclosure will be
far more likely to succeed; if, however, “factual and uncontroversial”
means a compelled disclosure that does not convey ideology, there will
be a harder path to success. At its root, much of the debate or dialogue
around climate change today is based around responses to the problem,
not the existence of the problem in the first place.97
4.

Prong four: unduly burdensome

The fourth prong of the Zauderer test asks whether the compelled
disclosure is “unjustified or unduly burdensome” in such a way that it
would chill protected commercial speech.98
Disclosure is often considered the least intrusive form of government compelled speech and is thus more likely to survive a First
Amendment challenge.99 In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United
91

Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8. (6th Cir. 2012).
Entm’t Software v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2006).
93
See Fowler, supra note 16, at 1674.
94
Id. at 1676.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
John Schwartz, Fossil Fuels on Trial: New York’s Lawsuit Against Exxon Begins, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/climate/new-york-lawsuit-exxon.html
[https://perma.cc/BJH7-GDQ4] (In ongoing litigation, Exxon’s lead attorney has asserted the company “has long acknowledged that climate change is real”).
98
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
99
See id. at 650 (“[D]isclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s
interest than do flat prohibitions on speech. . . .”).
92
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States, the Sixth Circuit cited the fact that, even with a disclosure, the
company can still make “direct comments on public issues.”100 This idea
fits with the First Amendment values of the marketplace of ideas and
the free flow of information. It is the government’s burden to prove that
a compelled disclosure is justified and not overly burdensome to the regulated party.101
When determining whether a disclosure is unduly burdensome,
courts look to the magnitude of the disclosure compared to the content
it is regulating, as well as the source of the disclosure, and the viewpoint
it expresses.102 Courts have previously struck down disclosures that required an interest group to convey ideas “expressly contrary to their
views,”103 disclosures where the government had not justified the size
or scope of the disclosure,104 and disclosures with sets of facts that indicated there were other means to accomplish the government’s desired
outcome without compelling speech.105
For a climate change disclosure to succeed, the government entity
must be able to demonstrate the public benefit of the disclosed information. The disclosures suggested in Part I—the requirement that New
York City skyscrapers post energy-efficiency scores in a conspicuous
place106 and the Japanese requirement that the carbon footprint of food
production be posted on the packaging107—both benefit the public by
providing it with additional information. In theory, the market functions better when consumers have more information, and producers
whose process is energy intensive would lose market share or be forced
to modify their supply chain.
D. NIFLA: A Sea Change in Compelled Disclosure
The Supreme Court addressed compelled disclosures head-on during the 2018 Term in NIFLA v. Becerra.108 In NIFLA, a group of antiabortion groups, including crisis pregnancy centers,109 challenged a

100

Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8. (6th Cir. 2012).
See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 2018).
102
See NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2377 (2018).
103
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1996).
104
See Am. Beverage, 916 F.3d at 757; Public Citizen v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d
212, 229 (5th Cir. 2011).
105
Entm’t Software v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2006).
106
See Gannon, supra note 6.
107
See McCurry, supra note 7.
108
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
109
See WATTERS ET AL., PUB. LAW RES. INST., PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS: ENSURING
ACCESS AND ACCURACY OF INFORMATION 4 (2011). Crisis Pregnancy Centers are “pro-life (largely
Christian belief-based) organizations that offer a limited range of free pregnancy options, counseling and other services to individuals that visit a center.” Id.
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California disclosure requirement110 that mandated the disclosure of
available public programs providing comprehensive medical services.111
The law distinguished between licensed112 and unlicensed facilities,113
and laid out different required disclosures for each. The groups challenged the laws as an infringement on their First Amendment rights.
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction under the existing Zauderer standard.114 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit on the
notice requirements for both the licensed and unlicensed facilities.115
The Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Thomas, held
the disclosure requirement for the licensed facilities presumptively unconstitutional as a content-based speech regulation.116 In this case, the
Court determined that the requirement that crisis pregnancy centers
promote state-provided abortion services regulated the content of pregnancy centers’ speech.117 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s formulation of a category of speech called “professional speech” and applied
strict scrutiny to the licensed-facility disclosure.118
While the Court found that Zauderer did not apply, it noted that
even if it had, the California licensed-facility disclosure requirement
would fail on two prongs.119 First, “the notice in no way relates to the
services that licensed clinics provide.”120 This fits into the first prong of
Zauderer: whether there is a substantial state interest reasonably related to the regulation. Secondly, and crucially for future compelled disclosure cases, the Court weighed in on the factual-and-controversial
prong of Zauderer. The Court found that the disclosure “requires these
clinics to disclose information about state sponsored services—including

110

Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 123470 et seq. (West 2020). The requirement comes from
the FACT Act—the stated purpose of which was “to ensure that California residents make their
personal reproductive health care decisions knowing their rights and the health care services
available to them.” NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 (2018).
111
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368.
112
See id. at 2369. The facilities had to disseminate a government-drafted notice that read:
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive
family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care,
and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the county social services office at [insert the telephone number].” Id.
113
See id. Unlicensed facilities had to disseminate a government drafted notice on site that
read: “[T]his facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and has no
licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services.” Id.
114
Id. at 2370.
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Id.
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Id. at 2371.
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Id.
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Id. at 2371–72.
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Id. at 2372.
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abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic. Accordingly, Zauderer
has no application here.”121
While it may seem obvious that abortion is controversial, the disclosure in NIFLA is now a guidepost against which future disclosures
will be measured. Abortion could be controversial for a number of different reasons, and the lack of specificity at which the Court addressed
the issue has left the meaning of “uncontroversial” vague. Simply put,
the holding in NIFLA provides no direction on the future of how “uncontroversial” will be interpreted going forward, and under which understanding of the word the Court found abortion to be “uncontroversial.”
The NIFLA Court also analyzed the unlicensed-facility disclosure
under Zauderer, but its analysis differed from that of the lower
courts.122 The state bore the burden of showing that the disclosure requirement was narrowly tailored to its interest so as not to chill protected speech.123 The Supreme Court found the state did not meet its
burden.124 Not only was the statute not narrowly tailored, but the Court
found that the state’s interest was purely hypothetical.125 The Court
noted that the state justification was ensuring that “pregnant women
in California know when they are getting medical care from licensed
professionals,”126 but also that California already made it a crime for
unlicensed facilities to practice medicine.127 This spoke to the fact that
the state had other means to police their interest and that the disclosure was superfluous.
While the Supreme Court upended compelled disclosure law in
NIFLA, particularly the factual-and-uncontroversial prong of Zauderer,
the Court attempted to reassure lower courts and the public that the
prior fifty years of commercial speech case law was not lost. It wrote,
“[W]e do not question the legality of health and safety warnings long
considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products.”128 This dicta within NIFLA provides
hope of stability for many longstanding disclosures, as well as the possibility that future government efforts to compel disclosure, including
efforts to curb climate change, will be upheld.
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A four-justice dissent written by Justice Breyer challenged the majority on virtually every ground. Justice Breyer questioned how the issues at stake were not related to health and safety, as the majority contended.129 It is worth noting that Justice Breyer also left open a window
to narrow NIFLA to the subject of abortion, calling the issue “special.”130
Finally, Justice Breyer defined the scope of the disclosure differently
than the majority, shifting away from abortion to a larger critique:
“[A]bortion is a controversial topic and a source of normative debate,
but the availability of state resources is not a normative statement or a
fact of debatable truth.”131 Breyer also critiqued the majority for its hypocritical approach to disclosure—where information about fetal heartbeats was allowed previously132—but information about health and resources available to patients was disallowed in the case before the
Court.133
E.

How NIFLA Changes the Analysis

NIFLA has yet to be widely interpreted by most lower courts. Since
NIFLA, however, the Ninth Circuit has considered the constitutionality
of compelled disclosure.134 In CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, the Ninth Circuit stressed a reading of NIFLA that brought the
meaning of “factual and uncontroversial” to the forefront of the court’s
analysis.135 The court noted that “NIFLA thus stands for the proposition
that the Zauderer standard applies only if the compelled disclosure involves ‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ information.”136 The court
went on to explain that it did “not read the Court [in NIFLA] as saying
broadly that any purely factual statement that can be tied in some way
to a controversial issue is, for that reason, controversial.”137 For the
Ninth Circuit, what distinguished NIFLA from Zauderer was that
“[w]hile factual, the compelled statement [in NIFLA] took sides in a
heated political controversy, forcing the clinic to convey a message fundamentally at odds with its [crisis pregnancy center’s] mission.”138
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Outside of CTIA, no other circuit court cases have addressed the
impact of the NIFLA ruling on compelled disclosures. One journal article on the subject proposed that, in a pre-NIFLA world, there were two
interpretations of “factual and uncontroversial.”139 One stated that the
information simply needed to be factual, and the other held that the
information needed to be factual and also not implicitly convey an ideology.140 Another legal scholar called the impacts of NIFLA “seismic.”141
In his view, the opinion left the scope of the government’s power to compel disclosure “an uncertainty.”142 The Harvard Law Review called the
decision “a profound shift in the Court’s treatment of compelled commercial disclosures.”143 The Harvard article predicted that “[t]he way
the NIFLA Court applied intermediate scrutiny would also seem to preordain failure for almost all consumer-protective regulations.”144
This Comment argues that the alarm and uncertainty stressed by
other legal scholars overemphasizes the impact of NIFLA on compelled
disclosure law. The Court signaled its intention not to upset the “legality of health and safety warnings long considered permissible.”145 It remains to be seen how courts will treat NIFLA going forward, but considering the limited intrusion and effectiveness of disclosure, it is
unlikely to cause the seismic change some predict. Instead, NIFLA can
likely be limited to the issue of abortion; other disclosures aimed at public health and safety will survive.
III. COMPARING CLIMATE CHANGE TO ABORTION
A government entity arguing that a climate change disclosure is
lawful after NIFLA will have the difficult task of distinguishing climate
change from abortion. NIFLA is now the most recent word from the Supreme Court on compelled disclosures and the Zauderer standard.
Thus, any future compelled disclosures will be measured against the
“controversiality” of abortion. For a climate change disclosure to survive
a First Amendment challenge, the government entity must be able to
distance climate change from NIFLA and the controversy associated
with abortion. At its root, this argument will come down to the basic
facts around climate change and its effects juxtaposed against abortion,
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a topic that has loomed large in America’s consciousness for half a century.146
Abortion relates to unknowable moral issues: when life begins, personal autonomy, and the rights of a fetus. Abortion concerns religious
and moral convictions and opposing worldviews that are seemingly impossible to reconcile.147 There will certainly be those who disagree with
this basic premise, yet, even if science were to distill when life begins,
or the consciousness of a fetus, it is not clear that this would resolve the
deep-seated issues around abortion. Abortion pits the concerns of the
unborn versus the right to dictate life choices on behalf of the mother.
The opposing viewpoints on abortion are likely unresolvable because
both sides harbor interests so immutable that they will not compromise.
This is unlike climate change, which does not elicit the same moral reactions, and is more akin to the evolving science on tobacco use in the
mid-twentieth century.148
Conversely, climate change is not a disagreement about morals as
much as a dispute about scientific projections and the proper means to
address the threat. Climate change relates to the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and the resulting effects on our planet. Climate
change is measurable and observable, no matter the level of obfuscation
and denial that opponents bring to meeting the problem head on.149 The
evidence for and against abortion, such as when life begins or the moral
implications of abortion, may never be before the Court; the same cannot be said for climate change. We know how fast sea levels are rising,150
how fast glaciers are melting,151 the rate of deforestation,152 and the
forced migration of populations as a result. Even more critically, we
146
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know what causes these global shifts.153 Unlike abortion, climate
change is supported by evidence courts can weigh. Courts can then determine the validity of a compelled disclosure tailored to these issues.
While there is certainly a vocal minority opposed to the idea of climate
change, which this article addresses in Part IV.C, the science has progressed beyond this viewpoint to the point of academic consensus.154
Whereas people with opposing viewpoints on abortion may never reach
consensus on the unknowable or resolve differences between deeply
held worldviews, climate change data is at our fingertips.
To reiterate, regardless of whether one believes in climate change
or its dangers, there is actual evidence of its veritable existence—its
probability of harm—that the Court can weigh against a general public
policy in favor of speech. Denial of this evidence, and a lack of belief in
climate change, will not prevent a court from appropriately weighing
the evidence. In abortion, there is no such counterbalance. As mentioned above, even if the science on abortion were clearer, it is not obvious that this would dissuade either side from their respective views.
Abortion is unresolvable on a moral level; there will always be disagreement between those who favor a woman’s autonomy and those who advocate for the life of the unborn fetus. One way to see this is to look at
the fundamental differences in how courts treat these two topics.
The Supreme Court has taken vastly different approaches to the
issues of climate change and abortion. The Supreme Court has walked
a careful line in dealing with abortion in the many cases it has handled,
while in climate change cases the Court has shown a much greater willingness to rely on scientific expertise, partially because of the measurable data related to climate change that is far less clear in the abortion
context.155 Also, while abortion litigation often pits two sides with diametrically opposed moral convictions, the same cannot be said about
climate change. In many cases, the question is not whether it exists, but
what is the proper means to address it.156
The way the Supreme Court has addressed climate change is best
exemplified in the most high-profile climate change case yet to come
before the Court.157 In Massachusetts v. EPA,158 the Commonwealth
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sought judicial review of the EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions.159 Justice Stevens began his opinion with a matter-of-fact
assessment of the situation:
A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided
with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends
are related. For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflect heat. It is therefore a
species—the most important species—of a “greenhouse gas.”160
Significantly, the Supreme Court held that the states had standing to
challenge the EPA’s decision not to promulgate a rule on greenhouse
gases,161 a “win” in the long game for environmental advocacy and the
fight against climate change.162
Throughout the opinion, Justice Stevens relied on bureaucratic expertise to demonstrate the threat of continued greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.163 At various points in the opinion, he cited
the National Research Council,164 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,165 and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.166 While the fight in Massachusetts v. EPA centered on
the delegated authority to the EPA and administrative law principles,167 at no point in the arguments did either party refute the science
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underlying climate change.168 Justice Stevens put it bluntly when he
described the injury to the challenging states, writing, “[t]he harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized.”169
This contrasts with the Court’s approach to abortion, which it has
treated in a careful, measured way, wary of upsetting individuals of all
viewpoints. The Court’s signature ruling on abortion was Roe v. Wade170
in 1973.171 The Roe Court acknowledged a woman’s right to an abortion,
while at the same time recognizing the state’s interest in the health and
safety of the mother and the fetus.172 Roe attempted to juggle these competing interests and find a middle ground on a very difficult issue. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun did not shy away from the diametrically opposed viewpoints on the issue and the gravity of the
controversy before the court. In the second paragraph of his opinion he
wrote:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and
emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of
human existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward
life and family and their values, and the moral standards one
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and
to color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion.173
Justice Blackmun’s acknowledgment of the high stakes set the tone for
the opinion, which walked a fine line by acknowledging the convictions
on both sides. Further into the opinion, Justice Blackmun addressed
the unknowable question of when life begins and the difficulty faced by
a court in tackling such issues.174 Blackmun’s approach highlighted the
high-level moral and philosophical questions that abortion raised. As
168
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he made clear, the Court’s role in a dispute of such magnitude is to attempt to find a line of compromise; the Court is not to play expert on
the moral and the metaphysical. Instead, Blackmun ended with the
sentiment that “[t]his holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative
weights of the respective interests involved.”175
The way the Court handled these two opinions could not be more
disparate. These cases represented the Supreme Court’s first chance to
dictate the law on issues important to the country. In Massachusetts v.
EPA, Justice Stevens acknowledged at the outset the harms associated
with climate change and the risks it posed.176 In Roe, Justice Blackmun
sought a middle ground and conceded the unknowable questions at the
root of abortion.177 While the Roe opinion trod carefully on existential
questions, Massachusetts v. EPA treated climate change tactically, as
an evident problem that the government must address.178
The Supreme Court has revisited both issues since these first cases,
and the trajectories of jurisprudence have continued along their initial
paths.179 Climate change was before the court again in American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut,180 four years after Massachusetts v.
EPA. Like the dispute in Massachusetts v. EPA, the dispute in American Electric Power was not centered on the existence, threat, or scientific fact of climate change.181 Rather, in American Electric Power, the
question centered on choice-of-law rules.182 At points, the Court cited
EPA rulemaking on climate change as authority, stating:
[The] EPA concluded that “compelling” evidence supported the
“attribution of observed climate change to anthropogenic” emissions of greenhouse gases. Consequent dangers of greenhouse
gas emissions, [the] EPA determined, included increases in heatrelated deaths; coastal inundation, and erosion caused by melting icecaps and rising sea levels; more frequent and intense hurricanes, floods, and other “extreme weather events” that cause
death and destroy infrastructure; drought due to reductions in
mountain snowpack and shifting precipitation patterns;
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destruction of ecosystems supporting animals and plants; and
potentially “significant disruptions” of food production.183
The Court cited the EPA rule as persuasive authority supporting the
agency’s role in regulating greenhouse gases and the threat of climate
change.184 At the same time, in a footnote, the Court gave some credence
to the opposing viewpoint.185 It stated, “For views opposing [the]
EPA’s . . . , [t]he Court, we caution, endorses no particular view of the
complicated issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions and climate
change.”186 This was somewhat of a shift from the Court’s position four
years earlier in Massachusetts v. EPA, where it strongly supported the
executive branch’s conclusions on climate change.187
Unlike the deference afforded to government regulators in the climate change context, the Court’s abortion jurisprudence has continued
the careful balancing act staked out in Roe. Nineteen years after the
Supreme Court decided Roe, it revisited the standard in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.188 Justice O’Connor
wrote portions of the Court’s opinion in Casey189 and elaborated on Justice Blackmun’s sensitivity to the topic. She wrote:
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose
some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our
most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision.190
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that no court decision can resolve the
existential dispute and that the “moral and spiritual implications” of
abortion were unresolvable.191 Justice O’Connor’s opinion explicitly accepted that disagreement about abortion is inevitable.192 At various
points throughout her opinion, Justice O’Connor described the singularity of the issue. She stated that “abortion is a unique act,” placing
183
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the issue of abortion, and the Roe line of cases, in rarefied territory.193
Justice O’Connor compared the abortion issue to the Court’s opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education,194 which overruled Plessy v. Ferguson195
and the separate-but-equal-doctrine.196 The comparison came from the
importance of the issue, as well as the critical need for the Court not to
overturn the fragile Roe precedent.197 In comparing Roe to Brown, Justice O’Connor clearly articulated the role of the court in such divisive
matters:
It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation
of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution.
The Court is not asked to do this very often, having thus addressed the Nation only twice in our lifetime in the decisions of
Brown and Roe. But when the Court does act in this way, its
decision requires an equally rare precedential force to counter
the inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart its implementation.198
Both Justices Blackmun and O’Connor’s views of the significance of the
issue lives on in the national consciousness and the current dialogue on
the issue.199 It can be seen in Justice Thomas’s NIFLA majority opinion,
which held that abortion is “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”200
The thread continued through Justice Breyer’s NIFLA dissent that labeled the issue “special.”201
While American Electric Power shifted away from complete acceptance of climate change as an undeniable fact,202 it still stands far
afield from the tone and caution with which the Supreme Court has
addressed abortion. Roe and Casey invoked the metaphysical, the spiritual, and the philosophical.203 Justice O’Connor compared the fragile

193

Id. at 853.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
195
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
196
Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Amy Harmon, ‘Fetal Heartbeat’ v. ‘Forced Pregnancy’: The Language Wars of the Abortion
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/fetal-heartbeatforced-pregnancy.html [https://perma.cc/5FBY-QS6G].
200
NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
201
Id. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202
See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 417 n.2 (2011).
203
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
194

335]

CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURES AFTER NIFLA

359

precedent of Roe to Brown,204 a comparison that puts the issue in rare
historical company. On the other hand, climate change is handled with
basic statement of facts, and deference to agency expertise.205 The Court
does not grapple with the existence of climate change in the way that is
apparent in both Roe and Casey.
This analysis, and the difference between the two lines of cases,
helps to provide context for NIFLA and what it will mean for compelled
disclosure going forward. Based on how the Supreme Court has handled
abortion over the last fifty years, it should not be a surprise that Justice
Thomas found abortion “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”206
This was in contrast to the way the Court has viewed climate
change. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court treated it simply as a problem to be solved. In American Electric Power, while recognizing the opposition, the Court still cited the serious threats climate change posed
to the nation.207 It stands to reason that a climate change disclosure
would be judged in the light of the evidence before the court. Climate
change is a subject that is inherently knowable in a way that abortion
is not today, and may never be. Opinions on abortion reflect a comprehensive worldview that may never be reconciled between opponents.
Disputes on climate change are limited to facts and different strategies
to approach the problem. They relate to tradeoffs between short-term
and long-term gains, not deeply seated world views. Abortion relates to
other constitutional considerations like the Establishment Clause and
the Ninth Amendment right to privacy. Though great in importance, at
its core, climate change is simply a policy issue. Abortion is not only
about matters of life and death, but bodily integrity; it is conceived of
as an individual liberty, a quality that climate change does not share.
IV. ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURES UNDER ZAUDERER
Aside from differentiating itself from abortion, a successful defense
of any climate change disclosure will have to survive the Zauderer
standard on its own merits. This standard certainly looks different after
NIFLA, but a government entity can still stress the scientific strength
of the case for plans to address climate change as well as the one-sided
health and safety consequences that merit the disclosures and a change
in consumer behavior. This Part will analyze climate change disclosures
under each Zauderer prong, address counterarguments, and demonstrate that under most, if not all, conceptions of the Zauderer standard
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after NIFLA, a climate change disclosure should survive review. Where
helpful, this analysis will incorporate the examples referenced previously, the New York energy efficiency score posted on buildings and the
Japanese carbon footprint on food labels.
A climate change disclosure should easily pass Zauderer prong one,
which requires that the disclosure reasonably relate to a substantial
state interest. While prong two is arguably no longer relevant to the
analysis, it is still illustrative of the tension between a Court’s choice to
apply Zauderer or Central Hudson. Prong three, “factual and uncontroversial” is the most difficult to pass after NIFLA. However, with a
proper conception of “uncontroversial,” and a focus on scientific certainty, a climate change disclosure can survive. Finally, prong four requires the disclosure not be unduly burdensome. So long as the disclosure remains facially neutral and avoid pitfalls of past failed
disclosures, it should survive.
A. Prong One: Substantial State Interest
Any climate change disclosure should be able to meet the first Zauderer prong requiring that the regulation be reasonably related to a substantial state interest. As mentioned earlier, health, safety and the environment are the traditional realms of government interests that can
lead to valid compelled disclosures.208 The Supreme Court has also previously recognized the substantial state interest in regulating greenhouse gases in Massachusetts v. EPA.209 Once a substantial interest is
identified, the government entity must argue that the disclosure reasonably relates to that interest. The party arguing for the disclosure
simply must link the effects of climate change to the energy consumed
by the skyscraper in the New York example, or the supply chain in the
food labelling context. In both cases, there is a bedrock of science to
support energy consumption and the contribution of power plants to the
increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the effects of climate change.210
Parties fighting the regulation will compare this case to cases that
have failed on this prong, such as the conflict diamond labelling disclosure, where the disclosure was only tenuously linked to the civil war in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.211
So long as the government grounds its argument in the long-established precedent of a state interest in health and safety, a disclosure
208

See supra part II.C.1.
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
210
Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sourcesgreenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/R32D-L5K9] (last visited Sept. 6, 2020).
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Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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will survive prong one. The Japanese labelling scheme and the New
York building score share much in common with the mercury labelling
in Sorrell,212 or the risk of radiation in CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City
of Berkeley.213 Another data point that could help the disclosure survive
a First Amendment challenge is the Congressional intent articulated in
the Clean Air Act that identifies the substantial state interest in mitigating climate change.214 Given this strong background and the ability
to point to congressional will, it is likely that a climate change disclosure would pass the first Zauderer prong.
B. Prong Two: Addressing Deception
While the second prong of the Zauderer test originally required deception, both the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have found that the
test sweeps far beyond deception.215 Therefore, any climate change disclosure will not have to prove that it addresses deception. However, the
regulated parties challenging any disclosure could attempt to argue using the remnants of this prong that nondeceptive communication should
be governed by Central Hudson and its intermediate scrutiny test rather than Zauderer. The government entity will argue for the lower
standard that Zauderer brings, which is more deferential to the government interest. While this analysis would change depending on the disclosure before the court, given the expansion of Zauderer beyond deception, it is likely that a government entity would prevail, and the
disclosure would be analyzed under Zauderer.
C. Prong Three: Factual and Uncontroversial
The third Zauderer prong, which requires the disclosure be “factual
and uncontroversial,” will be where the majority of the argument
around a climate change disclosure takes place. After NIFLA, we know
this prong does not simply mean factual, and that both words operate
to define the limits of the government’s ability to compel disclosure.216
But does “factual and uncontroversial” mean the regulation cannot convey an ideology? Does a lack of scientific controversy survive? Or is it
politically controversial? I argue that, under any of these standards, a
climate change disclosure can survive the post-NIFLA Zauderer

212

272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001).
CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2019).
214
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411; The Clean Air Act and GHG Emissions, CTR. FOR CLIMATE
STRATEGIES, http://www.climatestrategies.us/clean-air-act-and-ghg-emissions [https://perma.cc/W
ND4-RMAF].
215
See CTIA, 928 F.3d at 842; Am. Meat Institute v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir 2014).
216
NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
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analysis. The government must argue using the analysis above, which
differentiates abortion from climate change, on all of these levels to
show that climate change is not “controversial” in the way that abortion
is.
If, as one scholar suggests, “factual and uncontroversial” means
that a disclosure must not “convey a controversial ideology,”217 a climate
change disclosure can survive by focusing on the information to be disclosed, which will narrow the scope of inquiry. The government can also
argue that the movement to respond to climate change is not an ideology. If the challenge is directed at a carbon footprint disclosure, like the
New York building score or the Japanese scheme, then the government
can defend the disclosure by arguing that, unlike the NIFLA disclosure,
this does not express an ideology.
At this stage it is important to differentiate the “conveyance” of an
ideology from tacit support for an ideology. Of course, climate change
disclosures can be linked to a variety of ideologies, but under that standard, all disclosures on any range of topics, would be unconstitutional.
What separates the NIFLA disclosures from Japanese nutritional labels or a New York energy efficiency score is that the content of the
disclosure is the ideology. While one can feel however they want about
nutrition or energy consumption, the NIFLA disclosures required the
speakers to advocate for abortion services, which were antithetical to
the speakers’ worldview.
Requiring a carbon footprint disclosure in itself is not a value judgment on the amount of energy used to deliver a product to the consumer.
On the other hand, the NIFLA disclosures specifically disclaimed the
services provided by the regulated entities, thus conveying an ideology
that state-operated services (which provided abortion services) were a
superior form of medical care.218 A climate-change-related disclosure
simply intends to provide more extensive information to consumers in
order to improve the marketplace.
It can be instructive to consider the harm inflicted by requiring the
speech in each case, as well as the ability to counter the compelled
speech. In the case of the NIFLA disclosure, the state was requiring the
speakers to express a view completely inapposite of their beliefs, and
the mission of their organization.219 No ability for the speaker to counter
that speech with their own beliefs could take away from the dignitary
harm inflicted by the disclosure requirement. However, in the example
of the New York building score, it is hard to fathom how displaying
217

Fowler, supra note 16, at 1679.
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2377.
219
Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the disclosure law at issue “compels individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs”).
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energy consumption is in and of itself antithetical to any worldview.
Even if a building owner believes climate change is a hoax, the disclosure simply requires display of energy efficiency. Furthermore, the
building owner could counter the compelled disclosure with their own
information.
On a broader level, efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change
are not an ideology in the same way that either pro-life or pro-choice
segments of society are. Much argument about climate change relates
to the best institutions, and best means to resolve the issue, as opposed
to whether climate change is, in fact, a problem at all. For example, in
litigation between Exxon and the State of New York regarding Exxon’s
knowledge of climate change and alleged fraudulent disclosures, none
of the argument centered on the existence of climate change, instead it
concerned who should address the problem and how.220
In contrast, in the abortion context, a crisis pregnancy center and
a Planned Parenthood condemn the fundamental objectives that each
seeks to carry out. This is an example of polar opposites in ideology,
whereas the effects of climate change do not inform a worldview in the
same way. Regardless of how we feel about climate change, the seas will
continue to rise. A government argument grounded in science can succeed in differentiating itself from deeply held personal beliefs like the
morality of abortion rights.
If “factual and uncontroversial” can be proven through a lack of scientific controversy, then a climate change disclosure should certainly
survive. The overwhelming consensus among scientists globally is that
human activity is contributing to an unprecedented warming of the
planet.221 While the Supreme Court identified a possible difference in
opinion in a footnote in American Electric Power,222 when the source of
the criticism of climate change is put in proper context, it becomes far
easier to dismiss. The majority of academic work that questions climate
change has been funded by the Heartland Institute, an organization
funded by the fossil fuel industry.223 When the overwhelming majority224 is stacked against the miniscule dissent to the facts of climate
change, it is hard to identify the argument as “controversial.”
If “uncontroversial” can be established through scientific consensus, a climate change disclosure is likely to survive. Courts are adept at
hearing technical evidence and making critical determinations, and differentiating fact from falsehood, a space where the science in support of
220
221
222
223
224

See Schwartz, supra note 97.
NASA, supra note 154.
Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 417 n.2 (2011).
See Goldenberg, supra note 149.
See EPA, supra note 210.
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climate change overwhelms. Unlike abortion, where disagreements
cannot be resolved by marshalling more evidence, courts can resolve
questions related to the warming of the planet, its effects, and reasonable ways to mitigate the harm.
If “factual and uncontroversial” relates to the political controversy
of the disclosure, while more of an uphill battle, a climate change disclosure can still survive this analysis by pointing to public opinion and
agency expertise. This is a particularly fascinating analysis under the
Trump administration, which has worked diligently to deregulate and
deconstruct executive branch attempts to combat climate change.225 If
“factual and uncontroversial” relates to political disagreement, it may
be the hardest standard to overcome, particularly under the Trump administration. However, a government entity could point to public support for addressing climate change. A Yale study on climate change
from 2019 shows that 67 percent of Americans polled believe that
“global warming is happening,” and 60 percent believe that the President and Congress “should do more to address global warming.”226 If
that is not compelling to a court, the government entity can point to the
consensus among agencies about climate change and the need to address it, despite what political appointees say.227 In this way, the case
can be compared favorably to American Beverage, where the disclosure
was ruled invalid because the FDA did not agree with the regulators.228
However, in this case, we can see at least fourteen prominent executive
agencies with a published policy plan to address climate change.229 Still,
if the court were to emphasize the controversy on a political level, as a
debate framed and governed by the political process, a court may find
the disclosure “controversial.”
On the other hand, the fact that a legislature or city government
passed the disclosure requirement in the first place should demonstrate
the political viability of the disclosure in the first place. It seems implausible that a change in federal political control could result in creating a controversy out of scientific consensus. For instance, if the next
president were to say that cigarettes have medicinal value, would that
225

Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, The Trump Administration Is
Reversing 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/N5PE-BU8F] (last
updated July 15, 2020).
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Yale Climate Opinion Maps 2019, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMM. (Sept. 17,
2019), https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us/ [https://perma.cc/TL9
8-FBKA].
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Climate Change Adaptation: What Federal Agencies Are Doing, CTR. FOR CLIMATE &
ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Feb. 2012), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2012/02/climate-changeadaptation-what-federal-agencies-are-doing.pdf [https://perma.cc/N852-79YQ].
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make their regulation controversial? At the same time, courts can rest
on the fact that local legislatures are politically accountable, therefore
not insulated from the costs of promulgating “controversial” policy. In
this regard, while politics may be a factor, it is likely judges are looking
for something more to create controversy.
D. Prong Four: Unduly Burdensome
The fourth prong of Zauderer requires the disclosure not be unduly
burdensome to the regulated party. The NIFLA disclosure was unduly
burdensome because it required antiabortion advocates to deliver a
script antithetical to their views.230 The NIFLA court also found that
there were other means to accomplish the goals of the disclosure.231 The
proposed disclosure in American Beverage was unduly burdensome because it required too large an area of the packaging to be devoted to the
disclosure.232
While this inquiry is more fact based, there are lessons to draw
from disclosures that have failed on this prong. First, unlike American
Beverage, climate change disclosures do not require too much space
from the regulated entity’s label or advertising, whether that is in the
form of a carbon score posted on the side of a New York building, or on
a candy bar wrapper. Additionally, most buildings and food manufacturers should have their energy consumption data readily available, as
this is a large cost in either business. Therefore, the costs to calculate
the score should not be prohibitive. Second, the government must be
able to successfully argue that, while there are other means to accomplish this goal, by putting the information before the consumer directly,
it has a greater impact. Further, unlike NIFLA, the disclosure of this
information is not loaded in the same way. Requiring the owners of a
skyscraper to disclose their energy footprint is not antithetical to their
mission. Courts generally recognize that disclosure is the least intrusive form of compelled government speech, and that determination will
play in the government’s favor here. In many ways the government can
argue that this disclosure looks similar to the nutritional facts already
disclosed on many food packages.
V.

CONCLUSION

By emphasizing the science and differentiating from the unknowable, deeply held moral beliefs tied to abortion, a climate change disclosure can successfully pass Zauderer scrutiny. If a court measures a
230
231
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NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371. (2018).
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“controversy” according to the political salience of the issue, it will be a
harder argument to make, but public opinion is behind government regulation addressed at climate change. While NIFLA has altered the landscape around compelled disclosure, the extraordinary nature of the issue before the Court in that case explains the result. Climate change
has been difficult to tackle at the federal level, but local initiatives like
the New York building code change can be effective in informing consumers and driving change through a more perfect market.
Disclosure should be a tool that legislators worldwide use to continue to mitigate the harm associated with climate change. While the
First Amendment addresses the scope and reach of compelled disclosure, a climate change disclosure that intends simply to inform consumers, rather than persuade as to a correct course of action should be successful under Zauderer. Yet, the way in which the Supreme Court
resolved NIFLA leaves some mystery as to the future direction on the
topic. This Comment has attempted to address possible interpretations
of “factual and uncontroversial” and the Zauderer standard going forward, and under many of those possibilities, a climate change disclosure
will survive.

The Practice of Prayer at School Board Meetings:
The Coercion Test as a Framework to Determine
the Constitutionality of School Board Prayer
Claire Lee†

I.

INTRODUCTION

Prayer in the public sphere has been part of American daily life
since the founding.1 Historically, both legislative sessions and school
days began with Bible readings or prayers to solemnize the day.2 The
constitutionality, or lack thereof, of these prayers lies in the First
Amendment’s provision that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . . or
abridging the freedom of speech.”3 The First Amendment protects individual speech, but it also ensures that the government does not use
speech to favor one religion over another. While the Supreme Court in
Engel v. Vitale4 found official school prayer in schools violated the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, in Marsh v. Chambers,5 it conversely recognized the constitutionality of legislative prayer, observing
that opening legislative bodies with prayer was a practice “deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”6 Lying at the juncture of this conflicting First Amendment jurisprudence are school
boards — effectively legislative bodies in the educational setting — that
begin meetings with prayer.
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While school boards have legislative functions such as setting
school district policies and curricula, they are unlike traditional legislatures because they are student focused.7 Not only do they make decisions that impact students, but frequently students are also in attendance at meetings.8 Students may be required to attend meetings as
student board or student council representatives, or they may attend
sporadically when they are recognized by the board, disciplined, or attending to make their voices heard.9 School boards’ hybrid function
make them difficult to classify within existing jurisprudence.
While the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits treat school board meetings as extensions of the school setting, making prayer unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit treats school board prayer as protected under
the First Amendment.10 Further complicating the circuit split, each of
the circuits employs a jumble of Establishment Clause tests, leaving no
clear authority on which test should be used.11 While the “historical
practices test” dominates legislative prayer jurisprudence,12 school
prayer cases frequently use a combination of tests.13 School board
prayer cases have used the Lemon, historical practices, coercion, and
endorsement tests to different degrees.14
This Comment will explain the prominent Establishment Clause
tests utilized by the Supreme Court in Part II and discuss the conflicting jurisprudence of school and legislative prayer in Part III. Part IV
will analyze the approaches taken by the various circuits regarding
school board prayer. For the purpose of resolving this circuit split, Part
V of this Comment will argue in favor of a fact-specific coercion test that
gives flexibility and clarity while also protecting students. Additionally,
this Part will discuss the shortcomings of using the historical practices,
endorsement, and Lemon tests in the school board prayer context. All
7

See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2018).
8
See, e.g., id.
9
See, e.g., id. at 1138–39 (explaining instances in which students attend school board meetings as part of a disciplinary proceeding, “student showcase,” “student recognition,” or as a Board
student representative).
10
Compare Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 282 (3d Cir. 2011), Coles v. Cleveland
Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 383–85 (6th Cir. 1999), and Chino, 896 F.3d at 1145 with Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 529–30 (5th Cir. 2017).
11
See, e.g., Indian River, 653 F.3d at 283–90 (applying the Lemon and endorsement tests and
using language from the coercion test); Coles, 171 F.3d at 383 (applying the Lemon test); Chino,
896 F.3d at 1148 (applying the Lemon test); McCarty, 851 F.3d at 529 (applying the legislative
prayer historical practices test).
12
See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–790 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway,
572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014).
13
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992).
14
See, e.g., Indian River, 653 F.3d at 283–90; Coles, 171 F.3d at 383; Chino, 896 F.3d at 1148;
McCarty, 851 F.3d at 529.
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three overlook important factors present in school board meetings including setting, audience, and history.
II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS
The Establishment Clause provides that “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion.”15 Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Establishment Clause applies not only to federal authorities, but also to state and local authorities such as school boards.16
While this rule appears simple, courts have historically been far from
clear on what counts as establishment.17 As a result, modern courts apply an assortment of different tests at different times, sometimes even
applying multiple tests to decide a single case.18 The most applicable
tests in legislative and school prayer jurisprudence are the Lemon, endorsement, coercion, and historical practices tests. These four tests
have been used both alone and jointly by the Supreme Court to explain
its Establishment Clause school and legislative prayer cases.19
A. Lemon Test
In 1971, the Court first handed down the three-part Lemon test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,20 where it considered the constitutionality of state
statutes that provided state funding to secular and religious private
schools.21 Relying on many years of “cumulative criteria,” the Court
found that a statute passes constitutional muster if (1) it “ha[s] a secular legislative purpose,” (2) “its principal or primary effect [is] one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) “the statute [does] not
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”22 The
third prong of the Lemon test has been interpreted to prohibit a law
that has “divisive political potential” or may lead the state to overseeing
and meddling in religious affairs.23
The “divisive political potential” aspect broadens the Lemon test
such that policies that are facially neutral toward religion may still be

15

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
17
See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 725, 728 (2006).
18
See id. (noting at least ten Establishment Clause standards).
19
See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–790 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway,
572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992); Indian River, 653 F.3d at 283–
90; Coles, 171 F.3d at 383; Chino, 896 F.3d at 1148; McCarty, 851 F.3d at 529.
20
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21
Id. at 606.
22
Id. at 612–13 (internal citations omitted).
23
Id. at 614–15, 622.
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found unconstitutional.24 In Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe,25 the Court found unconstitutional a policy of allowing students to
vote on who would give invocations at high school football games.26 The
Court emphasized that the voting mechanism would encourage religious divisiveness in a public school setting, which would be at odds
with the First Amendment.27
Almost as soon as the Lemon test was announced, justices on the
Court began to erode the doctrine, in part, because of its lack of clarity
and malleable nature.28 As a result, in many of the cases following
Lemon, the Court either expressly declined to apply the test or ignored
it.29 Recently, a plurality in American Legion v. American Humanist Association30 found that the Lemon test should not be used in at least some
Establishment Clause cases because it fails to consider that, for historical practices, it may be difficult to determine an original purpose, and
purposes may multiply or evolve over time.31 While the Lemon test, if
enforced broadly, may remove religion from government spaces, it may
do so at the cost of limiting historically supported religious practices.
B. Endorsement Test
Unsatisfied with the shortcomings of the Lemon test, Justice
O’Connor proposed the endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly,32 where
the Court considered the legality of a nativity scene on town property.33

24

See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).
530 U.S. 290.
26
Id. at 305 – 07.
27
Id. at 317.
28
See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2081–82 (2019) (finding that
there are considerations counseling against the usefulness of Lemon in deciding the constitutionality of longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices); McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,
890 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting that a majority of the justices had “repudiated the
brain-spun ‘Lemon test’”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398–99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children
and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District.”).
29
See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1 (1993)); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171 (2012); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392 (2018)).
30
139 S. Ct. 2067.
31
Id. at 2082–85.
32
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
33
See id. at 670–71, 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice O’Connor sought to clarify the Lemon test by using endorsement
as the focus of analysis. Under this analysis, the first two Lemon factors
turn on “whether [the] government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion . . . [and] whether, irrespective of [the] government’s
actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval.”34 Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test is
based on the idea that government endorsement sends a message that
is linked to political inclusion.35 As a result, religious endorsement may
make non-adherents of that religion feel like outsiders. The test narrows Lemon’s scope while also ensuring that the government does not
send a message of inclusion or exclusion based on religion.36 Given the
overlap between the Lemon and endorsement tests, courts have used
the endorsement test both as a stand-alone analysis and as a “legitimate part of Lemon’s second prong.”37
Like the Lemon test, the endorsement test is extremely manipulatable because it assesses endorsement through the eyes of a “reasonable
observer.”38 While a “reasonable observer” may appear to be objective,
Justice O’Connor notes that this hypothetical person should be “deemed
aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which
the religious display appears.”39 As such, the results of this analysis will
depend on the background and cultural assumptions that a judge gives
the “reasonable observer,”40 thus giving excessive power to the court by
way of discretion. Additionally, as a narrowed version of the Lemon test,
the endorsement test may protect more religious speech instead of
staunchly upholding the Establishment Clause.
C. Coercion Test
With the misgivings of the Lemon and endorsement tests in mind,
courts in school prayer cases have recently turned to the coercion test,
which focuses on compelled religious practices’ potential effects on

34

Id.
See id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
36
See Gey, supra note 17, at 738.
37
Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 850 (7th Cir. 2012) (viewing the endorsement test
as a “legitimate part of Lemon’s second prong”); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
652 (2002) (using the endorsement test to find a school-voucher program constitutional).
38
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgement), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565
(2014).
39
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgement).
40
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growing young minds.41 In Lee v. Weisman,42 the Court found that the
government cannot “coerce anyone to support or participate in religion
or its exercise.”43 Unlike the Lemon test, the coercion test lacks formal
criteria. Instead, it looks to the extent of supervision and social pressures on students to participate in the prayer or religious activity.44
This means that courts will analyze state action to determine if it directly or indirectly coerces individuals to participate in religious activity.45 While some, most notably Justice Scalia,46 have argued that only
direct coercion should be considered, precedent currently dictates that
even indirect coercion—laws that do not directly coerce religious behavior—may violate the First Amendment.47
The coercion test has flexibility of a different kind, providing in the
analysis a consideration of time and place not present in the Lemon or
endorsement analyses. Furthermore, by taking a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the coercion test provides space to consider that some
religiously rooted practices in public spaces may not be coercive. Steven
Gey argues that the coercion test, looking at both direct and indirect
coercion, is incoherent and unpredictable as every government action is
potentially coercive.48 If the coercion test were instead modified to only
consider direct coercion, the resulting predictability would come at the
cost of rendering the Establishment Clause redundant.49 Considering
only direct coercion—in Justice Scalia’s view, the most egregious and
overt actions—it is likely that any government actions violating the Establishment Clause would also run afoul of the Free Exercise or Free
Speech Clauses.50
D. Historical Practices Exception
Within Establishment Clause jurisprudence, there is an exception
to the application of the jumble of tests. The historical practices exception first evolved as the basis for the legislative prayer exception.51 In
Marsh, the Court implied that when a practice has a long historical
41

See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
505 U.S. 577.
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Id. at 587.
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See id. at 593.
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See id. at 588.
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pedigree, other Establishment Clause tests are either wholly or partially inapplicable.52 Relying on legislative prayer in the First Congress,
the Court stated that historical patterns alone do not justify constitutional violations but do shed light on what the Framers thought comprised unconstitutional conduct.53
This exception is still largely undefined as to what practices qualify
and how long of a history a practice must have to qualify.54 While it is
uncertain how longstanding a practice must be, Michael McConnell has
suggested some characteristics of what the Framers thought were constitutional violations.55 These characteristics include: government control over the doctrine and personnel of the established church, mandatory attendance in the established church, government financial
support of an established church, restrictions on worship in dissenting
churches, restrictions on political participation by dissenters, or use of
the church to carry out civil functions.56 Under the historical practices
framework looking at practices extending to the founding, practices
that do not fit within these characteristics would be constitutional, as
the founders would not have considered them violations.
The historical practices exception allows the Court to preserve
long-held traditions that may seem to violate the First Amendment but
have been ingrained in the American tradition. This may act as a
tradeoff between Establishment Clause protections and upholding longstanding religious speech. Such a tradeoff may come at a cost to predictability and constitutionality. Similar to the criticism of other Establishment Clause tests, the exception can also be unpredictable. The jurisprudence does not define how long-standing a practice must be to
qualify for the exception, leaving its application to practices outside of
legislative prayer uncertain.57 Additionally, the exception fails to consider that a historical practice may have a long pedigree but nonetheless be considered unconstitutional by modern standards.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND SCHOOL PRAYER
The various Establishment Clause tests and historical practices exception have been applied in different degrees and combinations in
school and legislative prayer cases.58 These two lines of jurisprudence
52

See id. at 788–92.
Id. at 790.
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See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014).
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Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131–76 (2003).
56
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53

374

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

lead to a divergence in outcomes with school prayer being held largely
unconstitutional and legislative prayer being held largely constitutional.59 To understand the application of these tests to school board
prayer — a hybrid of school and legislative prayer — the two lines of jurisprudence must be examined.
A. Religion and Public Schools
Unlike other areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has been largely consistent in striking down religious expression or involvement in the area of public schools.60 School prayer
jurisprudence began with Engel v. Vitale and School District of Abington v. Schempp,61 in which the Court found school-sponsored prayer and
Bible readings unconstitutional.62 The statute in question in Engel required students to begin each school day by saying aloud a prayer, while
in Schempp the challenged statutes required schools to begin each day
with readings from the Bible. Both Engel and Schempp were decided
prior to the Lemon test, and the Court undertook an analysis focused
largely on the concern of mixing religious activity with a government
institution by considering coercion, endorsement, and the neutrality of
the statute in question.63 Following the advent of the Lemon test, the
Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree64 reconsidered required school
prayer in the form of a moment of silence for “meditation or voluntary
prayer.”65 Relying on Lemon and the endorsement tests, the Wallace
court emphasized that the implicated state statute did not have a secular purpose and thus was unconstitutional.66
More recently, the Court has moved away from applying the Lemon
or endorsement tests in favor of the coercion test in school prayer

577, 595 (1992); Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 283–90 (3d Cir. 2011); Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 383 (6th Cir. 1999); Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino
Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1148 (9th Cir. 2018); Am. Humanist Ass’n
v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 2017).
59
See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
60
See, e.g., Bruce P. Merenstein, Last Bastion of School Sponsored Prayer? Invocations at
Public School Board Meetings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1042 (1997); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952);
Engel, 370 U.S. 421; Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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374 U.S. 203.
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See id. at 211; Engel, 370 U.S. at 430.
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See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 431, 436; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221–26.
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472 U.S. 38 (1985).
65
Id. at 40.
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See id. at 56.
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cases.67 This became evident in Lee v. Weisman,68 decided in 1992,
where the Court employed the coercion test and found prayer at a nonmandatory, public school graduation unconstitutional.69 The Court emphasized that the school’s control of the event placed pressure on students to participate and that the pressure, while indirect, could be as
real as overt compulsion.70
The Court in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe71 similarly found prayer before football games unconstitutional.72 There, the
Court relied on Lee’s coercion test while also employing the Lemon and
endorsement tests to find the practice similar to the unconstitutional
prayer in Lee.73 Extending Lee, the Santa Fe Court contended that prayers in a school setting could be coercive even if attendance was “purely
voluntary.”74 The Court utilized all three tests to emphasize that, regardless of which Establishment Clause test was used, the practice was
unconstitutional. This analytical choice demonstrates that, while the
coercion test is most frequently used in modern analysis, the Lemon and
endorsement tests are still relevant in school prayer cases. The continued relevance of the Lemon and endorsement tests, both inherently hostile toward integrating church and state, may weaken attempts to argue that school prayer is constitutional.75
B. Legislative Prayer
Prayer in legislative bodies, on the other hand, is constitutional under the historical practices exception.76 In Marsh, the Supreme Court
ruled that legislative prayer could coexist with the First Amendment.77
There, a state legislator challenged the constitutionality of a practice
by the Nebraska legislature of opening each session with prayer by a
chaplain paid with public funds.78 In the Court’s ruling, it noted that
adults and elected legislators are presumably not vulnerable to religious pressure.79 Marsh relied on the long history of legislative prayer
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in America to justify its constitutionality.80 The Court commented that
there was an “unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years” leaving “no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions
with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.”81 Relying on
the historical practices test, the Court declared that this was not an
establishment of religion, but rather a “tolerable acknowledgement of
beliefs widely held among the people.”82
Recently, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in Town of Greece
v. Galloway,83 ruling that an opening prayer at a town meeting was constitutional.84 The opening prayer at issue in Town of Greece was given
by clergy — unpaid volunteers — selected from congregations listed in a
local directory.85 Relying on its decision in Marsh, the Court stated that
the historical practices exception applied if the prayer practice “fits
within the tradition long followed in Congress and state legislatures.”86
In finding that the prayer in Town of Greece fell within the historical
practices exception, the Court further noted that the prayer was not
coercive because the target audience of the prayer was mature adults
not “readily susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer pressure.”87
Justice Kennedy, writing for the fractured court, distinguished Town of
Greece from Lee, finding that mature adults at legislative sessions are
free to leave, arrive late, or make protests without being disrespectful.88
Furthermore, the Court noted that within the context of legislative sessions, it may not even be noticed if someone in attendance wanted to
exit the room during a prayer they found distasteful.89
Additionally, the Court noted that the prayer took place during the
opening, not the policymaking portion of the meeting.90 The Court found
that the prayer delivered during the ceremonial portion of the meeting
acknowledged religious leaders and the institutions they represented,
without endorsing a religion as a policy of the community.91
While the legislative prayer jurisprudence makes clear that prayer
at the opening of legislative sessions is constitutional, the Court left
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open how this might apply to circumstances outside of an elected state
legislature.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In light of uncertain Supreme Court precedent, lower courts both
before and after Town of Greece have considered whether prayers preceding school board meetings are more like school prayer or legislative
prayer.92 Since school and legislative prayer jurisprudence utilize different Establishment Clause tests and lead to diverging outcomes, the
determination of whether school board prayer is more like prayer in a
classroom or in the legislature is critical to the analysis.
Prior to Town of Greece, the Third and Sixth Circuits held that the
coercive nature of school board prayer resembled school prayer, finding
school board prayer unconstitutional under the Lemon test.93 After
Town of Greece, the Ninth Circuit held the same.94 The Fifth Circuit is
the only circuit to disagree.95
The Third and Sixth Circuits’ pre-Town of Greece rulings both used
the coercion and the Lemon tests in their analyses.96 In Coles v.
Cleveland Board of Education,97 the Sixth Circuit rejected the
comparison between school boards and legislative sessions.98
Challenged in Coles was a 1992 prayer policy that resulted in each
school board meeting opening with either a prayer offered by a local
religious leader chosen by the school board president, a moment of
silent prayer, or a prayer led by the school board president.99 These
school board meetings were held on school property and provided
opportunities for voluntary and required student attendance.100 The
public-comment portion of the meeting allowed students and parents to
voice their concerns over school polices and, under certain
circumstances, served as a forum for addressing student disciplinary
grievances.101

92

See, e.g., Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2011); Coles v. Cleveland Bd.
of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999); Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2018); Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d
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Additionally, student representatives sat on the Cleveland Board
of Education to summarize the students’ perspective on school
activities.102 The school board also regularly invited students to attend
its meetings to acknowledge their academic, athletic, or community
service achievements.103 Considering the presence of the students, the
Sixth Circuit reasoned that school board meetings, unlike legislative
sessions, risk coercion.104 Because school board meetings concern
students, students have an incentive to attend and, in some cases, are
required to attend—local townsfolk have no such compulsion.105
Further, in contrast to legislators, school board members “are directly
communicating, at least in part, to students.”106 While in Engel and Lee
the risk of coercion was enough to make prayer unconstitutional, here,
coercion was only enough to trigger the Lemon test.107 Under the Lemon
test analysis, the prayers were unconstitutional.108
The Third Circuit, in Doe v. Indian River School District,109
followed the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning.110 In Indian River, the school
board had a long-standing policy of praying at regularly scheduled
meetings.111 This policy allowed, on a rotating basis, an adult Board
member to offer a prayer or request a moment of silence explicitly
stipulating that such prayers were voluntary and no employees,
students, or community members in attendance were required to
participate.112 The court noted that school board meetings, whether or
not they are mandatory, invite student participation, and,
consequently, “bear several markings of . . . implied coercion.”113 Thus,
the court held, prayer before school board meetings resembles other inschool prayer and cannot survive the Lemon test.114 Therefore, the
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prayers before Indian River School District board meetings were
deemed unconstitutional.115
The Ninth Circuit’s post- Town of Greece ruling is the most recent
and relevant opinion to the side of the circuit split that finds school
board prayer unconstitutional.116 In Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified School District Board of
Education,117 the court found that school board prayer failed the Lemon
test because it lacked a secular purpose.118 The Chino Valley Unified
School District Board’s challenged 2013 policy “provide[d] for prayer
delivery [opening school board meetings] ‘by an eligible member of the
clergy or a religious leader in the boundaries of’ the district.”119 This
prayer usually followed the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance by a
member of the school community and presentation of the colors by the
Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps to begin each meeting.120 In
addition to providing the forum for making decisions on student
discipline and district administration, Chino Valley school board
meetings featured “student showcase[s]” and “student recognition”
involving “students of all ages—from elementary school to high school—
who are in attendance.”121 The Board’s student representative
additionally served as an active contributor at meetings, voting with
the Board in open sessions and discussing student issues during the
period for comment.122
In finding that the prayer policy failed the Lemon test, the Ninth
Circuit analogized the case to Santa Fe, stating that messages other
than prayers could serve the stated purpose of having the prayer.123
This analysis differed slightly from the Third and Sixth Circuit’s
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approaches by minimizing discussion of coercion in the application of
the Lemon test.124 The Ninth Circuit found Chino to be dissimilar from
Town of Greece because it determined that the setting of a board meeting, where schoolchildren are often in attendance and under the control
of the board, was unlike a legislative meeting where members have
equal status.125 As a result of these factors, the court found that the
large numbers of children and adolescents present made the situation
inconsistent with the legislative prayer tradition.126 The Ninth Circuit’s
ruling limited the ability of school board members to begin meetings in
prayer, but also limited the government from indoctrinating children in
attendance with the Christian religion.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit classified school board meetings as
legislative, and consequently held that pre-meeting invocations, often
consisting of prayer, were constitutional.127 In American Humanist Association v. McCarty,128 the Birdville Independent School District
opened their public monthly meetings with two students reciting the
Pledge of Allegiance, the Texas pledge, and delivering a statement—
which sometimes consisted of an invocation.129 While the school district
did not mandate that the invocation include a prayer, frequently students elected to open with a prayer.130 Like other school boards, students frequently attended meetings to receive awards or for brief performances.131 In this context, the Fifth Circuit specifically found that a
“school board is more like a legislature than a school classroom or
event.”132 Even though children are in attendance, the Fifth Circuit
stated that that fact was not enough to change a school board meeting
prayer case into a school prayer case.133 Thus, instead of finding school
boards to be within school prayer jurisprudence, the Fifth Circuit followed Town of Greece and the historical practices exception, finding
prayer at school board meetings constitutional.134 This decision allows
school board members to share their religious convictions through
124
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prayer, despite the risk that the prayers may persuade the children in
attendance.
V.

THE COERCION TEST AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SCHOOL
BOARD PRAYER CASES

A. The Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ Establishment Clause Analyses Are
Ill-Suited for School Board Prayer Cases
While the Ninth and Fifth Circuits used two predominant Establishment Clause analyses, both the Lemon test and historical practices
exception are ill-suited for school board prayer cases.135 Both have a
myriad of issues in development and application in addition to overlooking important considerations.
1.

The Lemon test is unsatisfactory due to doctrinal shortcomings and waning support

The Lemon test has been eroded and avoided by the Court since its
inception due to its doctrinal difficulties and extreme malleability.136
The doctrinal implications of Lemon stem from how broadly or narrowly
it is interpreted. If interpreted broadly, the Lemon test makes it difficult to reconcile the Establishment Clause with the Free Exercise
Clause.137 Taken literally, Lemon’s requirement that a statute have a
“secular purpose” would foreclose all government actions that account
for religious interests.138 However, past decisions concerning the Religion Clauses make it clear that it is constitutional to, say, excuse Amish
schoolchildren from compulsory education laws and religious conscientious objectors from military service.139 Narrow interpretations, on the
other hand, may overprotect religious interests. This flexibility in interpretation gives the Court desirable latitude, but, as the Court itself has
conceded, does so at the cost of clarity and predictability.140 As a result,
decisions under the Lemon test are difficult to reconcile as a whole.141
135
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This flexibility means that a particular court can mold the Lemon test
to its desired outcome, leaving school boards without clear guidance on
which policies are acceptable and which policies are unconstitutional.
Recently, the Court highlighted the shortcomings of the Lemon test
in American Legion.142 There, Justice Alito, writing for a majority, explained that in some Establishment Clause cases the Lemon analysis is
incredibly difficult to undertake.143 In the case of long-established practices or symbols, he noted, it may be difficult to identify the original
purpose.144 Furthermore, with the passage of time, the original purpose
may change or be replaced with multiple purposes.145 Finally, ending
any historical practice will often not appear neutral, making it seem as
if the government is hostile toward religion.146 For these reasons, the
Court found the Lemon test unsuitable for at least some categories of
Establishment Clause cases.147 Justice Kavanaugh, concurring, argued
that the Lemon test is not applicable in any Establishment Clause cases
due to its shortcomings.148 Beyond the difficulty in conducting a Lemon
test analysis, Justice Kavanaugh argued that in modern jurisprudence
the Lemon test is not good law as the Court does not actually use Lemon
in its decision-making.149
Due to the doctrinal issues, the Court’s inconsistent use of the test,
and recent hostility toward it, the Lemon test is unsuitable for school
board prayer cases. As explained in American Legion, it fails to consider
the historical significance of some practices, a factor relevant in both
legislative prayer and school board prayer cases.150 Furthermore, as a
notoriously malleable test, it could be used, as it has been in other Establishment Clause cases, to create inconsistent results that could either over or under protect religious interests depending on the

nonpublic and predominantly parochial schools violated the Establishment Clause because the
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interpretation of the test.151 The Lemon test undercuts First Amendment protections by not providing clear and coherent guidance on Establishment Clause violations.
In sum, the Lemon test fails because of doctrinal shortcomings
stemming from its inherent malleability and difficult application. These
shortcomings lead to decisions that are difficult to reconcile as a whole.
With the Lemon test waning in support, as Justice Kavanaugh pointed
out, it is not a suitable candidate for reconciling this circuit split.152
2.

The historical practices exception is unsatisfactory because it
fails to consider the context of the practice and changing understandings of what constitutes an Establishment Clause violation

Likewise, the historical practices exception has shortcomings that
make it an unsuitable candidate for these cases. The historical practices
exception purportedly relies on unbroken history to uphold practices
that might otherwise be found to violate the Establishment Clause.
However, it assumes that the founders’ understanding of constitutional
practices holds true today.153 This fails to consider how the nation and
the understanding of the constitution over time has developed. What
may have once been considered a religious yet constitutional practice,
may today serve as a sign of government-established religion.154 Furthermore, the requirement of an unbroken history that the exception
relies on has been undermined through subsequent decisions. While the
practice in Marsh was continued for over two hundred years, practices
with much shorter histories have also been granted the exception.155
American Legion used historical practices to justify preserving a memorial cross that had been on public land for less than a century.156 Town
of Greece used historical practices to justify the decade-old practice of
opening town council meetings with prayer.157 Without an actual
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history to rely on, the historical practices exception has no other doctrinal support.158
Further, while some school boards can trace their opening prayers
back to the nineteenth century, even the oldest traditions of school
board prayer do not date back to the founding.159 The tradition of school
boards can be traced back to the seventeenth century, when the Massachusetts Bay Colony passed a law requiring towns to establish and
maintain schools, administering these schools through town meetings.160 It was not until the early nineteenth century that school boards
developed as independent bodies from the government.161 This may be
a long enough history of school board prayer, as evidenced by the
Court’s decisions in American Legion and Town of Greece, to qualify for
the historical practices exception. However, since school boards as independent bodies did not exist at the founding, it is incredibly difficult
to surmise what the founders did or did not think of the constitutionality of school board prayer.
Finally, the historical practices exception is unsatisfactory in
school board prayer cases because it fails to consider the extraneous
circumstances, such as setting and audience, at play in school boards.
The prayers in Engel and the Bible readings in Schempp were historically accepted practices, yet the Court in both cases refused to look at
history alone as history could not outweigh the impact on students.162
Similarly, the setting and audience of a school board present a different
picture from both a classroom and a legislature. With the potential for
requiring student attendance as representatives and audience members, school boards host more than just developed adult minds. In looking only to history, the historical practices exception misses how a particular practice may lead to a different effect depending on the
environment. As a result, the exception fails to fully protect the rights
afforded to individuals in the Establishment Clause.
The Lemon test and historical practices exception have limitations
in their own right. When these limitations are considered in light of the
hybrid setting of school boards, it becomes apparent that neither line of
analysis provides for the comprehensive consideration of all the factors
158

See, e.g., Segall, supra note 153, at 723–24.
See, e.g., Marie Elizabeth Wicks, Prayer is Prologue: The Impact of Town of Greece on the
Constitutionality of Deliberative Public Body Prayer at the Start of School Board Meetings, 31 J.L.
& POL. 1, 30–31 (2015) (noting the historical records in eight states trace school board prayer to
the nineteenth century); Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 2006)
(tracing school board prayer to “at least 1973”).
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Public Education FAQ, NAT’L SCH. BD. ASS’N, https://www.nsba.org/About/Public-Educatio
n-FAQ [https://perma.cc/2AFJ-Y4SJ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
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Id.
162
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963).
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present in school board prayer cases. With the analyses of the Ninth
and Fifth Circuits both unsatisfactory, only the endorsement or coercion
tests stand as possible options for reconciling school board prayer cases.
B. The Endorsement Test Is Too Unpredictable
As a narrower version of the Lemon test, the endorsement test appears at first to provide the clarity that Lemon lacks, and also considers
the setting overlooked in the historical practices exception. Nonetheless, the endorsement test is also ill-suited for school board prayer cases
because of its unique unpredictability and waning support by the Court.
Narrowing the focus of Lemon to endorsement provides some clarity as to what practices qualify as a secular purpose, solving some of the
doctrinal flexibility inherent in Lemon.163 Furthermore, the endorsement test overcomes one of the historical practices exception’s shortcomings by considering both the history and context of the government
action.164 The endorsement test introduces new unpredictability, however, that leaves it as malleable as the Lemon test.
Justice O’Connor calls for endorsement to be assessed through the
eyes of a reasonable observer “deemed aware of the history and context
of the community and forum in which the religious display appears.”165
This creates an analysis that is fact-specific and lacks clarity.166 The
outcome will necessarily depend on what background knowledge and
community awareness a particular judge assumes a reasonable observer to have.167 This leads to malleability that can be exploited. For a
school board prayer case, this unpredictability is even more apparent
as outcomes would likely differ depending on whether the reasonable
observer is a student or an adult, and whether the meetings had required student attendance or almost no students in attendance. As a
result, an endorsement analysis would make it difficult for school districts to make decisions concerning the allowance of religious activities
given different environments. Additionally, similar to the Lemon test,
in some cases an endorsement analysis may be difficult to make if the
government’s original purpose is difficult to identify or has changed.168
Finally, modern incorporation of the endorsement test into the
Lemon test has resulted in hostility toward the endorsement test.169 The
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See Gey, supra note 17, at 737.
See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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See Gey, supra note 17, at 739.
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See id.
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See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2082–85 (2019).
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Court in American Legion mentioned endorsement as a way of evaluating the first and second prongs of Lemon, before concluding that the
Lemon test is unsuitable in some Establishment Clause cases.170 While
not explicitly hostile to the endorsement test as a stand-alone test, the
overlap with the Lemon test and the unique malleability of the endorsement test does not make it a better candidate for school board prayer
cases.
C. The Coercion Test Provides the Best Framework
The coercion test, which considers both direct and indirect coercion,
provides the best framework for considering hybrid school board prayer
cases. It considers all of the external factors present in school boards,
takes into account the intent of the Establishment Clause, and also protects those that are most vulnerable. In doing so, the coercion test takes
relevant considerations from the Lemon test, endorsement test, and historical practices exception and puts them in context of the environment.
While the Lemon test, endorsement test, or historical practices exception might be appropriate for other categories of Establishment
Clause cases, they all fail to provide full consideration of the unique
school board situation.171 The coercion test, on the other hand, is able to
account both for historical significance and for the impact on a particular audience.172 As a totality-of-the-circumstances test looking at direct
and indirect coercion, the coercion test focuses on whether the state action, school board prayer, is coercing anyone to support or participate
in religion.173 As such, a court can consider the relevance of factors such
as the history of the school board’s prayer practice, the presence of students at the board meetings as school board members or as student government representatives, and the agency of those present to leave or
participate when determining whether coercion is present. A totalityof-the-circumstances approach allows a court to recognize that religion
is an important part of society but balances that consideration against
the potential harms to society of coercing religious observance. Furthermore, this approach allows flexibility given the environment, while still
giving direction to school boards. A court can decide if the historical
tradition of legislative prayer is outweighed by the coercive pressures
on students present at board meetings.
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See id. at 2080, 2085.
See, e.g., Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing
that the Lemon test, considering endorsement, fails to account for the historical significance of a
particular practice); Wicks, supra note 159, at 30–31 (noting that school board prayer cannot be
traced to the founding, weakening the application of the historical practices exception).
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See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
173
See id. at 587, 593.
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Additionally, the coercion test recognizes the Framers’ intent that
it is not only unconstitutional to establish a national religion, but that
freedom of conscience should be closely guarded.174 Unlike other Establishment Clause tests, the coercion test is directly focused on how a particular practice or tradition affects an audience. The coercion test recognizes that some practices, such as the passive acknowledgement of
religion, may not be a violation of the Establishment Clause, even
though they are religious. Additionally, by focusing on the specific actor,
action, and result, this test recognizes that freedom of conscience can
be affected to different degrees in different populations. This is useful
in school board settings where both young minds, as seen in school
prayer cases, and developed minds, as traditionally thought of in legislative prayer cases, are present.175
The coercion test is uniquely situated to address cases involving
school board meetings, where both young and developed minds are affected.176 Traditionally, school boards are comprised of elected adult officials making legislative decisions.177 However, they are also inherently student focused, existing to set policies and procedures for
education in a particular community.178 Not only do school board decisions affect the lives and education of students and parents, some students may regularly serve on school boards, be required to attend meetings as student representatives, or voluntarily attend meetings to voice
their concerns.179 The record of Chino demonstrates that at every meeting, students were in attendance to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, to
participate in the “student showcase,” to be recognized during “student
recognition,” and to serve as student representatives.180 In McCarty,
students frequently attended meetings to receive awards or share brief
band or choir performances.181 As a result, the unique presence of students at school board meetings makes the coercion test uniquely suited
to consider how the environment and context of prayer may or may not
affect young minds.
Some critics may argue that the coercion test is unnecessary, and
that school boards are just legislatures where the historical practices
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See, e.g., Lisa M. Kahle, Making “Lemon-Aid” from the Supreme Court’s Lemon: Why Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Should be Replaced by a Modified Coercion Test, 42 SAN
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See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 592; Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014).
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See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 592; Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 590.
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See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018).
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See, e.g., id. at 1138–40.
179
See, e.g., id.; Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2017).
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See Chino, 896 F.3d at 1138–40.
181
See McCarty, 851 F.3d at 524.

388

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

exception applies.182 A critic might argue that having students present
at school board meetings is no different than having minors present at
legislative sessions. The argument is that the mere presence of students
should not transform a historical legislative practice into a school
prayer.183 This criticism fails to recognize that while in a legislature the
legislative members will always be consenting adults, this is not the
case with school boards.184 Many school boards have student representatives, and even those that do not have a high likelihood that students
will be present at school board meetings.185 This is similar to the cheerleaders and football players in Santa Fe, who, due to their extracurricular commitments, were required to be at the games.186 Furthermore,
the Court has found that even at purely voluntary events, such as attending football games as a spectator, coercion can still be present.187
There must be consideration for the choice with which students are presented between attending school board meetings they find important
and avoiding personally offensive or uncomfortable religious rituals.188
Even in instances where few students are present, these concerns prevail, as students in attendance might be even more vulnerable to pressure to conform to the religious norms of their adult counterparts.
Additionally, critics may claim that school boards are more like legislatures because there is a diminished educational function in school
boards. This argument fails to consider that graduations and football
games, both only tangentially educational in nature, are considered
within the school prayer domain.189 Just as football games may be part
of an extracurricular activity for some students, so too may school board
meetings.190
Finally, by implementing a totality-of-the-circumstances test,
courts are afforded necessary flexibility without too much unpredictability. A totality-of-the circumstances approach does not force courts to
apply a rigid rule, which is useful in the school board setting where a
particular environment may greatly affect the coercive influence. Critics may argue that this flexibility leads to the same lack of clarity as
the other Establishment Clause tests because a totality-of-the-

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
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circumstances approach does not make clear what audience members
are considered in the coercion analysis nor the bounds of indirect coercion.
When determining which audience members to consider for coercion, the flexibility of the coercion test can be distorted by a court to
produce its desired outcome.191 This could lead to inconsistent results.
One court may find school board prayer without student board members
but with students present constitutional, while another may find school
board prayer with regular student board representatives present unconstitutional. Courts could be drawing incredibly fine lines to distinguish between nearly identical situations. On one hand, this nuance
may be preferred, as an invocation’s level of coercion on a student board
representative and a student audience member may be different. However, such nuance may lead to gameplaying, with some districts making
student representative attendance voluntary to allow for constitutional
prayers. This could be dealt with by defining the coercion test to only
look at the coercive impact on those required, or practically required, to
be in attendance. Focusing the coercion test on these individuals ensures that those most likely to be directly or indirectly coerced are considered. A focus on those required to be in attendance also would be
congruent with the outcome in legislative prayer. Since legislators are
necessarily adults, the coercive power of prayer is diminished.192
Furthermore, looking at those required or practically required to be
in attendance ensures that coercion is not viewed in a rigid, formalistic
sense. This idea is further supported by school prayer cases such as Lee
and Santa Fe where students were not required to be at graduation or
football games, but, due to social peer and administrative pressures,
were practically required to be in attendance as a part of their overall
educational experience.193 This factor allows consideration for students
who are in attendance as recognized students, disciplined students, or
those who are there as student representatives. For example, a member
of the state champion softball team might be practically required to attend the school board meeting as a member of the team being recognized
for their accomplishment. By not attending the student may be forfeiting intangible benefits and an opportunity to celebrate their accomplishment.194 This particular safeguard still gives flexibility for nuance
without leading to unpredictability. A school board would then be given
notice as to which students are taken into account in the coercion
191
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analysis while also preserving flexibility given the different factors in
different school boards.
The flexibility of the scope of indirect coercion can be mitigated by
using a “reasonable student” to determine if coercion is present given
the totality-of-the-circumstances. For those who are incredibly sensitive, virtually any government favoritism toward religion is coercive because it benefits those who choose the favored faith.195 Such an extreme
would make the coercion test just as unpredictable as other Establishment Clause tests. This fault can be reconciled by analyzing coercion
through the perspective of a reasonable student in that particular totality-of-the-circumstances, giving some objectivity to the test. Unlike
Justice O’Connor’s suggestion to give the reasonable student community knowledge and context, the reasonable student under the proposed
coercion test will remain objective. Extra community knowledge is unnecessary, not only because it introduces malleable subjectivity, but
also because the totality of the environment is already being considered.
Under the coercion test, the totality-of-the-circumstances provides useful information on the historical practices of the prayer without turning
the coercion test into a subjective test. Furthermore, while some students may be more prone to coercion than others, the test can still remain objective. The school prayer jurisprudence makes clear that the
Court is not as concerned with how any particular student feels about
religion in schools, but how religious expressions in a school environment result in pressures to conform as perceived by a reasonable student.196 The Court’s decisions around school prayer are not based on
how actual students responded to the prayer, but rather the effects that
the prayers could have.197
The coercion test is the most suitable framework for school board
prayer cases. By considering the totality-of-the-circumstances from the
point of view of a reasonable student, the test ensures that both the
historical significance and the potential coercion of school board prayer
are taken into account. Considering more factors gives a more robust
view as to the effect school board prayer may have on those in the audience. This test provides flexibility while also ensuring safeguards to
give school boards predictability. Since school boards fall at the juncture
of school prayer and legislative prayer, incorporating important considerations from both bodies of jurisprudence ensures that the unique environment of a school board is not unnecessarily forced into Establishment Clause tests designed for schools or legislatures.
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D. Under the Coercion Test, School Board Prayer Is Likely Unconstitutional
Once it is clear that the coercion test is best suited for school board
prayer cases, an application will likely lead to a finding that prayers in
these cases are unconstitutional. As defined by Justice Kennedy, the
coercion test is a totality-of-the-circumstances test looking to the extent
of supervision and social pressures to participate to determine if the
state “coerce[s] anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”198 School boards—like classrooms, graduation ceremonies, and
football games—are controlled and supervised by state actors. The
school board, as the government actor, determines its policies and procedures. This is unlike an impromptu decision by students to pray
around the flagpole or other student-instigated action. Legislative
prayer and school prayer collide in the “social pressure to participate”
consideration. In making that determination, a court needs to decide if
the historical significance of school board prayer is such that it does not
make it coercive. For example, like legislative prayer, if a religious invocation has been used by a school board for centuries, perhaps the
practice has become less about religion and more about tradition. On
the other side are the pressures that student board members and representatives, unlike adults, may face. Unlike school prayer at graduations, the audience at school boards is likely primarily adults. However,
while students may be fewer in number, they may be required to attend
the meetings either in an official capacity or to receive recognition.199
This may place an even higher social pressure on them to conform in an
audience primarily comprised of their elders. Furthermore, even if students are not required to attend meetings, this fact may not be dispositive. The Court in Santa Fe explained that even purely voluntary events
may produce unconstitutionally coercive pressures.200
Given all of these considerations, school boards present an opportunity where students in attendance may feel the coercive pressure by
those in the audience to pray. As a student in an environment likely
filled with adults, this coercion seems unacceptable. In some cases, a
historical practice of prayer may reduce the coercive factor. This may
occur where the historical practice lends itself to tradition, reducing the
level of coercion. However, a historical practice should not easily outweigh coercive concerns. After all, schools had a history of beginning
the day with prayer or a Bible verse, and yet the Court found these
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practices too coercive to be constitutional.201 Since school boards are
uniquely positioned to impact the student population and frequently
have students in attendance, both in required and voluntary capacities,
the unique concerns of coercion of minors indicate that official school
board prayer should be found unconstitutional under the coercion test.
Importantly, such an analysis will not prohibit school board members in their individual capacity from joining together privately before
a meeting and praying.202 Such an act of personal choice is not only constitutionally protected, but also does not have the same coercive power
as a school board authorized prayer. Instead of acting in their role as
government actors, individual school board members can engage in private prayer beforehand, which allows them to practice their own personal beliefs.
VI. CONCLUSION
School board prayer lies at the juncture of diverging school prayer
and legislative prayer jurisprudence and does not fit either category.
While school boards are legislative bodies making decisions for a community, they are also student centric.203 Unlike a legislature made up
of adult representatives, school boards frequently have student members and representatives.204 Even those without student representation
may have students attend to be recognized or to voice their opinions.205
This makes a school board outside the confines of both a legislature and
a classroom and in need of a suitable Establishment Clause test for this
hybrid case.
The circuit split with respect to school board prayer developed as
the Ninth and Fifth Circuits attempted to use Establishment Clause
tests that failed to consider the entirety of the circumstances. The Ninth
Circuit’s approach using the Lemon test is ill-suited for school board
prayer due to its extreme malleability and recent Court hostility toward
it.206 The historical practices exception used by the Fifth Circuit is likewise unsatisfactory because it overlooks the effect of a historical practice in a particular time and place. Additionally, the historical practices
exception was developed based on an unbroken history extending back
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to the founding, something that school board prayer cannot claim.207
Turning to other prominent Establishment Clause tests, the endorsement test likewise is ill-suited for school board prayer cases. While it
narrows the scope of Lemon, it introduces unnecessary subjectivity
through the use of a standard of a reasonable observer aware of the
history and context of the community and forum.208
Ultimately, the coercion test provides the best framework to consider school board prayer cases. It provides for a full consideration of all
the relevant factors not fully considered in either the Lemon test, endorsement test, or historical practices exception. As a totality-of-thecircumstances approach, it can look at all of the relevant factors from
the view of a reasonable student in the audience to determine if coercion
is present. Furthermore, both school and legislative prayer decisions
consider coercion as at least a relevant factor.209 Since Town of Greece,
legislative prayer has looked at both historical practices and coercion.
Furthermore, the coercion test was developed in Lee for a school prayer
case.210 It is this common factor of coercion that can unite the diverging
jurisprudence and can be used to evaluate the constitutionality of school
board prayer.
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Preserving a Democratic Shield: First
Amendment Challenges to Michigan’s
Independent Redistricting Commission
Michael Ortega†

I.

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment protects speech from the street corner to the
ballot box.1 With a pervasive fear of governmental suppression and a
commitment to strong public discourse, courts have forged the modern
First Amendment into a democratic shield.2 Although this shield does
not go far enough to protect those who need it,3 this Comment focuses
on a different problem: the warping of a pro-democratic shield into an
anti-democratic sword. How should the First Amendment apply when
plaintiffs challenge government action that broadens public debate?
How should courts address plaintiffs wielding the First Amendment to
attack pro-democratic reforms? This Comment addresses these questions by analyzing recent First Amendment challenges to Michigan’s
independent redistricting commission (“IRC”).4
Partisan gerrymandering, the manipulation of electoral district
lines for partisan gain, is “incompatible with democratic principles.”5
† B.S., University of Miami, Class of 2018; J.D. candidate, University of Chicago Law School,
Class of 2021. Thank you to Gerry Hebert and Paul Smith for some preliminary musings on the
subject, and to Nicholas Stephanopoulos and the Legal Forum for invaluable feedback throughout
the writing process. This Comment is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, who was robbed
of his native Cuba and his dreams of practicing law, and yet dedicated his life to securing the
dreams of his family.
1
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939); see also Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983).
2
See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
3
See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117, 2127 (2018) (“The result [of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence] has been to limit
the effectiveness of the First Amendment as a tool for protecting the expressive freedom of those
at the bottom of the economic and social hierarchies—those whose speech is most likely to be constrained by forces other than the discriminatory animus of government actors.”).
4
S.M., Republicans Challenge Michigan’s Redistricting Commission in Court, ECONOMIST
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2019/08/01/republicans-challen
ge-michigans-redistricting-commission-in-court [https://perma.cc/4TN9-G4YV].
5
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v.
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Partisan gerrymanders discriminate against voters on the basis of
party affiliation and frustrate the effectiveness of political association,
“undermin[ing] the protections of ‘democracy embodied in the First
Amendment.’”6 In 2018, sixty-one percent of Michiganders voted to
amend the state’s constitution to create an independent redistricting
commission.7 The amendment empowers this citizen-led commission to
draw congressional and state legislative districts, thus preventing the
majority party in the legislature from unilaterally controlling the mapdrawing process.8 Less than a year later, the Michigan Republican
Party and a group of Republican political actors (hereafter, “the Michigan plaintiffs”) filed complaints on First Amendment grounds seeking
to prevent Michigan from implementing the commission.9
The First Amendment protects rights that are necessary for democratic self-governance.10 Courts crafted the doctrines on which the
Michigan plaintiffs rely—bans on political patronage, the associational
rights of political parties, and viewpoint discrimination—in response to
government practices limiting the ability of private actors to participate
in public debate.11 By challenging redistricting reform in this manner,
the plaintiffs’ claims warp these doctrines; Michigan’s IRC expands
public discourse rather than contracting it. Moreover, the plaintiffs’
success would entail striking down a ballot initiative passed by a supermajority of Michiganders, overturning the results of a public debate.
The Michigan plaintiffs seek to distort jurisprudence, forcing the First
Amendment to “bit[e] its own tail.”12
The Supreme Court has closed the federal courthouse door to partisan gerrymandering claims.13 In doing so, the Court may not have
ended these battles so much as shifted the battleground from the maps

Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 791 (2015)).
6
Id. at 2514 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (plurality opinion)). But see id. at 2504. (“[T]here are no restrictions on speech, association, or any
other First Amendment activities in the districting plans at issue. The plaintiffs are free to engage
in those activities no matter what the effect of a plan may be on their district.”).
7
2018 Michigan Election Results, MICH. DEP’T OF ST. (Nov. 26, 2018), https://mielections.us/election/results/2018GEN_CENR.html [https://perma.cc/EN8H-3WFE].
8
Amendment Language, VOTERS NOT POLITICIANS, https://votersnotpoliticians.com/languag
e/ [https://perma.cc/N3QG-BAKF].
9
S.M., supra note 4; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief [hereinafter Political
Actors Complaint] at ¶ 2, Daunt v. Benson, 425 F.Supp.3d 856, No. 1:19-cv-00614 (W.D. Mich. July
30, 2019).
10
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1102
(2016) (collecting cases and scholarship).
11
See infra Part IV.A.
12
Tim Wu, Beyond First Amendment Lochnerism: A Political Process Approach, KNIGHT FIRST
AMEND. INST. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/beyond-first-amendment-lochnerism-a-political-process-approach [https://perma.cc/2E32-8Y26].
13
See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
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to the mapmakers. Litigation similar to Michigan’s IRC challenge is
likely in the coming years,14 and the 2020 census and reapportionment
will bring fierce redistricting battles across the country.15 In some cases,
these fights will be between citizens and their elected officials.16 Courts
should not construe the First Amendment to aid the latter.
The argument of this Comment is two-fold. First, because the Michigan plaintiffs’ arguments subvert the doctrines on which they rely,
courts should reject their First Amendment claims. Second, these doctrines cannot support the plaintiffs’ claims because of their origins as
pro-democratic shields against government action. This signals a potential limiting principle for First Amendment jurisprudence more generally: plaintiffs should not be able to use pro-democratic doctrine to
achieve anti-democratic ends.17
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II provides a brief historical background to the problem of partisan gerrymandering, focusing
on Michigan’s current congressional maps, and describes the relevant
features of Michigan’s independent redistricting commission. Part III
analyzes the doctrines on which the Michigan plaintiffs rely and shows
that they cannot support the plaintiffs’ claims without serious distortion. Part IV demonstrates why these doctrines are inapposite by returning to their pro-democratic roots and introduces a pro-democratic
limiting principle on First Amendment claims. The theoretical contours
of this principle and some anticipated responses are then mapped out.
Part V concludes.
II. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND MICHIGAN’S “PROP 2”
A. The Problem of Partisan Gerrymandering
Every ten years, states must redraw their state legislative and congressional district maps to account for population changes.18 Partisan
14

John Wildermuth, Redistricting Battle in Michigan Could Threaten California Citizens’
Commission, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Redistrictin
g-battle-in-Michigan-could-threaten-14284757.php [https://perma.cc/GXM2-RLB3]; see also David
Gartner, Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 590–91 (2019).
15
Ally Mutnick, Epic Redistricting Battles Loom in States Poised to Gain, Lose House Seats,
POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/30/redistricting-house-2020-091
451 [https://perma.cc/XN8P-DNTK].
16
Vann R. Newkirk II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arms Race, ATLANTIC (Oct.
28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/gerrymandering-technology-redmap-2020/543888/ [https://perma.cc/L8CB-U49T].
17
Cf. Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 123 (2009) (“[W]hen a
statute is not clear, the law should favor the voters and their enfranchisement. . . .This is a venerable principle, and one that all courts should embrace as a legitimate canon of construction in
election law cases.”).
18
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).
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gerrymandering is the process of manipulating district lines for political
gain, typically to advantage one political party over another.19 Partisan
gerrymandering has always been a part of American politics,20 but the
practice has become much more relevant in recent years.21 Gerrymanders have also become much more efficient. “[T]he scale and skew of
today’s gerrymandering are unprecedented in modern history.”22
In Rucho v. Common Cause,23 the Supreme Court held that challenges to partisan gerrymanders present political questions “beyond the
reach of federal courts.”24 The majority determined that, despite the undemocratic nature of partisan gerrymandering,25 courts have “no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to
limit and direct their decisions” when remedying gerrymandering
harms.26 The Court did recognize, however, that some states are addressing partisan gerrymandering by taking away the legislature’s
power to draw districts, and cited Michigan’s 2018 constitutional
amendment doing just that.27
B. Michigan’s Maps
Before 2018, the state legislature drew Michigan’s congressional
district map.28 Republicans controlled both legislative houses and the
governorship during the 2010 redistricting cycle and produced one of
the most gerrymandered congressional maps in the country.29 Emails
uncovered during litigation revealed partisan motivations and selfdealing underlying the redistricting process: accommodating incumbents, cramming “ALL of the Dem garbage” into four districts, and

19

RUTH GREENWOOD ET AL., DESIGNING INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS 4–5
(2018), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/Designing_IRC_Report2-071018_0.pd
f [https://perma.cc/V4VM-V28H].
20
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494–95 (2019).
21
N.Y. Times Editorial Board, Do-It-Yourself Legislative Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/opinion/redistricting-gerrymandering-citizens-michig
an.html [https://perma.cc/6ZZT-7Q9R].
22
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 876 (2015).
23
139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
24
Id. at 2506–07.
25
Id. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S.
787, 824 (2015)).
26
Id. at 2507.
27
Id.
28
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 3.61–64, repealed by MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
29
Ted Roelofs, Gerrymandering in Michigan is Among the Nation’s Worst, New Test Claims,
BRIDGE (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/gerrymandering-michig
an-among-nations-worst-new-test-claims [https://perma.cc/BE4U-ESGR].
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spending “a lot of time providing options to ensure [that Republicans]
have a solid 9-5 delegation in 2012 and beyond.”30
Opponents of Michigan’s gerrymander turned to the ballot box and
the federal courts. In November 2018, a non-profit organization called
Voters Not Politicians spearheaded a successful effort to amend Michigan’s constitution, instituting an independent redistricting commission.31 Concurrently, the League of Women Voters challenged the district maps on First Amendment grounds. In League of Women Voters of
Michigan v. Benson,32 a three-judge district court panel concluded that
“the predominant purpose of the Enacted Plan was to subordinate the
interests of Democratic voters and entrench Republicans in power,” in
violation of the First Amendment.33 The court held that legislators discriminated against citizens based on their partisan views and burdened
citizens’ associational rights by making it more difficult to organize as
a party.34 That court enjoined the use of those maps for future elections
and required Michigan to draw a remedial map,35 but the Supreme
Court vacated this order in light of Rucho.36
C. Redistricting Commissions and Michigan’s Step Forward
Although states have relied on redistricting commissions since the
1950s, most states reserve a large role for the state legislature.37 In Hawaii and New Jersey, for example, legislative leaders of each major
party choose an equal number of commissioners, who then select a
chairperson.38 Newer commissions, such as California’s, have limited
the role of legislative actors.39 In 2018, Michigan amended its constitution through ballot initiative to create an independent citizens

30

Beth LeBlanc & Jonathan Oosting, GOP Emails: Let’s ‘Cram Dem Garbage’ Into Southeast
Michigan Districts, DETROIT NEWS (July 26, 2018), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/polit
ics/2018/07/26/gop-emails-dem-garbage-gerrymander-lawsuit/838694002/ [https://perma.cc/GU5H
-CU2J].
31
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6. See infra Part II.0.
32
373 F. Supp. 3d. 867 (E.D. Mich. 2019), vacated by Chatfield v. League of Women Voters,
140 S. Ct. 429 (2019).
33
Id. at 953–54.
34
Id. at 938, 954–55. But see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2504 (2019) (holding
that partisan gerrymanders do not violate the First Amendment).
35
League of Women Voters of Mich., 373 F. Supp. 3d. at 960.
36
Chatfield, 140 S. Ct. at 429–30.
37
Creation of Redistricting Commissions, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, (Aug. 1, 2020),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/creation-of-redistricting-commissions.aspx [https://permacc/8fpv-KL5y].
38
HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2.
39
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(2)(B)(e) (limiting legislative leaders to only striking randomly selected applicants).
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redistricting commission similar to California’s for state legislative and
congressional races.40
By codifying expert guidance on how best to prevent gerrymandering and preserve independence, Michigan’s IRC marks a step forward
in IRC design.41 The amendment requires that the commission consist
of thirteen randomly selected members: two sets of four commissioners
for affiliates of each major party, and five commissioners that do not
affiliate with either major party.42 This distinguishes Michigan’s IRC
even from California’s, which grants each party five seats with four for
independents, creating an even-numbered commission that could deadlock.43 Decisions adopting district maps require a majority vote that
must include at least two commissioners from each major political party
and two unaffiliated commissioners.44
Michigan’s IRC bans political actors and their immediate families
from serving on the commission. The constitutional amendment prevents anyone from applying for the commission who currently is or in
the past six years has been: a candidate or elected official to a partisan
office; a member of a political party’s leadership; an employee of the
legislature, partisan officials, candidates, or political action committees; a registered state lobbyist; or an immediate family member of individuals otherwise barred.45 The IRC’s proponents defend these restrictions as necessary to create “a fair, impartial, and transparent
process where voters––not politicians––will draw Michigan’s . . . district maps.”46
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO MICHIGAN’S IRC
In August 2019, Republicans challenged the amendment establishing Michigan’s IRC, wielding novel expansions of First Amendment doctrine in an attempt to invalidate the commission. Two groups of plaintiffs filed now-consolidated complaints. As of this writing, the case is
pending before the Sixth Circuit47 after the Western District of Michigan granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.48
40

Compare MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6, with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252.
See generally GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 19; Redistricting Commissions: What Works,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., (July 24, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/redistricting-commissions-what-works [https://perma.cc/8RJC-PLJ2].
42
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2)(a)(iii), (f).
43
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(2).
44
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(14)(c).
45
Id. § 6(1)(b)(i–vi), (c).
46
We Ended Gerrymandering in Michigan, VOTERS NOT POLITICIANS, https://votersnotpolitic
ians.com/redistricting/ [https://perma.cc/XGY7-CPFX].
47
Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal at 1, Daunt v. Benson, No. 1:19-cv-614 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 2020).
48
Opinion and Order at 34, Daunt v. Benson, No. 1:19-cv-614 (W.D. Mich. July 6, 2020).
41
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The first group of plaintiffs, backed by an affiliate of the National
Republican Redistricting Trust,49 consists of political actors banned
from serving on the commission. They argue that the amendment places
an unconstitutional condition on a government benefit: commission
membership is available only to those who do not exercise their First
Amendment rights.50 Relying on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
banning political patronage, the group challenges what they perceive to
be an underlying assumption of the IRC: that “it is only elected officials
and candidates, and those somehow tied to them, [that] have a personal
and passionate interest in the outcome of redistricting.”51
The Michigan Republican Party (“MRP”) spearheads the second
complaint, which relies on the First Amendment’s protections of associational rights for three constitutional attacks.52 First, the MRP argues
that individuals express their party affiliation in part by running for
office, working on campaigns, and serving in party leadership; by restricting who may serve on the commission, Michigan forces individuals
to choose between associating with the MRP and serving on the commission.53 Second, the MRP alleges injuries to its own associational interests, including not being involved in the seating of Republican commissioners and the lack of assurance that self-designated Republicans
are “bona-fide affiliates.”54 Third, the MRP claims that the allocation of
five commissioner positions to non-affiliated candidates amounts to
viewpoint discrimination: each major party is disfavored with only four
seats apiece. The MRP seeks to show that the challenged provisions fail
to satisfy strict scrutiny: that no compelling government interest justifies the provisions and that there are less restrictive alternatives.55
It is difficult to imagine how the redistricting commission could remain independent if a court accepts the Michigan plaintiffs’ claims.
Their viewpoint discrimination theory would likely bar any seat allocation that did not afford equal space to party-affiliated and non-affiliated
members. Expanded associational rights would then lead to party leaders vetting would-be commissioners. And should the patronage claims
succeed, Michigan would be unable to prevent political parties from
choosing those with financial and professional incentives to particular
redistricting outcomes from serving on the commission. Fortunately,

49

S.M, supra note 4.
Political Actors Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 6, 38–47.
51
Id. ¶ 61.
52
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2 [hereinafter MRP Complaint],
Mich. Republican Party v. Benson, No. 1:19-cv-00669 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2019).
53
Id. ¶¶ 78–82.
54
Id. ¶¶ 66–73.
55
Id. ¶¶ 74–75, 85–86, 98–99.
50
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none of these doctrines support the Michigan plaintiffs’ claims. This
Section addresses these doctrines—political patronage, associational
rights, and viewpoint discrimination—in turn, showing that the Michigan plaintiffs are attempting to shoehorn their grievances into inapposite jurisprudence.
A. Political Patronage: Turning Elrod On Its Head
The banned political actors root their claim in a series of cases
striking down political patronage systems. This line begins with Elrod
v. Burns,56 when the Supreme Court held that a sheriff violated the
First Amendment rights of Republican subordinates when he required
them to support the Democratic Party or risk termination.57 The plurality held that “[t]he denial of a public benefit may not be used by the
government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to
achieve what it may not command directly,”58 and that
[I]f conditioning the retention of public employment on the employee’s support of the in-party is to survive constitutional challenge, it must further some vital government end by a means
that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in
achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the
loss of constitutionally protected rights.59
The Supreme Court later refined and expanded the Elrod plurality’s
holding in Branti v. Finkel,60 when it heard a challenge to an alleged
partisan-motivated termination of public defenders.61 Branti refined an
exception the Court made in Elrod for policymakers: elected officials
may discriminate on partisan grounds for high-level employees to ensure the proper functioning of representative government.62 The Court
held that some positions can be exempt from Elrod if “the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”63 In
1990, the Court in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois64 expanded its

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350–51, 357 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 361.
Id. at 363.
445 U.S. 507 (1980).
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980).
Id. at 518 (citing Elrod, 427 U.S. at 366–67).
Id.
497 U.S. 62 (1990).
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patronage ban beyond firing to include other employment decisions, including hiring.65
The Michigan plaintiffs claim that the IRC amendment’s exclusionary provisions force them to choose between the exercise of their First
Amendment rights and a government benefit: between political activity
and eligibility to serve on the commission.66 But the cases on which the
plaintiffs rely ban employment discrimination solely on the basis of
party affiliation, not engaging in professional politics.67 Party affiliation
is not grounds for exclusion from Michigan’s IRC,68 and to claim the
contrary is to misunderstand the ban. The amendment bans individuals
because of their professional conflicts of interest, not their political beliefs.69 Moreover, even if a court were to grant that party affiliation was
a criterion for serving on the commission, the commissioners of the IRC
easily fall within the policymaker expression. Granting the Michigan
plaintiffs’ claims subverts the rationales behind banning patronage in
the first place: to ensure an effective governance system and preserve
the democratic process.
The Michigan plaintiffs misunderstand the patronage ban. Rutan
articulates the Supreme Court’s rule regarding political patronage: “the
First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge[, hire,
transfer, or recall] . . . public employees solely for not being supporters
of the political party in power, unless party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the position involved.”70 No part of Michigan’s IRC does
this. Party affiliation plays no role in the Michigan plaintiffs being
banned from the commission, which excludes their Democratic counterparts as well.71
Michigan’s IRC also differs from patronage systems because government officials are barely involved in the selection process. Being selected is akin to winning two lotteries; the Secretary of State has no
discretion whatsoever in choosing commissioners.72 Legislative leaders
from both major parties are able to strike some applicants, but such
strikes do not affect the partisan composition. That is, attempting to
strike candidates of rival parties would not result in fewer rival party

65

Id. at 79.
Political Actors Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 6, 38–47.
67
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64 (summarizing Elrod and Branti).
68
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(1)(b).
69
VOTERS NOT POLITICIANS, supra note 46 (“The amendment disqualifies these individuals
from servicing on the Commission because they are most likely to have a conflict of interest when
it comes to drawing Michigan’s election district maps.”).
70
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64.
71
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(1).
72
Id. § 6(2).
66
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members from sitting on the commission.73 Patronage systems worked,
in part, to alter the partisan makeup of government employees, and the
IRC’s partisan makeup can only change if a third party wins more representatives in the state legislature than either the Democratic or Republican Parties.74
If courts find that the patronage cases control this dispute, they
should also recognize that the commissioners are high-level policymakers exempt from the patronage ban.75 The Sixth Circuit has extended
the policymaking exception articulated in Branti to positions on partisan-balanced commissions.76 When such a commission is tasked with
drawing political boundaries, partisan considerations are much more
important. Through commissioner selection, consensus-driven voting
rules, and explicit criteria, the IRC’s design prevents any political faction from unilaterally controlling the redistricting process.77 Neutralizing partisanship—ensuring that “representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of [new] policies”—
requires knowing candidates’ party affiliations and seating them accordingly.78 Without question, party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for an IRC commissioner. Moreover, the commission has sole
power to draft its procedural rules and hire staff and consultants to aid
its deliberations,79 it has legal standing to defend actions regarding
adopted plans,80 and its commissioners are subject to strict limitations
on receiving gifts.81 Government officials with such broad discretion and
authority typically fall within Branti’s policymaking exception.82
Using political patronage jurisprudence to enjoin an independent
redistricting commission subverts the rationale of the patronage ban.
In striking down patronage systems, the Court chided the government
for claiming that such partisan systems were required for effective governance;83 in this case, banning the Michigan plaintiffs and others like

73

Id. § 6(2)(e).
Id. § 6(2)(a)(iii), (f).
75
See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
76
McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557 (6th Cir. 1996).
77
See Statewide Ballot Proposal 2018-2—Redistricting, CITIZENS RES. COUNCIL OF MICH.
(Aug. 30, 2018), https://crcmich.org/wp-content/uploads/Official_Ballot_Wording_Prop_18-2_6320
52_7-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV6D-FWUP]; see also VOTERS NOT POLITICIANS, supra note 46.
78
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
79
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(4).
80
Id. § 6(6).
81
Id. § 6(11).
82
Cf. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (comparing the irrelevance of party affiliation
for a football coach with its relevance to assistants to the Governor).
83
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 75, 75 (1990).
74
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them, irrespective of party affiliation, is necessary to effectively govern.84
The Supreme Court has recognized the preservation of the democratic process as a compelling government interest.85 In the context of
patronage bans, this means that individuals cannot be discouraged
from expressing themselves politically at work.86 But an IRC is different. Commissioners are encouraged to express themselves politically;
the diversity of political opinion allows partisan commissioners to produce non-partisan outcomes.
Allowing the banned Michigan plaintiffs to serve on the commission would undermine the democratic process in at least two ways. The
allowing court would not only overrule the will of a supermajority of
Michiganders, but also grant immense power to those with the most to
gain professionally from redistricting. Banning individuals directly involved in the political process, or those with close family members so
involved, is a narrowly tailored regulation that serves multiple compelling state interests, if it raises constitutional problems at all.87
B. Associational Rights: Who Speaks for “The Party”?
The Michigan plaintiffs rely in part on the First Amendment protections afforded to political parties.88 Political parties are quite complex,89 and for decades, defining their scope has tied academics and
judges in knots.90 Political scientist V. O. Key defined parties as having
three basic components: first, the “party-in-government,” elected officials who affiliate with a party; second, the “party leadership,” individuals who work for the party organization itself; and finally, the “partyin-the-electorate,” individuals whose affiliation with the party is limited

84

Intervenor-Defendant Voters Not Politicians’ Answer in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction [hereinafter Voters Not Politicians’ Answer] at 30–31, Daunt v. Benson, No. 1:19cv-00614 (W.D. Mich. Sep. 19, 2019) <<The exclusion of applicants who are officeholders, candidates, or those financially tied to officeholders and candidates is necessary to maintain the integrity of the electoral system, to ensure district lines that will foster competition, reduce incumbency
protection in line-drawing, and encourage new candidates. . . . All of these compelling interests
can only be advanced by excluding from the Commission those whose interests are advanced by
drawing districts that benefit their own political and financial interests, rather than drawing districts that foster a functioning representative democracy.>>
85
See infra notes 135–145 and the accompanying text.
86
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 69–71.
87
See Voters Not Politicians’ Answer, supra note 84, at 30–31.
88
See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
89
Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.
95, 95–115 (2002).
90
Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of
Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 775–79 (2000).
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to self-identifying, voting in party primaries, and the like.91 Although
the Supreme Court generally focuses on party leadership when discussing parties, the Court has made clear that political parties are more
than their state and national committees.
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut92 marked the first time
the Supreme Court struck down a state election regulation on the
grounds that it violated a political party’s First Amendment associational rights.93 The Connecticut GOP opened its primary elections to
unaffiliated voters, in violation of a state statute requiring party primaries be open only to voters registered with the party.94 Citing Elrod, the
Court held that “[t]he freedom of association protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments includes partisan political organization.”95
The Court articulated two distinct associational rights that are in tension in the IRC litigation: an individual’s “right to associate with the
political party of one’s choice” and a party’s “freedom to identify the people who constitute the association.”96
The Court may have implicitly resolved this tension by limiting a
party’s associational freedom to the selection of nominees for elected
office. In California Democratic Party v. Jones,97 the Court struck down
California’s blanket primary, which allowed individuals to vote for any
party’s candidate in any race, with the highest vote-getter of that
party’s candidates being considered that party’s nominee.98 In doing so,
the Court highlighted the importance of a party’s “right to exclude,”
holding that the blanket primary forced parties “to adulterate their candidate-selection process—the basic function of a political party—by
opening it up to persons wholly unaffiliated with the party.”99
The Supreme Court’s most recent case in the Tashjian line
squarely presented this tension. In Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,100 party leaders challenged Washington’s primary system, in which the top two vote-getters, regardless of
party affiliation, would advance to the general election, but candidates
91

V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES & PRESSURE GROUPS 163–65 (5th ed. 1964) (Key uses
slightly different terms: “party-in-the-legislature” when discussing the “party-in-government” and
“professional political workers” when discussing the “party leadership”).
92
479 U.S. 208 (1986).
93
Id. at 211.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 214.
96
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 215 (“Some of the Party’s members devote
substantial portions of their lives to furthering its political and organizational goals . . . while still
others limit their participation to casting their votes for some or all of the Party’s candidates.”).
97
530 U.S. 567 (2000).
98
Id. at 586.
99
Id. at 575, 581 (internal citations omitted).
100
552 U.S. 442 (2008).
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could self-designate their party preferences.101 The Court held that
Washington’s primary system did not infringe on the associational
rights affirmed in Jones because it did not choose nominees: “the law
never refers to candidates as nominees of any party, nor does it treat
them as such.”102
The Michigan plaintiffs seek an unprecedented expansion of a political party’s right to exclude. Parties have never been understood to
have First Amendment claims to non-elected partisan offices: the line
of cases demarcating associational rights has been limited to internal
party affairs and primary elections. Additionally, such an expansion of
associational rights would empower party leadership to exclude self-affiliated members, putting the rights of the party and the individual in
tension.
Political parties do not have an associational right to vet appointments to partisan offices. Many federal agencies have partisan balance
requirements in which neither major party chooses its standard-bearers.103 Moreover, presidents must often appoint cross-partisans.104
Given the MRP’s worry of Democratic leaders striking applicants from
the Republican pool, such requirements would seem to inflict a greater
associational harm. Yet no court has held these requirements unconstitutional, and it is difficult to see how they could be on associational
grounds.105
The MRP seeks a role in the commissioner selection process because it does not trust that those who self-identify as Republicans are
“bona-fide affiliates.”106 The Michigan plaintiffs’ challenge, therefore,
can be cast as a battle between the party leadership and the party-inthe-electorate—the average Republican voter.107 Viewed in this light,
the MRP’s claim seems much more sinister: individuals not known by
party officials to promote the tenets of “the party” have no right to call
themselves members. In Washington State Grange, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito expressly rejected the view that self-designated
political affiliation outside of party nominations raises such forced association concern: “[T]here is no general right to stop an individual from
101

Id. at 444.
Id. at 453.
103
See infra notes 114–121 and accompanying text.
104
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Johnjerica Hodge, & Wesley W. Wintermyer, Partisan Balance
Requirements in the Age of New Formalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941, 969 (2015).
105
But cf. id. at 983–84 (arguing that increased restriction on presidential appointments could
invalidate federal partisan balance requirements on separation of powers grounds). Even if parties
could show an associational harm, scholars have been skeptical of universally applying strict scrutiny to such cases. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Networking the Party: First Amendment Rights and
the Pursuit of Responsive Party Government, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1225, 1287–88 (2018).
106
MRP Complaint, supra note 52, at ¶¶ 66–73.
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See KEY, supra note 91, at 164.
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saying, ‘I prefer this party,’ even if the party would rather he not.”108
The MRP has a right to protect its brand and make its positions known,
but that right does not extend to preventing others from affiliating with
the party or requiring a purity test for self-designated affiliates.
C. Viewpoint Discrimination or Viewpoint Channeling?
Michigan’s IRC allocates five seats to commissioners unaffiliated
with either major political party and four seats to each party’s affiliates.109 The Michigan plaintiffs claim this disparity amounts to viewpoint discrimination because, by allocating a minority of seats to each
major party, the IRC “seeks to suppress speech and expression motivated by Republican ideologies and perspectives, while enhancing the
perspectives of commissioners who are unaffiliated.”110
A government engages in content-based discrimination when its
regulation targets particular speech, can only be justified by referencing
its content, or is adopted because of government disapproval of the proscribed message.111 Viewpoint discrimination, a more pernicious form
of content-based discrimination, occurs when the government “targets
not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers[:] . . . when
the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”112 In order to survive a viewpoint discrimination challenge, the government must show its regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.113
Michigan’s 4-5-4 seat allotment is a kind of partisan balance requirement. These requirements, common at the federal level, are typically reserved for independent governmental bodies; they not only temper partisan considerations, but also “foster a sense of legitimacy in the
agency’s actions in the public’s eye.”114 Michigan’s partisan balancing is
unique even among other redistricting commissions. Only two other
states include a contingent of non-affiliated commissioners: Colorado’s
commission requires a 4-4-4 split among the two major parties and nonaffiliated members,115 and California’s requires a 5-4-5 split, ensuring
108

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 460–61 (2008) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring). Cf. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005) (distinguishing between an
individual right to affiliate with a party and a “less important burden” on a party’s right to attract
new voters).
109
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2)(f).
110
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 23, Mich. Republican
Party et al. v. Benson, No. 1:19-cv-00669 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2019).
111
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015).
112
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
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Krotoszynski, Jr. et al., supra note 104, at 983, 1009–17.
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COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44.1(10).
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that party-affiliated members have greater seats than non-affiliated
members.116 Both come with the cost of an even-numbered commission,
risking deadlock and various contingency mechanisms to approve district maps.
The Michigan plaintiffs’ viewpoint discrimination claim should fail.
First, no court has held partisan balance requirements to discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint, even though the majority of them allow for an
imbalance between the major political parties. Second, the selection
process and composition of the commission make it nearly impossible to
intentionally suppress any ideology. Third, the fact that the people
barred from serving as commissioners are not excluded from any other
part of the redistricting process—and that any barred individual can
serve on the commission after six years—undercuts the notion that the
government seeks to suppress a particular viewpoint.
Partisan balance requirements are something of a misnomer; rather than requiring equal party representation, nearly all of them
simply limit partisan imbalance to no more than a bare majority.117 If
successful, however, the Michigan plaintiffs’ viewpoint discrimination
challenge could apply with equal force to institutions such as the
FTC,118 the SEC,119 the EEOC,120 and dozens more, despite having been
perceived as constitutional for decades.121 Therefore, courts should be
wary of extending viewpoint discrimination jurisprudence to reach this
commission.
It is difficult to see how Michigan’s IRC discriminates on the basis
of viewpoint. No part of the commission discriminates on the basis of a
particularized message or seeks to suppress particular ideologies.122 On
the contrary, the IRC’s design channels partisan interests in such a way
that no one ideology dominates any other.123 The complaint also assumes that non-affiliates of either party constitute a unified viewpoint
that disfavors the Michigan plaintiffs.124 This assumption is misguided.
116
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Given the multiple layers of random selection, neither affiliated nor
non-affiliated commissioners are likely to have monolithic viewpoints.
It is highly unlikely that the four Democratic, four Republican, and five
non-affiliated commissioners will represent three distinct positions on
redistricting that correspond with their respective labels. Attempts by
partisans from either major party to game the non-affiliated group will
simply make a diversity of views more likely. This makes a claim that
the government is seeking to repress any particular ideology suspect.125
Moreover, if the alleged discrimination is rooted in affiliation with a
major party, then such discrimination would favor the Michigan plaintiffs: commissioners affiliating with major political parties enjoy an 8-5
seat advantage.
Echoing the responses to the political patronage claims, the IRC
amendment bars the Michigan plaintiffs not because of their viewpoints
but because of their professional conflicts of interest.126 This undermines the notion that the government is targeting their ideology. Furthermore, the Michigan plaintiffs can still participate in the redistricting process. The commission is required to be incredibly transparent by
holding public meetings, facilitating public participation, and publishing the materials used to create the maps.127 Political actors can still
participate in public hearings as can any other citizen. They are only
restricted from casting votes for particular maps, something the First
Amendment should not guarantee.
IV. PROTECTING THE DEMOCRATIC FIRST AMENDMENT
Democracy thrives when citizens exercise their First Amendment
rights. The Founders valued freedom of speech because they believed
“that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.”128 The First Amendment traditionally accomplishes this by shielding individuals from governmental regulation of speech; it protects the autonomy of citizens to
choose how to express themselves on matters of public concern,129 free
from government censorship130 or command.131
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What happens, then, when private actors attempt to weaponize the
First Amendment and undermine democratic governance?132 The remainder of this Comment will address this dangerous strand of “First
Amendment opportunism”: one in which private, partisan actors wield
the First Amendment against public, democratic reforms.133 The following Section grounds the doctrinal distortion the Michigan plaintiffs seek
in the doctrines’ pro-democratic origins: the Supreme Court fashioned
these doctrines to preserve democratic governance or its pre-requisites.134 It addresses each of those doctrines in turn before introducing
a theoretical limiting principle on First Amendment jurisprudence and
addressing some potential responses.
A. Forging Anti-Democratic Swords from First Amendment Shields
The Supreme Court consistently justified its holdings banning patronage schemes with appeals to democratic values. The Elrod plurality
cited “the free functioning of the electoral process” as a distinct First
Amendment harm.135 With regard to belief and association, the plurality held patronage to be “inimical to the process which undergirds our
system of government and is at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.”136 Branti contemplated an
electoral regulation in which party affiliation would be essential to a
government employee’s work.137 When reaffirming these decisions in
Rutan, the Court once again referred to “the preservation of the democratic process” as a compelling state interest.138
The Court uses the phrases “democratic process” and “electoral process” to refer to processes of political competition.139 The Elrod plurality
held that preserving that competition “is certainly an interest protection of which may in some instances justify limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”140 It then reasoned that patronage schemes ran counter to this compelling interest because they could result in the
entrenchment of the party in power.141 This is precisely the problem
Michigan’s IRC solves. By removing any party’s monopoly over the
132

See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501–02
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redistricting process, it prevents the majority party from entrenching
itself, thereby protecting the free functioning of the electoral process.
The Supreme Court also grounds its unconstitutional conditions
analysis in concerns about political competition. Rutan makes clear
that the government may not condition the receipt of a benefit on the
waiving of a constitutional right.142 The conditions in patronage systems are unconstitutional “because of the coercion of belief that necessarily flows from the knowledge that one must have a sponsor in the
dominant party in order to retain one’s job.”143 The Michigan plaintiffs
argue that the IRC’s conditions bring their claim within the Court’s patronage jurisprudence.144 Again, the Michigan plaintiffs are not banned
from the IRC because of their political beliefs.145 And because they are
not being coerced into supporting a particular ideology,146 the plaintiffs’
unconstitutional conditions claim is meritless.
Turning to the associational rights claims, these arguments suffer
from a major anti-democratic flaw. The arguments elevate the associational rights of a party above those of individuals and ignore the associational harms the IRC seeks to prevent. Once properly taken into account, the associational harms of partisan gerrymandering should
dissuade courts from ruling for the Michigan plaintiffs.
The First Amendment rights of political organizations, though distinct, are rooted in the rights of individuals to associate towards common ends.147 In California Democratic Party v. Jones, the Supreme
Court held that “[r]epresentative democracy in any populous unit of
governance is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their
political views.”148 This reliance on political parties should not blind
courts to their unique dangers. Political parties “seek to gain and keep
control of the machinery of government and thus to direct the great involuntary association, the state. This makes it especially critical that
courts guard against the dominant political party attempting to entrench itself in power by squeezing out its rivals.”149
The Michigan plaintiffs, currently members of the majority party
in the Michigan state legislature,150 seek to use the right of association
142
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to run roughshod over the associational rights of individuals. Several
members of the Supreme Court, though never a majority, have attributed associational harms to partisan gerrymandering. In his concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer,151 Justice Kennedy argued that partisan
gerrymanders burden individual associational rights because they have
“the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to
disfavored treatment by reason of their views.”152 Most recently, Justice
Kagan led three other justices in dissent, arguing that partisan gerrymandering dilutes the votes of disfavored party members, “frustrat[ing]
their efforts to translate those affiliations into political effectiveness.”153
The majority in Rucho, however, did not find that partisan gerrymandering caused any First Amendment harms because the petitioners
failed to provide a manageable judicial standard.154
The Supreme Court has not considered another associational harm:
the manner in which legislatures draw partisan gerrymanders. The
First Amendment protects political parties because of their ability to
advance the beliefs of the individuals that constitute them.155 A partisan gerrymander’s true frustration of political success is not the lack of
enthusiasm the minority party may experience in its interactions with
voters and donors. It is the exclusion of that party’s elected officials from
meaningful participation in the redistricting process.
Michigan’s last redistricting cycle illustrates this well. Because Republicans held the governorship and majorities in both legislative
houses in 2011, they could exclude Democrats entirely from the process.
“[S]ecuring enough voters for passage did not necessarily require securing a single vote from a Democratic legislator in either chamber.”156
During the 2011 redistricting cycle, the line-drawers worked “in a secure location” to avoid Democrats.157 Republican leadership met weekly
away from the legislature to discuss redistricting, and “took several
steps to ensure that these . . . meetings remained secret,” including using personal rather than government email addresses and labeling
meeting agendas confidential.158 No Democrats were invited to attend
any of the meetings until after the maps were voted out of committee.159
151
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If the First Amendment purports to protect an “unfettered interchange
of ideas,”160 then the necessary exclusion of partisan opponents in designing partisan gerrymanders could constitute an associational harm
in its own right.
Finally, the Michigan plaintiffs argue that the commission’s unequal seat allocation constitutes viewpoint discrimination. The antidemocratic implications of this charge are less apparent because viewpoint discrimination claims are not inherently focused in the electoral
process. The First Amendment protects individuals from viewpoint discrimination because “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the
principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”161 Here
again, the doctrinal subversion the Michigan plaintiffs seek is clear: in
their attempt to preserve their ability to stifle speech of minority party
members, the Michigan plaintiffs would have courts dismantle an institution designed to stop them.
The crux of the Michigan plaintiffs’ viewpoint discrimination claim
is an unequal seat allocation.162 First Amendment doctrine seems to be
in tension on this point. On one hand, the Supreme Court has held that
“there is an equality of status in the field of ideas and government must
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.”163 On the
other hand, the Court maintains that “the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”164 This leaves the government in an untenable position. If both
are true, the government can neither allocate an equal nor unequal
number of seats. Some authors accept this tension as proof that the
Court must address structural questions of democracy with a different
paradigm than rights-interests balancing.165 The First Amendment is
flexible enough to engage in this kind of structural analysis.
B. A Pro-Democratic Limiting Principle on First Amendment Jurisprudence
If the doctrinal distortion is unconvincing, a review of the challenged governmental action should put this litigation’s anti-democratic
nature in stark relief. A supermajority of Michiganders passed a
160
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constitutional amendment via ballot initiative.166 That amendment
vests the power to draw district lines—to determine which votes will
count towards particular seats—away from the self-interested legislature and into the hands of citizens. It is this governmental action that
the Michigan plaintiffs seek to enjoin. The Michigan plaintiffs are attempting to use the First Amendment to overturn the results of a public
debate that will change how future debates will be had.
Success for the Michigan plaintiffs would repudiate the First
Amendment doctrines’ democratic origins. That fact sheds light on a
potential limiting principle: the First Amendment should not be construed to further anti-democratic efforts. There are many ways courts
could incorporate this principle: for instance, upholding the preservation of the democratic process as a compelling interest, as in Elrod;167
refusing judicial review to overturn the result of public debate,168 or presuming the constitutionality of facially pro-democratic actions. Courts
adopting this principle may simply leave doctrine as is but apply it with
a more pro-democratic mood.169 The remainder of this Comment will
provide a theoretical framework for this limiting principle regardless of
the doctrinal form it takes.
1.

Protecting democracy with a republican First Amendment

At its root, a pro-democratic limiting principle flips the First
Amendment’s “premised . . . mistrust of governmental power.”170 In the
early twentieth century, the Supreme Court used this mistrust to fashion a shield for the soapbox dissenter.171 Although this shield is necessary for democratic self-governance, this model of the First Amendment
assumes a world in which the state only works to restrict speech, and
the individual only seeks to express himself. The Michigan plaintiffs
flip the script: it is private individuals, rather than the state, who seek
to restrict speech. To adapt to circumstances like these, a different
model might prove useful:
We should learn to recognize the state not only as an enemy, but
also as a friend of speech; like any social actor, it has the potential to act in both capacities, and, using the enrichment of public
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debate as the touchstone, we must begin to discriminate between
them. When the state acts to enhance the quality of public debate, we should recognize its actions as consistent with the
[F]irst [A]mendment. What is more, when on occasions it fails
to, we can with confidence demand that the state so act. The duty
of the state is to preserve the integrity of public debate[,] . . . to
safeguard the conditions for true and free collective self-determination. It should constantly act to correct the skew of social
structure, if only to make certain that the status quo is embraced
because we believe it the best, not because it is the only thing we
know or are allowed to know.172
The idea that the state is able—and sometimes required—to enhance
speech is not new. Courts have understood the First Amendment not
only as protecting a means of self-fulfillment, but also as a collective
tool used to define the social good, what Morgan Weiland refers to as
the “republican tradition,” in the classical sense of the term.173 Proponents of the republican tradition argue that “[w]hat the phrase ‘the freedom of speech’ in the First Amendment refers to is a social state of affairs, not the action of an individual or institution.”174
Government action is valid, so held the Supreme Court, as long as
it furthers “the First Amendment goal of producing an informed public
capable of conducting its own affairs.”175 Thus, governments can be
made to protect speakers from hecklers’ vetoes, not only to respect the
speaker’s rights, but also to ensure that the audience can listen.176 This
understanding presumes the existence of mechanisms that allow an informed public to conduct its affairs according to its own will.177 A prodemocratic limiting principle would fit neatly within this tradition, and
the litigation challenging Michigan’s IRC—a representational reform
enacted via ballot initiative—tees up this principle quite well.
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Representational reforms via ballot initiative

Michigan passed the IRC via ballot initiative. The popular initiative has been part of American democracy since the dawn of the twentieth century.178 Although government action should not escape liability
simply because a majority of voters approve,179 initiatives are far from
the legislative180 or executive181 actions that typically give rise to First
Amendment challenges. Whereas traditional government action constrains public debate, popular initiatives take effect as the result of one.
Furthermore, the IRC initiative survived attempts by several of the
Michigan plaintiffs to remove it from the ballot in the first place.182 Rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims then, the Michigan Supreme Court explained “that the adoption of the initiative power, along with other tools
of direct democracy, reflected the popular distrust of the Legislative
branch of our state government.”183 It is telling that legislators and
party leaders, having failed to block the measure and having lost at the
polls, now seek to use the courts to overturn popular will.184 The First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to participate in public debate; it does not guarantee that they win.
Michigan’s IRC is also a particular kind of government action: a
representational reform. Questions regarding how votes are cast and
aggregated, as well as how winners are declared, form the core of the
electoral process. When governments act to open these decisions to public discussion, they further First Amendment principles. Since Stromberg v. California,185 the Court has held that “[t]he maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may
be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained
by lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system.”186 Pro-democratic representational reforms generally, and
178

For a brief history, see Robert S. Sandoval, Restricted Subject Matters: Misconceptions of
Speech and Ballot Initiatives, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 669, 671–76 (2015).
179
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
180
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–83 (1968) (reviewing a challenge to a
federal statute based in part on the alleged intent of Congress to stifle protests against the Vietnam War).
181
See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111–12 (1969) (reviewing a challenge to law
enforcement officers’ arrests of civil rights protesters).
182
Citizens Protecting Mich.’s Constitution v. Sec’y of State, 921 N.W.2d 247, 247 (Mich. 2018).
183
Id. at 254 (internal citations omitted).
184
See Wu, supra note 12 (proposing a specific variant of the democratic limit: an anti-circumvention principle); id. (“In cases where the underlying law does not censor political speech, nor
arise from majoritarian prejudice against a despised or unpopular speaker, and particularly where
the political debate is in progress, the judiciary should avoid using the First Amendment to give
one side of the debate a judicially granted circumvention of democratic politics.”).
185
283 U.S. 359 (1931).
186
Id. at 369.

418

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

Michigan’s IRC in particular, create space for public debate by supplanting a traditionally opaque and one-sided process.187
Representational reforms are especially powerful when passed via
ballot initiative. As was the case in Michigan, heavily gerrymandered
district maps render the legislature unresponsive to citizens’ concerns.
As Justice Ginsberg noted, direct democracy is fully consistent with the
notion of the people as sovereign.188 Courts can and should give ballot
initiatives a “hard[ ] look” if they appear to endanger the rights of minorities.189 But this strict review is misplaced when voters themselves
act to improve the mechanisms by which their voices are heard.190
C. Anticipated Responses
A pro-democratic limiting principle on First Amendment jurisprudence could face several challenges. Practically, whatever doctrinal
form this principle takes, courts will have to reckon with plaintiffs who
ground their claims, as the Michigan plaintiffs have, in pro-democratic
language. Theoretically, three larger issues loom. First, courts might
reject the premise altogether: the First Amendment protects individuals from government interference, not government from private challenges. Second, it is precisely when government claims to act pro-democratically that courts should apply more scrutiny, not less. Finally, and
perhaps most damning, such a principle may run afoul of Rucho: judgements about which side of a First Amendment dispute is “pro-democratic” are not legal, but political. The remainder of this Section addresses each of these in turn.
1.

Finding the wolf in sheep’s clothing

Plaintiffs are not likely to bring First Amendment challenges in
anti-democratic language, although post-Rucho this may change.191
One difficulty with a pro-democratic limiting principle arises not when
plaintiffs are brazenly anti-democratic, but when they couch their anti-
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democratic intentions in pro-democratic language. The Michigan plaintiffs do this in spades.192
Courts can overcome this hurdle in at least two ways. First, they
could refuse to apply the limiting principle if the government does not
address the democratic implications of the plaintiff’s challenge. Judges
would trust the adversarial process to illustrate what the plaintiff’s
rhetoric might hide. Second, they might only apply the limiting principle in extreme cases, which are easier to identify. If plaintiffs are seeking large doctrinal expansions, judges may feel more comfortable applying the limit. A strong version of this principle would have courts
sanction plaintiffs for making frivolous claims,193 but the intended result of the limiting principle can be achieved simply by raising the limit
sua sponte. This practical difficulty is no different than many circumstances in which courts skeptically examine the claims that come before
them, and so should not pose much of a problem for this limiting principle.
2.

A narrower First Amendment

In contrast to the small-“r” republican view articulated above, the
understanding of the First Amendment as primarily a shield for private
actors from government action dominates the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.194 This view focuses on the removal of governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,195 but is not incompatible
with a pro-democratic limiting principle.
The First Amendment shields private actors from government interference because autonomy of expression typically results in the
speech environment required for functioning democracies.196 The republican approach does not require abandoning individual expressive
rights; Zechariah Chafee described the First Amendment as balancing
individual interests with the societal needs of collective decision-making.197 A pro-democratic limiting principle could provide this balance by
stopping plaintiffs from commandeering First Amendment jurisprudence to exclude expression from political opponents.198
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Even granting that a pro-democratic First Amendment limit
should exist, how should it apply to anti-democratic actions not
grounded in speech? Gerrymandering’s democratic deficits differ from
typical First Amendment harms: fair district lines are not intrinsically
related to broadening public discourse. Chief Justice Roberts made this
point implicitly in Rucho: “there are no restrictions on speech, association, or any other First Amendment activities in the districting plans at
issue. The plaintiffs are free to engage in those activities no matter
what the effect of a plan may be on their district.”199
Courts should adopt a pro-democratic limit in rejecting IRC challenges, even if they adhere to a narrow view of the First Amendment.
Independent commissions are designed to address non-speech issues
like representative skews via the expansion of public debate. Michigan’s
IRC opens up a traditionally secretive redistricting process to the public.200 Eliminating that opportunity could prove a larger First Amendment harm than upholding it.
Moreover, non-speech mechanisms can create speech harms, which
weakens the case for not applying the First Amendment in defense of
independent commissions. The relationship between partisan gerrymandering and political competitions makes this clear. If the First
Amendment is to protect expression and association such that government is responsive to popular will,201 then uncompetitive elections produce serious First Amendment harms.202 District maps drawn by commissions are typically more competitive than those drawn by
legislatures,203 so interpreting the First Amendment to uphold IRCs is
fully consistent with its aims.
3.

More or less government skepticism

When should courts trust the government’s word? Dissenting from
the Court’s validation of a campaign finance ballot initiative, Justice
Scalia quipped, “The incumbent politician who says he welcomes full
and fair debate is no more to be believed than the entrenched
199
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Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 270–
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monopolist who says he welcomes full and fair competition.”204 First
Amendment jurisprudence can be seen as having “as its primary,
though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.”205 The motives underlying government action on representational issues are especially relevant because decisions on these matters
change the rules of political participation, affecting every other public
debate.206
In an article defining this motive-discovering approach to the First
Amendment, Justice Kagan, then a professor, outlined a typology of impermissible motives for speech restrictions: disapproving of particular
ideas, privileging favored speech, threatening officials’ self-interest.207
These motives are unlikely to drive reforms like Michigan’s IRC. Official self-interest and entrenchment are almost mutually exclusive with
the introduction of an independent redistricting commission.208 And although it is easy to imagine a commission designed to discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint—such as one that banned any affiliates from a
minority party from meaningful participation—it is precisely that First
Amendment harm that IRCs prevent.209
4.

Another political question?

A pro-democratic limiting principle could entangle courts in nonjusticiable political questions. The government must create elections
before citizens can become candidates, finance campaigns, organize political parties, and vote. Building electoral systems requires making decisions about what kind of politics is desirable.210 For courts to apply a
democratic limiting principle, they might have to make normative decisions about what kind of democratic system should be furthered or
whether a provision promotes democracy at all.211
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Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
205
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996).
206
Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“Especially since the right to exercise the
franchise . . . is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”).
207
Kagan, supra note 205, at 428–29.
208
Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808,
1824–27 (2012).
209
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(5); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(2); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV,
pt. 2, § 1(12).
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50–51 (2004).
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This kind of normative decision might run afoul of Rucho.212 The
Supreme Court has long held political questions beyond the reach of the
judiciary,213 and this proposed limiting principle invites them. The majority in Rucho understood the plaintiffs to have made a claim about a
particular democratic system—proportional representation—and chastised them for doing so.214 The Rucho Court was also clear that, unlike
in racial vote-dilution cases, political motives raise no constitutional
quandaries.215 This might signal an unwillingness to involve courts in
determining whether a reform is democracy-promoting and therefore
worth protecting. So, is a pro-democratic limiting principle on First
Amendment jurisprudence feasible in a post-Rucho world? Yes.
The foregoing critique assumes that courts do not and should not
engage in policymaking. This assumption is neither true nor tenable.
Justices consider policy outcomes as early as the certiorari process.216
And despite deriving much of its legitimacy from the fiction that it is a
legal institution, rather than a political one, the Supreme Court must
often “decide cases where legal criteria are not in any realistic sense
adequate to the task.”217 The question, then, is not whether courts
should refrain from making policy decisions, but—in Chief Justice Roberts’ words, whether the Court has the duty to say “this is not law.”218
The question, then, is how to understand the judiciary’s role as a policymaker not directly accountable to the people.219
Democracy requires a commitment to abide by collectively adopted
rules despite individual dissent, so long as the rulemaking process is
open and fair. Democratic malfunction, therefore, does not occur when
elected officials craft rules with which people disagree. “Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when . . . the ins are
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay
in and the outs will stay out.”220
212

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019).
See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 46 (1849).
214
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (“Unable to claim that the Constitution requires proportional
representation outright, plaintiffs inevitably ask the courts to make their own political judgment . . . and to rearrange the challenged districts to achieve that end.”).
215
Id. at 2497 (“The basic reason [partisan gerrymandering is difficult to adjudicate] is that,
while it is illegal for a jurisdiction . . . to engage in racial discrimination in districting, a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of
Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062, 1067 (2009) (“When they prefer the expected policy
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218
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
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The Rucho majority’s deference to the political branches on the solution to partisan gerrymandering is backwards. It is precisely because
judges are not elected—and therefore insulated from political pressures—that they must safeguard the process by which individuals
translate their preferences into government action.221 Justices need not
apply their own conceptions of democracy. They must simply clear the
path for the public to decide for themselves. The proposed limiting principle would fit this mold well: courts should uphold Michigan’s IRC
against First Amendment challenges not only because the commission
will result in a more inclusive political process, but also because it was
chosen directly by those with the right to decide.
The Supreme Court has intervened in the political process before,
most notably in striking down malapportioned districts. In Reynolds v.
Sims,222 the Court invalidated a state legislative map with wildly unequal district populations, beginning a massive wave of redistricting
across the country.223 With “no effective political remedy” available to
the plaintiffs,224 the Court exalted political participation such that it
asked whether any “constitutionally cognizable principles” justified judicial inaction, a far cry from the Rucho Court’s recalcitrance.225 Far
from reducing the Court’s legitimacy, its intervention in Reynolds
quickly removed a barrier to political participation in a manner most
came to respect.226 A democratic limiting principle on First Amendment
jurisprudence might do the same.
The Rucho court distinguished Reynolds—and might target a democratic First Amendment limit—on two grounds. First, although malapportionment is unconstitutional, partisan considerations in redistricting are not.227 Second, the one-person, one-vote standard is
“relatively easy to administer as a matter of math,” whereas partisan
gerrymandering claims lack an objective measure based in the Constitution.228 Both these distinctions fall short. The Supreme Court has
largely held government partisanship unconstitutional in other areas,
including the First Amendment via the patronage cases discussed
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2524–25 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
221
ELY, supra note 220, at 103; see also Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 53–54
(2000) (“What exactly is the Supreme Court good for if it refuses to examine a likely constitutional
error that if uncorrected will engender a national crisis? . . . Political considerations in a broad,
nonpartisan sense will sometimes counsel the Court to abstain, but sometimes to intervene.”).
222
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
223
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545–47 (1964).
224
Id. at 553.
225
Id. at 561.
226
See ELY, supra note 220, at 121.
227
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019).
228
Id. at 2501.

424

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

above.229 As to the second challenge, the one-person-one-vote standard
is not found in the Constitution either—indeed, the composition of the
Senate explicitly rejects such a conception of democracy.230 Administrability and objectivity depend largely on the form such a limiting principle would take. Some limits are easier to administer or more objective
than others: compare a refusal to entertain challenges at all with a presumption of constitutionality, for instance. Administrability and objectivity should inform how courts apply this limit, but these constraints
do not prevent courts from enforcing any limit whatsoever.
V.

CONCLUSION

Pro-democratic reformers are building independent redistricting
commissions on shaky grounds. The majority that held partisan gerrymanders nonjusticiable in Rucho may soon strike down independent
commissions across the country,231 perhaps using the Michigan plaintiffs’ claims to do so. But whereas that decision was based on the Elections Clause and governed only congressional redistricting, a First
Amendment challenge would reach even further. “[T]he First Amendment theory would [hold unconstitutional] all commissions, whether
created by voter initiative, state legislation, or Congress, and whether
responsible for congressional or state legislative redistricting . . . if they
excluded certain citizens from membership.”232 Regardless of the outcome of the pending litigation, the Michigan plaintiffs’ challenges provide a peek into Pandora’s box: a warning of the kinds of challenges
reformers can expect.
This Comment has labored to make two points. First, the First
Amendment doctrines on which the Michigan plaintiffs rely in challenging their state’s IRC fail to support their claims. They are either entirely
inapposite or would require such peripheral expansion as to threaten
the doctrines’ cores.233 Second, the Michigan Plaintiffs’ use of these doctrines fail because the doctrines are rooted in the preservation of prerequisites for a functioning democracy—government insulation from
party patronage, rights of political association, and protection from
viewpoint discrimination. This Comment then proposed a solution to
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Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 376–403 (2017); see also supra notes 135–143 and accompanying
text.
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similar challenges going forward: courts should refuse to bend First
Amendment doctrines in a way that furthers anti-democratic ends.
Proponents of reforms like Michigan’s IRC would do well to counter
anti-democratic challenges with a robust articulation of the First
Amendment, one that stands in full-throated defense of the ways it can
and should protect our democracy. Only by holding true to the core of
the First Amendment—by resisting the forging of anti-democratic
swords from democratic shields—can courts prevent the First Amendment from collapsing under the weight of its own distorted doctrine.

“Segs and the City” and Cutting-Edge Aesthetic
Experiences: Resolving the Circuit Split on Tour
Guides’ Licensing Requirements and the First
Amendment
Marie J. Plecha†

I.

INTRODUCTION

Tourism represents an important contributor to state and local
economies.1 The industry is growing within the United States, as domestic and international travel to and within states continues to increase and contribute to revenue.2 Accordingly, some U.S. cities have
sought to regulate operations of the industry, including the activities of
official tour guides.3 City tour guides can play an essential role in influencing visitors’ perceptions of a city’s history, cultural customs, and anthropological development. This is especially the case given the rapid
expansion of information technology, as tourists increasingly rely on
human guides only where they seek a customized interactive experience
on their visits to a particular locality.4
A circuit split currently exists between the Fifth Circuit and the
D.C. Circuit regarding whether cities may impose rigorous licensing requirements on potential tour guides, which can include written examinations, personal background checks, and even drug tests.5 The
†

B.A. Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate, The University of Chicago Law School.
See, e.g., Importance & Economic Impact of Domestic Tourism, WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM
COUNCIL, https://www.wttc.org/publications/2018/domestic-tourism/ [https://perma.cc/EJW2LKC3].
2
See, e.g., U.S. Travel and Tourism Overview, U.S. TRAVEL ASS’N, https://www.ustravel.org
/system/files/media_root/document/Research_Fact-Sheet_US-Travel-and-Tourism-Overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TH9D-WJU9] (updated Mar. 2020) (noting that U.S. domestic travel increased
1.9 percent from 2017 to a total of 2.3 billion person-trips in 2018).
3
Id.
4
For a longer discussion, see Betty Weiler & Rosemary Black, The Changing Face of the Tour
Guide: One-way Communicator to Choreographer to Co-creator of the Tourist Experience, 40
TOURISM RECREATION RES. 364–78 (2015), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02508281
.2015.1083742 [https://perma.cc/W7VX-JHUD].
5
Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that a licensing scheme
for tour guides was content neutral and that requiring guides to pass an examination and drug
test furthered the city’s substantial interests in protecting the tourism industry and protecting the
public from crime). Contra Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding
that the District’s licensing scheme of for-hire tour guides was not narrowly tailored to further the
District’s substantial interest in promoting the industry and economy, as necessary to constitute
an acceptable limitation on protected speech under the First Amendment).
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essential debate concerns whether the licensing requirements constitute an unacceptable limitation on protected speech in violation of the
First Amendment, or if the tests represent a permissible exercise of the
city’s police powers in an effort to regulate the local tourism industry.6
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kagan v. City of New Orleans,7 the split endures among the federal courts of appeal.
A key development in Supreme Court jurisprudence since the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Kagan and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Edwards
v. District of Columbia8 is the Supreme Court’s decision providing guidance regarding the appropriate treatment of professional speech with
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA)9 in
2018. In that case, the Court struck down a statute implementing mandatory notice requirements for crisis pregnancy centers, and held that
“professional speech” of individuals who perform services requiring a
state license is not a separate category of speech exempt from the rule
that content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.10 Hence, if
tour guides’ speech is a form of “professional speech” as referenced in
NIFLA, the decision could implicate the extent to which state and local
governments may constitutionally regulate it.
This Comment will argue that tour guides’ speech is not a form of
professional speech. Thus, as will be explored, the circuit split should
be resolved by applying the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Edwards to
strike down similar tour guide licensing schemes as unconstitutional
violations of the First Amendment. These licensing statutes should be
subject to heightened strict scrutiny review rather than intermediate
scrutiny, because (1) the regulations are a content-based regulation of
speech, (2) tour guides engage in political speech when they interact
with tourists, and (3) burdensome licensing hurdles can constitute a
form of compelled speech for tour guides.
Part II will outline the factual and legal background of the circuit
split and relevant frameworks for First Amendment analysis. Part III
will argue that tour guide speech constitutes protected political speech
and that local licensing regulations should be subject to heightened
strict scrutiny review. Part IV summarizes the argument and the
broader context of the issue.

6

See, e.g., Kristin Tracy, “And to Your Left You’ll See . . . ”: Licensed Tour Guides, the First
Amendment, and the Free Market, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 169 (2016).
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Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 135 S. Ct. 1403 (2015).
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755 F.3d 996.
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138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Circuit Split
Two federal circuit courts of appeals are currently split regarding
whether city tour guide licensing requirements restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment. On one side of the split is the Fifth Circuit
in Kagan v. City of New Orleans,11 a 2014 decision. In Kagan, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that granted summary judgment
to the city of New Orleans against plaintiff tour guides who claimed
that the city’s licensing scheme infringed upon their First Amendment
free speech rights.12 The city required its tour guides to: 1) “pass an
examination on knowledge of the city’s historical, cultural, and sociological developments,” 2) not have been convicted of a felony within the
past five years, 3) pass a drug test, and 4) pay a $50 initial licensing
fee.13 The court first noted that under a facial review of the city’s licensing law, the law furthered a clear purpose of “promot[ing] and protect[ing]” visitors and tourists by identifying “those tour guides who
have licenses and are reliable, being knowledgeable about the city and
trustworthy, law-abiding and free of drug addiction.”14 The law was
thus a permissible exercise of the city’s police power serving an important governmental purpose.15
However, the Fifth Circuit proceeded to engage in intermediate
scrutiny review in accordance with the District of Columbia district
court’s analysis in the Edwards case (regarding the District’s law).16
The court distinguished the case law cited by plaintiffs-appellants—
cases requiring strict scrutiny analysis because the relevant laws were
content based—by reasoning that the New Orleans ordinance at issue
was content-neutral.17 New Orleans’s licensing requirements, the Fifth
Circuit noted, while somewhat rigorous, had “no effect whatsoever on
the content of what tour guides say.”18 The court held that the law survived intermediate scrutiny review because it “promote[d] a substantial

11

753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 561.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 561–62.
16
Id. at 562 (citing Edwards v. Dist. of Columbia, 943 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2013))
(holding that a similar tour guide licensing scheme in the District of Columbia did not violate the
First Amendment under intermediate scrutiny review because “[n]othing about the District’s interest in keeping visitors from dangerous, unethical, or uninformed guides [was] remotely related
to the suppression of free expression, or intended to control the content of what . . . tour guide[s]
may say during tours”).
17
Id.
18
Id.
12
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interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”19
By requiring tour guides to sustain a foundation of knowledge about the
city and not be felons or drug addicts, the law promoted a government
interest of city and visitor safety that would be unserved without the
law’s protections. The New Orleans ordinance thus did not violate the
First Amendment, so the licensing requirements could remain in effect.20
On the other side of the split is the D.C. Circuit in Edwards v. District of Columbia,21 also decided in 2014. The case was similar to Kagan
in its premise: a group of for-hire city tour guides, who owned and operated a Segway-rental and tour business called “Segs in the City,”
brought a First Amendment challenge against the District, alleging
that its licensing scheme for tour guides constituted an unacceptable
limitation on protected speech.22 To qualify for an official license to work
as a city tour guide, an applicant was obligated to:
(1) be at least eighteen years old . . . (2) be proficient in English
. . . (3) not have been convicted of certain specified felonies . . .
(4) make a sworn statement that all statements contained in his
or her application are true and pay all required licensing fees . . .
and (5) pass an examination “covering the applicant’s knowledge
of buildings and points of historical and general interest in the
District.”23
The plaintiffs specifically objected to the District’s regulations that levied civil and criminal penalties like fines on individuals who conducted
a tour without first satisfying these requirements.24 According to the
plaintiffs, the exam requirement was particularly rigorous, as it consisted of 100 multiple-choice questions and drew from subject matter in
fourteen different categories, including Architecture, Dates, Government, Historical Events, and Regulations.25 Similar to the Fifth Circuit
in Kagan, the district court held that the law survived intermediate
scrutiny analysis and did not violate the First Amendment.26
On appeal, the plaintiff-appellants presented two principal arguments: (1) the tour guide regulations were a content-based restriction
on speech rather than a content-neutral restriction on conduct, and
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
Id.
Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 999–1000.
Id. at 1000.

427]

“SEGS AND THE CITY” & AESTHETIC EXPERIENCES

431

thus qualified for strict scrutiny review; and in the alternative, (2) even
if the regulations were content-neutral, they would fail intermediate
scrutiny review because there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to
conclude that the regulations promoted a substantial government interest that would otherwise be achieved less effectively.27 The Edwards
court declined to decide the question of whether strict scrutiny should
apply, as it agreed with the appellants’ second argument: the city’s regulations failed even under the more lenient intermediate scrutiny
standard.28
In its analysis, the D.C. Circuit assumed arguendo that the regulations were content-neutral and placed only incidental burdens on
speech.29 The court proceeded with analysis under the intermediate
scrutiny standard, under which a government regulation is constitutional if:
(1) “it is within the constitutional power of the Government”; (2)
“it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest”;
(3) “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression”; (4) “the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest;” and (5) the regulation leaves open ample alternative channels for communication . . . .
The court’s analysis fixated primarily on the government’s economic interest in promoting the tourism industry. Ultimately, the court held
that the District’s law failed the second and the fourth prongs.30 In respect to the second prong, the District had presented no evidence in the
record that ill-informed tour guides (the issue that purportedly justified
the multiple-choice exam) were in fact a problem for the city’s tourism
industry,31 or that the exam regulation actually furthered the District’s
interest in preventing the stated harms.32 As to the fourth prong, the
District had provided no evidence that normal market forces, such customer reviews on Yelp or tour guide companies’ own economic interests
in attracting customers through high-quality tours, would not serve as
an adequate defense to “seedy, slothful tour guides” on their own as an
alternative to the regulation.33 The District had also failed to provide
evidence that less rigorous requirements would not be equally effective
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1006–1007.
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in promoting their governmental interest.34 Thus, there was no justification for the District’s argument that the restrictive laws were the
most effective means of accomplishing its stated objectives.35
Additionally, the court found inconsistencies in the District’s position. For example, while tour buses with pre-recorded audio narrations
were exempt from the licensing requirement, the regulations still applied to guides who used audio guides or distributed pamphlets instead
of speaking while on a guided walking or Segway tour.36 The court held
that the tour bus exemption was arbitrary and thus rendered the regulations impermissibly underinclusive, as they restricted speech for
some groups but not others.37 This could potentially lead the District to
favor or disfavor a particular type of speech in its implementation of the
policy. In addition, the court held that if the regulations are understood
primarily as a restriction on conduct with only incidental effects on
speech, then they were overbroad because they would forbid an unlicensed individual from lecturing to a tour guide even if accompanied by
a fully licensed guide.38 Thus, finding that the government regulations
were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to directly advance the District’s
asserted interests, the court struck down the licensing scheme as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.39
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the tour guides’ appeal of Kagan, the circuit split has not been resolved. Classifying and
analyzing the appropriate constitutional framework for tour guide
speech can help identify the proper legal outcome for a future reviewing
court.
To frame the terms of the debate, the primary doctrinal question is
whether the states’ regulation of tour guides’ speech is content-based or
content-neutral. Content-neutral regulations limit speech without regard to the message that is being conveyed, while content-based restrictions limit speech because of the message conveyed.40 Contentbased laws are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict
scrutiny,41 while content-neutral laws generally must survive only intermediate scrutiny.42 Determining how to classify tour guides’ speech

34

Id. at 1009.
Id.
36
Id. at 1008.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1008–09.
39
Id.
40
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 189–90 (1983).
41
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
42
Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014).
35
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thus informs the nature of the judicial scrutiny a regulation should receive and the likelihood it will be upheld.
B. The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra
Decision as it Relates to Tour Guide Speech
Although the Supreme Court has not issued a ruling on the tour
guide licensing regime question, its decision in NIFLA in 2018 adds
more color to discussion about occupational or professional speech. How
the Court thinks about this type of speech could be relevant to the tour
guide analysis. NIFLA involved a First Amendment action brought by
two crisis pregnancy centers—pro-life centers that offer pregnancy-related services—in California against state and local officials.43 The centers challenged a state law called the California Reproductive Freedom,
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT
Act) that required clinics that primarily served pregnant women to post
certain notices at their facilities.44 These notices included (1) for licensed clinics, a statement that California provided free or low-cost services, including abortions (with a phone number to call); or (2) for unlicensed clinics, a notice that the state of California had not licensed the
clinic to provide medical services.45 The state alleged that the purpose
of the FACT Act was to “ensure that California residents make their
personal reproductive health care decisions knowing their rights and
the health care services available to them.”46 However, the petitioners
alleged that the notice requirements violated their First Amendment
rights by compelling them to engage in speech about abortion, a practice
which the crisis pregnancy centers opposed.47
The Court held that the notice requirements violated the First
Amendment and were unconstitutional, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.48 The Court commented specifically on the appropriate level of
scrutiny for the notice requirement for the licensed medical clinics. It
determined that California’s law was content-based because it “target[ed] speech based on its communicative content”—in this instance,
the availability of abortions in the state.49 Typically, content-based restrictions on speech are subject to an exacting strict scrutiny analysis
on review, under which they “are presumptively unconstitutional and
may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2365 (2018) (NIFLA).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2369.
See id. at 2370.
See id. at 2378.
Id. at 2371 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
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tailored to serve compelling state interests.”50 However, the Ninth Circuit had not applied strict scrutiny even though the law was contentbased because it found that the notice requirement regulated professional speech, which it reasoned was afforded less protection than other
forms of speech.51 Under this less demanding level of scrutiny, the
Ninth Circuit held that the California law did not violate the First
Amendment.52
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s distinction of professional
speech as a separate category of speech subject to different rules or a
different standard of scrutiny.53 The Court stated that “[s]peech is not
unprotected merely because it is uttered by professionals.”54 As the
Court reasoned, less protection for professional speech has been afforded by the Court only in two distinct circumstances: (1) where a law
requires professionals to disclose factual and noncontroversial information in their commercial speech;55 and (2) where a law regulates professional conduct that incidentally involves speech, such as in a lawyer’s
efforts to procure clients.56 In the case of the crisis pregnancy centers,
neither line of precedents was implicated.57
The Court reasoned that in the context of professional speech, content-based regulations pose the same risks as in any other circumstance
in which the state seeks to “suppress unpopular ideas or information”
rather than to advance a legitimate regulatory goal.58 Accordingly,
there was no constitutional basis for affording this type of speech disparate treatment.59 Because government policing of the content of professional speech threatens to infringe the “uninhibited marketplace of
ideas” necessary to uncover the truth (and in the areas of medicine and
public health, potentially save lives), content-based regulations must
undergo strict scrutiny review as in other contexts.60 Moreover, the category of professional speech could be difficult to define, and states could
choose the amount of protection particular speech receives simply by
requiring a license for that profession of the speaker.61
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Applying the strict scrutiny review it deemed appropriate, the
Court held that the notice requirement was “wildly underinclusive” because it singled out crisis pregnancy centers by requiring the disclosures, excluding from its scope numerous other types of health centers
and community clinics that educated women about health care services.62 The Court also noted that there were other ways that the state
could have conveyed or publicized the information to women aside from
requiring compelled disclosures for the clinics.63 Consequently, the
Court held that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest that California asserted. The notice requirement was
essentially a form of content-based compelled speech for the crisis pregnancy centers and could not withstand strict scrutiny review.64
C. Defining Tour Guides’ Speech: Relevant First Amendment Frameworks
In order to articulate a legal theory to resolve the circuit split concerning tour guides’ speech, it is necessary to classify the exact nature
of this speech. This analysis will help indicate the appropriate legal
framework a court should use when weighing licensing schemes within
the First Amendment’s bounds. Ultimately, I conclude that political
speech is the appropriate classification.
1.

Occupational or professional speech

An initial question is whether tour guides’ speech could be plausibly identified as occupational or professional speech. The Supreme
Court held in NIFLA that professional speech is not a separate category
subject to a distinct level of scrutiny,65 and relevant academic commentary66 suggests that tour guide speech may not fall into this category
anyway (which could inform how we conceptualize the effect of the
NIFLA decision on the circuit split).
In her article, Licensing Knowledge, Professor Claudia E. Haupt
provides some color regarding what types of speech could plausibly be
considered professional at all, as opposed to pure First Amendment
speech.67 Haupt argues for a distinction between passing along mere
information, as a tour guide does, and giving actual professional advice,
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as a doctor does.68 She contends that professional speech (i.e., speech
that could defensibly be subject to state licensing requirements that do
not undermine First Amendment protections) goes beyond “the conveyance of raw information” and is instead
individualized to the situation of the client[,] . . . tied to a body
of disciplinary knowledge from which it gains authority, and . . .
occurs within a social relationship that is defined by knowledge
asymmetry between speaker and listener, reliance on the
speaker’s advice, and trust in the accuracy of that advice.69
In Haupt’s view, tour guide speech is mere information conveyance rather than the offering of professional advice. Thus, state licensing requirements are less justified because the state lacks the viable objective
of preventing tangible harm to consumers.70
In another article, The Limits of Professional Speech, Haupt further articulates her argument for narrowing the boundaries of what we
conceptualize as professional speech.71 She argues that the objective of
licensing professionals’ speech is to ensure that clients receive “accurate, comprehensive, and reliable advice” that comports with modern
scientific and academic knowledge of the relevant topic, and that the
notion of “professional speech” should be defined narrowly to limit the
scope of malpractice liability for some forms of “false speech.”72 Haupt
argues that the required crisis pregnancy center disclosures in NIFLA
should not have been analyzed by the Ninth Circuit under professional
speech terms because the required disclosures regulated the delivery of
medical services rather than the content of actual professional advice.73
Under Haupt’s theory, an employee conveying information to his or
her customers (like a tour guide does) would present a more viable First
Amendment defense to a licensing requirement than would a professional conveying specialized disciplinary knowledge (like a doctor).74
This “information vs. knowledge” distinction, assuming that tour guides
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do not provide “knowledge” in the same way doctors do, provides support to the D.C. Circuit’s view in Edwards that city tour guides submit
a colorable First Amendment claim against licensing schemes.
2.

Commercial speech

Another relevant classification of speech for tour guides is commercial speech. This is because city tour guides are often employed by a
private tour guide company rather than operating freelance or being
employed by the city itself.75 Commercial speech, for purposes of First
Amendment analysis, is defined as expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.76 Essentially, it does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.77 For example, advertisements for the prices of prescription drugs constitute commercial
speech.78 Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, but
the Constitution accords it a lesser protection than it does other constitutionally safeguarded expression.79 Under the four-part test articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the government may regulate commercial speech if:
(1) the speech at issue concerns lawful activity and is not misleading;
(2) the asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.80
In all likelihood, tour guides’ speech cannot be classified as commercial speech. Beyond simply proposing an economic transaction to
visitors, tour guides provide commentary on the geography, history, politics, and sociology of a given city, which serves to enrich tourists’ intangible enjoyment of the destination rather than target their economic
interests. It is thus unlikely that governments could use this framework
to justify licensing requirements.
3.

Political speech

There is a far more colorable argument for classifying tour guides’
speech as political speech, which is afforded the strongest First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court has identified political speech as
75

Tour Guide Career, IRESEARCH, http://career.iresearchnet.com/career-information/tour-gu
ide-career/ [https://perma.cc/48KD-5ZSH].
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core First Amendment speech, critical to the functioning of the U.S.
democratic system.81 As the Court has affirmed, “the practice of persons
sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end”—
such as marches and protest activities—is “deeply embedded in the
American political process” and invokes particularly forceful First
Amendment protections.82 Furthermore, the location of the activities
matters, as restrictions on speech in a traditional public forum like
streets and sidewalks are reviewed under the strictest level of scrutiny.83
If tour guide speech constitutes a form of political speech, licensing
restrictions are more likely to be analyzed under a rigorous strict scrutiny standard. In addition to protecting protest activities, courts have
interpreted the First Amendment’s core political speech protections to
prevent the government from making it difficult for people to talk to
each other about political issues.84 Political speech includes “interactive
communication concerning political change,”85 “advocacy of political reform,”86 “handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint,”87 and “persuasive speech seeking support for particular
causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues.”88
Given that tour guides enter their posts with differing perceptions of a
city’s history, cultural customs, and anthropological development colored by their personal experiences and ideological views, there is a plausible argument that tour guide speech constitutes protected political
speech.
4.

Compelled speech

An alternative or additional possibility is that tour guide licensing
requirements are tantamount to compelled speech, impermissible under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that just as the
First Amendment can prevent the government from prohibiting speech,
it can prevent the government from compelling individuals to express
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2001) (citing Campbell v. Buckley, 203 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2000)).
85
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 (1988).
86
Id. at 421 n.4.
87
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
88
See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).

427]

“SEGS AND THE CITY” & AESTHETIC EXPERIENCES

439

certain views, or to pay subsidies for speech to which they object.89 In
United States v. United Foods, Inc.,90 the Court held that assessments
imposed on fresh mushroom handlers pursuant to a statute to fund advertisements promoting mushroom sales violated the First Amendment.91 In NIFLA, the Court struck down the crisis pregnancy center
notice requirements because it found that they compelled individuals to
speak a particular message, thus altering the content of their speech.92
Requiring aspiring tour guides to prepare for and pass a content-based
examination about the city’s culture, history, and sociology (which was
being required in both Kagan93 and Edwards94) or to pay a fee in order
to qualify for a state license (as was the case in Kagan95) could constitute compelled speech because these requirements force tour guides to
express or subsidize a set of factual positions selected by the state.
Returning to The Limits of Professional Speech, Haupt argues that
the disclosures required in NIFLA should be properly analyzed under
the compelled speech doctrine articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,96 rather than classified as a form of true professional
speech.97 In Zauderer, the Court subjected certain required consumer
disclosures only to rational basis review, because the advertisers’
speech interests were outweighed by the state’s interest in preventing
consumer deception or confusion.98 In the tour guide context, the relevant question is whether and to what extent cities’ interest in preventing tourists’ confusion or deception outweighs tour guides’ interest in
communicating their (potentially political) views during their tours.99 If
the cities’ interest prevails substantially, then the infringement upon
the guides’ free speech protections should be subject to a lower standard
of review, like rational basis review.100 In Zauderer, the court identified
the protection of consumers’ interest in information as they navigate
the marketplace as the principal objective of the compelled
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disclosures.101 The cities’ interest in providing visitors with accurate information about the locale’s history and culture could justify compelling
potential guides to gain familiarity with certain information.
D. The Appropriate Level of First Amendment Scrutiny for Tour
Guide Speech.
The key doctrinal question to inform future courts’ consideration of
tour guide regulations is what level of scrutiny should be appropriately
afforded. The court in Edwards declined to rule on the question of
whether they must undergo strict scrutiny review because it determined that the District of Columbia regulations did not survive even
intermediate scrutiny.102 Intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral restrictions that place an incidental burden on speech.103 While
courts have formulated intermediate scrutiny differently, the regulation on speech is generally required to serve an “important” or “substantial” interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression.104 Strict
scrutiny, on the other hand, applies to government restrictions on the
content of protected speech,105 particularly political speech,106 or the
speech of disfavored speakers.107 Strict scrutiny requires that the challenged statute be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest.108
The level of scrutiny afforded to tour guide licensing requirements
critically informs whether they will survive under the First Amendment. The key inquiry is whether the burdens imposed on would-be tour
guides (like multiple choice exams) restrict the content of would-be tour
guides’ speech, or whether these burdens are content-neutral in nature.
This further highlights the question of to what extent tour guide commentary is tantamount to political speech.
III. ARGUMENTS
A. Tour Guide Speech is an Important First Amendment Issue.
As an initial matter, it is important to establish that tour guide
speech is a category that substantially requires First Amendment
101
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protections. Recent demographic and economic trends in the profession
and the tourism industry generally illustrate the need for an ideologically diverse cohort of tour guides in the United States. First, domestic
tourism to and within the U.S. is growing, so more people are visiting
U.S. cities and listening to tour guides’ speech.109 For foreign visitors,
the ideologies and views represented in a live tour have the potential to
color perspectives of the U.S. more generally. For domestic tourists, exposure to a particular tour guide’s viewpoint could either mitigate or
reinforce the country’s polarized political divide.
Second, academic research indicates that with the rapid expansion
of information technology, visitors who do opt for human tour guides
increasingly rely on them to provide interactive and personalized experiences rather than simply communicate facts.110 Tourists seeking raw
information about the locale are more likely to rely on the Internet or
other digital sources, so a human tour guide plays a growing role as a
communicator and experience-broker, rather than a one-way presenter
and entertainer.111 In their article “The Changing Face of the Tour
Guide,” Professors Betty Weiler and Rosemary Black argue that tour
guides broker visitors’ experiences by facilitating encounters with certain physical access points and by channeling their communication expertise to empathize with each unique visitor.112 Because tour guides
assume growing communicative responsibility to add legitimate value
to visitors’ experiences over the Internet, there is greater room for interjection of guides’ personal experiences with a particular location or
cultural tradition—a practice which necessarily implicates speech.
Third, the current cohort of tour guides in the U.S. lacks substantial demographic diversity, which illustrates the importance of facilitating minority perspectives in the profession.113 In 2019, sixty-nine percent of tour guides in the U.S. were White.114 The next highest groups
were “Other” (seven percent) and Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish (seven
percent).115 Additionally, the majority of tour guides in the U.S. have
some level of post-high school education: thirty-six percent hold a certificate or associate degree, twenty percent hold a bachelor’s degree, and
nine percent hold a master’s degree.116 As a result, perspectives and
109
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experiences from lower socioeconomic classes may be excluded from the
profession and shielded from tourists.
Since tour guides do not necessarily represent a diverse range of
perspectives to tourists under current industry demographics—and
there is a growing responsibility for guides to provide personalized communicative expertise as information technology expands—it is important for guides to receive vigorous First Amendment protections and
face fewer state-imposed barriers to entry into the profession.
B. Tour Guide Speech Does Not Constitute a Form of Professional
Speech Over Which the Government’s Police Powers Should Justify Licensing Requirements.
Though the Supreme Court held in NIFLA that professional speech
should not be analyzed under a different legal standard with respect to
its First Amendment protections, a compelling question still arises regarding the bounds of what we conceive as professional speech and
whether tour guide speech fits into this framework. In her scholarship,
Cynthia Haupt advanced the claim that there is a distinction between
passing along mere information as a tour guide and giving actual professional advice as a doctor.117 She argues that the notion of professional
speech should be defined narrowly to encapsulate only the conveyance
of knowledge to avoid impermissibly expanding the scope of the doctrine.118
Consistent with Haupt’s theory, tour guide speech should not be
categorized as professional speech that could defensibly be subject to
state regulations such as licensing requirements. However, in divergence from Haupt’s theory, tour guide speech does not constitute “mere
information conveyance,” more similar to that of a sales cashier than
that of a doctor. Given tour guides’ critical role in channeling their personal communication skills and unique backgrounds to personalize
tourists’ experiences,119 tour guides’ speech should be classified as political speech rather than falling neatly at either end of Haupt’s proposed spectrum.120
While the government should be permitted by its police powers to
regulate the activities of pure knowledge-based professionals like doctors, whose giving of misinformation could risk serious harm to patients
or clients, it should not be permitted to regulate the information tour
guides give that often bleeds into guides’ personal opinions. Thus, to the
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extent courts conceptualize professional speech as speech that the government can regulate, tour guide speech should not be grouped into this
category at all. While tour guides are often employed by larger corporations or organizations, unlike doctors they communicate information to
clients in a way that is necessarily informed by their own personalized
experiences and not beholden to scientific research or the findings of
the relevant knowledge community. While there is some degree of information asymmetry between tour guides and visitors regarding the
history, norms, and culture of the relevant locale, the harms of misinformation to consumers are more likely psychic rather than entailing a
risk of physical or medical harm, which should limit the scope of the
government’s viable interest in regulation. Moreover, even if tour
guides’ speech could plausibly be grouped with that of doctors or lawyers (under a similar theory of information asymmetry, perhaps),
NIFLA would require heightened scrutiny of the speech assuming that
it is content-based as this Comment argues that it is.121 Finally, because
tour guide speech is political, and thus enjoys particularly forceful First
Amendment protections,122 state restrictions in the form of strict licensing regimes must fail strict scrutiny review.
A potential counterargument is that tour guides are typically employed by companies, rather than operating freelance, and are thus operating in a professional capacity rather than in a personal capacity.
Additionally, there is some risk of harm to their clients (tourists) if they
communicate misinformation. However, tour guides cannot feasibly be
subjected to malpractice liability like doctors can, and the risk of physical harm to clients is undoubtedly lower than in contexts like medicine.
Tour guides should receive an even stronger First Amendment shield
than doctors for communicating information that is not consistent with
the accepted standard of knowledge, for example, if they happen to have
an unconventional view. This is especially the case because doctors are
less likely to convey political opinions or address ideological topics as
they communicate knowledge to patients. And for tour guides, even
without the threat of potential malpractice liability, the risk of receiving poor customer reviews and being subjected to natural market forces
should sufficiently deter them from providing misinformation.
Another obvious weakness with Haupt’s position is the difficulty in
line-drawing between knowledge-based and information-based speech,
which the ambiguity of classifying tour guides’ speech aptly illustrates.
While tour guide speech bears more closely to the conveyance of
knowledge-based advice than Haupt concedes, it is ultimately an
121
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oversimplification to reduce some forms of occupational speech as
wholly devoid of interjections of the speaker’s opinions. While governments can likely make stronger arguments in favor of regulating
knowledge-based speech within the legal exercise of police powers, the
distinction is largely inapposite in light of NIFLA’s rejection of professional speech as a legally distinguishable category.123
C. Tour Guide Speech Constitutes Protected Political Speech.
Rather than being analyzed under the umbrella of professional or
commercial speech, tour guides’ speech should be classified as a form of
political speech that must receive particularly forceful and heightened
First Amendment protections.124 Tour guides do not operate in a professional vacuum nor simply communicate information that is wholly detached from their personalized life experiences. Assuming that tour
guides have lived in, spent time in, or acquired information about the
relevant city by some means over the course of their lifetimes, tour
guides’ perceptions of a city’s sociological development, political history,
and esoteric customs are necessarily colored by their distinct personal
and political ideologies. Moreover, tour guides’ communication style
and word choice reflects their personalities and psychological makeup,
which academic literature indicates can be correlated with political
preferences.125 One study indicated that the frequency of particular
words that people used on Twitter correlated with Democratic or Republican political affiliation.126 For example, Democrats were more
likely to use emotionally expressive words and focus on entertainment
and culture rather than politics, while Republicans used swear words
less frequently and highlighted their religiosity more often.127 Democrats were also more likely to use first-person singular pronouns (perhaps reflecting their desire to emphasize uniqueness), while Republicans were more likely to use first-person plural and third-person
masculine pronouns.128 Since even tour guides who follow a script likely
do not plan out every word ahead of time (especially when responding
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to visitors’ questions), there is ample room for guides’ personality traits
and ideological preferences—to the extent that they are correlated with
certain word choices or modes of diction—to bleed through and reach
listeners. And this is especially the case with the increasing industry
demand for guides to empathize and connect with visitors to provide
interactive in-person experiences.129
Political speech includes “interactive communication concerning
political change,”130 and the First Amendment protects the ability of
people to talk freely to each other about political issues.131 Since tour
guides—either explicitly or implicitly—communicate their understanding of certain political events or figures through their choice of rhetoric
(and the words that they select could be correlated with ideological preference), there is a colorable argument that their speech could be classified as political. Accordingly, courts reviewing cities’ licensing requirements should interpret the content of tours as a form of “interactive
communication” relating to political issues,132 rather than simply a oneway transmission of information within an employee’s workday as
Haupt classified it. Acknowledging the expressive nature of tour guides’
interactive communication with visitors—and the ideological views that
are consciously or subconsciously transmitted—would require particularly forceful First Amendment protections and strict scrutiny review
of regulations.133 For example, tour guides could make comments about
political figures in the city or describe a landmark in a particular way
that reflects their ideologies. This designation as political speech would
provide tour guides with the utmost First Amendment immunity from
burdensome licensing schemes that could potentially have the effect of
suppressing their speech. In resolving the circuit split, this would provide further support to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Edwards striking
down the licensing requirements.
A possible counterargument is that tour guides may largely stick
to a script in communicating the content of their tours to clients, so
there may not be much room for interjection of political preferences or
ideology. However, as discussed above, tour guides’ choice of rhetoric or
diction regarding a particular historical or political event can subconsciously convey an implicit bias or internalized ideological viewpoint.
And as indicated by academic literature, personality traits alone could
reflect political attitudes, especially if visitors on the tours are
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particularly perceptive.134 For example, political conservatives are more
likely to display resistance to change and acceptance of inequality,
while political liberals are more likely to display openness and agreeableness.135 These are certainly traits that visitors could perceive as they
interact with their guides and ask questions, even if the guides generally stick to a script. Additionally, tour guides could choose to explicitly
communicate their beliefs on a particular subject matter. More data regarding the script requirements for guides compared by U.S. cities
could lend further credence to this argument. But given the level of personal engagement between tour guides and visitors and the likely opportunity for visitors to ask personalized questions, there is a strong
case for the political speech designation even if the majority of a given
tour follows a regular formula.
D. Regulation of Tour Guide Speech is Content-Based Rather than
Content-Neutral, so the Proper Legal Standard for Evaluating
Tour Guide Licensing Requirements is Strict Scrutiny.
Rather than the intermediate scrutiny review under which the D.C.
Circuit struck down the District of Columbia’s statute in Edwards, tour
guide licensing requirements should be analyzed under a heightened
strict scrutiny review. Strict scrutiny applies to government restrictions
on the content of protected speech.136 Even if cities’ licensing schemes
do not explicitly impose requirements on the information included in
the tours, and the tour guides theoretically remain free to say what they
wish, they can still impact the content of the tours that are ultimately
permitted to proceed. This is because the requirements function as a
mechanism allowing the state to select what types of people they will
permit to become tour guides to begin with, which directly affects the
content of the tours that reach visitors. Rigorous multiple-choice tests
and high licensing fees could impose high costs of entry for would-be
tour guides and could potentially incentivize some people interested in
the profession to opt out. For example, potential guides of lower socioeconomic classes may be unable to afford the licensing fees, or individuals with lower education levels may not be sufficiently equipped to
prepare for the written exams.
Possibly, individuals who would opt out because of the requirements could be individuals with politically dissenting views who may
not educate or finance themselves within the conventional societal
framework (which could be correlated with overcoming the licensing
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thresholds and succeeding in entering the profession). This seems especially plausible because most tour guides in the U.S. are currently white
individuals with some level of post-high school education.137 At the very
least, there is certainly a colorable argument that the requirements select for people who are more educated, more affluent, and less likely to
have committed a crime. Especially in light of my discussion above regarding implicit and explicit ideological rhetoric and biases, the licensing requirements could have the effect of favoring one form of political
speech (i.e., one set of views) over others. For this reason, the licensing
requirements are not content-neutral and should receive heightened
strict scrutiny review.
The obvious counterargument is that the licensing statutes simply
impose a set of requirements for tour guides and have no effect whatsoever on the content of what they actually say. However, given the current lack of educational (and thus socioeconomic) diversity in the profession,138 it is highly plausible that the cumbersome nature of fees and
exam requirements tend to favor some societal groups (i.e., more educated and affluent individuals) and impose higher upfront costs on others. And this may affect the content of the tours that the city ultimately
allows to go forward.
E. Licensing Requirements for Tour Guides Constitute a Form of
Compelled Speech.
There is a plausible argument that certain elements of the cities’
licensing requirements, like written examinations and mandatory fees,
constitute a form of compelled speech. Most likely, however, this classification would be largely fact dependent. Through its analysis of compelled disclosures, NIFLA again becomes relevant in this discussion.
The licensing requirements are most likely to constitute compelled
speech where they require potential tour guides to pass a written examination, thereby compelling them to learn a particular framework of
understanding about the city’s history, culture, and sociological realities. In both Kagan and Edwards, the relevant cities (New Orleans and
the District of Columbia, respectively) required tour guides to pass written examinations. In Edwards, the examination addressed content from
fourteen different categories, which included “Government,” “Historical
Events,” and “Regulations.”139 As discussed above, a particular resident’s perception of a particular historical event (e.g., the Civil War) or
a state regulation could vary drastically from another’s based on his or

137
138
139

CAREER EXPLORER, supra note 113; see also CAREER EXPLORER, supra note 116.
See supra Section III.A.
Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 999–1000 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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her identity, demographics, and personal experiences. By requiring tour
guides to learn a state-selected set of facts (which could potentially
bleed into ideologies) and implicitly representing them as the foundation for state-sanctioned tours, local government thus compel tour
guides to endorse a certain set of views.
The same could be said for mandatory licensing fees (which were
required in the facts of Kagan), which would analogously require tour
guides to subsidize the continued state endorsement of this set of ideologies.140 Similar to the Court’s reasoning in NIFLA, which rejected a
separate First Amendment framework of analysis for professional
speech,141 the exam requirements and fees may constitute compelled
speech and should not receive lessened First Amendment scrutiny
simply because they occur in a professional context. Rather, they should
be reviewed under strict scrutiny because they constitute a contentbased regulation of speech.142
Under the Zauderer framework that Haupt would require, cities’
interest in avoiding confusion or deception of tourists likely does not
outweigh tour guides’ interest in communicating their personal views
to visitors, which the written examinations in particular could have the
potential to hinder. This is because the content of tours amounts to a
form of political speech—which receives particularly forceful First
Amendment protections—and risking tourist confusion is unlikely to
cause constitutional harm. So the regulations should not receive a less
rigorous standard of judicial scrutiny because the state’s interest is obviously countervailing.143 As a caveat to this point, evidence that tourist
misinformation is rampant in a particular city as a result of unreliable
guides—which does not currently appear to exist anecdotally or on a
quantitative scale—could tip the scales in favor of the state’s interest.
Additionally, the applicability of the compelled speech doctrine here is
again largely fact dependent. While the cities in both Kagan and Edwards required written examinations for tour guides, another city could
theoretically impose other licensing requirements that do or do not violate the First Amendment without implicating the compelled speech
doctrine at all.
A potentially compelling counterargument here is that the required
written examinations and fees do not appear to alter the content of the
tours themselves, after the guides ultimately receive their licenses
(short of evidence that a city actually requires its guides to communicate the material reflected on the exams). While this argument
140
141
142
143

See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411–12 (2001).
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371–72 (2018).
See supra Sections III.C–D.
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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certainly limits the strength of the compelled speech argument, it is
plausible that the nature of the material chosen for the exams colors
the tour guides’ understanding of the city’s history, politics, and sociology, especially given the effects of recency bias that could compel tour
guides to prioritize this new knowledge over previously existing ideological views or perceptions of the city. The presence of certain material
on the examination could also imply to tour guides that they are discouraged from or expected not to expressly contradict this information
in their tours (and guides have an incentive to follow actual or perceived
state policies in order to avoid losing their jobs). Furthermore, while
less apposite to the question of the circuit split itself (which concerns
licensing requirements), tour guide companies’ internal rules and employee expectations have the potential to inhibit a tour guide’s speech
or compel expression of a particular set of views.
F.

The Circuit Split is Properly Resolved by Adopting the D.C. Circuit’s Interpretation in Edwards.

In resolving the existing circuit split, the proper legal outcome is
similar to the approach that the D.C. Circuit adopted in Edwards: rigorous licensing requirements imposed on potential tour guides constitute an unacceptable limitation on protected speech in violation of the
First Amendment.144 Moreover, although the Edwards court declined to
decide the question, these licensing statutes should be subjected to
heightened strict scrutiny review rather than intermediate scrutiny, because intensive licensing schemes can have the effect of altering the
content of tour guide speech that is permitted to reach the tourist audience. The interest in safeguarding tour guides’ First Amendment rights
should outweigh the cities’ police powers-based efforts to regulate the
local tourism industry because tour guides engage in a form of vigorously protected political speech. This is an especially critical concern
given the increasing reliance on human tour guides to provide communicative and personalized experiences to visitors.145

144
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Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
See Weiler & Black, supra note 4, at 364.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Protecting tour guide speech matters. Tour guides can serve as the
primary liaisons and gatekeepers to U.S. cities, and the ways in which
they represent the locale can meaningfully shape the perceptions of visitors and their contacts at home, both domestically and abroad. Maintaining a diverse cohort of U.S. tour guides is important to ensure that
a representative range of viewpoints on a city’s culture, politics, and
traditions are conveyed to tourists. Otherwise, the narrative of political
discourse surrounding a city as portrayed to visitors could be controlled
by the state. Because tour guide speech can convey the guides’ ideological leanings through express statements, conscious or subconscious
word choice, or even through their personalities, it should be properly
classified as political speech. And because licensing requirements constitute a filtering mechanism that can select for particular education
levels, socioeconomic classes, or even races, the speech regulations are
content-based and should receive heightened strict scrutiny review. Additionally, while largely fact dependent in its applicability, the compelled speech doctrine may limit states’ ability to require written examinations about the city or mandatory licensing fees.
There may still be room for cities and localities to retain some degree of regulatory authority over local guides without implicating the
First Amendment. A possibility could be requiring all official tour guide
companies to register with the city, so that the city has some ability to
track which groups are representing ideas about the locale to the outside world. In order to maximize free speech protections, however, it
may be wiser for cities to surrender regulatory power to the markets
and allow private mechanisms like Yelp reviews or competitive pricing
schemes to govern the success of particular types of tours or tour guides
in the city. With constitutionally shielded political discourse at stake,
perhaps states should loosen their regulatory grip on their local branding and permit the “Segs and the City”-s of the world to roam free.

When Free Speech Isn’t Free: The Rising Costs of
Hosting Controversial Speakers at Public
Universities
Rebecca Roman†

I.

INTRODUCTION

“Free” speech seems like a misnomer when looking at the price public universities have to pay to protect students’ First Amendment rights.
Accommodating controversial speakers on campus requires universities
to balance budget constraints with free speech. Recently, universities’
obligation to provide security to people on campus and their commitment to free speech have come into conflict, resulting either in hefty
security costs or lawsuits because the law is unsettled as to who should
pay the security fees for controversial speakers.1 The potent combination of rising security costs and frequent and aggressive responses to
these controversial speakers makes this a serious First Amendment issue.2 However, trying to impose the security fees on the student groups
who invite these speakers may infringe on students’ First Amendment
rights.
Examples of this clash between free speech and financial feasibility
are easy to find. In 2017, the University of California, Berkeley spent
four million dollars on security costs and other expenses for events featuring controversial speakers like Milo Yiannopoulos and Ben Shapiro.3
†
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UC Berkeley Chancellor Carol Christ says such security costs are “certainly not sustainable.”4 On the other hand, UC Berkeley paid out
$70,000 to two student groups to settle a free speech suit that was filed
after the University tried to restrict speeches by two controversial
speakers.5 On the other side of the country, University of Florida
Spokeswoman Janine Sikes noted that “[p]ublic institutions cannot continue to pay this kind of money,” when discussing the $500,000 tab the
University ran up in security costs when white nationalist Richard
Spencer visited campus.6 Meanwhile, the University of Washington
paid $122,500 in legal fees in a settlement with College Republicans
after trying to make the student group pay $17,000 as a “security fee”
for costs associated with hosting a rally with the conservative group,
Patriot Prayer.7
The crux of the problem established by these examples is that there
are two incongruent yet uncompromisable interests at stake. One is the
protection of students’ First Amendment rights to free speech, and the
other is the finite budgets of universities and the money they must
spend to protect that speech. This Comment first argues that public
universities cannot impose additional security fees on student groups
who invite controversial speakers without running afoul of the First
Amendment and provides universities with constitutionally permissible alternatives to help lower security costs. Section II provides necessary background on applicable First Amendment doctrine. Section III
discusses Supreme Court precedent on fees in public forums and student speech rights in a university setting, as well as recent lower court
campus security fee cases. Finally, Section IV uses that progression of
cases to establish that imposing additional security costs on student
groups that invite controversial speakers impermissibly infringes on
students’ First Amendment rights. In light of this conclusion, Section V
lays out constitutionally permissible alternatives for universities to
manage security costs.

speech-events-uc-office-president/ [https://perma.cc/3LAF-835Q].
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Watanabe, supra note 1.
5
Alex Morey, UC Berkeley Agrees to Pay $70k, Change Policies, in Speech Suit Settlement,
FIRE (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.thefire.org/uc-berkeley-agrees-to-pay-70k-change-policies-inspeech-suit-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/X2FM-SHLU].
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
There are two foundational First Amendment issues at play in addressing the free speech implications of security fees in a university
context: public forum doctrine and the heckler’s veto.
A. Public Forum Doctrine
Public forum doctrine is an analytical tool used by courts to determine what kinds of restrictions the government can impose on speech
based on where the speech takes place. There are three types of forums
in which speech is protected to varying degrees: (1) traditional public
forums, (2) designated public forums, and (3) nonpublic forums.
Traditional public forums are those places that “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public,” such as parks and public streets.8 In addition to the traditional public forum, the government
can create a designated public forum by opening public property for
communicative activity.9 This second type of forum does not have to be
a public forum indefinitely, but so long as the government uses it as a
public forum, courts will treat it as such.10 Designated public forums
can be further broken down into limited and non-limited designated forums. Non-limited designated forums are not limited on who can speak
or what can be discussed.11 In contrast, a limited designated forum is a
type of designated public forum opened only for certain groups or types
of speech.12 Lastly, nonpublic forums are forums for public speech that
are not “traditional” and have not been designated a public forum by
the government.13 Examples of nonpublic forums include airport terminals, public schools’ internal mail systems, and polling places.
In a nonpublic forum, the government may apply content-based restrictions on speech, as long as the restrictions are reasonable and do
not discriminate based on speakers’ viewpoints.14 Traditional and
8

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
9
See id. at 45.
10
See id. at 46 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981)).
11
Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for
Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 498
(2005).
12
See id.; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, 47 (“A public forum may be created
for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain subjects.”).
13
See Langhauser, supra note 11, at 498.
14
See id. at 494, 503 (“Succinctly stated, ‘content’ refers broadly to the subject matter of the
speech; ‘viewpoint’ refers to the perspective from which a speaker views a particular topic—e.g.
viewing child-rearing questions from a Christian perspective; and ‘effect’ is what happens or is
likely to happen in response to the expression of that content and/or viewpoint.”) (footnote omitted)
(citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995)).
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designated forums are more protective of free speech. In these forums,
content-neutral restrictions will be subject to intermediate scrutiny,
meaning they “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests but . . . need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”15 A regulation is content neutral if it serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression.16
Restrictions on the time, place, and manner of expressive activity are
generally content neutral because they do not discriminate based on the
content of the message.17 For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,18 the Supreme Court held that New York City did not run afoul of
the First Amendment when it passed a regulation on the volume of amplified music at concerts in Central Park because its purpose was to
regulate noise levels, as opposed to the content of the music.19
In traditional and designated public forums, content-based restrictions will be subject to strict scrutiny, meaning that to be upheld,
the regulation must further a compelling state interest and be narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.20 While there is no precise definition
of a compelling state interest, examples include “ensuring public safety
and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks,
protecting property rights, and protecting a woman’s freedom to seek
pregnancy-related services.”21 For a regulation to be narrowly tailored,
the regulation must promote a substantial government interest that
cannot be achieved as effectively in a less restrictive way.22 In other
words, the regulation must “not [be] substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.”23 For illustration, in McCullen v. Coakley,24 the Massachusetts state legislature sought to protect
its interest in public safety and patient access to reproductive health
care by making it a crime to “knowingly stand on a ‘public way or

15

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
Id. at 791.
17
Id.
18
491 U.S. 781.
19
See id. at 792.
20
See Langhauser, supra note 11, at 502.
21
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486–87 (2014) (citations omitted) (citing Schenck v. ProChoice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997)). See generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin
of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 398 (2006).
But see Ronald Steiner, Compelling State Interest, MTSU (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/31/compelling-state-interest [https://perma.cc/CEX4-DV74] (“An interest is
compelling when it is essential or necessary rather than a matter of choice, preference, or discretion.”).
22
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
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24
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sidewalk’ within 35 feet” of an abortion clinic.25 The Supreme Court held
that the statute was not narrowly tailored because the “buffer zones”
burdened significantly more speech than was necessary to achieve the
asserted state interests.26 In fact, the Court found that another provision in the same statute protected the state’s interests as effectively in
a less restrictive way, by making it a crime to knowingly impede “another person’s entry to or exit from a reproductive health care facility.”27
In sum, content-based restrictions on speech in public forums will
be subject to strict scrutiny review, while restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums will only face intermediate scrutiny. Section III will establish that universities contain a variety of public and nonpublic forums. For example, a classroom is not a public forum,28 but a student
activity fee often is a public forum, albeit a “metaphysical” one.29
B. The Heckler’s Veto
The heckler’s veto pertains to restrictions placed on speech by the
government in response to an audience’s reaction or expected reaction.
A heckler’s veto is an “impermissible content-based restriction on
speech where the speech is prohibited due to an anticipated disorderly
or violent reaction of the audience.”30 The Supreme Court has held that
a speaker should not be silenced because of a hostile audience, and
many courts have imposed affirmative obligations on the state to provide for the security of controversial speakers in public forums.31
The government’s obligation to protect and promote unpopular
speech in a typical heckler’s veto case is not without limit. First, speech
protections only apply to protected speech; that is, certain categories of
speech do not qualify for First Amendment—and therefore government—protection. For example, speech that amounts to incitement of
violence would not be protected, even in a traditional public forum.32
25

Id. at 469, 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 490.
27
See id. at 490–91.
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See Bishop v. Arnov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991).
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Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
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Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
31
See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992) (“Speech cannot be
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend
a hostile mob.”); see also Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The police
must permit the speech and control the crowd; there is no heckler’s veto.”) (quoting Hedges v.
Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1993)); Grider v. Abramson,
994 F. Supp. 840, 845–46 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (“The police were not at liberty to do nothing; authorities
had to develop some way of allowing the rallies to proceed while at the same time protecting those
participating.”), aff’d, 180 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 1999).
32
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (establishing that speech advocating illegal conduct is protected under the First Amendment unless the speech is likely to incite
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Additionally, “the law does not expect or require [the police] to defend
the right of a speaker to address a hostile audience, however large and
intemperate, when to do so would unreasonably subject them to violent
retaliation and physical injury.”33 With this background in mind, this
Comment argues that universities that impose additional security fees
on student groups who invite controversial speakers are engaging in a
de facto heckler’s veto by imposing these additional costs due to audiences’ reactions.
III. PROGRESSION OF CASES
There are two series of cases implicated by the question of who
should pay security fees required to host controversial speakers on campus. The first outlines when security fees can be charged in certain public forums. The second outlines the relationship between universities
and student speech. This Comment argues that these two series of cases
fit together to establish that when universities establish a designated
public forum, imposing additional security costs on student groups who
invite controversial speakers to campus constitutes an infringement on
students’ First Amendment rights. The recent security fee cases in Subsection C illustrate that some courts have adopted this conclusion.
A. Fees and Permits in Public Forums
The government must protect controversial speakers in traditional public forums and may not charge speakers for increased security costs based on audience reaction to their controversial speech.34
However, the Supreme Court has held that regulations regarding the
use of public forums that ensure the safety and convenience of the people are not inconsistent with the First Amendment, so long as they do
not give the government too much discretion.35 In Cox v. New Hampshire36 the Supreme Court upheld a statute that required organizers
to obtain a special license before putting on a demonstration in a public forum.37 The statute authorized a municipality to charge a permit
fee for the “maintenance of public order” of up to $300.38 The Court
held that it was constitutional to charge a fee limited to the purpose of

“imminent lawless action”).
33
Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 909 (6th Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds
by Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015).
34
See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 135–36.
35
See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
36
312 U.S. 569.
37
Id. at 575–78.
38
Id. at 576–77.
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meeting the expense of administering the licensing act and maintaining public order.39 The Court went so far as to state that:
[t]he suggestion that a flat fee should have been charged fails to
take account of the difficulty of framing a fair schedule to meet
all circumstances, and we perceive no constitutional ground for
denying to local governments that flexibility of adjustment of
fees which in the light of varying conditions would tend to conserve rather than impair the liberty sought.40
In contrast to Cox, the Supreme Court has also held that a similar ordinance allowing county commissioners to assess a fee of up to $1,000
per day was unconstitutional because it gave a county administrator
too much discretion to determine how much to charge.41 In Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement,42 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “the constitutionality of charging a fee for a speaker
in a public forum.”43 As a result of demonstrations that led to unrest in
a small rural county, commissioners enacted an ordinance that required
a permit and a fee to be paid in advance of any event.44 The fee was to
be determined as needed to “meet the expense incident to the administration of the ordinance and to the maintenance of public order,” but
was capped at $1,000.45 The commissioners wanted to impose some of
the increased security costs on the demonstrators because the provision
of “necessary and reasonable protection” to participants in these
demonstrations “exceed[ed] the usual and normal cost of law enforcement.”46 When the plaintiffs proposed a demonstration a few years
later, the county imposed a $100 fee for the permit.47 The plaintiffs sued
claiming the fee infringed on their First Amendment rights.48
In a public forum, content-based regulations of speech must be
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.”49 In Forsyth, the ordinance imposing a fee based on audience reaction was content-based because “[t]hose wishing to express views unpopular with

39
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Id. at 577.
Id.
See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992).
505 U.S. 123.
Id. at 129.
See id. at 130.
Id. at 126–27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 134–35 (1992).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 130.
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bottle throwers, for example, may have to pay more for their permit.”50
Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court found that the statute was
not narrowly tailored because there were no “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards guiding the hand of the Forsyth County administrator.”51 Specifically, the administrator did not have to rely on
objective factors or explain his unreviewable decision; therefore, a biased administrator could use the fees as a form of censorship.52 The uncontrolled discretion of the ordinance permitted a content-based metric
for assessing security fees.53 Thus, it invalidated the ordinance.54
The language of the regulations in Cox and Forsyth are hard to distinguish, making the outcomes hard to reconcile.55 The Forsyth Court
did not overrule Cox, but stated it did not read Cox to permit a state
entity to charge controversial speakers a premium due to hostile audience reaction.56 While this explanation fails to explain how such similar
language can be read in opposite ways, it makes clear that the Supreme
Court would not permit a premium to be charged to controversial speakers going forward.
The Supreme Court recently upheld a content-neutral permit system that allowed for permit seekers to be excluded if the exclusion
helped preserve park facilities, prevented dangerous uses of forums,
and assured financial accountability for damage caused by an event.57
In Thomas v. Chicago Park District,58 a park ordinance required individuals to obtain a permit before hosting events of more than fifty people.59 The ordinance listed reasons why the Park District could deny an
application for a permit, including that “the applicant has not tendered
the required application fee,” “the applicant . . . has on prior occasions
damaged Park District property and has not paid in full for such damage,” and “the use or activity intended by the applicant would present
an unreasonable danger to the health or safety of the applicant, or other
users of the park, of Park District Employees or of the public.”60

50

Id. at 134 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989)).
Id. at 133 (internal citations omitted).
52
Id. at 133–34.
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Id.
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Id. at 137.
55
Compare id. at 126–27 (the fee was to be determined as needed to “meet the expense incident to the administration of the Ordinance and to the maintenance of public order”), with Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576–77 (1941) (the statute authorized a municipality to charge a
permit fee for the “maintenance of public order” of up to $300).
56
Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 136.
57
See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002).
58
534 U.S. 316.
59
Id. at 322.
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Although mere time, place, and manner restrictions can be applied in a
discriminatory way by giving too much discretion to park officials, there
was no fear that an official would grant or deny a permit based on its
content under the ordinance in this case.61 The Park District could only
deny a permit for one of the reasons set forth in the ordinance, and the
Court found those grounds to be “reasonably specific and objective, and
[did] not leave the decision ‘to the whim of the administrator.’”62 Together, Cox, Forsyth, and Thomas illustrate that, in traditional public
forums, permits and fees must be assessed in an objective and content
neutral way and speakers cannot be excluded or surcharged based on
the content of their speech (lest the regulation be subject to strict scrutiny).
B. Universities and Students’ First Amendment Rights
Students enjoy the constitutional protections of the First Amendment in a university setting.63 Though the Supreme Court has long recognized the authority of the state and of school officials to “prescribe
and control conduct in the schools,”64 it has held that First Amendment
protections are “nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.”65 It is important to note that this Comment addresses the First
Amendment rights of students at public universities because the First
Amendment only applies to government actors.66 Although many private universities protect student speech with commendable commitment, those institutions are not bound by the First Amendment.67 However, there are many reasons why private universities should adhere to
First Amendment principles.68 Thus, this Comment may be applicable
to private universities committed to protecting free speech as well.
61

Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 324 (“They provide ‘narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards’ to guide the
licensor’s determination.”) (quoting Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133
(1992)).
63
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room
for the view that . . . First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses
than in the community at large.”).
64
Id.
65
Id. (“The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas . . . .’”) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents State Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
Of course, there are many cases that cabin this broad pronouncement and allow school administrators to restrict speech on campuses. See generally JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE
(2018).
66
See, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019) (“[W]hen
a private entity provides a forum for speech, the private entity is not ordinarily constrained by the
First Amendment because the private entity is not a state actor.”).
67
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS xi (2017) (“We
recognize, of course, that the First Amendment applies only to public colleges and universities.”).
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The cases that set the parameters for a university’s ability to interfere with students’ First Amendment rights arose in the context of student group recognition. The following cases established that universities provide limited public forums to registered student organizations
and that universities cannot deny these student organizations access to
those forums based on a group’s viewpoints.
Denial of official recognition of a student organization, without sufficient justification, violates students’ First Amendment right of association.69 In Healy v. James,70 the Supreme Court held that a public educational institution exceeds constitutional bounds when it “restrict[s]
speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by [a]
group to be abhorrent.”71 The Court further held that the denial of official recognition to a student group without justification unconstitutionally impedes a group’s ability to associate by denying access to campus
resources.72
Using the same logic as in Healy, the Supreme Court has made
clear that universities cannot allow some groups to use campus resources but deny others based on the content of their messages.73 In
Widmar v. Vincent,74 a state university was sued by a religious student
group that was denied access to campus facilities because of a regulation that prohibited the use of school property for religious purposes in
an attempt to avoid state support for religion.75 The Court held that the
University had rendered itself a limited public forum by holding itself
open for use by student groups.76 Relying on Healy, the Supreme Court
reiterated that students have a right to free speech on campus and that
the withholding of campus resources is a form of prior restraint, subject
to strict scrutiny.77 The Court held that the regulation was invalid because it was a content-based regulation on religious activity and the
University could not show that regulation of that activity was necessary

ideas, President Trump issued an executive order directed at both public and private universities
urging them to protect free speech on campus or risk losing federal funds. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Trump Signs Broad Executive Order, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/03/22/white-house-executive-order-prods-colleges-free-speech-program-level-data-and-risk [https://perma.cc/BQ2P-UQ4Q].
69
See Healy, 408 U.S. at 181 (“[T]he freedom of association is . . . implicit in the freedoms of
speech, assembly, and petition.”).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 187–88.
72
Id. at 181.
73
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
74
454 U.S. 263.
75
Id. 265–66.
76
Id. at 267–68, 272.
77
Id. at 267 n.5.
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to serve a compelling interest or that the regulation itself was narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.78
Similarly, universities cannot fund the speech of some groups but
not others based on viewpoints.79 Though it often authorized the payment of printing costs for student publications, the University in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia80 denied printing costs to a student group’s newspaper on the ground that it promoted
religious beliefs.81 The Supreme Court held that the University had created a limited public forum by enacting a policy of providing funding for
the printing costs of student publications and that the denial of funding
for the plaintiffs’ publication involved unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, violating the students’ First Amendment rights.82 It did
not matter that that the University was denying funding for speech as
opposed to a platform for speech, as in Widmar.83
Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberg establish that the “First Amendment generally precludes public universities from denying student organizations access to school-sponsored forums because of the groups’
viewpoints.”84 It may be permissible, however, to deny a student group
access to campus resources if the resources are a subsidy and withholding access would not constitute a prior restraint on free speech. At issue
in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez85 was the constitutionality of a
university policy that required registered student organizations to accept an “all-comers” policy to allow all students to participate in any
student organization.86 A student group sued the University after they
were rejected as a registered student organization (“RSO”) for refusing
to comply with the all-comers policy.87 The Court deemed the RSO program a limited public forum, such that it could only impose restrictions
on speech that were reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum and
viewpoint neutral.88 Unlike earlier cases, the Supreme Court characterized the denial of school resources to student organizations as denial of
a subsidy, as opposed to a prior restraint.89 In doing so, it forewent an
78

Id. at 270, 276.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
80
Id.
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Id. at 827.
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Id. at 831.
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Id. at 832–33 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276).
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Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 667–68 (2010) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
819; Widmar, 454 U.S. 263; Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)).
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561 U.S. 661.
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Id. at 668.
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analysis of the regulation under strict scrutiny, opting instead for the
“less restrictive limited-public-forum analysis.”90
The Martinez Court ultimately held that the all-comers policy did
not violate the students’ First Amendment rights because the policy
was a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral condition on RSO status.91 The
policy was considered reasonable because it comported with the limited
forum’s purpose to bring together individuals with “diverse backgrounds and beliefs, encourage[ing] tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students.”92 The all-comers policy was also viewpoint neutral
because the policy drew no distinction between groups based on their
message or perspective.93 Additionally, even without official recognition, the group had access to alternative channels, such as access to
school facilities and advertising mechanisms.94
On a related note, in furtherance of free speech, universities may
impose a mandatory fee to sustain open dialogues on campus so long as
the allocation of funding to student groups is viewpoint neutral.95 In
Board of Regents v. Southworth,96 a group of students tried to challenge
a mandatory student fee policy at their university, claiming it violated
their First Amendment rights because the fee was used to fund speech
with which plaintiffs did not agree.97 The University collected the activity fee to “facilitate[] the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among,
its students.”98 The Court held it was constitutionally permissible to
collect a fee for that purpose, so long as it protected students’ First
Amendment interests by allocating those funds to student groups in a
viewpoint neutral way.99
The cases in this section paved the way for the recent security fee
cases to be decided—and more commonly, settled—by ascertaining that
universities offer a number of limited public forums. These cases show
that when universities establish such forums, courts will step in to ensure that all students’ speech rights are protected equally. However,
courts have left open the question of how this precedent applies in the
context of imposing security costs on student groups who invite controversial speakers to campus.

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
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99

Id.
Id. at 697
Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 694–95.
Id. at 690.
See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229–30 (2000).
529 U.S. 217.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 229–30.
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C. Recent Campus Security Fee Cases
Professor Erica Goldberg has advocated that courts should apply a
Forsyth analysis—requiring a court to determine whether a fee structure gives administrators “unbridled discretion” and whether the structure is content neutral—to universities when assessing the constitutionality of security fees.100 She also recommended that universities
create a separate fund for extra security, rather than asking students
or the speaker to pay.101 Since her article was published in 2011, a number of cases have addressed the constitutionality of imposing security
costs on student groups who invite controversial speakers, though most
have been resolved by a settlement rather than a judgement.
While there is no Supreme Court judgment dealing with security
fee allocation for speakers invited by students, the Court has made clear
that a fee policy that gives a state actor too much discretion to determine security costs will be held unconstitutional.102 With this idea in
the background, the Fifth Circuit decided Sonnier v. Crain,103 in which
an uninvited, non-student speaker sued the Southeastern Louisiana
University to enjoin enforcement of the speech policy regulating speech
by non-students on campus and imposing security fees.104 The fee policy
stated that the “sponsoring individual(s) or organization(s) [would be]
responsible for the cost of . . . security beyond that normally provided
by the University.”105 The speaker claimed that the speech policy violated the First Amendment because it gave the University “sole discretion . . . in determining both the need for, and the strength of the security” and would impute any additional costs on the sponsoring
individual or organization.106 Relying on Forsyth, the Court struck down
the policy because it gave the University “unbridled discretion” to determine the security fee.107
When a university gives itself broad discretion to determine security costs for hosting speakers on campus, the underlying regulation
will likely be held unconstitutional. In an order granting the student
plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, a federal district

100

Erica Goldberg, Must Universities “Subsidize” Controversial Ideas?: Allocating Security
Fees When Student Groups Host Divisive Speakers, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 349, 395–96
(2011).
101
Id. at 403.
102
See generally Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
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613 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2010), opinion withdrawn in part on reh’g, 634 F.3d 778 (5th Cir.
2011).
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Id. at 438.
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Id. at 440 n.4.
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Id. at 447.
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Id. at 447–48.
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court recently applied Forsyth in the context of a security fee for a controversial speaker invited to campus by a student group.108 In College
Republicans v. Cauce,109 a student group sought to bring a controversial
speaker to campus for a “Freedom Rally.”110 The University’s event policy required student organizations to pay the anticipated costs of security for on-campus events.111 For the rally, the University determined
that it needed enhanced security based on the time and location of the
event, how many people were estimated to attend the event, and audience responses to the controversial speaker at prior events.112 The University therefore demanded a $17,000 reimbursement from the
group.113 The student group filed suit claiming the fee policy violated
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by “regulating the student organization’s expression based on its conservative viewpoints and
the potential reaction of those who oppose [the speaker].”114
In reaching its conclusion in Cauce, the court relied on Forsyth,
finding that the security fee policy at issue was neither reasonable nor
viewpoint neutral because it gave administrators “broad discretion to
determine how much to charge student organizations for enhanced security, or whether to charge at all.”115 The court noted that the amount
of the fee would “depend on the administrator’s measure of the amount
of hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its content.”116
The policy also failed because the fees were assessed based on “history
or examples of violence, bodily harm, property damage, significant disruption of campus operations and violations of the campus code of conduct and state and federal law.”117 The court feared this would lead administrators to “inevitably impose elevated fees for events featuring
speech that is controversial or provocative and likely to draw opposition.”118 This case was resolved when the parties agreed to a settlement—with the University agreeing to pay $122,500 in legal fees to the
College Republicans’ attorneys and agreeing to rescind the security fee
policy for student group events.119 Though the University decided it
108

See Coll. Republicans v. Cauce, No. C18-189-MJP, 2018 WL 804497, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
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would no longer charge student groups a security fee for speakers, the
settlement did not preclude the University from “creating a constitutionally permissible security fee for student events” in the future.120
In another recent case on security fees for invited speakers, a California district court allowed a student group to proceed on an Equal
Protection claim against its university for imposing a security fee that
was much higher than it had been for other similarly situated events.121
In Young American’s Foundation v. Napolitano,122 a registered student
organization had organized an on-campus speaking engagement featuring Milo Yiannopoulos, a controversial conservative figure.123 The university cancelled the Yiannopoulos event when protests turned violent.124
In response to this event, University officials instituted policies
that put restrictions on the student organization’s subsequent speaking
engagements featuring controversial figures.125 Under the policies, the
University charged a $5,788 security fee for one of its events.126 For another event, the University imposed a $15,738 security fee, later reduced to $9,162.127 The reduced fee was still almost twice as much as
the fee charged for an event featuring Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor in the same facility, with more people, and with access to a
larger part of the facility.128
The court in Napolitano ultimately found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged an Equal Protection Clause violation, based on the imposition of an unreasonable fee.129 Relying on Cox, the court noted that
“with regard to security fees, government officials may . . . properly impose fees consistent with the First Amendment.”130 However, the court
was not convinced that the fees in this case were reasonable, stating
that, “[i]n the absence of a pleaded explanation for any of the fees imposed, and where, as here, an explanation is not otherwise apparent, such allegations suffice to support an as-applied challenge” to the
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policies.131 This case was resolved when the plaintiffs settled with UC
Berkeley for $70,000 to cover the plaintiff’s attorney costs, as well as a
revision of the campus policies for hosting speakers.132 The school noted
that the settlement was not a concession that the policies allowed for
viewpoint discrimination.133
These recent security fee cases show that courts have tended to find
the imposition of additional security fees on student groups who invite
controversial speakers to be problematic, if not unconstitutional. Given
the trend of universities settling these cases, universities may even
agree.
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPOSITION OF FEES
None of the First Amendment case law directly precludes a university from charging security fees; however, the fees must comport with
constitutional requirements of content neutrality, lest they be subject
to strict scrutiny. The cases discussed in Section III demonstrate that
any fees based on audience reaction to a controversial speaker must
pass strict scrutiny to avoid violating the First Amendment because audience reaction is not a content neutral way to assess fees.134
Professor Goldberg looked to some of the cases discussed in this
Comment to address whether “[p]ublic universities should adopt clearly
articulated policies that conform to Forsyth, Southworth, and their
progeny to ensure that administrators do not punish unpopular views
or assess speaker’s fees based on controversial content.”135 She articulated the basic elements of a constitutional security fee as: “(1) riskneutral and content-neutral standards for determining security fees; (2)
explicit guidelines on how those fees are determined; and (3) a transparent process for student groups to appeal security fees that are larger
than normal.”136 The problem is, assigning additional security costs to
student groups who invite speakers who elicit violent reactions from
protestors will necessarily fail prong (1) of this test.
With foresight, Professor Goldberg’s article argued for extending
Forsyth to apply in the limited public forum context of a university
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setting.137 This not only complies with Supreme Court precedent,138 but
lower courts have also adopted this approach. The court in Cauce followed this approach when it relied on Forsyth to determine a security
fee was unconstitutional.139 However, in Napolitano, another federal
district court relied on Cox to hold that government officials can impose
security fees, consistent with the First Amendment.140 The court in Napolitano did not find the policy to be unconstitutional itself, but was
concerned that the security fee was being imposed inconsistently.141 The
fee policy itself may have been the issue, or it could have been that the
policy was applied incorrectly, leading to the inconsistencies. It is hard
to know, because in both of these district court cases, the parties settled
before the courts resolved the controversies.142 The Court in Forsyth
stated that the difference in the fee policy invalidated in Forsyth and
the fee upheld in Cox was that, in Forsyth, the county could impose an
increased security fee in anticipation of a hostile audience.143 However,
there did not seem to be any real difference in the discretion given to
the government in either case.144
Given the importance of the exchange of ideas on campus and the
constitutional protection of students’ speech, the cases discussed in Section III.B demonstrate that courts will not allow universities to charge
student groups who invite controversial speakers to campus more for
the security costs that they charge for other speakers. Additionally, a
security fee structure that would allow a university to impose a security
fee within a permissible range would not be workable. Given the exorbitant costs of security for these events, the range would be huge (e.g.,
a range from $0 to $500,000, in case Richard Spencer visits).145 Not only
would additional costs be unpayable by most student groups, but a
range that spans thousands of dollars leaves more room for arbitrary
enforcement than even the $1,000 range invalidated in Forsyth.
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Universities might try to avoid hosting certain controversial speakers altogether by relying on Thomas, in which a park district did not
violate the First Amendment by denying access to its facilities based on
an ordinance that was “reasonably specific and objective.”146 It is conceivable that a university could set up a policy very similar to that in
Thomas by requiring permits for invited speakers and making the permits subject to a set of limitations that would to allow it to withhold a
permit in cases of danger.147 Given case law in university settings, it is
clear that universities cannot discriminate based on student organizations’ viewpoints, which also precludes discrimination based on predicted audience reactions.148 When Richard Spencer rented space from
the University of Florida, the University was able to cancel his first reservation because there were imminent and legitimate dangers that it
could point to.149 However, the University acquiesced that absent extenuating circumstances, it was obligated to allow him use of the University as a public forum.150 Whether relying on Forsyth, Cox, or Thomas,
assigning additional security costs to student groups who invite controversial speakers will trigger strict scrutiny review, and the speakers
cannot be turned away simply because of a hostile audience.
V.

OTHER WAYS OF MANAGING SECURITY COSTS

Since public universities may not impose extra security fees on student groups who invite controversial speakers to campus and the costs
stemming from hosting these speakers are becoming unmanageable,
universities must figure out other ways to defray these costs.151 In light
of the analysis above, this section will address potential ways universities can decrease security costs that do not involve impermissible impositions of additional fees on student groups.
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A. Use Martinez to Argue that Security Fee Allotments are a
Subsidy
The most interesting approach a university might take to limit its
security expenses would require it to change the student fee structure
so that every RSO receives a set budget from the school to fund everything from printing newspapers to, say, covering the costs of security
fees to host a controversial speaker. Universities may also try to set a
baseline amount of money for security per event, available for all student groups, and any costs beyond that amount would be imposed on
the group inviting the speaker or hosting the event.152 A university
might be able to frame the both the RSO budgets or the security fee as
a subsidy and support their position along the same lines as the rationale in Martinez.153 First, the Martinez Court framed access to school
resources as a subsidy whereas, in the past, the Supreme Court had
framed the issue as one of prior restraint.154 In the past, courts viewed
withholding student group recognition as a prior restraint on speech it
limited their access to a limited public forum.155 A university might try
to argue that it is not withholding additional funding based on audience
reaction, but that it is giving something equally to all student groups.
Second, the all-comers policy in Martinez was determined to be “textbook viewpoint neutral” because it applied to everyone.156 While the
amount of money allotted to each student group would be equal, this
approach would likely still be seen as a prior restraint on speech, because student groups that cannot afford to cover additional security fees
for their speakers would not be able to invite them.157
B. Educate and Train Students Before Conflicts Arise
Universities can institute First Amendment education and/or
training for students, similar to that used for Title IX training.158
152
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Informing students in a direct and clear way of the importance of free
speech on campus and outlining responses to speakers with whom students do not agree may lead to more tolerance on campus. While the
University of Florida did spend over $500,000 when Richard Spencer
came to campus, the protests did not rise to the level of those at UC
Berkeley, which paid similarly large security fees for a similar event.159
One reason for this may be the way the University of Florida handled
the event. The University took a direct and transparent approach to
hosting Richard Spencer, who was not invited by a student group,160 by
dedicating a webpage which explained their responsibilities under the
First Amendment161 and advocated that students not give Spencer the
spotlight by staying away from the event.162 The University of Florida
made clear the reasons Spencer was coming to campus and how much
he paid to rent the space.163 In short, universities can reduce spikes in
security costs by investing in both conflict prevention geared towards
the event and general tolerance education.
The University of Chicago provides another example of a university
clearly stating expectations for student conduct.164 In 2016, the private
university sent a letter to all incoming freshmen informing them of the
University’s commitment to free speech and its refusal to compromise
on its values.165 When former chairman of a conservative media outlet
and Trump advisor Steve Bannon was invited to campus in 2018, protests erupted but did not escalate to violence, though Bannon never set
a date to speak.166 Additionally, the University of Chicago serves as an
ix-training-mandatory/ [https://perma.cc/FQ2W-FGWF].
159
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example of general tolerance education: the University sought to design
a more robust education program to educate students on the rights and
responsibilities that come with participating in the university community, including “targeted outreach measures for students and recognized student organizations, which build on existing student-centered
programs and resources but are coordinated by the Office of Campus
and Student Life and developed with the faculty.”167
C. Institute Physical Security Best Practices
Universities can institute best practices in securing these events to
decrease costs. Some have questioned whether the security fees for
these events needed to be as high as they were. For example, Ben
Shapiro’s visit to the University of Tennessee cost the University less
than $4,000, in sharp contrast with the hundreds of thousands spent by
other universities.168 To prepare for the event, the University instituted
a “clear bag policy” for attendees, prohibited signs and large bags, and
did not allow for re-admittance to the event.169 Similarly, the University
of Florida was credited for its successful strategy of separating Spencer’s supporters from protestors with physical barriers.170 As universities cannot pass on increased costs of security due to audience response
to a controversial speaker, they would be well-advised to consider instituting measures like these to help decrease their security costs.
D. More Aggressive University Response to Hecklers
Universities may decide to crack down harder on disruptive protestors to discourage conduct that infringes on the speech rights of others.
In 2017, the University of Chicago formed a committee to look into what
could be done about disruptive conduct on campus in response to controversial speakers.171 The committee recommended that the University work to reduce the chances that disrupters prevent others from

(Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/news/will-steve-bannon-speak-u-chicago-or-wont
-he [https://perma.cc/57H9-6SJK]; see also Grace Hauck, Rally to Disinvite Bannon Draws Counter-Protests, CHI. MAROON (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.chicagomaroon.com/article/2018/2/4/rallydisinvite-bannon-draws-counter-protests/ [https://perma.cc/H9BY-USM3].
167
Colleen Flaherty, Dealing with Disrupters, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/03/22/u-chicago-committee-proposes-ways-dealingthose-who-shout-down-invited-speakers [https://perma.cc/G38L-FW3B].
168
Rachel Ohm, Shapiro’s University of Tennessee Visit Didn’t Cost a Fortune, KNOX NEWS
(Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/education/2017/11/06/shapiros-universitytennessee-visit-didnt-cost-fortune-why-and-why-does-matter/818833001/ [https://perma.cc/ER52MNP2].
169
Id.
170
See Bauer-Wolf, supra note 159.
171
See Flaherty, supra note 167.
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speaking by instituting a “free speech deans on call” program that
would allow for the designation and training of faculty to deal with disruptive conduct as it happens.172 The centralized punishment apparatus would be made up of five members consisting of faculty and students and dole out punishment on a case-by-case basis.173 Punishment
need not be harsh to be effective, but punishing disrupters more seriously could lead to a decrease in disruptive activity for fear of repercussions. However, the speaker and the protestor have a First Amendment
right to free speech. The issue addressed by this Comment is the high
costs of security for controversial speakers given a hostile audience reaction. The goal is not to prevent protests but to ensure both the rights
of the speaker and the protester are protected. To help ensure that the
rights of protestors are protected, the University of Chicago committee
gave examples of what would constitute “disruptive”174 and “nondisruptive”175 conduct to ensure students would know they still have the ability to protest speakers with whom they disagree.
The heart of the problem addressed by this Comment is the conduct
of hecklers on campus, not the hecklees. Imposing additional security
costs on student groups who invite controversial speakers can make it
cost prohibitive for their voices to be heard. But, it should not be overlooked that there are important speech interests on both sides. The solutions discussed in this Section attempt to balance the rights of a
speaker with dissenters’ rights to object. Both parties have a right to
free speech and these solutions attempt to protect both parties’ speech
interests.
VI. COUNTERARGUMENTS
There are a number of counterarguments to the conclusion that
universities cannot impose additional security fees onto the student
groups who invite controversial speakers to campus. Most of the counterarguments suggest approaches that target a speaker’s ability to
speak in the first place. Whether a university can exclude these speakers altogether plays into the issue of security fees because there is a fear
that putting the security costs on the speaker or, in this case, the student group who invites the speaker, will chill speech if the student
Id.
Id.
174
Id. (“Disruptive protests . . . include blocking access to an event or to a university facility
and shouting or otherwise interrupting an event or other university activity with noise in a way
that prevents the event or activity from continuing in its normal course.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
175
Id. (“‘Nondisruptive protests include: marches that do not drown out speakers; silent vigils;
protest signs at an event that do not block the vision of the audience; and boycotts of speakers or
events,’ the [committee’s] report says.”).
172

173
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group cannot afford the fees.176 Because these speakers cannot be excluded based on audience reaction, this Section will show that the counterarguments cannot resolve the question of who should pay the
speaker fees.
A. Students’ Free Speech Rights are Not Being Infringed Upon
One might argue that students’ free speech rights are not implicated when a university imposes security costs on a student group who
invites an outside speaker. The argument would be that the speaker’s
rights are stifled, but not the rights of the students who invited the
speaker. Professor Goldberg persuasively argues that students’ free
speech rights are implicated in a number of ways. First, the fees infringe on a student group’s First Amendment right to receive information.177 Further, the non-student speech is attributable to the student group who invited the speaker, and the “extra security fees are a
burden on the student group’s speech in the same way as denying a
student organization funding to publish its religious newspaper.”178 Although the imposition of security fees do not prevent students themselves from speaking, their free speech rights are impeded nonetheless
when they cannot afford to invite speakers to campus.
B. Controversial Speakers Should Not be Brought to Campus
Another foreseeable counterargument is that nobody should pay
the security fees because these controversial speakers should not be invited to campus in the first place. This argument would be strong-er
against speakers like Richard Spencer or Milo Yiannopoulos, who are
widely considered to be more showmen than speakers of sub-stance.
The speech being offered may not seem to contribute to civil discourse,
however, the First Amendment protects even hateful and offensive
speech179
A stronger argument for excluding these speakers comes from Professor Robert Post of Yale University, who argues that there is no First
Amendment right to free speech on university campuses.180 If he is
176

See, e.g., Coll. Republicans v. Cauce, No. C18-189-MJP, 2018 WL 804497, at *3 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 9, 2018).
177
See Goldberg, supra note 100, at 383 (“Given a willing speaker, freedom of speech protects
both the source and the recipients of the communication”) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756, 773 (1976)).
178
Id. at 386 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995)).
179
Elisabeth E. Constantino, Comment, Free Speech, Public Safety, & Controversial Speakers:
Balancing Universities’ Dual Roles After Charlottesville, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 637, 639 (2018)
(citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
180
See Robert C. Post, There is No 1st Amendment Right to Speak on a College Campus, VOX
(Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-
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correct, then the solution to the escalating costs of security fees can be
avoided by preventing the controversial speakers from coming to campus in the first place. Professor Post argues that universities’ dual missions of “education and the creation of knowledge” take them outside
the realm of public discourse and therefore, allow universities to engage
in content discrimination.181 In support of his argument, he lists examples of this acceptable “content discrimination”: professors are prohibited from engaging in personal abuse of their students, professors hired
to teach mathematics must teach mathematics, and professors engage
in content discrimination when grading exams.182 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky of UC Berkeley published a response to Professor Post’s article,
saying that Professor Post argues for what he thinks that law should
be, instead of what the law is.183 Dean Chemerinsky points out the fatal
flaw in Professor Post’s argument: the idea that because free speech
principles do not always apply on campus, they can never apply.184
When a public university creates a limited public forum, it does not follow that the entire university becomes a public forum.185 As described
in Section III, the law is on Dean Chemerinsky’s side.186
C. It Is A Waste of Money to Host Controversial Speakers
One might also argue that the huge security costs required to host
these speakers are a waste of money for everyone involved because it is
so rare these speakers even get to actually speak. “Shouting down” controversial speakers has become a common response to speakers on campus, in which the speaker has a platform but cannot convey his message.187 This Comment does not argue that universities will always be
successful in protecting First Amendment rights, but the fact that it is
difficult to protect free speech rights does not mean universities do not
have the responsibility to try. Instituting some of the solutions
campuses-milo-spencer-protests [https://perma.cc/G9VD-8BWA].
181
Id.
182
Id. Professor Post states: “I subject my students to constant content discrimination. If I am
teaching a course on constitutional law, my students had better discuss constitutional law and not
the World Series.” Id.
183
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate Speech is Protected Free Speech, Even on College Campuses,
VOX (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-free-speechfirst-amendment-protest [https://perma.cc/BCT9-JN55].
184
Id.
185
Compare Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976–77 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a university classroom is a non-public forum), with Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (holding that the university had created a limited public forum by funding
the printing costs of student publications).
186
See supra Section III.B.
187
Charles S. Nary, The New Heckler’s Veto: Shouting Down Speech on University Campuses,
21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 306 (2018).
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described in Section V may not only lower security costs to the university, but may also increase the likelihood these speakers can actually
use the platform the university is protecting.188
VII. CONCLUSION
The University of Florida had to pay $500,000 for security when
Richard Spencer came to the campus, uninvited.189 If a university has
to foot the bill when speakers are not invited to campus by student
groups, the justifications for requiring them to pay the security fees are
even stronger when students are actually interested in what a speaker
has to say.190 On the other hand, if universities do not find a way to get
security fees under control, the community could lose out on the university as a forum altogether. The line of cases about the relationshipbetween universities and students makes it clear that universities provide limited designated public forums for students to invite speakers.191
These designated public forums are only treated as such as long as they
are open to the public.192 Universities may decide the costs are too high
to allow outside speakers in if they are consistently having to pay millions of dollars per year on security fees alone. While it may be the case
that less harm would come to speech on campus by charging a fee as
opposed to not having speakers on campus altogether, the First Amendment forbids universities from imposing additional security costs onto
the student groups who invite controversial speakers to campus. In an
effort to preserve the university as a marketplace of ideas that universities have come to serve as, universities and scholars must continue to
develop methods of coping with exorbitant security costs when controversial speakers come to campus.

188

See, e.g., supra Section V.B (discussing how instituting free speech training for students
may decrease the amount of heckling that occurs in response to controversial speakers).
189
Belkin, supra note 2.
190
See Padgett v. Auburn Univ., No. 3:17-CV-231-WKW, 2017 WL 10241386, at *1 (M.D. Ala.
Apr. 18, 2017). The court sided with a student who invited Richard Spencer to campus after the
university cancelled the event due to security concerns. Id. The court granted a temporary restraining order against the university to enjoin it from cancelling the event. Id.; see also Jeremy
Bauer-Wolf, Auburn University Lawsuit Settled, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 16, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/05/16/auburn-university-lawsuit-settled
[https://perma.cc/E7G5-UUYL].
191
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
192
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (citing
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).

Immigration, Retaliation, and Jurisdiction
Daniel Simon†

I.

INTRODUCTION

When federal officials told Ravidath Ragbir that they were deporting him because of his immigration activism, no one could stop them.1
This unreviewability was by design — a feature, rather than a bug, of
our immigration laws. Federal law curtails the ability of aliens facing
removal from the United States to seek relief through habeas corpus:
No federal court may exercise habeas jurisdiction over a claim by an
alien challenging her removal, regardless of whether that claim is statutory or constitutional in nature.2 While this limitation presents
broader problems for immigrants in detention, its impact is particularly
pronounced in the context of selective or retaliatory enforcement.
Ragbir’s case demonstrates the dangers of this general rule. Ragbir — an alien deportable as a result of a federal wire fraud conviction —
has spent years organizing for more lenient immigration policies. That
advocacy led a senior official from Immigration and Customs Enforcement to admit that he was deporting Ragbir because of his advocacy.
Ragbir remains in the United States thanks to the intervention of federal courts. But in Ragbir’s case, discretion layered with unreviewability allowed the Executive to come perilously close to deporting Ragbir
to his native Trinidad because of his criticisms of a government policy —
the undisputed nucleus of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
Whether he should be here or there is quite beyond the point: motive
matters in the law as in life, and identifying motives as impermissible
serves valuable expressive and dignitary purposes.
This Comment explains why certain claims of selective enforcement in retaliation for First Amendment activity are — thanks to the
†

AB 2017, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2021, The University of Chicago Law
School.
1
Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), vac’d sub nom. Pham v. Ragbir, No. 19-1046,
2020 WL 5882107 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020); see also Ragbir v. Holder, 389 F. App’x 80 (2d Cir. 2010);
Ragbir v. Lynch, 640 F. App’x 105 (2d Cir. 2016); Ragbir v. Barr, No. 18-1595, 2019 U.S. App.
LEXIS 37203 (2d Cir. July 30, 2019); Ragbir v. United States, No. 17-1256, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13236, (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2019), aff’d, 950 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. 2020) (denying writ of coram nobis).
2
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2020).
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Suspension Clause3 — exempt from the general rule of unreviewability
set forth above. Although courts have previously addressed related
questions, none has done so squarely, and none has done so in light of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Nieves v. Bartlett.4 In Nieves, the Court
held that the existence of probable cause generally bars retaliatory arrest claims except in those circumstances where an officer’s discretion
would typically counsel against arresting a similarly situated individual.5 Given that aliens in removal proceedings have no general “constitutional right to assert selective enforcement,”6 however, Nieves may
portend the doom of all retaliatory removal claims irrespective of the
Suspension Clause.
But it shouldn’t. The vast discretion afforded the executive in immigration enforcement authorizes it to knowingly tolerate the unlawful
presence of aliens within the United States. When, after obtaining an
order of final removal against an alien, the government grants the alien
a stay of removal, the government should not be allowed use that order
to chill that alien’s First Amendment rights. Such a proposition is not
new. The Constitution and statutes such as the Speedy Trial Act7 ensure that prosecutors cannot use the specter of criminal prosecution to
coerce criminal suspects. Immigration authorities shouldn’t be able to
do so either. Moreover, Nieves arose in the criminal context, whereas
immigration proceedings are civil. Thus, arguments that Nieves somehow changed the game are wide of the mark.
This Comment proceeds in three principal parts. The first traces
the histories of habeas corpus, immigration, and retaliation. The second
explains Ragbir’s dilemma. And the third brings the two together.
Ultimately, the Comment concludes that for a narrow class of aliens — those who entered the United States lawfully, remain in the
United States pursuant to a stay of removal, and have exhausted all
statutory avenues for review — the Suspension Clause bars the application of jurisdiction-stripping statutes to claims arising from the government’s retaliatory decision to remove the alien from the country. Because these aliens are in detention within — and have substantial ties
to — the United States, the writ of habeas corpus as understood at the
Framing guarantees that the Suspension Clause applies to them. When
an alien has exhausted her lone statutorily authorized motion to reopen
her case with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, no adequate

3

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019).
5
Id. at 1727.
6
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999).
7
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2080, as amended August 2, 1979, 93 Stat. 328, codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 – 3174.
4
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judicial forum exists in which she can challenge subsequent constitutional violations. Any statutes, then, which operate to preclude judicial
review of the government’s allegedly retaliatory decisionmaking must
be deemed inapplicable absent a Congressional suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Habeas Corpus in America
Any effort to examine the power of the executive to detain might
sensibly start with an examination of the laws authorizing such detentions. For reasons which will hopefully become apparent, this examination instead starts with the most ancient and storied remedy for such
detentions, the writ of habeas corpus.
“Indisputably hold[ing] an honored position in our jurisprudence,”8
the “Great Writ” of habeas corpus protects “liberty and republicanism”
against “arbitrary imprisonments,” “the favorite and most formidable
instruments of tyranny.”9 So essential is the protection against arbitrary arrest or detention that it has become a feature of customary international law10—an unsurprising development given the writ’s availability across both common and civil law systems.11 The Framers
regarded the availability of habeas as vital: early drafts of the Suspension Clause envisioned the writ as being “enjoyed in this Government
in the most expeditious and ample manner.”12 “Suffering the denial of
habeas corpus became a marker of liberty and independence, a point of
honor by which Americans would sustain rebellion.”13 The decision in
1774 to suspend the writ within Quebec even prompted an overture
from the Continental Congress for that province to join the fledgling
union.14 It is no wonder, then, that the Framers took care when drafting
8

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982).
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 137 – 38 (9th ed. 1783) (“And by the
habeas corpus act, 31 Cha. II. c. 2. (that second magna carta, and the stable bulwark of our liberties) it is enacted, that no subject of this realm . . . shall be sent prisoner into . . . places beyond the
seas (where they cannot have the benefit and protection of the common law).”).
10
Int’l Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, art. 9, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668.
11
See, e.g., “amparo de libertad” and “Verfassungsbeschwerde.” Cf. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A
WORLDWIDE STUDY (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) (surveying international criminal procedure); Wilhelm Karl Geck, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative Survey of Present Institutions and Practices, 51 CORNELL L. REV. 250, 300 – 301 (1966).
12
1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 249 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1837); see also 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 460 – 64 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
1837).
13
PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 253 (2010).
14
1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774 – 89, 105–13 (1904); see Zechariah
9
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the Constitution to limit the circumstances in which the writ could be
suspended.
To do so the Framers drew from the experience of the Confederation. Before the Ratification, just four state constitutions contained provisions protecting the writ.15 Confederation-era legislation in Pennsylvania,16 New York,17 and Virginia18 protected the writ, while Georgia
and Massachusetts adopted a belt-and-suspenders strategy.19 These
statutory enactments largely tracked the language of Britain’s seminal
Act of 1679,20 with two states going so far as to copy the text verbatim —
including now-superfluous language regarding “his majesty’s justices.”21 South Carolina’s 1712 enactment of the 1679 Act remained in
force,22 thus bringing the total number of states with positive protection
for the writ to eight.23 At the nascent federal level, the Northwest Ordinance enacted by the Confederation Congress in 1787 specifically provided that “inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to
the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus.”24
At Philadelphia, however, little was said about what would become
the Suspension Clause. Notables at the Convention questioned the need
for an explicit protection of the writ in the new Union, fearing it would

Chafee Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. L. REV. 143, 145 (1952).
15
Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776 – 1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 247
(1965). Georgia incorporated the Act of 1679 into its constitution; North Carolina conferred a personal right to habeas corpus (though it did not use those words); and Massachusetts and New
Hampshire provided both an affirmative right to the writ and legislative power to suspend it for a
period of time. See N.C. CONST art. XIII (1776); GA. CONST. art. LX (1777); MASS. CONST. ch. 6, art.
VII (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 91 (1784).
16
Act of Feb. 18, 1785, § 12, reprinted in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA 573 (7th ed.,
Philadelphia, Davis 1847) (imposing a £200 fine on anyone who transfers a prisoner without legal
authority).
17
Act of Feb. 21, 1787, N.Y. Laws 1785 – 88, 424 (Official Reprint 1886).
18
Act of 1779, 11 VA. STAT. 410 (Richmond, Cochran 1823) (prohibiting transfers of prisoners
out of the state except “where the prisoner shall be charged by affidavit with treason or felony,
alleged to be done in any of the other United States of America, in which . . . case he shall be sent
thither in custody” by order of a Virginia court).
19
See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. LX (1777) (“The principles of the habeas-corpus act shall be a part
of this constitution.”); Act of Mar. 16, 1785, 1 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 72, § 10 (1823) (prohibiting
“any person [from] transport[ing] . . . any subject of this Commonwealth . . . to any part or place
without the limits of the same . . . except [if] such person be sent by due course of law, to answer
for some criminal offense committed in some other of the United States of America”).
20
Regarded by Blackstone as the “second magna carta,” the Act represented a decades-long
struggle to codify the power of courts to question the basis for an individual’s detention. 31 Cha.
2. c. 2 § 8 (1679); see supra note 9; Halladay, supra note 13, at 80 – 81.
21
See GA CONST. art. LX (1777); Act of Oct. 16, 1692, 2 S.C. STAT. 74 (Cooper 1837).
22
Act of Dec. 12, 1712, 2 S.C. STAT. 399 – 401 (Columbia, Johnston 1837) (adopting the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679).
23
Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maryland round out the Thirteen.
Rhode Island had no written constitution before the Ratification. See Oaks, supra note 15, at 247.
24
The Northwest Ordinance, art. II, codified at 1 Stat. 50 (1787).
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provide a roadmap for abuse.25 Initial proposals placed in Article III an
outright prohibition on suspending the writ, presumably to empower
federal judges in their own right.26 When the rough outlines of what
would become the Suspension Clause were approved, the Clause was
moved to Article I to reflect its constraint on Congress’s powers. The
resulting text — that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it”27 — tracked that of Massachusetts’ constitution and was approved seven to three. The three dissenters believed
the writ should be inviolable.28
Of course, all thirteen states would ratify the Constitution. While
the Constitution provided an implied right of habeas corpus, it would
take legislative action to provide a path for accessing the writ. Congress
did not delay. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 178929 provided that
federal district judges and justices of the Supreme Court could issue
writs of habeas corpus to those incarcerated by the federal government.30 Although unsettled at Ratification,31 the question of whether
the Suspension Clause was intended to vest the federal courts with jurisdiction of their own was answered in Ex parte Bollman.32 The First
Congress had, in the First Judiciary Act, supplied federal courts with
jurisdiction to preserve the privilege gestured towards in the Suspension Clause.33 In Bollman, Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the
failure to do so would have violated the Suspension Clause itself.34
Since that time, little has changed in the writ’s purposes. Much has
changed in the way of process and limitations, however. Modern federal
25

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 442 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956); see also, Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 451, 463 – 65 (1996) (describing AntiFederalist opposition to the Suspension Clause).
26
See Neil Douglas McFeeley, The Historical Development of Habeas Corpus, 30 SW. L. J. 585,
595 (1976) (noting that Charles Pinckney’s plan provided for the habeas right in what was then
Article VI, the section on judicial power).
27
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
28
Oaks, supra note 15, at 248; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec.
20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 440 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) (objecting
that the Constitution lacked “the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws”).
29
Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81 – 82 (1789).
30
Id. § 14. The current habeas corpus statute authorizing review of federal detention, 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (2020), flows directly from this first authorization.
31
Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 961, 973–74 (1998); accord WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 113 – 15 (Phillip H. Nicklin ed., Portage Pub., Inc. 2011) (1825); Akhil Reed Amar,
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1509 – 10 (1987).
32
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807).
33
Id. at 95.
34
Id. (“[F]or if the means [of exercising review] be not in existence, the privilege itself would
be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.”).

482

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

habeas corpus petitions are brought in federal district court.35 But as
recently as 2009, the Court has reaffirmed that habeas must remain
available so as to protect against arbitrary detentions.36 The Suspension Clause ensures that, absent an “adequate and effective” alternative
to habeas, the writ itself will be available.37 And nowhere is “the need
for collateral review is mo[re] pressing” than “[w]here a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after being tried and convicted in a court.”38
Modern habeas corpus has, for all intents and purposes, always
acted as a check on the authority of the executive to detain the individual.39 “The scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach all
manner of illegal detention—its ability to cut through barriers of form
and procedural mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously
guarded by courts and lawmakers.”40 But while legislative, jurisprudential, and academic discussion of habeas corpus has largely centered on
review of criminal convictions or punishments, habeas has never been
so limited. Aliens have long used the Great Writ as a manner of seeking
review of their detention or exclusion from the United States.
B. Immigration Proceedings & Their Limits
The power to exclude noncitizens is a hallmark of sovereignty.41
But for the first eighty years of the Republic, Congress passed just one
35

28 U.S.C. § 2241. Though statutes authorize the Supreme Court to grant habeas corpus as
a matter of the Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court has not done so since 1925. See Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925); cf. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (denying petitioner’s habeas claim on the merits).
36
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008).
37
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
38
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783.
39
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301–03 (2001), superseded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. (“At its
historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”).
See, e.g., Swain, 430 U.S. at 380 n.13 (1977); Id. at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he traditional Great Writ was largely a remedy against executive detention.”); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) (“The historic purpose of the writ has been to
relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.”).
40
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 2 91 (1969); see also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346
(1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[H]abeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very issue
of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although
every form may have been preserved, opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an
empty shell.”).
41
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (“As a member
of the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in that field are equal to the right
and power of the other members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not
completely sovereign. The power to . . . expel undesirable aliens . . . [is not] expressly affirmed by
the Constitution, nevertheless exist[s] as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality.”) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV.
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bill related to the admission or removal of aliens from the United States:
The Alien Friends Act42 authorized the removal or exclusion of individuals “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.”43 Since
then, immigration policy and the structures used to effectuate that policy have evolved to meet new economic and political realities. Modern
immigration law is “akin to a corn maze,”44 governed by a complex web
of statutes, regulations, and discretion. Much has been written on these
subjects; a primer is in order nonetheless.45
1.

Historical proceedings

The Court in the Passenger Cases46 confirmed that regulation of
immigration was an exclusively federal subject.47 Despite this confirmation of federal supremacy, Congress did not act in the realm of immigration until 1875.48 In the 1880s, Congress began to exercise what
would become known as its Plenary Power.49 Starting in the Chinese
Exclusion Case,50 Congress’s unenumerated power to regulate the exclusion and removal of immigrants was rooted in the sovereign right of
the nation to defend itself.51 While the Plenary Power has been the subject of much debate by scholars, its place in constitutional law is secure.
Removal of aliens ultimately came to be viewed as an administrative process rather than a true “legal” (in the common law sense)

255, 274 (1984).
42
Ch. 58, 1 Stat. 557 (1798).
43
Id. § 1. Congress had passed the Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. That law,
however, regulated naturalization rather than immigration — a distinction of significance.
44
Ragbir v. Sessions, No 18-cv-236, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13939, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
2018), vacated as moot, No. 18-1595, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 37203 (2d Cir. July 30, 2019).
45
The realm of exclusion, or the denial of entry into the United States, is largely beyond the
scope of this Comment. The Executive enjoys even broader discretion in the area of exclusion than
it does in removal, and the First Amendment has never been applied extraterritorially. See, e.g.,
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 – 23 (2018); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
769–70 (1972) (holding that plenary power authorized the Attorney General to exclude foreign
nationals on the basis of their speech); Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 103 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (applying Mandel’s reasoning and holding). Claims regarding the exclusion
of aliens on First Amendment grounds are thus unlikely to succeed.
46
48 U.S. 283 (1849).
47
Id.
48
See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477 – 78; accord INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 305 (2001).
49
See generally Legomsky, supra note 41.
50
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
51
See, e.g., Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2010); see also CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 318. But see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012) (“The
history of the United States is in part made of the stories, talents, and lasting contributions of
those who crossed oceans and deserts to come here.”).
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proceeding requiring a hearing before a court.52 But a constant feature
of whatever process was due to an alien was the availability of habeas
to challenge her removal. One judge in the Northern District of California is reported to have heard over seven thousand habeas petitions challenging the removals of mostly Asian immigrants between 1882 –
1890.53
Frustrated with the delays such proceedings could entail, Congress
elected to provide alternative forms of review. In the 1917 Immigration
Act Congress strove to curb judicial review to the maximum extent possible.54 Even so, courts continued to exercise review of exclusion and
deportation orders for compliance with “fundamental principles of justice embraced within the conception of due process of law.”55 With the
passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)56 — the
backbone of modern immigration law— the government ushered in a
system of administrative and judicial review based on factors such as
an alien’s residence within or without the nation, the grounds for removing the alien, and principles of finality. Following the enactment of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),57 immigrants facing removal
could seek “substantial evidence” review pursuant to the Hobbs Act of
the government’s decision in a court of appeals.58 But prior to the APA’s
enactment, habeas was the exclusive avenue for an alien to challenge
removal or exclusion. In 1961, Congress amended the INA to modify
various substantive aspects of immigration law such as country quotas,
but nothing in these amendments was intended to foreclose habeas review.59 For the next three decades, little would change in American immigration proceedings.
52

See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
Christian G. Fritz, A Nineteenth Century “Habeas Corpus Mill”: The Chinese Before the Federal Courts in California, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 347, 348 (1988).
54
S. Rep. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 2, 16 (remarking of § 17 of the Act that “[t]he
last [finality] provision, while new in this particular location, is not new in the law, the courts
having repeatedly held that in the cases of aliens arrested for deportation, as well as in the cases
of those excluded at our ports, the decision of the administrative officers is final, and the Supreme
Court having in several decisions regarded the case of the alien arrested for deportation as practically a deferred exclusion (The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 [(1903)]; Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 [(1906)]; etc.).”).
55
Kwok Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 458 (1920) (quoting Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673,
681–82 (1912)).
56
Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
57
Pub.L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
58
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50 – 51 (1955); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 52 –53 (1950) (holding that deportation proceedings must comply with the APA to be enforceable).
59
“[T]here is always available to an alien in custody under a deportation order the right to
apply for a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of questioning the validity of the order.” H. Rep.
No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2974.
53
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2. Modern immigration proceedings
Congress dramatically reformed immigration proceedings in 1996.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)60 and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA)61 ushered in the modern system for adjudicating deportability
and removal. Today, aliens who arrive or remain in the United States
without authorization are subject to removal from the country,62 as are
lawful permanent residents who become “deportable.”63 A lawful permanent resident can be rendered deportable by committing any crime
that: may result in a sentence of more than one year in prison; involves
the transportation or possession of any controlled substance except less
than thirty grams of marijuana; is defined as an “aggravated felony”; is
a domestic violence offense; or is the alien’s second crime of “moral turpitude.”64 A deportable alien is, by contrast, only made removable if the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) chooses to seek that alien’s
removal and proves that the alien is in fact deportable.
To render an alien removable, the DHS serves an alien it believes
to be subject to removal with a “notice to appear” for a hearing before
an immigration judge employed by the Department of Justice.65 At that
proceeding, the alien may be detained pending removal, have their residency status modified, or may be released.66 Ultimately, the immigration judge determines, based on applicable statutes and regulations,
whether to issue an order of final removal against the alien. Only once
such an order has been entered may DHS remove an alien.
Both the government and the alien may appeal adverse aspects of
the immigration judge’s ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), an appellate body within the Department of Justice.67 Further
review may be sought by filing a petition for review in a court of appeals,
which has discretion to grant the petition and order reconsideration of
certain aspects of the decision or alternative relief.68 Although similar
to the original petition for review process first established in the 1950s,
60

Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996).
Div. C, Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1996 (H.R. 3610), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009 – 546 (1996).
62
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (2020).
63
Id. § 1227(a)(2).
64
Id.
65
Id. § 1229(a) (initiation of removal proceedings); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a) (2020) (describing authority of Immigration Judges); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (2020) (authorizing appointment of
immigration judges).
66
8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(1)(i) – (iv).
67
Id. §§ 1003.1 – 1003.3 (2020).
68
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341 – 2353 (2020) (specifying procedures for exercise of jurisdiction by courts of appeals over petitions for review).
61
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the modern process consolidates judicial review of removal into a single
Article III proceeding with only a narrow set of claims subject to review
therein.69 Questions of law and constitutional questions are reviewed
de novo, while factual determinations by an immigration judge or the
BIA are reviewed for substantial evidence.70
Because immigration hearings are not criminal in nature,71 aliens
have a right to counsel, but not appointed counsel, during these proceedings.72 Likewise, other protections which accompany the criminal
justice system are absent from the immigration context.73 Although immigration proceedings are civil, recent cases have recognized the serious impact that removal can have on an alien and her family. Most notably, in Padilla v. Kentucky74 the Court held that an attorney’s failure
to advise her client that his conviction for transporting marijuana
would render him deportable could form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.75
Resource constraints make removing all deportable aliens impossible. Congress has authorized the executive to selectively pursue both an
order of removal and the order’s ultimate effectuation.76 An alien
69

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
div. C, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
70
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (specifying courts of appeal may review constitutional questions
and questions of law in a petition for review proceeding); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.”).
71
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
72
8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2020); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.3 (2020) (implementing regulation). Nearly all agree
that this right is constitutional in nature. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“[T]he Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); see also Biwot v.
Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The right to counsel in immigration proceedings
is rooted in the Due Process Clause.”); Dakane v. U.S. Attorney General, 399 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“It is well established in this Circuit that an alien in civil deportation proceedings . . . has the constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause . . . to a fundamentally fair hearing.”); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”) (citing Reno, 507
U.S. at 306); Rosales v. Bureau of Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, 426 F.3d 733, 736 (5th Cir.
2005) (“[D]ue process requires that [deportation hearings] be fundamentally fair . . . .”); Brown v.
Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The right . . . under the Fifth Amendment to due process of law in deportation proceedings is well established.”). The Attorney General has agreed with
this consensus. Matter of Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009).
73
For example, the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, does not apply to immigration proceedings: Congress may pass laws that retroactively render aliens deportable for
offenses that, at the time of conviction, could not have led to deportation. See Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“And whatever might have been said at an earlier date for applying the ex
post facto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this Court that it has no application to deportation.”).
74
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
75
Id. at 374; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (classifying aliens convicted “of a violation
of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance” as deportable).
76
See INA § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(c)(2)(A)(i)) (authorizing the Attorney General to
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against whom an order of final removal has been entered may request
a stay of removal.77 A 2017 article suggests that nearly one million individuals are present in the United States despite the fact that ICE has
obtained a final order of removal against them.78 Regardless of whether
these aliens’ removals have been formally stayed through the processes
set forth in law, their continued presence is the result of ICE’s discretion79: No statute provides for judicial review of the decision to grant,
deny, or terminate a stay of removal.80 Because a stay of removal is entered only after the issuance of an order of final removal, there is frequently nothing left for a court to review. The result is that current federal law operates — contrary to reality — as if the entry of an order of
final removal is tantamount to execution of that order.81
3.

Collateral review of immigration proceedings

The broad power of Congress to define the substantive bases for
excluding or removing immigrants did nothing “which in any manner
affect[ed] the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to issue a
writ of habeas corpus.”82 “We know that at common law a petitioner’s
status as an alien was not a categorical bar to habeas corpus relief.”83
In 1892, the Court affirmed that “[a]n alien immigrant, prevented from
landing . . . is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain
whether the restraint is lawful.”84
stay the removal of an alien if removal “is not practicable or proper”); see also Clark v. Suarez
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (2005) (stating that, pursuant to 6 U.S.C. §§ 251(2), 252(a)(3),
271(b), the Secretary of Homeland Security now has the authority to stay removals originally delegated by Congress in § 241 of the INA to the Attorney General).
77
8 C.F.R. § 241.6 (2020) (“Any request of an alien under a final order of deportation or removal for a stay of deportation or removal shall be filed . . . with the district director [of ICE] having jurisdiction over the place where alien is at the time of filing.”); see also Id. § 212.5 (2020)
(listing factors ICE should consider in whether to grant a stay); accord 8 U.S.C. § 1231(c)(2)(A).
78
Vivian Yee, Migrants Confront Judgment Day over Old Deportation Orders, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/us/migrants-facing-old-deportation-or
ders.html [https://perma.cc/65XW-REXF].
79
Id.
80
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); see also infra Part III.
81
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is
ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a
period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).”).
82
United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 628–29 (1888).
83
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 747 (2008); see, e.g., Sommersett v. Stewart (Sommersett’s Case), 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 80 – 82 (1772) (ordering an African slave freed upon finding the
custodian’s return insufficient). See generally Khera v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [1984]
A.C. 74, 111 (H.L.) (“Habeas corpus protection is often expressed as limited to ‘British subjects.’ Is
it really limited to British nationals? Suffice it to say that the case law has given an emphatic ‘no’
to the question.”).
84
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); see also United States v. Jung
Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888) (affirming district court’s use of habeas corpus to review an immigrant’s long-term detention aboard a ship of voyage in San Francisco harbor).
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This remained the case for over a century. In two landmark cases
involving the power of the federal judiciary to review the exclusion of
aliens from the United States, the Court declined to provide the aliens
with relief. In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,85 the Court
declined to require the Attorney General to admit Knauff, a war bride.86
Knauff filed a habeas petition challenging her exclusion on the grounds
that “her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States.”87 The Attorney General declined to provide any basis for that
conclusion, and the Court said he was not required to do so.88 Three
years later in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,89 the Court
held that a noncitizen indefinitely detained because no other country
would accept him could not compel his admission to the United States.90
Despite Mezei’s functional imprisonment on Ellis Island, the Court held
that the refusal of other countries did not affect the unfettered discretion afforded to the Attorney General to make determinations regarding
the admissibility of noncitizens.91
But in both cases the Court reached the merits. Nowhere in either
opinion did the Court consider that the Plenary Power precluded judicial consideration of the immigrants’ habeas petitions. The substantive
discretion enjoyed by the executive did not minimize the procedural protections afforded by habeas corpus. Whether the immigrants could win
relief on the merits was discrete from the method of challenging their
predicaments. And even where Congress curtailed the extent of judicial
review over immigration decisions, habeas remained available. In Heikkila v. Barber,92 the Court concluded that, stripped of all jurisdiction
other than that “required by the Constitution,” habeas remained because some possibility of “judicial intervention in deportation cases” is
necessary.93 In fact, until 1952 “the sole means by which an alien could
test the legality of his or her deportation order was by bringing a habeas
corpus action in district court.”94
Seeking to streamline the process for removing aliens, Congress
enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act.95 But the 1961
85

338 U.S. 537 (1950).
Id. This uncomfortable phraseology comes from statute. See War Brides Act of 1945, Pub.
L. No. 79-271, 59 Stat. 659.
87
Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539.
88
Id. at 544 – 45.
89
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
90
Id. at 213.
91
Id. at 213 –15.
92
345 U.S. 229 (1953).
93
Id. at 235.
94
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001).
95
Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections
86
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amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act ensured that the
right of aliens to access habeas corpus was provided for by statute.96
This status quo remained for the better part of four decades.
First enacted by IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) originally provided
that:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act.97
That text was ambiguous as to whether it precluded jurisdiction over
constitutional as well as statutory claims. Courts of appeals were nearly
unanimous that the efforts in AEDPA and IIRIRA to strip courts of jurisdiction did not extend to habeas corpus.98 And in 2001 the Supreme
Court agreed: nothing in IIRIRA or AEDPA did anything to limit the
jurisdiction of district courts over aliens’ petitions for habeas corpus if
existing avenues, such as a petition for review, were foreclosed.99
Congress responded. Section 106 of the REAL ID Act of 2005100
aimed to eliminate habeas review of the government’s “‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”101 The modern, post-REAL ID Act text of § 1252(g) reads:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any
other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court

of 8 U.S.C.).
96
75 Stat. 651, 652 (1961), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(10) (repealed 1996).
97
Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3612.
98
See Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 1998); Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d
Cir. 1998); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999); Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 483 (4th Cir.
1999); Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1999); Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d 666
(6th Cir. 1999); Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d 719 (8th Cir. 1999); Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603
(9th Cir. 1999); Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 1999) (as amended upon
denial of rehearing en banc); Mayers v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999). The lone dissenting
circuit was the Seventh. LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998).
99
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001). Although St. Cyr did not address § 1252(g) directly,
it did address other subsections of § 1252 with identical language.
100
Pub. L. No. 109 – 13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005).
101
Real ID Act § 106 adds a new subsection, (a)(5) to 8 U.S.C. § 1252: “Notwithstanding any
other provision of law (statutory or non-statutory), including [habeas, mandamus, and All Writs
Act] . . . a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision
of this chapter.”
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shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf
of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under this chapter.102 (2005 additions italicized).
The legislative history of § 106 makes clear that Congress’s intent was
to provide the clear statement the Court said was lacking from the earlier language in St. Cyr.103 Courts construing § 106 recognized that the
continued ability of an immigrant to seek review of certain aspects of
an immigration judge’s decision — questions of law and constitutional
claims104 — in the Courts of Appeals ensured that an adequate substitute to habeas corpus remained.105
To take stock: habeas corpus in the United States has traditionally
been understood to protect against unlawful executive detentions,106 regardless of citizenship.107 Aliens frequently — and, for nearly a century,
exclusively — used habeas corpus to challenge their removal from the
United States.108 Frustrations with the delays such review brought led
Congress to consolidate review in administrative agencies and, in meritorious cases, the courts of appeals. Simultaneously, Congress dramatically expanded the number of otherwise lawfully present aliens subject

102

The meaning of “nonstatutory” is unclear. The Second Circuit concludes that “nonstatutory”
means “constitutional.” Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 66 (2d Cir. 2019). (“[W]e are aware of no
‘nonstatutory’ claim that a petitioner could bring in relation to a deportation proceeding other than
one rooted in the Constitution.”). The Ninth Circuit disagrees: in Arce v. United States, that court
concluded that § 1252(g) did not preclude jurisdiction over a habeas claim brought by an alien who
had been removed in violation of a judicial order staying his removal, suggesting that the inherent
power of a court exceeds statutory and nonstatutory grants. 899 F.3d 796, 799–801 (9th Cir. 2018).
103
151 CONG. REC. 8393 (2005); see also Strengthening Interior Enforcement: Deportation and
Related Issues: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Immigr., Border Sec. & Citizenship and
Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. Of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005); Paul
Diller, Habeas and (Non-) Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 615 (2010) (confirming that the REAL
ID Act had been passed in direct response to St. Cyr.); H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 175 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 300 (Conference Report on the REAL ID Act seeking to avoid
the constitutional concerns presented in St. Cyr regarding the complete suspension of habeas corpus for immigrants).
104
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
105
See, e.g., Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2008); Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2007); Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2006); Alexandre v. Attorney General, 452 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006).
106
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 386 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
107
Cases arising from the United States’ detention of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base reaffirmed the traditional understanding that, because a writ of habeas corpus was
directed against the jailer on the detainee’s behalf, an issuing court’s jurisdiction over the jailer —
not the detainee — is the paramount question in determining the jurisdictional power of a court to
issue the writ. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2006), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No.
109-148, div. A, title X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
108
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001) (“[S]ome judicial intervention in deportation cases
is unquestionably required by the Constitution.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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to removal on the basis of criminal convictions. But, facing resource limitations, the executive must decide against whom it should seek a removal order. Those constraints become even more acute when it comes
to effectuating such orders. Thus, those ultimately removed109 from the
United States are done so only after ICE takes two affirmative steps: 1)
the initiation of proceedings; and 2) the effectuation of removal. But the
decision gap between the branches taking those steps creates unfettered, unreviewable discretion.
C. Retaliation
“As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”110 Thus, “as a general matter
the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an
individual to retaliatory actions” for engaging in protected speech.111
This protection is not limited to the realm of criminal prosecutions but
extends to all manner of governmental benefits or punishments.112
1.

Modern doctrine

The earliest causes of action for unlawful arrest stemmed from the
common law tort equivalent of false imprisonment.113 “At common law,
false imprisonment arose from a ‘detention without legal process,’
whereas malicious prosecution was marked ‘by wrongful institution of
legal process.’”114 The presence of probable cause was generally a complete defense for peace officers to a claim of false imprisonment.115 Two
109

This analysis excludes the vast number of individuals removed pursuant to “expedited removal.” Expedited removal is available against certain categories of recently-arrived aliens who
are incapable of demonstrating long-term presence within the United States — generally those apprehended near the border.
110
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564,
573 (2002)).
111
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
592 (1998)).
112
Perry v. Spinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[The government] may not deny a benefit
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be
penalized and inhibited.”).
113
Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544, 549 – 50 (1861) (noting that “[w]ant of reasonable and probable cause” is an “element in the action for a malicious criminal prosecution”); see also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 653 (AM. LAW INST. 1938).
114
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 –
90 (2007)).
115
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, OR, THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 175 (Chicago, Callaghan 1880); 1 F. Hilliard, THE LAW OF TORTS OR
PRIVATE WRONGS 207 – 08 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1859).
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cases undergird modern First Amendment retaliation doctrine and define in what circumstances that general presumption might be overcome: Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle116
and Hartman v. Moore.117
Fred Doyle sued the Mt. Healthy, Ohio school board after his teaching contract was not renewed, he alleged, because of his comments on
school policy to a local radio program.118 The board countered, arguing
that Doyle would have been let go due to unrelated workplace problems
regardless of his radio appearance.119 The Supreme Court concluded
that even though Doyle had shown that his statements were one of the
factors which led to his termination, he had not shown that they were
the but-for cause of his termination.120 But, because of his initial showing that his conduct was protected First Amendment activity and that
the board considered that conduct during their decision making, the
Court remanded so that the district court could allow the Board to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that Doyle’s employment would
have been discontinued irrespective of his protected conduct.121
In Hartman, William Moore was indicted for various violations of
federal lobbying laws stemming from his advocacy against the implementation of ZIP+4 by the postal service.122 After his acquittal — in
which the district court remarked that there was a “complete lack of
direct evidence” against the defendants123 — Moore filed suit against
five postal inspectors and the charging Assistant United States Attorney alleging they had instigated and undertaken the prosecution in response to Moore’s criticisms of the Postal Service.124
Hartman posed a problem not present in Mt. Healthy’s civil context:
the arresting officer and the prosecutor are almost never the same person. Thus, the retaliatory animus of the officer may be irrelevant to the
prosecutor’s decision to charge a suspect. And because prosecutors enjoy
absolute immunity,125 the crux of a retaliatory prosecution claim is that
116

429 U.S. 274 (1977).
547 U.S. 250 (2006).
118
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281 – 83 (1977).
119
Brief for Respondent at *6, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (No. 75-1278).
120
Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
121
Id.
122
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252 (2006). Although irrelevant, the nature of the dispute
is fascinating: Moore’s company produced multiline optical scanners which would have been rendered obsolete to his largest customer, the Postal Service, had ZIP+4 become the norm; it obviously
has not. Ironically, Moore’s company did not receive a renewed contract for multiline readers.
123
United States v. Recognition Equip. Inc., 725 F. Supp. 587, 596 (D.D.C. 1989).
124
Hartman, 547 U.S. at 254.
125
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Absolute prosecutorial immunity is a longstanding feature of common law. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1872) (first recognizing absolute
prosecutorial immunity); accord Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608) (early
117
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the arrestor exerted improper influence over the prosecutor—that there
is a nexus between the two. In Hartman the court held that “[a] plaintiff
alleging a retaliatory prosecution must show the absence of probable
cause for the underlying criminal charge.”126 “If the plaintiff proves the
absence of probable cause, then the Mt. Healthy test governs: The plaintiff must show that the retaliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the prosecution, and, if that showing is made, the defendant
can prevail only by showing that the prosecution would have been initiated without respect to retaliation.”127 By requiring plaintiffs alleging
retaliatory prosecution to plead and prove that probable cause—the
nexus—did not exist, the Court protected the prosecutor’s prerogative
while preserving an avenue for relief.128
Having addressed the civil and prosecutorial contexts, it was inevitable that the Court would be asked to address what standard applied
when individuals alleged retaliatory arrest. The first two cases to present this question were met with artful dodges.
At a shopping mall in Beaver Creek, Colorado, Vice President Dick
Cheney was confronted by Steven Howards who was, simply put, not a
fan.129 Secret Service agents assigned to the Vice President’s detail
overheard Howards remark that he planned to ask the Vice President
“how many kids he’[d] killed” that day.130 While confronting the Vice
President, Howards allegedly placed his hand on the Vice President’s
shoulder.131 After a brief investigation, Agent Gus Reichle arrested
Howards132 — the state harassment and assault charges against him
were ultimately dismissed.133 Nevertheless, Howards sued Reichle and
his colleagues, alleging their decision to arrest him was in retaliation
for his statements about the Vice President.134
Although presented with an opportunity to establish a standard for
determining what a plaintiff must prove to show a retaliatory arrest,
the Court dodged in Reichle v. Howards.135 The Tenth Circuit below had
held that the agents were not entitled to qualified immunity for their
recognition of the immunity); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291 – 96 (N.Y. 1810) (tracing history
of the immunity).
126
Lozeman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1947 (2018) (citing Hartman, 547 U.S.
at 265 – 66).
127
Id.
128
After nearly a decade of further proceedings, Moore finally lost his case against the inspectors at trial. Moore v. Hartman, 102 F. Supp. 3d 35 (D.D.C. 2015).
129
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 660 (2012).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 661.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 662.
135
566 U.S. 658 (2012).
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conduct as it related to Howards’ First Amendment claim.136 In a unanimous opinion, the Court, perhaps tautologically, concluded that because it was not established that a retaliatory arrest unsupported by
probable cause amounted to a constitutional violation—the dodged
question—the agents were entitled to qualified immunity.137 And since
answering that question was enough to reverse, the Court chose that
path of least resistance.138
Five months after Steven Howards was arrested, Fane Lozman
was, too.139 But it would take until 2018 for the Court to be presented
with Lozman’s case and, with it, a second opportunity to resolve the
unanswered question from Reichle.
A longtime critic of his local government, Lozman was arrested at
a city council meeting when he refused to vacate the podium.140 This
arrest was only the latest in a series of actions taken by the city against
Lozman: He was fined for failing to muzzle his dachshund (who had no
history of misbehavior) and was sued by the city in admiralty in a dispute arising from his houseboat.141 In a now-familiar pattern, Lozman
sued.
Recognizing the long history of animosity between Lozman and his
local government, the Court concluded that Lozman’s arrest was no ordinary arrest.142 Unlike in Reichle where the arrest comprised the totality of the interaction between the citizen and the government, Lozman’s saga with the City spanned years.143 Moreover, transcripts from
prior city council meetings showed that council members sought to use
City resources to “intimidate” Lozman.144 Unlike in Reichle, then, Lozman’s beef was not with the officer who arrested him, but with the council who ordered him arrested pursuant to their policy of retaliation.145
“On facts like these, Mt. Healthy provides the correct standard for
136

Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1149 (10th Cir. 2011).
Reichle, 566 U.S. at 669 – 71.
138
Id. at 663 (“If the answer to either question is ‘no,’ then the agents are entitled to qualified
immunity. We elect to address only the second question.”).
139
Compare McLaughlin, 634 F.3d at 1135 (noting date of Howards’ arrest as June 16, 2006),
with Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (2018) (citing Def.’s Ex. 505, Doc. 687)
(noting date of Lozman’s arrest as November 2006).
140
Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1949– 50.
141
City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel, Approximately
Fifty-Seven Feet In Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that the dachshund in
question — Lady — was, by all accounts, a very good girl). That libel gave rise to Lozman’s first
victory in the Supreme Court. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115 (2013).
142
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1949 (2018).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 1954 (“Instead Lozman alleges more governmental action than simply an arrest. His
claim is that the City itself retaliated against him pursuant to an official municipal policy of intimidation”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
137
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assessing a retaliatory arrest claim.”146 The Court remanded the case to
apply Mt. Healthy and afford the City the opportunity to prove that Lozman’s conduct was not the but-for cause of his arrest, thus leaving the
question presented — whether a claim of retaliatory arrest is defeated
as a matter of law by the presence of probable cause for the arrest —
unanswered yet again.147
2.

The Nieves standard

Russell Bartlett’s enjoyment of Arctic Man—the subarctic bacchanal which descends upon Paxson, Alaska, each spring—was cut short
when he was arrested by Trooper Luis Nieves on April 13, 2014.148 The
two men had previously encountered one another earlier that day when
a well-lubricated Bartlett began shouting at neighboring partiers to not
talk to Nieves, who was asking them to place their keg inside their RV.
Nieves and Bartlett exchanged words, then parted.149 Their separation
was not long for this world.
Later that evening, a second trooper was questioning two individuals when Bartlett reappeared, carrying with him his message of noncompliance.150 After observing the second trooper push Bartlett away,
Nieves rushed over and arrested Bartlett.151 During the course of the
arrest, Nieves purportedly said to Bartlett, “bet you wish you had talked
to me now.”152 And while the charges against him were ultimately
dropped, Bartlett sued, alleging the arrest was retaliatory.153 After his
grant of summary judgment was reversed by the Ninth Circuit, Trooper
Nieves sought certiorari from the Supreme Court.154
In a 2019 opinion for himself and four others, Chief Justice Roberts
concluded that the existence of probable cause to arrest Bartlett defeated his claim as a matter of law. Drawing on Mt. Healthy and Hartman, the Court held that probable cause will defeat most claims but
that “objective evidence that [the plaintiff] was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of

146

Id. at 1955.
Id. at 1954 (“Whether in a retaliatory arrest case the Hartman approach should apply, thus
barring a suit where probable cause exists, or, on the other hand, the inquiry should be governed
only by Mt. Healthy is a determination that must await a different case.”).
148
Bartlett v. Nieves, No. 4:15-cv-00004-SLG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87805 at *1 – 2 (D. Alaska
July 17, 2016).
149
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1720 (2019).
150
Id.
151
Id. at 1720 – 21.
152
Id. at 1721 (citing Bartlett v. Nieves, 712 F. App’x 613, 616 (9th Cir. 2017)) (cleaned up).
153
Id.
154
Id.
147
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protected speech had not been” may allow such claims to go forward.155
Thus, a jaywalker who is arrested may be able to sustain his burden,
but the protestor in a crowd will not, particularly because “protected
speech is often a ‘wholly legitimate consideration’ for officers when deciding whether to make an arrest.’”156 But for that rare case where an
individual can provide objective evidence that he was arrested while
individuals similarly situated but for their silence were not, the Mt.
Healthy standard governs.157
3.

In immigration

Neither the First nor Fifth Amendment “acknowledge[] any distinction between citizens and resident aliens.”158 Nor does either recognize
the distinction between those lawfully and unlawfully present.159 But
the ability of aliens to enforce those rights is not identical to that of
their citizen peers.
The Court first addressed a claim of retaliatory removal in 1904.160
After delivering a speech in New York City calling for general labor
strikes, John Turner was arrested and detained on Ellis Island pending
deportation for being an anarchist. The Court held that no First Amendment violation had taken place because Turner would be free to speak
somewhere else following his deportation.161 During the Cold War the

155

Id. at 1727.
Id. at 1724 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That protected speech may be
a legitimate consideration in a context such as a riot does not render it legitimate in the immigration context. A rabblerousing demonstrator who fails to disperse may be deemed more likely to
escalate a situation because of her protected speech. But an immigration activist who is subjected
to removal proceedings explicitly because of her anti-ICE rhetoric poses no such risk of escalation
in a heated situation. And, unlike local law enforcement, ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations officers are not tasked with maintaining public order at a demonstration.
157
Id. at 1725 (citing Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1952 (2018)).
158
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 161 (Murphy, J., concurring)). But see also Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The
Precarious Status of Non-Citizen Speech Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2016).
159
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 – 94 (2001). The Department of Justice in 2015 filed a
brief in a class action against the Department of Homeland Security which argued that aliens
unlawfully present in the United States are not protected by the First Amendment. See Federal
Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction at 11 – 13, Pineda-Cruz v. Thompson, No. 15-cv-00326, 2015 WL
3922298 (W.D. Tex. May 7, 2015). The outcome of that case did not turn on whether aliens unlawfully present were, in fact, protected by the First Amendment. See Dkt. 54, Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal, Pineda-Cruz, 15-cv-00326 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2015). The government cites as authority
for that proposition a published district court opinion, but that case addressed whether a nonresident noncitizen could claim the protections of the First Amendment in a defamation action against
him. See Hoffman v. Bailey, 996 F. Supp. 2d 477 (E.D. La. 2014).
160
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (argued by Clarence Darrow
and future Justice James Clark McReynolds).
161
Id. at 292.
156
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Court sanctified the deportation of Communists162 and former Communists.163 And in Kleindienst v. Mandel164 the Court permitted exclusion of a Belgian socialist despite recognizing that it would prevent resident citizens from hearing his message.165
But the seminal case in the area of selective removal is Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC ).166 Eight members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — then a terrorist organization in the eyes of the federal government167 — faced deportation because, according to the FBI Director, of their First
Amendment activity.168 Rejecting their challenge, the Supreme Court
in 1999 held that “an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.”169 Selective prosecution claims in the criminal context “invade a special province of the Executive — its prosecutorial
discretion.”170 Those alleging selective prosecution must introduce clear
evidence to displace “the presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully.”171 Moreover, “[e]xamining the basis of a prosecution delays the
criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting
the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and
may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy.”172
Unlike in the context of criminal law enforcement where constitutional challenges merely “postpone the criminal’s receipt of his just deserts [sic],” selective-enforcement challenges in the deportation context
“permit and prolong a continuing violation of United States law.”173 The
mere unlawful presence of the alien in the United States for the duration of the challenge, in other words, is a sufficient justification for the
government to remove the alien.

162

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594– 96 (1952).
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531–32 (1954).
164
408 U.S. 753 (1972).
165
Id. at 760–70.
166
525 U.S. 471 (1999) [hereinafter AADC].
167
Id. at 473.
168
Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. on Intel. on the Nomination of William H. Webster,
to be Dir. of Cent. Intel., 100th Cong. 95 (1987) (“[A]ll of them were arrested because they are
alleged to be members of a world-wide Communist organization which under the McCarran Act
makes them eligible for deportation . . . . [I]n this particular case if these individuals had been
United States citizens, there would not have been a basis for their arrest.”).
169
AADC, 525 U.S. at 488.
170
Id. at 489.
171
Id. (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 – 64 (1996)).
172
Id. at 490 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985)).
173
Id.
163
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Moreover, as was particularly the case in AADC (and Knauff and
Mezei, too), inquiry into the motives of immigration officials may result
in “the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-intelligence products and techniques.”174 And although “the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as
a punishment,” “the contention that a violation must be allowed to continue because it has been improperly selected is not powerfully appealing.”175 The Court did not, however, foreclose lower courts from hearing
habeas corpus petitions in the “rare case in which the alleged basis of
discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be
overcome,” but it offered no guidance as to what “outrageous” might
be.176
III. RETALIATORY DISCRETION: THE CASE OF RAVIDATH RAGBIR
One scholar has catalogued at least a dozen instances in which a
high-profile immigration activist has been subject to removal proceedings,177 and there is reason to believe that count is underinclusive.178
One case in particular has teed up the question of whether an Article III
court can consider claims of retaliatory deportation through habeas corpus.
Admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in
1994, Ravidath Ragbir was convicted of federal wire fraud in 2001.179
Like many aliens convicted of federal crimes, his conviction rendered
him eligible for deportation180 from the United States because both of
his crime of conviction is an “aggravated felonies” under the Immigration and Nationality Act.181 After his conviction was affirmed,182 his

174

Id. at 491.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Jason A. Cade, Judicial Review of Disproportionate (or Retaliatory) Deportation, 75 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1427, 1443–45 (2018).
178
That survey measured until March 2018. See id. at 1445 n.95.
179
Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2019), vac’d sub nom. Pham v. Ragbir, No. 191046, 2020 WL 5882107 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020). All facts here are portrayed in the light most favorable
to Ragbir partially for demonstrative purposes, but also because that is the light in which reviewing courts have viewed them. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
180
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (authorizing removal of those aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies, defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) to include frauds involving a loss of greater than
$10,000); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p) (cancelling lawful permanent resident status for those
against whom a final order of removal has been entered).
181
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (defining “aggravated felonies”). It is worth noting that the list
of “aggravated felonies” has grown substantially over time. This growth is particularly concerning
because it renders more aliens potentially deportable, but as described supra Part III.B.2, the
government enjoys discretion as to against whom it will pursue immigration proceedings.
182
United States v. Ragbir, 38 F. App’x 788, 794 (3d Cir. 2002).
175
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petition for certiorari denied,183 and his 30-month sentence completed,
the government sought and obtained an order of final removal against
Ragbir.184 Challenges to that order were fruitless.185
Like many undocumented aliens, Ragbir was not removed. For
nearly a decade Ragbir benefited from this discretion: On four occasions
between 2011 and 2018, ICE granted Ragbir administrative stays of removal. During the period of these stays, Ragbir was required to check
in with immigration officials and refrain from illegal conduct.186 While
enjoying ICE’s grace, Ragbir became an outspoken critic of American
immigration policy.187 This criticism drew significant media coverage.188
In January 2018 Ragbir’s lawyers began meeting with the Deputy
Director of ICE’s New York office — Scott Mechkowski — to discuss renewing Ragbir’s stay of removal. During one meeting, Mechkowski told
Ragbir’s counsel that he had met with Jean Montrevil — with whom
Ragbir had co-founded an immigration-rights group — and told him,
“Jean, from me to you . . . you don’t want to make matters worse by saying things.”189 Montrevil was deported by ICE a short time later.190 During that same conversation with Ragbir’s counsel, Mechkowski remarked that “there isn’t anybody in this entire building that
doesn’t . . . know about [Ragbir].”191 At a follow-up meeting four days
later, Mechkowski stated that he felt “resentment” about a protest Ragbir had led against ICE in 2017.192 Three days later, Mechkowski informed Ragbir at a face-to-face meeting that his application for a renewal of his stay was denied and that his stay was being terminated
prematurely.193 Ragbir was arrested and flown to Florida for deportation that afternoon.194 Meanwhile Ragbir’s counsel filed a habeas petition in the Southern District of New York which was ultimately granted

183

Ragbir v. United States, 537 U.S. 1089 (2002).
Ragbir, 923 F.3d at 58.
185
Ragbir v. Holder, 389 F. App’x 80, 85 (2d Cir. 2010); Ragbir v. Lynch, 640 F. App’x 105, 108
(2d Cir. 2016); Ragbir v. Barr, No. 18-1595, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 37203, at *3 (2d Cir. July 30,
2019); Ragbir v. United States, No. 17-1256, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13236, at *85–86 (D.N.J. Jan.
25, 2019), appeal pending, No. 19-1282 (3d Cir. 2019) (stay of judgment pending appeal denied
Feb. 27, 2019).
186
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d), immigration officials “may require reasonable assurances”
that an alien whose removal has been stayed will make any required appearances and will “depart
the United States when required to do so.”
187
Ragbir, 923 F.3d at 59.
188
See id. at 59 n.8; see also, Cade, supra note 177, at 1444 n.91.
189
Ragbir, 923 F.3d at 60 (citation omitted).
190
Id.
191
Id. (citation omitted).
192
Id. (citation omitted).
193
Id.
194
Id.
184
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on the basis that Ragbir’s immediate detention and removal violated
his due process rights to an orderly departure.195 Ragbir then filed a
lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a litany of ICE
officials, alleging that the decision to remove him was in retaliation for
his First Amendment conduct.196
The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Ragbir’s
claims as a result of § 1252(g).197 Because the response to Ragbir’s conduct did not fall within the “outrageous” discrimination exception to the
general rule set forth in AADC, he was not entitled to challenge his removal.198 It thus avoided the Suspension Clause question and dismissed
the case.
Not so, said the Second Circuit.199 The Second Circuit concluded
that (a) § 1252(g) precludes judicial review of the decision to terminate
or deny a stay and (b) that constitutional claims are “nonstatutory” under that subsection.200 The court thus proceeded to determine whether
AADC foreclosed Ragbir’s claim of retaliatory removal.201 It did not: Because Ragbir was previously a lawful resident, his removal was “indeed
a punishment”202 seemingly meted out in response to “speech on a matter of ‘public concern.’”203 Not only was Ragbir’s speech on a matter of
public concern, thus “occup[ying] the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values,”204 but it was speech concerning “political
change” lying at the “core” of political speech.205 Repression of such activity “‘trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith.’”206
The court then weighed these interests against the government’s
“interest in having unchallenged discretion to deport Ragbir.”207 It
wasn’t close. Unlike in AADC, where the aliens were members of a terrorist group, Ragbir alleged “the Government undertook the deportation to silence criticism of the responsible agency.”208 Moreover, Ragbir’s

195
196
197

Ragbir v. Sessions, 18-cv-236, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13939, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018).
Ragbir, 923 F.3d at 60–61.
Ragbir v. Homan, No. 18-cv-1159, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86753, at *9 – 18 (S.D.N.Y May 23,

2018).
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Id. at *25 – 26.
Ragbir, 923 F.3d 53.
Id. at. 64– 65.
Id. at 62 – 67.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 69 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 – 52 (2011)).
Id. (quoting Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451 – 52).
Id. (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 – 22 (1988)).
Id. at 70 (quoting Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425)).
Id. at 72.
Id.
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presence in the United States was not “an ongoing violation of United
States law.”209 A lawful permanent resident rendered deportable by a
criminal conviction has no legal obligation to deport himself, and his
continued presence in the country is not a violation of any law, unlike
immigrants who enter the country without authorization or inspection.210 Only after an order of final removal is entered does an alien lose
lawful permanent resident status.211 And even though ICE had indeed
received an order of final removal against Ragbir, it affirmatively authorized his presence in the country for nearly a decade.212
After the Second Circuit deemed the government’s conduct “outrageous” within the meaning of AADC, the Suspension Clause question
that the district court had dodged became unavoidable. Ragbir had exhausted both direct review of his order of removal and his statutorily
authorized single motion to reopen those proceedings long before the
alleged retaliation took place,213 thus leaving him no “adequate substitute” to habeas corpus.214 Thus, because Congress has not suspended
the writ, the Second Circuit concluded that the application of § 1252(g)
to his case violated the Constitution.215
Although the Second Circuit remanded to the district court to determine what relief might be appropriate if Ragbir succeeded in demonstrating that retaliatory animus motivated ICE’s decision, it did suggest that a delay in his removal equivalent to the most recent stay
granted by ICE would balance both the government’s interest in removing “aliens convicted of ‘aggravated felonies’” and Ragbir’s First Amendment interests.216

209

Id. (quoting AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)). Recall: In AADC, none of the aliens had established lawful permanent residence in the United States; all had temporary visas the terms of
which they had violated, rendering them deportable. 525 U.S. at 473.
210
See Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation, and the First Amendment after
Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 342 (2000).
211
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
212
Ragbir, 923 F.3d at 58 – 59.
213
Id. at 58 – 59, 62, 62 n.10 (“[T]he Government does not dispute, that [Ragbir] could not have
brought his claim in a BIA proceeding or in a petition for review. That is because Ragbir’s claim
arose only after his petition process was exhausted and his order of removal became final.”). Cf. 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (specifying that aliens are entitled to one motion to reopen their immigration
proceedings and that any such motion must be filed within ninety days of the entry of the final
order of removal).
214
Ragbir, 923 F.3d at 73– 74.
215
Id. at 78 – 99.
216
Id. at 79 n.34 (citing Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Kevin MacAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Feb. 20, 2017) (on file with
author)). It is notable that prior Administrations had even more emphatically stated that aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies were the highest enforcement priority for DHS. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski,
Acting Dir. of Immigr. & Customs Enf’t (Nov. 20, 2014) (on file with author) (classifying as “Priority
1,” the “highest priority to which enforcement resources should be directed,” “aliens convicted of
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The government sought rehearing, which was denied.217 The Supreme Court granted, vacated, and remanded the government’s petition
for a writ of certiorari in light of its prior opinion in Department of
Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam.218
Thuraissigiam presented the question of whether an alien seeking
asylum but subject to so-called “expedited removal”219 could seek review
of his asylum claim through habeas corpus.220 The Court said “no”.221
But it went further. Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court raises doubts
as to whether aliens in removal proceedings are within the protection
of the Suspension Clause. Because aliens seek not discharge from custody but the right to remain in the United States, Justice Alito argued,
they do not seek the “simple” remedy that habeas protected at the
Founding.222 Instead, they seek a new legal right — to remain in the
United States. Moreover, Justice Alito argued that many of the cases
discussed previously223 from the “finality era” of the late 19th to mid20th centuries are irrelevant to the Suspension Clause analysis because
those courts drew their authority from the then-applicable laws granting habeas jurisdiction in immigration matters.224 Of course, the value
of the finality era cases comes not from their reliance on the Suspension
Clause, but in their discussion of the scope of habeas corpus.
In any event, Justice Alito’s opinion in Thuraissigiam reaffirmed
that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus as it existed at common law provided
a vehicle to challenge all manner of detention by government officials,
and the Court had held long before that the writ could be invoked by
aliens already in the country who were held in custody pending deportation.”225 Thus, there should be no reason for the Second Circuit to
reach a different result on remand.226

an ‘aggravated felony’” as defined by the INA).
217
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and/or Rehearing En Banc, Ragbir v. Homan, 923
F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1597).
218
140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
219
Thuraissigiam was apprehended just twenty-five yards from the United States’ border with
Mexico, thus rendering him eligible for the trimmed-down removal proceeding known as “expedited removal.” 140 S. Ct. at 1964– 65; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(I – II) (outlining eligibility for expedited removal).
220
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1963.
221
Id. at 1969.
222
Id. at 1971.
223
See supra at Part II.
224
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1975 – 81.
225
Id. at 1981.
226
The Thuraissigiam Court’s discussion of due process is likewise inapposite to Ragbir’s case;
Ragbir was a lawful permanent resident, not unlawful entrant.
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IV. THE CASE FOR HABEAS JURISDICTION
Ragbir’s case presents circumstances markedly different from
those in Thuraissigiam.227 And if the Second Circuit recognizes as much
and reaffirms its original holding, it is quite likely that Ragbir’s case
will present one of the first opportunities for the Court to give meaning
to AADC ’s reservation of “outrageous” conduct.228 If the Court finds that
ICE’s conduct towards Ragbir was “outrageous” as (un)defined by
AADC, it will be forced to address whether § 1252(g) applied to the stayof-removal context violates the Suspension Clause. It should answer
both in the affirmative.
A. Aliens and the First Amendment
1.

AADC is distinguishable

Any theory under which Ragbir can receive habeas review of his
detention presupposes a world in which deportable aliens can prevail
on a claim of selective enforcement. AADC may have foreclosed that
possibility. But Justice Scalia’s reservation of “outrageous conduct” offers hope, as does the recognition that much of the Court’s doctrine relating to governmental retaliation was established after AADC was decided.229 So, too, does the unique context of the aliens in AADC.
Under modern statutes, the aliens in AADC might have been prosecuted for providing material support to a terrorist organization. The
foreign policy rationale which supports much of the Plenary Power doctrine upon which immigration law is based — and which was explicitly
relied upon in AADC as a reason to deny those aliens relief — is inapposite in the context of speech about immigration as a domestic policy
matter. “[S]peech critical of the exercise of the State’s power lies at the
very center of the First Amendment.”230 Although one could describe
discourse on immigration as a meta-foreign policy issue, that is almost
certainly a bridge too far. And “when retaliation against protected

227

Unlike in Thuraissigiam, Ragbir does seek “simple release”: his objective is to remain in
the United States as he did pursuant to the stay of removal issued by DHS. That the “law” that
resulted in his detention is regulatory in nature is of no matter. But for DHS’s decision to terminate
his stay, Ragbir would be free within the United States. Cf. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1974
(“The relief that a habeas court may order and the collateral consequences of that relief are two
entirely different things. Ordering an individual’s release from custody may have the side effect of
enabling that person to pursue all sorts of opportunities that the law allows.”)
228
It is quite likely that, unless the government elects not to seek certiorari, the Court would
once again take up Ragbir’s case, particularly given recent changes to the Court’s membership:
“Holding that an Act of Congress unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas corpus is momentous.” Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1978.
229
Hartman, Reichle, Lozman, and Nieves all post-date AADC.
230
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1034 (1991).
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speech is elevated to the level of official policy, there is a compelling
need for adequate avenues of redress.”231 Ragbir is not the only individual who has been subjected to allegedly retaliatory enforcement by ICE
in recent years:232 In 2018, a Commentator cataloged a dozen such
cases233 in recent years; there is no reason to believe the number has
decreased.
One might argue that Ragbir’s advocacy of relaxed immigration
policy in the United States can continue from his native Trinidad and
Tobago, much as the Court suggested in Turner, where the anarchist
would be deported the Australia to continue his speech. But that, too,
ignores not only the nature of the First Amendment but the nature of
rights in general. In another context the Court has reinforced the principle that the availability of alternative venues is not an adequate substitute for direct protection of a right.234 Moreover, First Amendment
jurisprudence has shifted hard against curtailing speech since AADC.235
This presupposes that Ragbir has First Amendment rights at all.236
The Court has never directly addressed whether unlawfully present aliens are protected by the First Amendment, but the alternative would
represent an outcome surprising to many. It strains credulity to believe
that ICE could deport all unlawfully present aliens who are Catholic
but not those who are Protestant. It is similarly implausible that ICE
could allow Catholics, but not Protestants, to worship in immigration
231

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1954 (2018).
Indeed, Ragbir’s prayer for relief and the body of his complaint both suggest that a court
could provide relief in his case to individuals other than Ragbir. See Complaint at 40 – 41, Ragbir
v. Homan, 18-cv-1159, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102443 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2018).
233
Cade, supra note 177, at 1443 nn.86 –88, 1444 nn.89–92, 1445 nn.93 – 95.
234
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 37 – 38, Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136
S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
235
See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443
(2011); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 567
U.S. 298 (2012); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464
(2014); Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
236
Before the Second Circuit, the government did not argue that Ragbir lacked First Amendment rights as a result of his deportability. Compare Brief for U.S., Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53
(2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1597), with Ragbir v. Homan, No. 18-cv-1159, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86753
(S.D.N.Y May 23, 2018) (“Political speech is worthy of the highest protection and so long as Ragbir
remains in the United States, the First Amendment guarantees his freedom to speak and associate
on any subject of his choosing.”), thus the argument is forfeited, if not waived. See Ret. Plans
Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592, 595 (2020) (“The Second Circuit ‘did not address the[se]
argument[s], and, for that reason, neither shall we.’”) (quoting F. Hoffmann – La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U. S. 155, 175, (2004)); Jander, 140 S. Ct. at 597 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[I]t
is beyond debate that ‘[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention
of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute
precedents.’”) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925)); see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 306 (2010) (declining to consider argument not presented
in the court of appeals); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Availl Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168 – 69 (2004)
(same). Cf. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosing Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 913 (2014) (“[W]e are a court
of review, not of first view.”) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)).
232
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detention. Nor is it plausible to imagine a world in which ICE could
condition a stay of removal on an alien’s agreement to not engage in
political speech — which the Court has repeatedly identified as the core
of the First Amendment.237 And if ICE did enact such a policy, courts
would have jurisdiction to hear such challenge, jurisdictional considerations notwithstanding.238
2.

Nieves is irrelevant

Ragbir was decided before the Court’s decision in Nieves, a fact the
government took pains to emphasize in its petition for rehearing before
the Court of Appeals. That reliance may be misplaced. For decades the
government has repeatedly emphasized — not incorrectly — that immigration proceedings are not criminal and that deportation is not a punishment.239 And the Court has repeatedly agreed: “While the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as
a punishment.”240 But the Court has drawn sharp lines between claims
of retaliatory civil action (such as employment) and retaliatory criminal
action (such as arrest or prosecution).241 Nieves dealt with the question
of arrest by law enforcement on criminal charges. Given immigration
removal is not criminal, Nieves’s broadside against retaliatory criminal
arrest claims is inapposite.
While it does not bolster Ragbir’s claim, Nieves does not undermine
Mt. Healthy, particularly in light of Lozeman. Recall, Lozeman distinguished between the heat-of-the-moment arrests like those in Nieves
and Reichle and a pattern or practice of governmental discrimination.
The decision to remove an individual from the United States is not “a
dangerous task that requires making quick decisions in ‘circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.’”242 Instead, removal decisions are made by ICE officials and presented before a neutral magistrate. Even in those cases that are not reviewed by an Immigration
Judge or a court due to delegated discretion (like Ragbir’s), ample time
237

See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463 – 64 (2018); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 328, 339 – 41
(2010); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (striking down on First
Amendment grounds a law which criminalized access to certain major social media websites by
sex offenders).
238
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840 (2018) (eschewing “uncritical literalism”
when construing phrases like “arising from” to, in that case, allow for consideration of a habeas
petition challenging indefinite detention without bail hearings) (citation omitted).
239
See, e.g., AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
240
Id. (citing Carlson v. Landon, 324 U.S. 524, 537 (1952)); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (“[R]emoval proceedings are civil . . . .”) (citation omitted); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action . . . .”).
241
See Part II.C.1 above.
242
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1725 (2019) (describing the nature of making arrests)
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 397 (1989)).
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exists for ICE to consider an alien’s suitability for a stay. In Ragbir’s
case, his counsel was in discussions with ICE officials for months before
the meeting at which Ragbir was detained.243
Moreover, the decision to arrest an individual and the decision to
pursue the charges of arrest are often made by different individuals
within different organizations in the arrest context. In Russell Bartlett’s case, for example, his arrest may have been inspired by impermissible animus, but the decision of the local district attorney—who may
be accountable to a different polity than the arresting officer—to pursue
otherwise-valid charges against him is entitled to a presumption of regularity and impartiality.244 Attributing the animus held by Trooper
Nieves to prosecuting attorneys would require prosecuting attorneys to
conduct substantial investigations into an officer’s subjective motivations before pursuing charges. It is unclear whether prosecutors can
make such evaluations in an unbiased way. Nor is it clear who would
review any such determinations.
But ICE acts alone and unsupervised in the realm of stays of removal. Much like the school board in Mt. Healthy and the city council
in Lozman, the decision to remove prominent ICE critics is clouded in a
fog of uncertainty. As Gerald Neuman and others have noted, “Prosecutorial and adjudicative functions may be mixed, creating psychosocial
and economic disincentives to the impartial resolution of cases once
they have been brought.”245 Is ICE choosing to remove Ragbir because
his number is up, or because he is a “persistent gadfly”246 much like
Fane Lozman? One frequently intoned virtue of the administrative
state is its responsiveness to political pressures from the President. But
in a system constrained by statute and regulation, the exercise of discretion in individual cases cuts both ways. Supporters of the Obama
Administration’s deferred action initiatives cited AADC as a basis for
discretionary nonenforcement regimes.247 In any event, the officer-prosecutor division in the immigration context is far less clear than in the
criminal context. All immigration authority is centralized in the unitary
executive.
243

Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting that Ragbir’s application for renewal of his stay was filed in November 2017 and still under consideration, according to ICE, on
January 10, 2018).
244
See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“‘[T]he presumption of
regularity supports’ their prosecutorial decisions and, ‘in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.’”) (quoting United
States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15, (1926)).
245
Neuman, supra note 31, at 1023.
246
Adam Liptak, A Persistent Gadfly Wins Again in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 18,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/a-persistent-gadfly-wins-again-in-the-supr
eme-court.html [https://perma.cc/5RF7-ZWKV].
247
Cf. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 – 98 (2012).
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B. The Habeas Question
The problem in precluding habeas relief for retaliatory conduct is
that, as in the case of Ragbir, alternative routes are often foreclosed. A
final order of removal was entered against Ragbir in 2007. From that
time until his arrest by ICE 2018, his continued presence in the United
States was pursuant to stays of removal.248 Once an order of removal is
entered against an immigrant and all appeals before the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Court of Appeals are exhausted, no judicial
review stands between an alien and deportation.249 Thus, if the alleged
retaliatory conduct takes the form of a denial or termination of a stay
of removal, no neutral magistrate will ever be interposed between authorities and arbitrary enforcement. This is so despite the Court’s recent recognition that habeas review remains available for immigrants
perpetually detained pending removal.250
In its petition for rehearing before the Second Circuit, the government went to great lengths to emphasize that the order of removal entered against Ragbir had twice been sanctified by other Article III
courts.251 But that assertion, like the Sixth Circuit’s in Hamama v. Adducci,252 misses the crucial distinction between review of the entry of
the order and the order’s ultimate execution. In Hamama, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that an alien’s ability to move to reopen their proceedings affords aliens an “adequate and effective”253 forum to challenge
their ultimate removal.254 But this view elides the fact that federal law
provides aliens just one motion to reopen their removal proceedings,
while the Executive can grant limitless stays of removal. That mismatch yields ample opportunity for abuse: Simply because Ragbir was
able to challenge the grounds for the order’s entry does not mean he has
the ability to challenge any of the myriad legal or factual developments
which may have arisen during the eleven years between the order’s entry and its execution.
To be sure, the decision to stay Ragbir’s removal is one committed
to DHS’s discretion.255 But that discretion should not allow immigration

248

From 2007 – 2011 Ragbir’s removal was stayed as he pursued appeals.
Congress was well aware of this phenomenon as well as the breadth of discretion afforded
immigration authorities in selecting whom to deport. See AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 483 – 84 (1999).
250
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
251
Petition for Rehearing at 9 – 11, Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53 (2d. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1597).
252
Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, No. 19-294, 2020 WL
3578681 (U.S. July 2, 2020).
253
Id. at 876.
254
Id. at 875.
255
8 U.S.C. § 1231(c)(2)(A) authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate regulations regarding the granting of discretionary relief; he has done so. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.6.
249
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officials to convert an order of final removal into a Sword of Damocles
hanging above the heads of immigrants like Ragbir. Besides, the government’s actions speak louder than its words: for eleven years ICE
deemed Ragbir insufficiently dangerous to prioritize. Claims that Ragbir is a criminal the government has prioritized for deportation reveal
the breadth of the discretion ICE is afforded in seeking and effectuating
removals under current law.
It is not clear what good habeas review will do, though. No one
challenges that Ragbir is removable based on his conviction. Numerous
administrations have prioritized deportation of those convicted of aggravated felonies.256 One of the crucial legitimating features of a standards-based system is a guarantee of reviewability. And although the
immigration system is superficially governed by rules, the two-step discretion afforded to immigration authorities injects nearly limitless discretion in the realm of deportable lawful permanent residents.
As the Court of Appeals suggested in Ragbir, perhaps a remedy is
that Ragbir is permitted to remain in the country for the duration of his
most recent stay — something of an expectation damages theory of habeas relief. Or perhaps the value is in naming-and-shaming government officials, thus potentially opening them to liability in a civil damages suit brought by the alien regardless of his location. Maybe
damages, but not a stay, is the correct remedy.257 Answers are not ventured here. Regardless of the relief Ragbir is ultimately afforded or denied, that he be given his day in court is essential to vindicating the
fundamental promise of habeas corpus: to protect against the “dangerous engine of arbitrary government.”258
V.

CONCLUSION

Since John at Runnymede, the principle that no person should be
imprisoned but in accordance with the law has suffused the common
law.259 And as Lord Coke wrote in his Institutes, “if a man be taken or
committed to prison contra legem terrae, against the Law of the land,”
“[h]e may have an habeas corpus.”260 We are far from the scenario envisioned by Madison 220 years ago in which “[i]f aliens had no rights

256

See supra note 216.
Recent scholarship examines the availability of other civil actions in situations like Ragbir’s. See Matthew Miyamoto, Comment, Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) Precludes the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction over Claims Brought by Wrongfully Removed Noncitizens, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655
(2019).
258
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136.
259
See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 1112– 21 (3d ed. 1944).
260
SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (6th
ed. 1681).
257
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under the Constitution, they might not only be banished, but capitally
punished, without a jury or the other incidents to a fair trial.”261 But
current immigration law layers unreviewability upon discretion. As
Professor Hart counseled a half century ago, “a power to lay down general rules, even if it is plenary, does not necessarily include a power to
be arbitrary.”262 The dual-discretion enjoyed by the Executive — choosing whom to make removable, and choosing from those whom to remove — invites arbitrariness. And as Justice Holmes observed, “the decision of the Department is final, but that is on the presupposition that
the decision was after a hearing in good faith.”263
The presumption of judicial review in America is strong for good
reason. “The ‘check’ the Judiciary provides to maintain our separation
of powers is enforcement of the rule of law through judicial review.”264
Thus for the narrow class of aliens like Ragbir — those (a) who were
lawfully present in the United States then (b) rendered removable due
to a criminal conviction or similar immigration infraction but (c) still
present pursuant to stays of removal and (d) who have exhausted their
sole motion to reopen — the Suspension Clause guarantees that their
claims of “outrageous” retaliatory removal — “contra legem terrae” — be
heard in court. As this piece and others have argued, the Suspension
Clause has always functioned as a backstop: if judicial review is otherwise unavailable, the traditional remedy of habeas corpus cannot be
suspended absent a clear Congressional statement.265
Those concerned with the strain on judicial resources that may result from recognizing the conclusion urged above can take solace in a
simple legislative fix. Just as Congress in the mid-twentieth century
shifted immigration oversight from habeas corpus to petitions for review, a modern Congress could cure any Suspension Clause concerns by
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JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799 – 1800 TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS 233 (1850).
262
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1390 (1953).
263
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908).
264
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 76 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(cleaned up).
265
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Comment, Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1084 (1998).
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reforming the current system of motions to reopen immigration proceedings. Such a move would resupply the requisite “adequate alternative” to avoid running afoul of the Suspension Clause while preserving
efficiency and discretion in immigration enforcement.

